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Title: The Necessary and Proper Clause

Original CoS Document (slug): [[https://conventionofstates.com/files/the-necessary-and-proper-clause|the-necessary-and-proper-clause]]

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Attached File: Article20_TheNecessaryAndProperClause_COSA122022.pdf

The Necessary and Proper Clause Does NOT Empower Congress to Control an Amendments Convention\rBy Robert Natelso\\


Created: 2024-02-08 15:22:44

Updated: 2025-02-08 19:00:01

Published: 2024-02-08 03:00:00

Converted: 2025-04-14T20:16:34.110119856


----


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**The Framers inserted the “Convention \\
for proposing Amendments” in the \\
Constitution to provide the states \\
with a way of obtaining constitutional \\
amendments without federal interference. **

**THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE **

**DOES NOT EMPOWER CONGRESS TO **

**CONTROL AN AMENDMENTS CONVENTION **

**Robert Natelson, Independence Institute’s Senior Fellow in Constitutional Jurisprudence and Head of the Institute’s  \\
Article V Information Center \\
Updated November 2022**

I heard a presentation by a spokesman for \\
a group that claims to defend the Consti-\\
tution and revere the Founders. Yet the \\
spokesman trashed the Constitution’s \\
Framers for allegedly exceeding their au-\\
thority and claimed they added a provision \\
that largely rendered another provision \\
useless. In other words, the spokesman \\
charged the Framers with being both (1) \\
dishonorable and (2) incompetent.

The Framers inserted the //“Convention \\
for proposing Amendments” //in the Consti-\\
tution to provide the states with a way \\
of obtaining constitutional amendments \\
without federal interference. Tench Coxe, \\
a leading advocate for the Constitution \\
during the ratification debates, pointed \\
out that the convention device allows the \\
states to obtain whatever amendments \\
they choose, “although the President, \\
Senate and Federal House of Representa-\\
tives should be unanimously opposed to \\
each and all of them.”

The spokesman, however, asserted that the \\
Constitution allowed Congress, through the \\
Necessary and Proper Clause, to dictate, \\
either in the convention call or by previous \\
legislation, how an amendments convention \\
is structured and how commissioners (dele-\\
gates) are selected and apportioned.

The claim that Congress can use the Nec-\\
essary and Proper Clause to structure \\
the convention was first advanced in the \\
1960s, and has been repeated numerous \\
times since then. A Congressional Re-\\
search Service report published earlier this \\
year noted that some in Congress have \\
taken the same line, although the report \\
did not actually endorse it.

But pause to consider: Why would the \\
Framers place in the Constitution a meth-\\
od by which Congress could largely control \\
a convention created to bypass Congress? \\
Were the Framers that stupid?

Of course not. Most of them were high-\\
ly experienced and extremely deft legal \\
drafters.

Behind the belief that the Necessary and \\
Proper Clause empowers Congress to \\
structure the convention are three dis-\\
tinct assumptions—all erroneous. They 

 

are (1) that the scope of Congress’s author-\\
ity under the Necessary and Proper Clause \\
is broader than it is, (2) that the Clause cov-\\
ers the amendment process, and (3) that \\
ordinary legislation may govern the amend-\\
ment process.

The Necessary and Proper Clause is the \\
last item in the Article I, Section 8 list of \\
congressional powers. It reads:

//“The Congress shall have Power...To make all \\
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for \\
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, \\
and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-\\
tion in the Government of the United States, \\
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”//

It happens that the most extensive \\
treatment of the Necessary and Proper \\
Clause is an academic book I co-\\
authored with Professors Gary Lawson, \\
Guy Seidman, and Geoff Miller: //The \\
Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause \\
//(Cambridge University Press, 2010) (cited \\
by Justice Thomas in a Supreme Court \\
case in 2014 and apparently relied on by \\
Chief Justice Roberts in 2012). This book \\
reveals the Necessary and Proper Clause to \\
be a masterpiece of legal draftsmanship. 

//Continued on back page//



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The Clause was based on usage common \\
in 18th-century legal documents. It is not \\
a grant of authority, but a rule of interpre-\\
tation. It tells us to construe certain enu-\\
merated powers as the ratifiers understood \\
them, rather than in an overly narrow way. \\
In legal terms, the Necessary and Proper \\
Clause informs us that those enumerated \\
powers include “incidental” authority.

Even if the Clause did apply to the amend-\\
ment process, the authority “incidental” \\
to Congress’s call would be quite narrow. \\
An entity that calls an interstate conven-\\
tion always has been limited to specifying \\
the time, place, and subject matter. It is the \\
state legislatures that control selection of \\
their own commissioners. \\
 \\
But, in fact, the Necessary and Proper \\
Clause does not extend to the amendment \\
process. To explain:\\
  \\
The Constitution includes numerous \\
grants of power. These grants are made to \\
Congress, to the President, to the courts, \\
to the Electoral College, and to state legis-\\
latures, state governors, and various con-\\
ventions. An entity exercising a power un-\\
der one of those grants is said to exercise a \\
“federal function.”

The Necessary and Proper Clause is \\
crafted to apply to most federal functions, \\
but it also excludes a number of them. \\
Specifically, it covers only the grants \\
listed in Article I, Section 8, and those 

vested in the “Government of the United \\
States” and in “Departments” and \\
“Officers” of that government.

In other words, the Clause omits con-\\
stitutional grants made to entities that \\
are not part of the “Government of the \\
United States,” even when those entities \\
exercise “federal functions.” See, for ex-\\
ample, //Ray v. Blair//, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) \\
(holding that presidential electors, who \\
ultimately derive their power from the \\
Constitution, exercise a federal function \\
but are not federal officers or agents). The \\
convention for proposing amendments is \\
one of a handful of entities that falls into \\
this category.\\
 \\
Even if we did assume, for sake of argu-\\
ment, that Congress is a “Department” of \\
the federal government for //other //purposes, \\
the rules for Article V are different.

The difference is that (according to the \\
courts) when Congress and state legisla-\\
tures act in the amendment process, they \\
do not act as the legislative branches of their \\
respective governments. Instead, they act \\
as //ad hoc //assemblies for registering the pop-\\
ular will. They can exercise only the power \\
granted by Article V, and not powers grant-\\
ed by other parts of the U.S. Constitution \\
or by state constitutions. Thus, in //Idaho v. \\
Freeman //(1981), a federal court ruled that:

//“Congress, outside the authority granted by \\
Article V, has no power to act with regard to \\
an amendment, i.e., it does not retain any of \\
its traditional authority vested in it by Ar-//

//ticle I” [which includes the Necessary and \\
Proper Clause].// 

(This case was later vacated as moot, but \\
there were no problems with the merits \\
of the ruling.) Or, as the Supreme Court \\
of Missouri pointed out when addressing \\
the state legislature’s Article V functions, \\
//“[The legislature] was not, strictly speaking, \\
performing the functions of a legislative body \\
for the state, but was acting as a representa-\\
tive of the people, pursuant to authority del-\\
egated to it by the federal Constitution. . . ” \\
State ex rel. Tate v. Sevier (//1933//).//  \\
 \\
(The U.S. Supreme Court denied cer-\\
tiorari in that case, meaning it refused to \\
consider reversing this decision.)\\
Again, when legislatures act under Article \\
V they do so as separate assemblies, not \\
as the legislative branches of their govern-\\
ments. This is a very old principle, dating \\
back to 1798, when the Supreme Court \\
held that congressional amendment pro-\\
posals do not need presidential signature. \\
See also //United States v. Sprague //(1931).  \\
 \\
Well, if Congress cannot insert language \\
in the “call” structuring the convention, \\
can it pass laws for the same purpose? \\
Again, the answer is “no.” A long list of \\
20th century cases from courts at all lev-\\
els holds that the amendment process is \\
governed by the express and implied pro-\\
visions of Article V, not by other sources \\
of law, such as statutes, state constitu-\\
tions, or ordinary legislative rules. See, \\
for example, //Leser v. Garnett //(1922) and \\
//Dyer v. Blair //(1975).

**(540)441-7227 | CONVENTIONOFSTATES.COM | Facebook.com/ConventionOfStates | Twitter.com/COSproject **

**Why would the Framers place in the **

**Constitution a method by which Congress **

**could largely control a convention **

**created to bypass Congress? Were the **

**Framers that stupid? Of course not. **