Title: The Final Constitutional Option Original CoS Document (slug): [[https://conventionofstates.com/files/the-final-constitutional-option|the-final-constitutional-option]] Login Required to view? No Attached File: Article10-ThefinalOption_COSA102022.pdf The Final Constitutional Option By Bob Berry, Regional Director for the Convention of States Projec Created: 2024-02-08 13:53:28 Updated: 2025-02-08 19:00:00 Published: 2024-02-08 03:00:00 Converted: 2025-04-14T20:15:55.109159994 ---- {{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_23712_pdfto001.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}} **The problem, which \\ hardly needs stating, \\ is that the federal \\ government has become \\ the very monster the \\ Founders anticipated. ** **THE FINAL CONSTITUTIONAL OPTION** **  ** **UPDATED NOVEMBER 2022 ** **HAVING BEEN DORMANT **for cen-\\ turies, a potent section in the U.S. Consti-\\ tution is now in the minds and on the lips \\ of a new generation of reformers who are \\ determined to keep the nation out of an \\ abyss. As America stares hard at the dark-\\ ness ahead, the new reformers — support-\\ ers of Convention of States Action — have \\ begun to popularize this forgotten consti-\\ tutional provision that might well become \\ Official Washington’s undoing. The problem, which hardly needs stating, \\ is that the federal government has become \\ the very monster the Founders anticipated. \\ Quite likely, the beast we face is far beyond \\ anything that could have been imagined \\ by the founding generation. Even today it \\ is hard to adequately comprehend the om-\\ nipresent and, thanks to the NSA, omni-\\ scient federal menace that hangs over every \\ aspect of life in 21st-century America. The Founders’ concern that power would \\ be consolidated at the federal level is dealt \\ with in Article V of the U.S. Constitution. Author Mark Levin, in his blockbuster \\ bestseller,  //The Liberty Amendments: Re-\\ storing the American Republic//, based his \\ ideas for reform on this less well-known \\ means by which amendments may be \\ proposed — a process that entirely out-\\ flanks Washington’s fixed fortifications. \\ Levin cogently argues that attempts at re-\\ form from within Washington are futile. Obviously, what is needed is a way to trump \\ the Beltway ruling class from without.\\   \\ Enter Article V, which prescribes the \\ amendment process. Article V establish-\\ es the amendment process as a two-phase \\ affair: proposal, followed by ratification \\ of three-fourths of the states. The states \\ have no way to ratify that which has not \\ first been proposed. From the beginning, \\ the states have relied on congressional su-\\ per-majorities to do the proposing. But the Founders knew that Congress would \\ be loath to propose anything that would \\ limit federal power, so they included a way  for the states to propose amendments in an \\ ad hoc assembly that Article V styles as “A \\ Convention for Proposing Amendments.” The idea of using the amendments con-\\ vention assembly has surfaced from time \\ to time in U.S. history — most recently in \\ the 1980s, with the movement to propose a \\ Balanced Budget Amendment (BBA). The  effort peaked with 33 states passing resolu-\\ tions — just one shy of the required two-\\ thirds of state legislatures, which would \\ have compelled Congress to issue a call for \\ the amendments convention. That’s when the effort took a bizarre detour \\ — into oblivion.The BBA advocates of the \\ 1980s, including then-President Reagan, \\ were decidedly of the political right. The \\ last thing anyone in the movement expect-\\ ed was for “friendlies” from elsewhere on \\ the right to object to the idea in near hyster-\\ ics as a plot to render the Constitution null \\ and void. The unlikely opponents, while \\ not necessarily opposed to a BBA, con-\\ demned in no uncertain terms the use of \\ the amendments convention to propose it. \\ It quickly became evident, from the critics’ \\ rhetoric, that they had confused the Con-\\ vention for Proposing Amendments assem-\\ bly with a so-called plenary (full authority) \\ Constitutional Convention. BBA advocates attempted to clarify the \\ difference between the types of conven-\\ tions by pointing out that, as sovereigns, \\ the states have never needed permission \\ from the Constitution to call an actual \\ Constitutional Convention. Indeed, the \\ only reason to invoke Article V would be \\ to self-limit the convention’s authority to \\ “proposing amendments,” as the assem-\\ bly’s name indicates. //Continued on back page// {{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_23712_pdfto002.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}} **The new reformers would do \\ well to press on with the case \\ for state-initiated amendments \\ and ignore the tired conspiracy \\ theories of the past.** //Continued from front page//  The critics would have none of it. In appeals to the public, the critics insid-\\ iously left out any mention of the ratifica-\\ tion process by three-fourths of the states \\ — the implication being that once the pro-\\ ceedings began, there would be nothing \\ that could be done to hold it back when, \\ inevitably, extreme elements moved to dis-\\ solve the Constitution. When challenged \\ on this, the foes weaved the assertion into \\ their conspiracy theory that the out-of-\\ control assembly would simply declare its \\ own sovereignty and dispense with the rat-\\ ification process altogether! As preposterous as this notion was, the \\ accompanying slogan was more effective: \\ “We don’t need a new Constitution!” \\ Gobsmacked, the BBA proponents could \\ only look on as state legislators made for \\ the tall grass. One by one, states began re-\\ scinding BBA resolutions. As a postscript to this sad chapter, it \\ should be noted that by the late 1980s, the \\ national debt had just topped $2  trillion. \\ An effective BBA at that time could have \\ stopped the bleeding that, by any objective \\ measure, has become an existential threat. **The Professor\\ **In 2009, an academic from the University \\ of Montana was surveying opportunities \\ for research. Of particular interest to Pro- fessor Robert G. Natelson were areas of \\ constitutional scholarship characterized \\ by a scarcity of research, poor research, \\ or, optimally, both. Intrigued by the vestigial Convention \\ for Proposing Amendments mentioned \\ in Article V, Natelson was struck by the \\ paucity of modern-day scholarship on the \\ topic, despite an abundance of original \\ source  material.   Quietly, he set to work. Before long, Natelson had acquired nearly \\ all of the journals of founding-era conven-\\ tions. This was added to his existing collec-\\ tion of material from each state’s ratifica-\\ tion convention as each considered whether \\ or not to approve the proposed 1787 Consti-\\ tution. A picture of early American conven-\\ tion tradition began to emerge.  Casting a wider net, he pulled in over 40 \\ generally neglected Article V court deci-\\ sions, some of which had been argued be-\\ fore the Supreme Court. In a series of pub-\\ lications, Natelson churned out his findings \\ (available at www.articlevinfocenter.com), \\ which surprised many — including himself. The research quickly became the gold \\ standard of scholarship about the pro-\\ cess, known formally as the “State-Ap-\\ plication-and-Convention” method of \\ amending the Constitution. Natelson held that, far from being a \\ self-destruct mechanism, the Founders \\ meant for the process to be used in \\ parallel to the congressional method as \\ yet another “check and balance” within \\ the framework of the newly constituted \\ federal government. Most importantly, Natelson drew a \\ strong distinction between the assembly \\ mentioned in Article V and the oft-men-\\ tioned Constitutional Convention. For \\ this reason, he is quick to correct anyone \\ mistakenly referring to the Convention \\ for Proposing Amendments as a “Con-\\ stitutional Convention.” Natelson’s research trove smashed the con-\\ spiracy theories of the 1980s and has be-\\ come the intellectual base of the resurgent \\ Article V movement that has been joined \\ by Levin and other prominent reformers. \\ When the history is written, it will record \\ that this was the moment the Article V \\ movement achieved critical mass. The new reformers would do well to press \\ on with the case for state-initiated amend-\\ ments and ignore the tired conspiracy the-\\ ories of the past. Having been marginal-\\ ized to an almost comic degree, the foes of \\ yesterday have been effectively dispatched. When a battle is won, it is wise to move to \\ the next battle, for the waiting opponent \\ is formidable and lives on Capitol Hill.    **(540)441-7227 | CONVENTIONOFSTATES.COM | Facebook.com/ConventionOfStates | Twitter.com/COSproject **