Title: The Baton Rouge Lawyer Original CoS Document (slug): [[https://conventionofstates.com/files/the-baton-rouge-lawyer|the-baton-rouge-lawyer]] Login Required to view? No Attached File: Tab_3_2022_Art_V_Revisited_BR_Lawyer.pdf Created: 2023-01-19 19:55:49 Updated: 2024-03-03 17:42:53 Published: 2023-11-24 13:00:00 Converted: 2025-04-14T20:09:24.119966497 ---- {{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_18754_pdfto001.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}} 18     The Baton Rouge Lawyer Article V Revisited: The U.S.   Constitutional Provision for States  to Control the Federal Government  and Louisiana Participation \\ //By Albert Dale Clary// The U.S. Constitution  has a little-known  provision for the states  to control a runaway  federal government: Article V,  the amendments article. Article  V has two methods for amending  the Constitution, but only one has been  used. All 27 of the current amendments  to the Constitution were proposed by  one method, in which Congress intro- duced amendments and states ratified  those proposals. However, Article V  has a second method for introducing  amendments, known as the convention  method.1 The text, logic and history  of Article V show this second method  was created to give states the power to  control the federal government when the  federal government fails to honor the  Constitution’s limits on federal power.\\ **Article V: The text \\ **Article V provides a process for the  states to propose amendments, rather  than Congress: The Congress, whenever two thirds  of both Houses shall deem it neces- sary, shall propose Amendments  to this Constitution, //or, on the Ap-// //plication of the Legislatures of two // //thirds of the several States, shall // //call a Convention for proposing // //Amendments//, which, in either  Case, //shall be valid// to all Intents  and Purposes, //as Part of this // //Constitution, when ratified by // //the Legislatures of three fourths of the // //several States//, or by Conventions in  three fourths thereof, as the one or  the other Mode of Ratification may  be proposed by the Congress . . . .2 So, when two-thirds of the states  apply for a convention for proposing  amendments, Congress “shall” call  that convention. However, any amend- ments proposed by the convention  only become “part” of the Constitution  if ratified by the legislatures of three- fourths of the states, just as any amend- ments proposed by Congress. \\ **How the state power to control the ** **federal government arose\\ **As the Constitutional Convention  neared its completion in 1787, the only  method to propose amendments was  for Congress to propose them. Then, on  Sept. 15, 1787, George Mason of Virginia  addressed the Convention and said, as  paraphrased by James Madison in his  notes of the Convention, “It would be  improper to require the consent of the  Natl. Legislature because they may abuse  their power, and refuse their consent on  that very account. . . .”3 \\ Thus, Article V was modified to provide  for states to control one mode of  proposing amendments.4 Both modes  of proposing amendments were subject  to the same state ratification to become  part of the Constitution. However, this  second method puts states in control  of both proposing the amendments  and ratifying the amendments. As one  contemporary essayist said,  The sovereign //power of amending // //the constitution //. . . does not lie with  the federal legislature, whom some  have erroneously apprehended to  be supreme. That power, which is  truly and evidently the real point of  sovereignty,  //is vested in the several // //legislatures// and [ratifying] conven- tions of the states, chosen by people  respectively with them.5   Alexander Hamilton in 1788 observed  this about Article V: //[T]he national rulers//, whenever nine  states concur, //will have no option upon // //the subject//. By the fifth article of the  plan //the congress will be obliged//,  . . .//The // //words of this article are peremptory//.  The Congress “//shall call a conven-// //tion//.” Nothing in this particular is  left to the discretion of that body.6 The use of this second method of  proposing amendments gives the states  power over both proposing and ratifying  {{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_18754_pdfto002.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}} July/August 2022    19 amendments. The role of Congress in  this process is very limited, //i.e.//, only to  “call” the convention.7 As explained by  Professor Natelson, this convention is a  Convention of States, not Congress,8 and  Article V was written by those familiar  with a long tradition of multi-colony and  multi-state conventions.9\\ **Current state efforts to amend the ** **Constitution \\ **State legislatures have approved  numerous applications for amendment  conventions. Various estimates range  from dozens to over 400.10 In 2015,  Congress began tracking these applica- tions, and a registry of “memorials” to  propose amendments is kept by the Com- mittee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House  of Representatives.11 Other websites also  privately track state resolutions.12\\ While no resolution has yet reached  the threshold 34 states required to  force Congress to “call” an amendment  convention, national interest in limiting  the growth of the federal government has  given birth to several Article V amendment  movements. Currently, the most notable  are the Balanced Budget Amendment  Task Force13 and the Convention of States  Project,14 but there are other efforts.15\\ **Louisiana Article V resolutions \\ **Louisiana has been one of the most  active states to approve such ap- plications.16 For example, in 1907 the  Louisiana legislature passed a resolution  calling for a convention to propose an  amendment for direct election of U.S.  Senators, noting that “[t]he failure of  Congress to submit such amendments  to the States has made it clear that the  only practicable method of securing a  submission to the States is through” an  Article V convention.17 More recently,  Louisiana has passed resolutions to  question federal government control  over public schools (1960),18 bar federal  taxation of interest income on state debt  (1970),19 allow school choice (1970),20  impose limits on the federal debt (1975)21  and require a balanced federal budget  (1975).22 However, in 1990 the legislature  rescinded all prior Article V resolutions.23\\ In 2016, the Louisiana legislature  approved an application for a convention  to propose amendments limited to three  subject areas: to (1) limit the terms of  office that may be served by its officials  and by members of Congress, (2)  impose fiscal restraints upon the federal  government and (3) limit the power and  jurisdiction of the federal government.24  In 2018, the legislature approved a  Commissioner Selection resolution,  discussed further below. Since then, two  Article V resolutions for term limits have  failed to pass.25 \\ **Possible Amendments arising ** **from the 2016 Louisiana Article V ** **resolution \\ **The three subject areas of the Louisiana  2016 resolution could include amend- ments that impose significant limits on  federal power. Possible amendments  germane to the call would be those  to impose term limits on members  of Congress and the judiciary and  to require a balanced budget. Other  possible amendments could be to repeal  the direct election of U.S. Senators,26  grant the states direct authority to check  Congress27 or check the authority of  federal bureaucracies28 or to narrow the  judicial expansion of the Commerce  Clause or the General Welfare clause. \\ **The Louisiana model legislation ** **for state legislative control of the ** **amendment convention \\ **Although some authors critical of an  Article V amendment convention raise  the specter of a “runaway” convention,29  Louisiana is one of the states that has  already passed a resolution to direct how  the state legislature will control the people  sent to the convention. In the 2018 Com- missioner Selection Resolution (CSR),  the legislature directed how it will //select//,  //authorize//,// instruct// and //supervise// the people  who attend this convention.30 As Professor  Natelson reports, “Founding-Era practice  informs us also that commissioners at an  amendment convention were to operate  under agency law and remain within the  limits of their commissions[,]”31 which  includes “//the duty to abide by instructions // //established by// concurrent resolution of //the // //legislature// for participation in the conven- tion and the duty //to act only within the scope // //of the Louisiana Legislature’s application for // //the convention// . . . .”32\\ This 2018 CSR imposes two layers  of limitations on the authority of  Louisiana’s commissioners. First, the  commissioners cannot act outside the  convention resolution by the Louisiana  legislature. The “duty to act only within  the scope of the . . . Legislature’s applica- tion” means Louisiana’s commissioners  cannot participate in any “runaway”  convention.33 Second, the commissioners’  {{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_18754_pdfto003.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}} 20     The Baton Rouge Lawyer authority to act will be limited by any  “instructions established by concurrent  resolution of the legislature.”34    \\ To leave no doubt, the Louisiana CSR  contains the clear statement that any vote  cast by a commissioner outside the scope  of the legislature’s instructions or the  legislature’s application “is an unauthor- ized vote and is therefore vo//id.//”35 This  Louisiana procedure is entirely consistent  with similar historical conventions, for  which typically the legislatures, sitting as  representatives of the citizens, selected,  “empowered,” instructed and supervised  their amendment convention commis- sioners.36 This procedure for limiting  authority of commissioners to an Article  V convention is also entirely consistent  with the Louisiana Civil Code articles  on mandate, which allow a principal to  impose limitations on the authority of  its mandates.37 It is anticipated all states  that send commissioners to the amend- ment convention would similarly select,  authorize, instruct and supervise that  state’s commissioners. \\ **Conclusions \\ **Louisiana has been a leader in the Article  V movement. The legislature has passed  perhaps more resolutions for Article V  conventions than any other state and has  also passed a CSR, which can serve as a  model to other states on how to control  the commissioners and conduct of any  Article V convention. //1 // Michael Stern, //Reopening the Constitutional Road to // //Reform: Toward a Safeguarded Article V Convention//, \\ 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 765, 765 (2011).\\ //2 // U.S. Const. art. V (emphasis added). //3 // Robert G. Natelson, //Proposing Constitutional // //Amendments by Convention: Rules Governing the \\ Process//, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 693, 732-33 n.21 (citing The \\ Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max \\ Farrand ed., 1937)) and n.264-69.\\ //4 // //See// Robert G. Natelson, //Founding Era Conventions // //and the Meaning of the Constitution’s Convention \\ for Proposing Amendments//, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 615, 621 \\ (2013).\\ //5 // As stated by Trent Coxe, a Philadelphia business- man and one of the most influential pro-Constitu-\\ tion essayists, as described by Robert G. Natelson \\ in The Law of Article V, State of Initiation of \\ Constitutional Amendments 28  (2018) (emphasis \\ added).\\ //6 // Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers No. 85  (1788) (emphasis added).\\ //7 // Natelson, //supra// note 3, at 733  //8 // Robert G. Natelson, //Why The Constitution’s “Con-// //vention for Proposing Amendments” Is a Convention \\ of the States//, Policy Brief, The Heartland Institute, \\ October, 2017.  \\ //9 // Natelson, //supra// note 4, at 620. //10 // The Article V Library, http:%%//%%article5library.org/ applications.htm.\\ //11 // U.S. House or Representatives Clerk, //Selected // //Memorials//, http:%%//%%clerk.house.gov/legislative/memo-\\ rials.aspx. \\ //12 // //See//, //e.g.//, State Legislators Article V Caucus, http:%%//%% articlevcaucus.com/; Friends of the Article V Con-\\ vention http:%%//%%www.foavc.org/01page/Amendments/\\ index.htm.\\ //13 // http:%%//%%bba4usa.org/. //14 // Convention of the States Action, https:%%//%%conven- tionofstates.com/ (note that the author is a volun-\\ teer for the Convention of States Project). \\ //15 // //See//, //e.g.//,U.S. Term Limits, https:%%//%%www.termlimits. com/; Wolf-PAC, https:%%//%%wolf-pac.com/.\\ //16 // //See// U.S. House Clerk, //supra// note 11.  //17 // National Archives, Center for Legislative Ar- chives, //Application of the Louisiana State Legislature // //**The Baton Rouge Lawyer**//**  ** **is seeking  ** **articles for publication. ** Contact Pam Labbe   at pam@brba.org **Interested in serving ** ** in a leadership position  ** **in the BRBA? ** Self-nomination forms for 2023  leaders will be in the next issue of   //The Baton Rouge Lawyer//. //and Governor for a Convention to Propose a Consti-\\ tutional Amendment for Direct Election of Senators, \\ November 25, 1907//, https:%%//%%www.archives.gov/legis-\\ lative/features/17th-amendment/louisiana.html.\\ //18 // House Concurrent Resolution (HCR) No. 21 (Act  2 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1960).\\ //19 // Senate Concurrent Resolution (SCR) No. 25  (Regular Session, 1970).\\ //20 // HCR No. 12 (Reg. Session, 1970). //21 // SCR No. 109 (Reg. Session, 1975).  //22 // HCR No. 269 (Reg. Session, 1975). //23 // HCR No. 218 (Reg. Session, 1990). //24 // SCR No. 52 (Reg. Session, 2016) (following the  Convention of States resolution).  \\ //25 // HCR No. 28 (Reg. Session, 2020); HCR No. 51  (Reg. Session, 2021). \\ //26 // The 17th amendment changed the method of  selection of U.S. Senators. \\ //27 // Mark R. Levin, The Liberty Amendments 179  (2013). \\ //28 // //Id.// at 99.  //29 // //See//, //e.g.//, //The Article V Convention to Propose // //Constitutional Amendments: Current Developments//, \\ Congressional Research Service, November 15, \\ 2017, CRS report R44435, p. 18.\\ //30 // HCR No. 4 (Reg. Session, 2018). //31 // Natelson, //supra// note 4, at 686. //32 // HCR No. 4, //supra// note 30, at Section 3.A (empha- sis added). \\ //33 // For an excellent analysis of the mistaken no- tion that an amendments convention can be a \\ “runaway” convention to act on matters outside \\ the authority of commissioners, //see// Michael B. \\ Rappaport, //The Constitutionality of a Limited Con-\\ vention: An Originalist Analysis//, 81 Const. Comm. \\ 53 (April 6, 2012), available at https:%%//%%ssrn.com/\\ abstract=2035638.\\ //34 // HCR No. 4, //supra// note 30, at Section 3.A.  //35 // //Id.// at Section 3.C. //36 // Robert G. Natelson, The Law of Article V: State  Initiation of Constitutional Amendments,  at § \\ 3.10. Selecting Commissioners, § 3.11. Empowering \\ Commissioners and § 3.12. Instructing and Super-\\ vising Commissioners.\\ //37 // //See// La. C.C. art. 2989, //et.seq.//