Title: Briefing Book

Original CoS Document (slug): [[https://conventionofstates.com/files/article-v-legislative-compendium|article-v-legislative-compendium]]

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Attached File: Digital_COSA_BriefingBook_COSA042023.pdf

The Article V Briefing Book for Lawyers and Legislative Drafter

Created: 2017-07-06 07:08:53

Updated: 2023-12-31 19:00:00

Published: 2017-07-17 17:00:00

Converted: 2025-04-14T19:21:58.157734734


----


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CONVENTION OF STATES ACTION

BRIEFING BOOK



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**2**

**Convention**// of//** States Action**

Briefing Book

Version: V1

COS Legislative Dept.

//Some of the images and graphics have been removed from its original form for printing.//



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**3**

[[../../../../../../../../../../../ericgreenwood/Desktop/COSA%20Compendium%20/Print_COSA%20Compendium%20for%20Legislators%20Lawyers.html#5|**Executive Summary\\
**]]For providing background and general information about COSA; includes process \\
description, endorsers, legislative progress, list of possible amendments, etc. 

 \\
[[../../../../../../../../../../../ericgreenwood/Desktop/COSA%20Compendium%20/Print_COSA%20Compendium%20for%20Legislators%20Lawyers.html#9|**Questions/Objections & Responses\\
**]]For providing brief responses to the most common objections. 

[[../../../../../../../../../../../ericgreenwood/Desktop/COSA%20Compendium%20/Print_COSA%20Compendium%20for%20Legislators%20Lawyers.html#13|**Convention Disinformation\\
**]]For responding to the “runaway” myth and claim that we don’t know how a \\
convention would work; includes excerpts from the call and commissions for the 1787 \\
Constitutional Conventions, a list of past interstate conventions, and a selection of key \\
court cases on Article V. 

[[../../../../../../../../../../../ericgreenwood/Desktop/COSA%20Compendium%20/Print_COSA%20Compendium%20for%20Legislators%20Lawyers.html#17|**Problems in the Testimony of Robert Brown\\
**]]For responding to erroneous testimony of JBS spokesperson Robert Brown. 

[[../../../../../../../../../../../ericgreenwood/Desktop/COSA%20Compendium%20/Print_COSA%20Compendium%20for%20Legislators%20Lawyers.html#41|**The Liberal Establishment’s Disinformation Campaign \\
Against Article V**]]

For demonstrating that the anti-Article V talking points originated from the Political \\
Left. 

[[../../../../../../../../../../../ericgreenwood/Desktop/COSA%20Compendium%20/Print_COSA%20Compendium%20for%20Legislators%20Lawyers.html#63|**Michael Farris article in Harvard Journal of Law & **]]

[[../../../../../../../../../../../ericgreenwood/Desktop/COSA%20Compendium%20/Print_COSA%20Compendium%20for%20Legislators%20Lawyers.html#63|**Public Policy,** ]]“Defying Conventional Wisdom.”

 \\
Detailed explanation of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, demonstrating that it was \\
not a “runaway convention.” 

[[../../../../../../../../../../../ericgreenwood/Desktop/COSA%20Compendium%20/Print_COSA%20Compendium%20for%20Legislators%20Lawyers.html#151|**250 Leftist organizations opposed to Convention of \\
States Action efforts**.\\
]]Demonstrates that the radical Left is opposed to our efforts.

[[../../../../../../../../../../../ericgreenwood/Desktop/COSA%20Compendium%20/Print_COSA%20Compendium%20for%20Legislators%20Lawyers.html#153|**The Jefferson Statement\\
**]]Demonstrates that well-respected, conservative scholars and legal experts  

support our efforts.

**PAGE 5**

**PAGE 9**

**PAGE 13**

**PAGE 17**

**PAGE 41**

**PAGE 63**

**PAGE 151**

**PAGE 153**



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**4**

America is spiraling out of control. People who respect neither our institutions or our citizens are in control of the levers 

of power in Washington, D.C. They intend widespread destruction to the foundations of our republic. We have been told 

that “elections” can fi x the problems ailing the nation. Most with our beliefs were disabused of this antiquated notion in 

2020. The bottom line is that Washington, D.C., today enjoys almost unchecked power.  

This is a systemic problem that requires a systemic solution. This is about more than elections. Elections cannot and 

will not solve the problems of a broken system. The only solution big enough to fi x our nation’s problems is an Article V 

convention for proposing constitutional amendments to rein in federal tyranny. This is the people’s fi nal “check” on D.C., 

exercised through their state legislators–the ingenious plan of the Founders to make state legislators’ ambitions (for state 

power) counteract federal offi  cials’ ambitions (for federal power)–for the good of the people.

While there is nothing “wrong” with the Constitution as drafted and ratifi ed, the problems we now face are undeniably 

the result of improper constitutional interpretations by the federal courts (i.e. the General Welfare Clause, the 

Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Commerce Clause). Conservatives like to say that federal offi  cials “ignore” the 

Constitution, but what they actually do is creatively “lawyer” around its limitations via Supreme Court rulings expanding 

federal power. 

We can and must restore the federal government to its proper, limited place by pushing back on the expansion and 

eff ectively overturning bad Supreme Court precedents that have eviscerated the Founders’ intended limitations on our 

federal system.

The Convention of States Resolution seeks to do this by using the tool given to the states in Article V of the 

Constitution. It calls for an Article V convention limited to proposing amendments that

** impose fi scal restraints on the **

**federal government, limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and limit the terms of offi  ce for its **

**offi  cials and for members of Congress.**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**Convention //of //States**

**OFFICIAL ENDORSERS**

**Gov. Ron DeSantis, **//FL Governor//

**Ben Shapiro, **//The Ben Shapiro Show//

**Mark Meckler, **//CEO COS Action//

**Mark Levin, **//The Mark Levin Show//

**Sean Hannity, **//Hannity & Colmes//

This page is intentionally left blank



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**5**

America is spiraling out of control. People who respect neither our institutions or our citizens are in control of the levers 

of power in Washington, D.C. They intend widespread destruction to the foundations of our republic. We have been told 

that “elections” can fi x the problems ailing the nation. Most with our beliefs were disabused of this antiquated notion in 

2020. The bottom line is that Washington, D.C., today enjoys almost unchecked power.  

This is a systemic problem that requires a systemic solution. This is about more than elections. Elections cannot and 

will not solve the problems of a broken system. The only solution big enough to fi x our nation’s problems is an Article V 

convention for proposing constitutional amendments to rein in federal tyranny. This is the people’s fi nal “check” on D.C., 

exercised through their state legislators–the ingenious plan of the Founders to make state legislators’ ambitions (for state 

power) counteract federal offi  cials’ ambitions (for federal power)–for the good of the people.

While there is nothing “wrong” with the Constitution as drafted and ratifi ed, the problems we now face are undeniably 

the result of improper constitutional interpretations by the federal courts (i.e. the General Welfare Clause, the 

Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Commerce Clause). Conservatives like to say that federal offi  cials “ignore” the 

Constitution, but what they actually do is creatively “lawyer” around its limitations via Supreme Court rulings expanding 

federal power. 

We can and must restore the federal government to its proper, limited place by pushing back on the expansion and 

eff ectively overturning bad Supreme Court precedents that have eviscerated the Founders’ intended limitations on our 

federal system.

The Convention of States Resolution seeks to do this by using the tool given to the states in Article V of the 

Constitution. It calls for an Article V convention limited to proposing amendments that

** impose fi scal restraints on the **

**federal government, limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and limit the terms of offi  ce for its **

**offi  cials and for members of Congress.**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**Convention //of //States**

**OFFICIAL ENDORSERS**

**Gov. Ron DeSantis, **//FL Governor//

**Ben Shapiro, **//The Ben Shapiro Show//

**Mark Meckler, **//CEO COS Action//

**Mark Levin, **//The Mark Levin Show//

**Sean Hannity, **//Hannity & Colmes//



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**6**

//**COS Resolution Language\\
**//The COS Resolution’s operative language defi nes the limits of the types of amendments that can be proposed.

The operative language is as follows: 

Section 1.  The legislature of the State of   

 hereby applies to Congress, under the provisions of 

Article V of the Constitution of the United States, for the calling of a convention of the states limited to 

proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States that impose fi scal restraints on the federal 

government, limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and limit the terms of offi  ce for its 

offi  cials and for members of Congress.

//**How The Process Works\\
**//Article V of the Constitution provides two ways in which amendments may be proposed: Congress may propose 

them, or the states can call a “convention for proposing amendments” upon application of 2/3 of the state legislatures 

(34 state legislatures). Regardless of which way amendments are proposed, they must always be ratifi ed by 3/4 of the 

states (38 states).

The amendments that can be proposed must be germane to the resolution, limited by the language of the resolution 

itself, passed by the state legislatures as the subject matter of the convention. Only the proposed amendments that 

pass by a simple majority (26 states) shall be put forth for ratifi cation. They are mere suggestions until ratifi ed.

//**Types of Amendments That Could Be Proposed\\
**//•  Limiting Supreme Court Justices to nine members of the court

•  Preventing the federal government from adding states without the affi  rmative consent of three quarters of   the 

existing states

•  A limitation on using Executive Orders and federal regulations to enact laws

•  A balanced budget amendment, including limitations on taxes and spending

•  Imposition of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)

•  Single Subject Amendment – One subject per bill in Congress

•  A redefi nition of the General Welfare Clause back to original intent (the original view was the federal government 

could not spend money on any topic within the jurisdiction of the states)

•  A redefi nition of the Commerce Clause back to original intent (the original view was that Congress was granted a 

narrow and exclusive power to regulate shipments across state lines–not all the economic activity of the nation)   

•  A prohibition of using international treaties and law to govern the domestic law of the United States

•  Placing an upper limit on federal taxation

•  Requiring the sunset of all existing federal taxes and a super-majority vote to replace them with new, fairer taxes

•  Religious freedom amendment, prohibiting the government from further interference with our religious freedoms

•  Regulatory curtailment by forcing Congress to vote on regulations instead of deferring law making to regulators.

Former 

**U.S. Senator Rick Santorum** now serves as Senior Advisor to Convention of States. Major endorsers include 

(but are not limited to): 

**Mark Levin, Sean Hannity, Ben Shapiro, Gov. Ron DeSantis, Rep. Mark Meadows, Charlie **

**Kirk, Pete Hegseth, Lt. Col. Allen West, Dave Rubin, Rep. Chip Roy, David Barton, James O’Keefe, Steve Deace, **

**David Horowitz, Eric Metaxas, Dr. James Dobson, Rep. Louis Gohmert, Sen. Rand Paul, Sen. Marco Rubio, Sen. Jim **

**DeMint, Gov. Greg Abbott, The Honorable Jeb Bush, The Honorable Ben Carson,The Honorable Mike Huckabee, **

**Gov. Sarah Palin, Gov. Bobby Jindal, Sen. Ron Johnson, Kenneth Cuccinelli, Rep. Jeff  Duncan, Rep. Ralph Norman, **

**Sen. Jim Talent,** and many more. The late** U.S. Senator **

**Tom Coburn **was one of the leading proponents of COS 

and also served as a Senior Advisor. 

Conservative legal heavyweights serving on the

Convention of States Legal Board

of Reference include:

**•  Mark Levin**

**•  Prof. Robert P. George**

**•  Prof. Randy Barnett**

**•  Ambassador C. Boyden Gray**

**•  Mat Staver**

**•  Andrew McCarthy**

**•  Dr. John Eastman**

**•  Charles Cooper**

**•  Professor Nelson Lund**

**•  Michael Farris**

**•  Mark Meckler**

**81.3%**

**50.2%**

**63.3%**

//**Public Opinion Polling **//

Polling conducted across the nation indicates that, on average, 65.7% of voters across party lines support the 

Convention of States Resolution. That includes 81.3% of Republicans, 50.2% of Democrats, and 63.3% of 

“others.” Polling was conducted by Robert Cahaly of The Trafalgar Group, America’s most trusted and accurate 

pollster in the 2016, 2018 and 2020 elections.

//View our full list of endorsers at conventionofstates.com//

Charlie Kirk

Mark Levin

Sean Hannity

Gov. Ron 

DeSantis

Rep. Mark 

Meadows

Ben Shapiro

Rick Santorum

Lt. Col. Allen West

Hon. Ben Carson

Hon. Mike Huckabee

//**COS Founders**//

Convention of States was founded by 

**Mark Meckler,** Co-Founder of Tea 

Party Patriots and President of Citizens for Self-Governance, and 

**Michael **

**Farris**, Founder of Home School Legal Defense Association, Patrick Henry 

College, and the former CEO of Alliance Defending Freedom.

**Mark Meckler**

**Michael Farris**

//**COS Endorsers**//



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**7**

//**COS Resolution Language\\
**//The COS Resolution’s operative language defi nes the limits of the types of amendments that can be proposed.

The operative language is as follows: 

Section 1.  The legislature of the State of   

 hereby applies to Congress, under the provisions of 

Article V of the Constitution of the United States, for the calling of a convention of the states limited to 

proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States that impose fi scal restraints on the federal 

government, limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government, and limit the terms of offi  ce for its 

offi  cials and for members of Congress.

//**How The Process Works\\
**//Article V of the Constitution provides two ways in which amendments may be proposed: Congress may propose 

them, or the states can call a “convention for proposing amendments” upon application of 2/3 of the state legislatures 

(34 state legislatures). Regardless of which way amendments are proposed, they must always be ratifi ed by 3/4 of the 

states (38 states).

The amendments that can be proposed must be germane to the resolution, limited by the language of the resolution 

itself, passed by the state legislatures as the subject matter of the convention. Only the proposed amendments that 

pass by a simple majority (26 states) shall be put forth for ratifi cation. They are mere suggestions until ratifi ed.

//**Types of Amendments That Could Be Proposed\\
**//•  Limiting Supreme Court Justices to nine members of the court

•  Preventing the federal government from adding states without the affi  rmative consent of three quarters of   the 

existing states

•  A limitation on using Executive Orders and federal regulations to enact laws

•  A balanced budget amendment, including limitations on taxes and spending

•  Imposition of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)

•  Single Subject Amendment – One subject per bill in Congress

•  A redefi nition of the General Welfare Clause back to original intent (the original view was the federal government 

could not spend money on any topic within the jurisdiction of the states)

•  A redefi nition of the Commerce Clause back to original intent (the original view was that Congress was granted a 

narrow and exclusive power to regulate shipments across state lines–not all the economic activity of the nation)   

•  A prohibition of using international treaties and law to govern the domestic law of the United States

•  Placing an upper limit on federal taxation

•  Requiring the sunset of all existing federal taxes and a super-majority vote to replace them with new, fairer taxes

•  Religious freedom amendment, prohibiting the government from further interference with our religious freedoms

•  Regulatory curtailment by forcing Congress to vote on regulations instead of deferring law making to regulators.

Former 

**U.S. Senator Rick Santorum** now serves as Senior Advisor to Convention of States. Major endorsers include 

(but are not limited to): 

**Mark Levin, Sean Hannity, Ben Shapiro, Gov. Ron DeSantis, Rep. Mark Meadows, Charlie **

**Kirk, Pete Hegseth, Lt. Col. Allen West, Dave Rubin, Rep. Chip Roy, David Barton, James O’Keefe, Steve Deace, **

**David Horowitz, Eric Metaxas, Dr. James Dobson, Rep. Louis Gohmert, Sen. Rand Paul, Sen. Marco Rubio, Sen. Jim **

**DeMint, Gov. Greg Abbott, The Honorable Jeb Bush, The Honorable Ben Carson,The Honorable Mike Huckabee, **

**Gov. Sarah Palin, Gov. Bobby Jindal, Sen. Ron Johnson, Kenneth Cuccinelli, Rep. Jeff  Duncan, Rep. Ralph Norman, **

**Sen. Jim Talent,** and many more. The late** U.S. Senator **

**Tom Coburn **was one of the leading proponents of COS 

and also served as a Senior Advisor. 

Conservative legal heavyweights serving on the

Convention of States Legal Board

of Reference include:

**•  Mark Levin**

**•  Prof. Robert P. George**

**•  Prof. Randy Barnett**

**•  Ambassador C. Boyden Gray**

**•  Mat Staver**

**•  Andrew McCarthy**

**•  Dr. John Eastman**

**•  Charles Cooper**

**•  Professor Nelson Lund**

**•  Michael Farris**

**•  Mark Meckler**

**81.3%**

**50.2%**

**63.3%**

//**Public Opinion Polling **//

Polling conducted across the nation indicates that, on average, 65.7% of voters across party lines support the 

Convention of States Resolution. That includes 81.3% of Republicans, 50.2% of Democrats, and 63.3% of 

“others.” Polling was conducted by Robert Cahaly of The Trafalgar Group, America’s most trusted and accurate 

pollster in the 2016, 2018 and 2020 elections.

//View our full list of endorsers at conventionofstates.com//

Charlie Kirk

Mark Levin

Sean Hannity

Gov. Ron 

DeSantis

Rep. Mark 

Meadows

Ben Shapiro

Rick Santorum

Lt. Col. Allen West

Hon. Ben Carson

Hon. Mike Huckabee

//**COS Founders**//

Convention of States was founded by 

**Mark Meckler,** Co-Founder of Tea 

Party Patriots and President of Citizens for Self-Governance, and 

**Michael **

**Farris**, Founder of Home School Legal Defense Association, Patrick Henry 

College, and the former CEO of Alliance Defending Freedom.

**Mark Meckler**

**Michael Farris**

//**COS Endorsers**//



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**8**

**PASSED COS**

**RESOLUTION (19 STATES)\\
PASSED LEGISLATIVE**

**CHAMBER (26 STATES)**

**PASSED COMMITTEE**

**HEARING (31 STATES)**

Updated 2/07/2023

//**Legislative makeup and Convention of States Legislative Victories**//

**Passed COS **

**Resolution (19 States)**

**Passed Legislative **

**Chamber (26 States)**

**Passed Committee **

**Hearing (31 States)**

**Filed COS Resolution  **

**(49 States)**

//AK, AL, AR, AZ, FL, GA, //

//IN, LA, MO, MS, ND, //

//NE, OK, TN, TX, UT, //

//WI, WV, SC//

//AL, AK, AR, AZ, FL, GA, //

//IA, LA, MS, NE, NH, NC, //

//ND, NM, TN, VA, SD, IN, //

//UT, OK, MO, TX, SC, WI,//

//WV, WY//

//AL, AK, AZ, AR, FL, GA, IN,//

//IA, KS, LA, MA, MI, MS, MO//

//MT, NE, NH, NM, NC, ND, //

//OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, //

//UT, VA, WV, WI, WY//

//AK, AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO ,//

//DE, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN,//

//IA, KS, KY, LA, MA, MD,//

//ME, MI, MN, MS, MO,//

//MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ,//

//NM, NY, NC, ND, OH,//

//OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD,//

//TN, TX, UT, VA, VT, WA,//

//WI, WV, WY//

**REPUBLICAN **

** **

**CONTROLLED LEGISLATURE**

**DEMOCRAT CONTROLLED\\
LEGISLATURE**

**DIVIDED CHAMBER\\
LEGISLATURE**

Convention of States Foundation\\
5850 San Felipe, Suite 575\\
Houston, TX 77057\\
512-487-5525\\
ConventionofStates.org

Convention of States Action\\
5850 San Felipe, Suite 580\\
Houston, TX 77057\\
512-487-5525\\
ConventionofStates.com

//*Tax deductible 501(c)3//

//Please feel free to reach out to me personally...//

//Mark.Meckler@COSAction.com//

//**Strategy for Passage of the COS Resolution\\
**//The strategy for passage of the Resolution is state-specifi c and is carried out by the 5 Million+ citizen activists 

recruited from within 100% of the state legislative districts. Citizen activists put the appropriate pressure on their 

state representatives to sponsor or vote in support of the Resolution. To date this strategy has accomplished:

• 

**49 **states fi ling the COS Resolution in their state legislatures.

• 

**31** states have passed the COS Resolution through at least one committee hearing.

• 

**26** states have passed the COS Resolution through one entire fl oor chamber.

• 

**19** states have passed the COS Resolution in its entirety.

The nineteen states that have already passed the Convention of States Resolution are: Florida, Georgia, Alaska, 

Alabama, Tennessee, Indiana, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arizona, North Dakota, Texas, Missouri, Arkansas, Utah, 

Mississippi, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Nebraska and South Carolina.

**Responses to Common Objections **

**Objection 1: The Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia defied its authority in  **

**proposing a new Constitution, so we can expect an Article V convention to do the **

**same.  **

**Response: **The 1787 convention did not run away. The runaway claim is based on the assumption 

that the Confederation Congress called the convention and defined its scope, but that is incorrect. 

The Constitutional Convention was called by Virginia in December, 1786, and its language gave 

the states power (under their reserved powers) to re-write the Articles of Confederation. The 

congressional resolution, issued months after Virginia had issued the call, was, by its own wording, 

merely an expression of “opinion” and a recommendation. 

Michael Farris, former President and CEO of Alliance Defending Freedom, has published an 

article refuting the claim. It is published in Volume 40 of the Harvard Journal of Law and Public 

Policy, and you can find it here.  

**Objection 2: Nothing in Article V limits the convention to a single topic, and in fact, states  **

**cannot limit the scope of an amendment-proposing convention. Once convened, state  **

**delegations will be free to rewrite the Constitution.  **

**Response**: The states whose applications trigger the convention retain the right to limit the 

scope of the convention however they choose. This is inherent in their power of application. In 

fact, this is the only reason there has never yet been an Article V convention; while over 400 

state applications for a convention have been filed, there have not yet been 34 applications for a  

convention on the same subject matter. Every scholar who has published articles or books on the 

subject in the 21st century agrees that a convention can be limited. 

As the //agents// of the state legislatures who appoint and commission them, the commissioners 

only enjoy the scope of authority vested in them by their //principals// (the state legislatures). Any  

actions outside the scope of that authority are void as a matter of common law agency 

principles, as well as any state laws adopted to specifically address the issue.   

The inherent power of state legislatures to control the selection and instruction of their 

commissioners, including the requirement that said commissioners restrict their deliberations to 

the specified subject  matter, is reinforced by the unbroken, universal historical precedent set by 

the interstate  conventions held at least 42 times in American history. Those who make a  

contrary claim cannot cite a single historical or legal precedent to support it.  

Finally, keep in mind that under the explicit terms of Article V, the convention’s only power  is 

to “propose” amendments to “this Constitution” (the one we already have). Only upon  

ratification by 38 states does any single amendment become part of the Constitution.  

**Objection 3: Adding amendments to the Constitution won’t help anything, because  **

**federal officials simply ignore the Constitution anyway.  **

**Response: **It is true that if our Constitution were being interpreted today—and obeyed—

according to its original meaning, we would not be facing most of the problems we face today 

in  our federal government. But the problem is today is more complex than that officials are

“ignoring” or “disobeying” the Constitution. The real issue is that  certain provisions of our 

Constitution have been wrenched from their original meaning,  perverted, and interpreted to 

mean something very different. Federal officials today follow the Constitution as //interpreted //by

the Supreme Court over the years. 

As just one example, consider the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act. Of  

course, nowhere in the Article I of the Constitution do we read that Congress has the power to  

force individuals to purchase health insurance. However, our modern Supreme Court

“interprets”  the General Welfare Clause of Article I broadly as a grant of power for Congress to

tax and  spend for virtually any purpose that it believes will benefit the people. Now we know

from  history that this is not what was intended. But it is the prevailing modern interpretation,  

providing a veneer of legitimacy to Congress’ actions—as well as legal grounds for upholding  

them.   

The federal government doesn’t “ignore” the Constitution—it takes advantage of loopholes  

created through practice and precedent. The only way to close these loopholes definitively

and permanently is through an Article V convention that reinstates limitations on federal power 

and  jurisdiction in clear, modern language.   

**Objection 4: We have no idea how an Article V convention would operate, because **

**it is not spelled out in Article V.**

**Response:  **The Constitution does not spell out the details of processes that were well-

known to the Framers (“grand jury” and “habeas corpus” are other examples), and 

interstate conventions were common practice for them. We know the process from the

historical records of past conventions. There have been at least 42 in American history. 

States always choose and instruct their commissioners, voting is always on a one-state, 

one-vote basis, and no interstate convention has ever become a “runaway.”

**Objection 5: Congress will use its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause**

**to control an Article V convention.**

**Response: **This argument is based on ignorance of existing precedent, holding that 

Congress  may not use any of its Article I powers in the context of Article V. //See Idaho//

//v. Freeman//, 529  F.Supp. 1107, 1151 (D. Idaho 1981) (“Thus Congress, outside of the 

authority granted by article  V, has no power to act with regard to an amendment, i.e., it

does not retain any of its traditional  authority vested in it by article I.”) This case was

later vacated as moot for procedural reasons,  but the central holding remains

unchanged. Congress may not use its power under the  Necessary and Proper Clause

with respect to the operation of an Article V convention.



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto009.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**9**

**PASSED COS**

**RESOLUTION (19 STATES)\\
PASSED LEGISLATIVE**

**CHAMBER (26 STATES)**

**PASSED COMMITTEE**

**HEARING (31 STATES)**

Updated 2/07/2023

//**Legislative makeup and Convention of States Legislative Victories**//

**Passed COS **

**Resolution (19 States)**

**Passed Legislative **

**Chamber (26 States)**

**Passed Committee **

**Hearing (31 States)**

**Filed COS Resolution  **

**(49 States)**

//AK, AL, AR, AZ, FL, GA, //

//IN, LA, MO, MS, ND, //

//NE, OK, TN, TX, UT, //

//WI, WV, SC//

//AL, AK, AR, AZ, FL, GA, //

//IA, LA, MS, NE, NH, NC, //

//ND, NM, TN, VA, SD, IN, //

//UT, OK, MO, TX, SC, WI,//

//WV, WY//

//AL, AK, AZ, AR, FL, GA, IN,//

//IA, KS, LA, MA, MI, MS, MO//

//MT, NE, NH, NM, NC, ND, //

//OK, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX, //

//UT, VA, WV, WI, WY//

//AK, AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO ,//

//DE, FL, GA, HI, ID, IL, IN,//

//IA, KS, KY, LA, MA, MD,//

//ME, MI, MN, MS, MO,//

//MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ,//

//NM, NY, NC, ND, OH,//

//OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD,//

//TN, TX, UT, VA, VT, WA,//

//WI, WV, WY//

**REPUBLICAN **

** **

**CONTROLLED LEGISLATURE**

**DEMOCRAT CONTROLLED\\
LEGISLATURE**

**DIVIDED CHAMBER\\
LEGISLATURE**

Convention of States Foundation\\
5850 San Felipe, Suite 575\\
Houston, TX 77057\\
512-487-5525\\
ConventionofStates.org

Convention of States Action\\
5850 San Felipe, Suite 580\\
Houston, TX 77057\\
512-487-5525\\
ConventionofStates.com

//*Tax deductible 501(c)3//

//Please feel free to reach out to me personally...//

//Mark.Meckler@COSAction.com//

//**Strategy for Passage of the COS Resolution\\
**//The strategy for passage of the Resolution is state-specifi c and is carried out by the 5 Million+ citizen activists 

recruited from within 100% of the state legislative districts. Citizen activists put the appropriate pressure on their 

state representatives to sponsor or vote in support of the Resolution. To date this strategy has accomplished:

• 

**49 **states fi ling the COS Resolution in their state legislatures.

• 

**31** states have passed the COS Resolution through at least one committee hearing.

• 

**26** states have passed the COS Resolution through one entire fl oor chamber.

• 

**19** states have passed the COS Resolution in its entirety.

The nineteen states that have already passed the Convention of States Resolution are: Florida, Georgia, Alaska, 

Alabama, Tennessee, Indiana, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arizona, North Dakota, Texas, Missouri, Arkansas, Utah, 

Mississippi, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Nebraska and South Carolina.

**Responses to Common Objections **

**Objection 1: The Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia defied its authority in  **

**proposing a new Constitution, so we can expect an Article V convention to do the **

**same.  **

**Response: **The 1787 convention did not run away. The runaway claim is based on the assumption 

that the Confederation Congress called the convention and defined its scope, but that is incorrect. 

The Constitutional Convention was called by Virginia in December, 1786, and its language gave 

the states power (under their reserved powers) to re-write the Articles of Confederation. The 

congressional resolution, issued months after Virginia had issued the call, was, by its own wording, 

merely an expression of “opinion” and a recommendation. 

Michael Farris, former President and CEO of Alliance Defending Freedom, has published an 

article refuting the claim. It is published in Volume 40 of the Harvard Journal of Law and Public 

Policy, and you can find it here.  

**Objection 2: Nothing in Article V limits the convention to a single topic, and in fact, states  **

**cannot limit the scope of an amendment-proposing convention. Once convened, state  **

**delegations will be free to rewrite the Constitution.  **

**Response**: The states whose applications trigger the convention retain the right to limit the 

scope of the convention however they choose. This is inherent in their power of application. In 

fact, this is the only reason there has never yet been an Article V convention; while over 400 

state applications for a convention have been filed, there have not yet been 34 applications for a  

convention on the same subject matter. Every scholar who has published articles or books on the 

subject in the 21st century agrees that a convention can be limited. 

As the //agents// of the state legislatures who appoint and commission them, the commissioners 

only enjoy the scope of authority vested in them by their //principals// (the state legislatures). Any  

actions outside the scope of that authority are void as a matter of common law agency 

principles, as well as any state laws adopted to specifically address the issue.   

The inherent power of state legislatures to control the selection and instruction of their 

commissioners, including the requirement that said commissioners restrict their deliberations to 

the specified subject  matter, is reinforced by the unbroken, universal historical precedent set by 

the interstate  conventions held at least 42 times in American history. Those who make a  

contrary claim cannot cite a single historical or legal precedent to support it.  

Finally, keep in mind that under the explicit terms of Article V, the convention’s only power  is 

to “propose” amendments to “this Constitution” (the one we already have). Only upon  

ratification by 38 states does any single amendment become part of the Constitution.  

**Objection 3: Adding amendments to the Constitution won’t help anything, because  **

**federal officials simply ignore the Constitution anyway.  **

**Response: **It is true that if our Constitution were being interpreted today—and obeyed—

according to its original meaning, we would not be facing most of the problems we face today 

in  our federal government. But the problem is today is more complex than that officials are

“ignoring” or “disobeying” the Constitution. The real issue is that  certain provisions of our 

Constitution have been wrenched from their original meaning,  perverted, and interpreted to 

mean something very different. Federal officials today follow the Constitution as //interpreted //by

the Supreme Court over the years. 

As just one example, consider the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act. Of  

course, nowhere in the Article I of the Constitution do we read that Congress has the power to  

force individuals to purchase health insurance. However, our modern Supreme Court

“interprets”  the General Welfare Clause of Article I broadly as a grant of power for Congress to

tax and  spend for virtually any purpose that it believes will benefit the people. Now we know

from  history that this is not what was intended. But it is the prevailing modern interpretation,  

providing a veneer of legitimacy to Congress’ actions—as well as legal grounds for upholding  

them.   

The federal government doesn’t “ignore” the Constitution—it takes advantage of loopholes  

created through practice and precedent. The only way to close these loopholes definitively

and permanently is through an Article V convention that reinstates limitations on federal power 

and  jurisdiction in clear, modern language.   

**Objection 4: We have no idea how an Article V convention would operate, because **

**it is not spelled out in Article V.**

**Response:  **The Constitution does not spell out the details of processes that were well-

known to the Framers (“grand jury” and “habeas corpus” are other examples), and 

interstate conventions were common practice for them. We know the process from the

historical records of past conventions. There have been at least 42 in American history. 

States always choose and instruct their commissioners, voting is always on a one-state, 

one-vote basis, and no interstate convention has ever become a “runaway.”

**Objection 5: Congress will use its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause**

**to control an Article V convention.**

**Response: **This argument is based on ignorance of existing precedent, holding that 

Congress  may not use any of its Article I powers in the context of Article V. //See Idaho//

//v. Freeman//, 529  F.Supp. 1107, 1151 (D. Idaho 1981) (“Thus Congress, outside of the 

authority granted by article  V, has no power to act with regard to an amendment, i.e., it

does not retain any of its traditional  authority vested in it by article I.”) This case was

later vacated as moot for procedural reasons,  but the central holding remains

unchanged. Congress may not use its power under the  Necessary and Proper Clause

with respect to the operation of an Article V convention.



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto010.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**10**

**Responses to Common Objections **

**Objection 1: The Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia defied its authority in  **

**proposing a new Constitution, so we can expect an Article V convention to do the **

**same.  **

**Response: **The 1787 convention did not run away. The runaway claim is based on the assumption 

that the Confederation Congress called the convention and defined its scope, but that is incorrect. 

The Constitutional Convention was called by Virginia in December, 1786, and its language gave 

the states power (under their reserved powers) to re-write the Articles of Confederation. The 

congressional resolution, issued months after Virginia had issued the call, was, by its own wording, 

merely an expression of “opinion” and a recommendation. 

Michael Farris, former President and CEO of Alliance Defending Freedom, has published an 

article refuting the claim. It is published in Volume 40 of the Harvard Journal of Law and Public 

Policy, and you can find it here.  

**Objection 2: Nothing in Article V limits the convention to a single topic, and in fact, states  **

**cannot limit the scope of an amendment-proposing convention. Once convened, state  **

**delegations will be free to rewrite the Constitution.  **

**Response**: The states whose applications trigger the convention retain the right to limit the 

scope of the convention however they choose. This is inherent in their power of application. In 

fact, this is the only reason there has never yet been an Article V convention; while over 400 

state applications for a convention have been filed, there have not yet been 34 applications for a  

convention on the same subject matter. Every scholar who has published articles or books on the 

subject in the 21st century agrees that a convention can be limited. 

As the //agents// of the state legislatures who appoint and commission them, the commissioners 

only enjoy the scope of authority vested in them by their //principals// (the state legislatures). Any  

actions outside the scope of that authority are void as a matter of common law agency 

principles, as well as any state laws adopted to specifically address the issue.   

The inherent power of state legislatures to control the selection and instruction of their 

commissioners, including the requirement that said commissioners restrict their deliberations to 

the specified subject  matter, is reinforced by the unbroken, universal historical precedent set by 

the interstate  conventions held at least 42 times in American history. Those who make a  

contrary claim cannot cite a single historical or legal precedent to support it.  

Finally, keep in mind that under the explicit terms of Article V, the convention’s only power  is 

to “propose” amendments to “this Constitution” (the one we already have). Only upon  

ratification by 38 states does any single amendment become part of the Constitution.  

**Objection 3: Adding amendments to the Constitution won’t help anything, because  **

**federal officials simply ignore the Constitution anyway.  **

**Response: **It is true that if our Constitution were being interpreted today—and obeyed—

according to its original meaning, we would not be facing most of the problems we face today 

in  our federal government. But the problem is today is more complex than that officials are

“ignoring” or “disobeying” the Constitution. The real issue is that  certain provisions of our 

Constitution have been wrenched from their original meaning,  perverted, and interpreted to 

mean something very different. Federal officials today follow the Constitution as //interpreted //by

the Supreme Court over the years. 

As just one example, consider the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act. Of  

course, nowhere in the Article I of the Constitution do we read that Congress has the power to  

force individuals to purchase health insurance. However, our modern Supreme Court

“interprets”  the General Welfare Clause of Article I broadly as a grant of power for Congress to

tax and  spend for virtually any purpose that it believes will benefit the people. Now we know

from  history that this is not what was intended. But it is the prevailing modern interpretation,  

providing a veneer of legitimacy to Congress’ actions—as well as legal grounds for upholding  

them.   

The federal government doesn’t “ignore” the Constitution—it takes advantage of loopholes  

created through practice and precedent. The only way to close these loopholes definitively

and permanently is through an Article V convention that reinstates limitations on federal power 

and  jurisdiction in clear, modern language.   

**Objection 4: We have no idea how an Article V convention would operate, because **

**it is not spelled out in Article V.**

**Response:  **The Constitution does not spell out the details of processes that were well-

known to the Framers (“grand jury” and “habeas corpus” are other examples), and 

interstate conventions were common practice for them. We know the process from the

historical records of past conventions. There have been at least 42 in American history. 

States always choose and instruct their commissioners, voting is always on a one-state, 

one-vote basis, and no interstate convention has ever become a “runaway.”

**Objection 5: Congress will use its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause**

**to control an Article V convention.**

**Response: **This argument is based on ignorance of existing precedent, holding that 

Congress  may not use any of its Article I powers in the context of Article V. //See Idaho//

//v. Freeman//, 529  F.Supp. 1107, 1151 (D. Idaho 1981) (“Thus Congress, outside of the 

authority granted by article  V, has no power to act with regard to an amendment, i.e., it

does not retain any of its traditional  authority vested in it by article I.”) This case was

later vacated as moot for procedural reasons,  but the central holding remains

unchanged. Congress may not use its power under the  Necessary and Proper Clause

with respect to the operation of an Article V convention.

**Objection 6: A convention could change the ratification process just like the **

**Constitutional Convention did. **

**Response: **(excerpted from an article by Professor Rob Natelson): 

● This misinterprets the power of the 1787 convention, which met under the

states’ reserved powers and not under the Articles of Confederation;

● This contradicts the specific words of Article V, which lays out how

amendments to “this Constitution” must be ratified;

● This contradicts 200+ years of Article V court decisions, which rule that every

actor in the amendment process must follow the rules laid out in Article V; and

● This defies reality: The convention has no military force nor even any existence

after adjournment. How will it enforce its decree? Call out the army?

**Objection 7: The Article V process was intended only to correct drafting errors; **

**not to correct abuses of power. **

**Response: **At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Col. George Mason promoted the 

convention procedure specifically as a remedy for abuses of power by the national 

government. A number of other historical documents confirm that this was the 

Founders’ intention. (https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/the-founders-pointed-to-article-v-as-a-

cure-for-federal-abuse

) 

Moreover, amendments have been used for this purpose before and have been 

extremely effective. The Eleventh Amendment was proposed by Congress and ratified 

by the states specifically to reverse a wrong Supreme Court decision, //Chisholm v. //

//Georgia//, that had given the federal courts more jurisdiction than they should have had. 

The problem was corrected through the Article V amendment process. 

**Objection 8: An Article V convention would open up our beloved Constitution to **

**massive changes, and the convention could even replace our entire Constitution **

**with a new one. ** 

**Response: **An Article V convention to propose amendments is not the same as a 

“Constitutional Convention.” At a constitutional convention such as the one in 1787, the 

states gather pursuant to their reserved sovereignty and the basic right of the people to 

“alter or abolish” their government as recognized in the Declaration of Independence. 

At an Article V convention, on the other hand, the states gather pursuant to their power 

under Article V, and are limited by its provisions. 

The only power an Article V convention will have is the same power that Congress also 

has under Article V every day it is in session–the power to //propose amendments //that 

would be //added// to the Constitution (if ratified by 38 states) just like the 27 amendments 

we already have.  



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto011.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**11**

**Responses to Common Objections **

**Objection 1: The Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia defied its authority in  **

**proposing a new Constitution, so we can expect an Article V convention to do the **

**same.  **

**Response: **The 1787 convention did not run away. The runaway claim is based on the assumption 

that the Confederation Congress called the convention and defined its scope, but that is incorrect. 

The Constitutional Convention was called by Virginia in December, 1786, and its language gave 

the states power (under their reserved powers) to re-write the Articles of Confederation. The 

congressional resolution, issued months after Virginia had issued the call, was, by its own wording, 

merely an expression of “opinion” and a recommendation. 

Michael Farris, former President and CEO of Alliance Defending Freedom, has published an 

article refuting the claim. It is published in Volume 40 of the Harvard Journal of Law and Public 

Policy, and you can find it here.  

**Objection 2: Nothing in Article V limits the convention to a single topic, and in fact, states  **

**cannot limit the scope of an amendment-proposing convention. Once convened, state  **

**delegations will be free to rewrite the Constitution.  **

**Response**: The states whose applications trigger the convention retain the right to limit the 

scope of the convention however they choose. This is inherent in their power of application. In 

fact, this is the only reason there has never yet been an Article V convention; while over 400 

state applications for a convention have been filed, there have not yet been 34 applications for a  

convention on the same subject matter. Every scholar who has published articles or books on the 

subject in the 21st century agrees that a convention can be limited. 

As the //agents// of the state legislatures who appoint and commission them, the commissioners 

only enjoy the scope of authority vested in them by their //principals// (the state legislatures). Any  

actions outside the scope of that authority are void as a matter of common law agency 

principles, as well as any state laws adopted to specifically address the issue.   

The inherent power of state legislatures to control the selection and instruction of their 

commissioners, including the requirement that said commissioners restrict their deliberations to 

the specified subject  matter, is reinforced by the unbroken, universal historical precedent set by 

the interstate  conventions held at least 42 times in American history. Those who make a  

contrary claim cannot cite a single historical or legal precedent to support it.  

Finally, keep in mind that under the explicit terms of Article V, the convention’s only power  is 

to “propose” amendments to “this Constitution” (the one we already have). Only upon  

ratification by 38 states does any single amendment become part of the Constitution.  

**Objection 3: Adding amendments to the Constitution won’t help anything, because  **

**federal officials simply ignore the Constitution anyway.  **

**Response: **It is true that if our Constitution were being interpreted today—and obeyed—

according to its original meaning, we would not be facing most of the problems we face today 

in  our federal government. But the problem is today is more complex than that officials are

“ignoring” or “disobeying” the Constitution. The real issue is that  certain provisions of our 

Constitution have been wrenched from their original meaning,  perverted, and interpreted to 

mean something very different. Federal officials today follow the Constitution as //interpreted //by

the Supreme Court over the years. 

As just one example, consider the individual mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act. Of  

course, nowhere in the Article I of the Constitution do we read that Congress has the power to  

force individuals to purchase health insurance. However, our modern Supreme Court

“interprets”  the General Welfare Clause of Article I broadly as a grant of power for Congress to

tax and  spend for virtually any purpose that it believes will benefit the people. Now we know

from  history that this is not what was intended. But it is the prevailing modern interpretation,  

providing a veneer of legitimacy to Congress’ actions—as well as legal grounds for upholding  

them.   

The federal government doesn’t “ignore” the Constitution—it takes advantage of loopholes  

created through practice and precedent. The only way to close these loopholes definitively

and permanently is through an Article V convention that reinstates limitations on federal power 

and  jurisdiction in clear, modern language.   

**Objection 4: We have no idea how an Article V convention would operate, because **

**it is not spelled out in Article V.**

**Response:  **The Constitution does not spell out the details of processes that were well-

known to the Framers (“grand jury” and “habeas corpus” are other examples), and 

interstate conventions were common practice for them. We know the process from the

historical records of past conventions. There have been at least 42 in American history. 

States always choose and instruct their commissioners, voting is always on a one-state, 

one-vote basis, and no interstate convention has ever become a “runaway.”

**Objection 5: Congress will use its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause**

**to control an Article V convention.**

**Response: **This argument is based on ignorance of existing precedent, holding that 

Congress  may not use any of its Article I powers in the context of Article V. //See Idaho//

//v. Freeman//, 529  F.Supp. 1107, 1151 (D. Idaho 1981) (“Thus Congress, outside of the 

authority granted by article  V, has no power to act with regard to an amendment, i.e., it

does not retain any of its traditional  authority vested in it by article I.”) This case was

later vacated as moot for procedural reasons,  but the central holding remains

unchanged. Congress may not use its power under the  Necessary and Proper Clause

with respect to the operation of an Article V convention.

**Objection 6: A convention could change the ratification process just like the **

**Constitutional Convention did. **

**Response: **(excerpted from an article by Professor Rob Natelson): 

● This misinterprets the power of the 1787 convention, which met under the

states’ reserved powers and not under the Articles of Confederation;

● This contradicts the specific words of Article V, which lays out how

amendments to “this Constitution” must be ratified;

● This contradicts 200+ years of Article V court decisions, which rule that every

actor in the amendment process must follow the rules laid out in Article V; and

● This defies reality: The convention has no military force nor even any existence

after adjournment. How will it enforce its decree? Call out the army?

**Objection 7: The Article V process was intended only to correct drafting errors; **

**not to correct abuses of power. **

**Response: **At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Col. George Mason promoted the 

convention procedure specifically as a remedy for abuses of power by the national 

government. A number of other historical documents confirm that this was the 

Founders’ intention. (https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/the-founders-pointed-to-article-v-as-a-

cure-for-federal-abuse

) 

Moreover, amendments have been used for this purpose before and have been 

extremely effective. The Eleventh Amendment was proposed by Congress and ratified 

by the states specifically to reverse a wrong Supreme Court decision, //Chisholm v. //

//Georgia//, that had given the federal courts more jurisdiction than they should have had. 

The problem was corrected through the Article V amendment process. 

**Objection 8: An Article V convention would open up our beloved Constitution to **

**massive changes, and the convention could even replace our entire Constitution **

**with a new one. ** 

**Response: **An Article V convention to propose amendments is not the same as a 

“Constitutional Convention.” At a constitutional convention such as the one in 1787, the 

states gather pursuant to their reserved sovereignty and the basic right of the people to 

“alter or abolish” their government as recognized in the Declaration of Independence. 

At an Article V convention, on the other hand, the states gather pursuant to their power 

under Article V, and are limited by its provisions. 

The only power an Article V convention will have is the same power that Congress also 

has under Article V every day it is in session–the power to //propose amendments //that 

would be //added// to the Constitution (if ratified by 38 states) just like the 27 amendments 

we already have.  



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto012.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**12**

1 

**Conventional Disinformation **

Opponents of an Article V convention for proposing amendments to the U.S. Constitution are stoking 

fear with objections based upon disinformation. 

A common objection to an Article V convention for proposing amendments is the belief that the 

convention will “runaway” by ignoring the limitations placed on it. The Constitutional Convention of 

1787 is often cited as an example of a runaway convention.  

Limitations on a convention arise from two sources: the call and the commissions. The call is the first 

resolution calling for a convention, and it places limitations on the convention as a whole. A commission 

is a set of instructions a state legislature gives to its representatives (commissioners) and can be more 

restrictive than the call. 

The claim that the 1787 convention exceeded its call starts with incorrect identification of the call. 

Consider the table on page 14, listing each of the resolutions leading up to the 1787 convention. The 

claim is made that the Continental Congress made the call on February 21, 1787 and restricted the 

convention to revising the Articles of Confederation. How could this be the call if six states had already 

selected and instructed their commissioners prior to February 21, 1787? How would those states know 

the subject matter, date, and location of the convention? In fact, the Articles of Confederation did not 

grant the Confederation Congress the power to call a Convention of the States. 

It was Virginia that issued the call on November 23, 1786, without restricting the convention to revising 

the Articles of Confederation. New York and Massachusetts did issue commissions that restricted their 

commissioners to revising the Articles of Confederation, but the convention as a whole was not so 

restricted. 

There have been at least forty-two state conventions in our history (see the table on page 15), and not 

one has deviated from the scope of its call (runaway). It is also worth noting in that same table that all 

forty-two previous state conventions operated on the principle of one state, one vote. 

Another common objection claims that we do not know how an Article V convention would operate. 

The list of forty-two previous state conventions would demonstrate that we have a great deal of 

experience with operating an Article V convention. In addition, the operation of an Article V convention is 

well established in a significant number of court cases on the subject. A sampling of these rulings can be 

found in the table on page 16. 

Finally, it is self-evident that the framers knew exactly what they meant by a Convention of the States 

when they drafted that mechanism into Article V because they were participating in a Convention of the 

States at the time! In essence, the founders were saying, “if the states desire to propose amendments 

to the Constitution, use the same method we are using right now.” 

The data in the following three tables is clear evidence that an Article V convention for proposing 

a

mendments is the safe, reliable, and time-tested method the framers intended for such a time as this. 

**Objection 6: A convention could change the ratification process just like the **

**Constitutional Convention did. **

**Response: **(excerpted from an article by Professor Rob Natelson): 

● This misinterprets the power of the 1787 convention, which met under the

states’ reserved powers and not under the Articles of Confederation;

● This contradicts the specific words of Article V, which lays out how

amendments to “this Constitution” must be ratified;

● This contradicts 200+ years of Article V court decisions, which rule that every

actor in the amendment process must follow the rules laid out in Article V; and

● This defies reality: The convention has no military force nor even any existence

after adjournment. How will it enforce its decree? Call out the army?

**Objection 7: The Article V process was intended only to correct drafting errors; **

**not to correct abuses of power. **

**Response: **At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Col. George Mason promoted the 

convention procedure specifically as a remedy for abuses of power by the national 

government. A number of other historical documents confirm that this was the 

Founders’ intention. (https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/the-founders-pointed-to-article-v-as-a-

cure-for-federal-abuse

) 

Moreover, amendments have been used for this purpose before and have been 

extremely effective. The Eleventh Amendment was proposed by Congress and ratified 

by the states specifically to reverse a wrong Supreme Court decision, //Chisholm v. //

//Georgia//, that had given the federal courts more jurisdiction than they should have had. 

The problem was corrected through the Article V amendment process. 

**Objection 8: An Article V convention would open up our beloved Constitution to **

**massive changes, and the convention could even replace our entire Constitution **

**with a new one. ** 

**Response: **An Article V convention to propose amendments is not the same as a 

“Constitutional Convention.” At a constitutional convention such as the one in 1787, the 

states gather pursuant to their reserved sovereignty and the basic right of the people to 

“alter or abolish” their government as recognized in the Declaration of Independence. 

At an Article V convention, on the other hand, the states gather pursuant to their power 

under Article V, and are limited by its provisions. 

The only power an Article V convention will have is the same power that Congress also 

has under Article V every day it is in session–the power to //propose amendments //that 

would be //added// to the Constitution (if ratified by 38 states) just like the 27 amendments 

we already have.  

As was the case with the Bill of Rights, each amendment proposed by an Article V 

convention of the states would have to be ratified individually by 38 states. This is 

simply not a “re-writing” or “replacing” process. If the states wanted to do that, they 

would not need to use the Article V process. They would simply gather, as they did in 

1787, pursuant to their residual sovereignty. 

This chart highlights the distinctions between these two types of interstate conventions: 

 

 

 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto013.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**13**

1 

**Conventional Disinformation **

Opponents of an Article V convention for proposing amendments to the U.S. Constitution are stoking 

fear with objections based upon disinformation. 

A common objection to an Article V convention for proposing amendments is the belief that the 

convention will “runaway” by ignoring the limitations placed on it. The Constitutional Convention of 

1787 is often cited as an example of a runaway convention.  

Limitations on a convention arise from two sources: the call and the commissions. The call is the first 

resolution calling for a convention, and it places limitations on the convention as a whole. A commission 

is a set of instructions a state legislature gives to its representatives (commissioners) and can be more 

restrictive than the call. 

The claim that the 1787 convention exceeded its call starts with incorrect identification of the call. 

Consider the table on page 14, listing each of the resolutions leading up to the 1787 convention. The 

claim is made that the Continental Congress made the call on February 21, 1787 and restricted the 

convention to revising the Articles of Confederation. How could this be the call if six states had already 

selected and instructed their commissioners prior to February 21, 1787? How would those states know 

the subject matter, date, and location of the convention? In fact, the Articles of Confederation did not 

grant the Confederation Congress the power to call a Convention of the States. 

It was Virginia that issued the call on November 23, 1786, without restricting the convention to revising 

the Articles of Confederation. New York and Massachusetts did issue commissions that restricted their 

commissioners to revising the Articles of Confederation, but the convention as a whole was not so 

restricted. 

There have been at least forty-two state conventions in our history (see the table on page 15), and not 

one has deviated from the scope of its call (runaway). It is also worth noting in that same table that all 

forty-two previous state conventions operated on the principle of one state, one vote. 

Another common objection claims that we do not know how an Article V convention would operate. 

The list of forty-two previous state conventions would demonstrate that we have a great deal of 

experience with operating an Article V convention. In addition, the operation of an Article V convention is 

well established in a significant number of court cases on the subject. A sampling of these rulings can be 

found in the table on page 16. 

Finally, it is self-evident that the framers knew exactly what they meant by a Convention of the States 

when they drafted that mechanism into Article V because they were participating in a Convention of the 

States at the time! In essence, the founders were saying, “if the states desire to propose amendments 

to the Constitution, use the same method we are using right now.” 

The data in the following three tables is clear evidence that an Article V convention for proposing 

a

mendments is the safe, reliable, and time-tested method the framers intended for such a time as this. 

**Objection 6: A convention could change the ratification process just like the **

**Constitutional Convention did. **

**Response: **(excerpted from an article by Professor Rob Natelson): 

● This misinterprets the power of the 1787 convention, which met under the

states’ reserved powers and not under the Articles of Confederation;

● This contradicts the specific words of Article V, which lays out how

amendments to “this Constitution” must be ratified;

● This contradicts 200+ years of Article V court decisions, which rule that every

actor in the amendment process must follow the rules laid out in Article V; and

● This defies reality: The convention has no military force nor even any existence

after adjournment. How will it enforce its decree? Call out the army?

**Objection 7: The Article V process was intended only to correct drafting errors; **

**not to correct abuses of power. **

**Response: **At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, Col. George Mason promoted the 

convention procedure specifically as a remedy for abuses of power by the national 

government. A number of other historical documents confirm that this was the 

Founders’ intention. (https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/the-founders-pointed-to-article-v-as-a-

cure-for-federal-abuse

) 

Moreover, amendments have been used for this purpose before and have been 

extremely effective. The Eleventh Amendment was proposed by Congress and ratified 

by the states specifically to reverse a wrong Supreme Court decision, //Chisholm v. //

//Georgia//, that had given the federal courts more jurisdiction than they should have had. 

The problem was corrected through the Article V amendment process. 

**Objection 8: An Article V convention would open up our beloved Constitution to **

**massive changes, and the convention could even replace our entire Constitution **

**with a new one. ** 

**Response: **An Article V convention to propose amendments is not the same as a 

“Constitutional Convention.” At a constitutional convention such as the one in 1787, the 

states gather pursuant to their reserved sovereignty and the basic right of the people to 

“alter or abolish” their government as recognized in the Declaration of Independence. 

At an Article V convention, on the other hand, the states gather pursuant to their power 

under Article V, and are limited by its provisions. 

The only power an Article V convention will have is the same power that Congress also 

has under Article V every day it is in session–the power to //propose amendments //that 

would be //added// to the Constitution (if ratified by 38 states) just like the 27 amendments 

we already have.  

As was the case with the Bill of Rights, each amendment proposed by an Article V 

convention of the states would have to be ratified individually by 38 states. This is 

simply not a “re-writing” or “replacing” process. If the states wanted to do that, they 

would not need to use the Article V process. They would simply gather, as they did in 

1787, pursuant to their residual sovereignty. 

This chart highlights the distinctions between these two types of interstate conventions: 

 

 

 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto014.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**14**

3 

**42 Historical State Conventions** 

Year 

Location 

Purpose 

Voting 

Runaway 

1677 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1684

Albany

Indian negotiations

1 State 1 Vote

No

1689 

Boston 

Defense issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1689 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1690 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1693 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1694 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1704 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1711 

Boston 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1722 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1744 

Albany 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1744 

Lancaster 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1745 

Albany 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1745

Albany

Indian negotiations

1 State 1 Vote

No

1747 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1751 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1754 

Albany 

Indian negotiations and plan of union 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1765 

New York City 

Response to Stamp Act 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1768 

Fort Stanwyx 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1774 

New York City 

Response to British actions 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1776-77  Providence, RI 

Paper currency and public credit 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1777 

Yorktown, PA 

Price control 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1777 

Springfield, MA 

Economic issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1778 

New Haven, CT 

Price controls and other responses to inflation 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1779 

Hartford, CT 

Economic issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1780

Philadelphia, PA

Price controls

1 State 1 Vote

No

1780 

Boston, MA 

Conduct of Revolutionary War 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1780 

Hartford, CT 

Conduct of Revolutionary War 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1781 

Providence, RI 

War supply 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1786 

Annapolis, MD 

Trade 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1787 

Philadelphia, PA 

Propose changes to political system 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1814 

Hartford, CT 

New England states response to the war of 1812  1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1850 

Nashville, TN 

Southern response to the North 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1861 

Washington, DC 

Propose a constitutional amendment 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1861 

Montgomery, AL 

Write the Confederate Constitution 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1889 

St. Louis, MO 

Propose anti-trust measures 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1922 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Colorado River Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1928-29 Santa Fe, NM

Negotiate temporary Rio Grande Compact

1 State 1 Vote

No

1928-38  Colorado Springs, CO 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Rio Grande Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1937 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Rio Grande Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1946-49  Denver, CO 

Negotiate the Upper Colorado River Basin 

Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

2017 

Phoenix, AZ 

Propose rules for an Article V convention to 

propose a balanced budget 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/list-conventions-states-colonies-american-history/ 

https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/no-a-convention-of-states-could-not-change-the-one-state-one-vote-

rule/ 

 

2 

 

**The 1787 Constitutional Convention Call and Commissions **

**Date **

**State **

**Commission **

11/23/1786 

Virginia 

devising and discussing all such alterations and further provisions, as may be 

necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the 

Union.  [meet Second Monday in May 1787 in Philadelphia] 

11/24/1786 

New Jersey 

for the purpose of taking into consideration the state of the Union as to trade and 

other important objects, and of devising such further provisions as shall appear 

necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to the 

exigencies thereof 

12/3/1786 

Pennsylvania  devising, deliberating on, and discussing all such alterations and further provisions as 

may be necessary to render the foederal constitution fully adequate to the exigencies 

of the Union 

1/6/1787  North Carolina  To discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects of our 

foederal union, and to procure the enlarged purposes which it was intended to 

effect. 

2/3/1787 

Delaware 

devising, deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and further Provisions, as 

may be necessary to render the Foederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of 

the Union  [each State shall have one vote] 

2/10/1787 

Georgia 

Devising and discussing all such alterations and farther provisions, as may be 

necessary to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the union. 

2/21/1787  Confederation 

Congress 

the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting 

to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as 

shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal 

constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 

Union. 

3/6/1787 

New York 

the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting 

to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as 

shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal 

constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 

Union. 

3/7/1787  Massachusetts  amend the Articles of Confederation to render the federal constitution adequate to 

the exigencies of government and the preservation of the union. 

3/8/1787  South Carolina  in devising and discussing all such alterations, clauses, articles and provisions as may 

be thought necessary to render the foederal constitution entirely adequate to the 

actual situation and future good government of the confederated states 

5/17/1787 

Connecticut  Such Alterations and Provisions, agreeable to the general Principles of Republican 

Government, as they shall think proper, to render the foederal Constitution adequate 

to the Exigencies of Government, and the Preservation of the Union. 

5/26/1787 

Maryland 

considering such alterations, and further provisions, as may be necessary to render 

the federal constitution adequate for the exigencies of the union. 

6/27/1787 

New 

Hampshire 

in devising and discussing all such alterations and further provisions as to render the 

federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union. 

 

Because it is first, the Virginia resolution is the call, placing limitations on the convention as a whole. 

These cannot be the call, because six states had already selected and instructed their commissioners. 

https:%%//%%conventionofstates.com/files/defying-conventional-wisdom-the-constitution-was-not-the-product-of-a-runaway-convention-by-michael-farris-1 

3 

**42 Historical State Conventions** 

Year 

Location 

Purpose 

Voting 

Runaw

1677 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1684

Albany

Indian negotiations

1 State 1 Vote

No

1689 

Boston 

Defense issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1689 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1690 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1693 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1694 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1704 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1711 

Boston 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1722 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1744 

Albany 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1744 

Lancaster 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1745 

Albany 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1745

Albany

Indian negotiations

1 State 1 Vote

No

1747 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1751 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1754 

Albany 

Indian negotiations and plan of union 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1765 

New York City 

Response to Stamp Act 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1768 

Fort Stanwyx 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1774 

New York City 

Response to British actions 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1776-77  Providence, RI 

Paper currency and public credit 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1777 

Yorktown, PA 

Price control 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1777 

Springfield, MA 

Economic issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1778 

New Haven, CT 

Price controls and other responses to inflation 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1779 

Hartford, CT 

Economic issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1780

Philadelphia, PA

Price controls

1 State 1 Vote

No

1780 

Boston, MA 

Conduct of Revolutionary War 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1780 

Hartford, CT 

Conduct of Revolutionary War 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1781 

Providence, RI 

War supply 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1786 

Annapolis, MD 

Trade 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1787 

Philadelphia, PA 

Propose changes to political system 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1814 

Hartford, CT 

New England states response to the war of 1812  1 State 1 Vote 

No

1850 

Nashville, TN 

Southern response to the North 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1861 

Washington, DC 

Propose a constitutional amendment 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1861 

Montgomery, AL 

Write the Confederate Constitution 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1889 

St. Louis, MO 

Propose anti-trust measures 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1922 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Colorado River Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1928-29 Santa Fe, NM

Negotiate temporary Rio Grande Compact

1 State 1 Vote

No

1928-38  Colorado Springs, CO 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Rio Grande Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1937 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Rio Grande Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1946-49  Denver, CO 

Negotiate the Upper Colorado River Basin 

Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

2017 

Phoenix, AZ 

Propose rules for an Article V convention to 

propose a balanced budget 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/list-conventions-states-colonies-american-history/ 

https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/no-a-convention-of-states-could-not-change-the-one-state-one-vot

rule/ 

 

2 

 

**The 1787 Constitutional Convention Call and Commissions **

**Date **

**State **

**Commission **

11/23/1786 

Virginia 

devising and discussing all such alterations and further provisions, as may be 

necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the 

Union.  [meet Second Monday in May 1787 in Philadelphia] 

11/24/1786 

New Jersey 

for the purpose of taking into consideration the state of the Union as to trade and 

other important objects, and of devising such further provisions as shall appear 

necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to the 

exigencies thereof 

12/3/1786 

Pennsylvania  devising, deliberating on, and discussing all such alterations and further provisions as 

may be necessary to render the foederal constitution fully adequate to the exigencies 

of the Union 

1/6/1787  North Carolina  To discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects of our 

foederal union, and to procure the enlarged purposes which it was intended to 

effect. 

2/3/1787 

Delaware 

devising, deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and further Provisions, as 

may be necessary to render the Foederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of 

the Union  [each State shall have one vote] 

2/10/1787 

Georgia 

Devising and discussing all such alterations and farther provisions, as may be 

necessary to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the union. 

2/21/1787  Confederation 

Congress 

the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting 

to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as 

shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal 

constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 

Union. 

3/6/1787 

New York 

the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting 

to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as 

shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal 

constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 

Union. 

3/7/1787  Massachusetts  amend the Articles of Confederation to render the federal constitution adequate to 

the exigencies of government and the preservation of the union. 

3/8/1787  South Carolina  in devising and discussing all such alterations, clauses, articles and provisions as may 

be thought necessary to render the foederal constitution entirely adequate to the 

actual situation and future good government of the confederated states 

5/17/1787 

Connecticut  Such Alterations and Provisions, agreeable to the general Principles of Republican 

Government, as they shall think proper, to render the foederal Constitution adequate 

to the Exigencies of Government, and the Preservation of the Union. 

5/26/1787 

Maryland 

considering such alterations, and further provisions, as may be necessary to render 

the federal constitution adequate for the exigencies of the union. 

6/27/1787 

New 

Hampshire 

in devising and discussing all such alterations and further provisions as to render the 

federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union. 

 

Because it is first, the Virginia resolution is the call, placing limitations on the convention as a whole. 

These cannot be the call, because six states had already selected and instructed their commissioners. 

https:%%//%%conventionofstates.com/files/defying-conventional-wisdom-the-constitution-was-not-the-product-of-a-runaway-convention-by-michael-farris-1 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto015.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**15**

3 

**42 Historical State Conventions** 

Year 

Location 

Purpose 

Voting 

Runaway 

1677 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1684

Albany

Indian negotiations

1 State 1 Vote

No

1689 

Boston 

Defense issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1689 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1690 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1693 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1694 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1704 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1711 

Boston 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1722 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1744 

Albany 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1744 

Lancaster 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1745 

Albany 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1745

Albany

Indian negotiations

1 State 1 Vote

No

1747 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1751 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1754 

Albany 

Indian negotiations and plan of union 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1765 

New York City 

Response to Stamp Act 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1768 

Fort Stanwyx 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1774 

New York City 

Response to British actions 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1776-77  Providence, RI 

Paper currency and public credit 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1777 

Yorktown, PA 

Price control 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1777 

Springfield, MA 

Economic issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1778 

New Haven, CT 

Price controls and other responses to inflation 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1779 

Hartford, CT 

Economic issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1780

Philadelphia, PA

Price controls

1 State 1 Vote

No

1780 

Boston, MA 

Conduct of Revolutionary War 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1780 

Hartford, CT 

Conduct of Revolutionary War 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1781 

Providence, RI 

War supply 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1786 

Annapolis, MD 

Trade 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1787 

Philadelphia, PA 

Propose changes to political system 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1814 

Hartford, CT 

New England states response to the war of 1812  1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1850 

Nashville, TN 

Southern response to the North 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1861 

Washington, DC 

Propose a constitutional amendment 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1861 

Montgomery, AL 

Write the Confederate Constitution 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1889 

St. Louis, MO 

Propose anti-trust measures 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1922 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Colorado River Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1928-29 Santa Fe, NM

Negotiate temporary Rio Grande Compact

1 State 1 Vote

No

1928-38  Colorado Springs, CO 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Rio Grande Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1937 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Rio Grande Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

1946-49  Denver, CO 

Negotiate the Upper Colorado River Basin 

Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

2017 

Phoenix, AZ 

Propose rules for an Article V convention to 

propose a balanced budget 

1 State 1 Vote 

No 

https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/list-conventions-states-colonies-american-history/ 

https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/no-a-convention-of-states-could-not-change-the-one-state-one-vote-

rule/ 

 

2 

 

**The 1787 Constitutional Convention Call and Commissions **

**Date **

**State **

**Commission **

11/23/1786 

Virginia 

devising and discussing all such alterations and further provisions, as may be 

necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the 

Union.  [meet Second Monday in May 1787 in Philadelphia] 

11/24/1786 

New Jersey 

for the purpose of taking into consideration the state of the Union as to trade and 

other important objects, and of devising such further provisions as shall appear 

necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to the 

exigencies thereof 

12/3/1786 

Pennsylvania  devising, deliberating on, and discussing all such alterations and further provisions as 

may be necessary to render the foederal constitution fully adequate to the exigencies 

of the Union 

1/6/1787  North Carolina  To discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects of our 

foederal union, and to procure the enlarged purposes which it was intended to 

effect. 

2/3/1787 

Delaware 

devising, deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and further Provisions, as 

may be necessary to render the Foederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of 

the Union  [each State shall have one vote] 

2/10/1787 

Georgia 

Devising and discussing all such alterations and farther provisions, as may be 

necessary to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the union. 

2/21/1787  Confederation 

Congress 

the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting 

to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as 

shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal 

constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 

Union. 

3/6/1787 

New York 

the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting 

to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as 

shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal 

constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 

Union. 

3/7/1787  Massachusetts  amend the Articles of Confederation to render the federal constitution adequate to 

the exigencies of government and the preservation of the union. 

3/8/1787  South Carolina  in devising and discussing all such alterations, clauses, articles and provisions as may 

be thought necessary to render the foederal constitution entirely adequate to the 

actual situation and future good government of the confederated states 

5/17/1787 

Connecticut  Such Alterations and Provisions, agreeable to the general Principles of Republican 

Government, as they shall think proper, to render the foederal Constitution adequate 

to the Exigencies of Government, and the Preservation of the Union. 

5/26/1787 

Maryland 

considering such alterations, and further provisions, as may be necessary to render 

the federal constitution adequate for the exigencies of the union. 

6/27/1787 

New 

Hampshire 

in devising and discussing all such alterations and further provisions as to render the 

federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union. 

 

Because it is first, the Virginia resolution is the call, placing limitations on the convention as a whole. 

These cannot be the call, because six states had already selected and instructed their commissioners. 

https:%%//%%conventionofstates.com/files/defying-conventional-wisdom-the-constitution-was-not-the-product-of-a-runaway-convention-by-michael-farris-1 

3 

**42 Historical State Conventions** 

Year 

Location 

Purpose 

Voting 

Runaw

1677 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1684

Albany

Indian negotiations

1 State 1 Vote

No

1689 

Boston 

Defense issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1689 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1690 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1693 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1694 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1704 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1711 

Boston 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1722 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1744 

Albany 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1744 

Lancaster 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1745 

Albany 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1745

Albany

Indian negotiations

1 State 1 Vote

No

1747 

New York City 

Defense 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1751 

Albany 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1754 

Albany 

Indian negotiations and plan of union 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1765 

New York City 

Response to Stamp Act 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1768 

Fort Stanwyx 

Indian negotiations 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1774 

New York City 

Response to British actions 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1776-77  Providence, RI 

Paper currency and public credit 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1777 

Yorktown, PA 

Price control 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1777 

Springfield, MA 

Economic issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1778 

New Haven, CT 

Price controls and other responses to inflation 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1779 

Hartford, CT 

Economic issues 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1780

Philadelphia, PA

Price controls

1 State 1 Vote

No

1780 

Boston, MA 

Conduct of Revolutionary War 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1780 

Hartford, CT 

Conduct of Revolutionary War 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1781 

Providence, RI 

War supply 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1786 

Annapolis, MD 

Trade 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1787 

Philadelphia, PA 

Propose changes to political system 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1814 

Hartford, CT 

New England states response to the war of 1812  1 State 1 Vote 

No

1850 

Nashville, TN 

Southern response to the North 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1861 

Washington, DC 

Propose a constitutional amendment 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1861 

Montgomery, AL 

Write the Confederate Constitution 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1889 

St. Louis, MO 

Propose anti-trust measures 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1922 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Colorado River Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1928-29 Santa Fe, NM

Negotiate temporary Rio Grande Compact

1 State 1 Vote

No

1928-38  Colorado Springs, CO 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Rio Grande Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1937 

Santa Fe, NM 

Negotiate the Rio Grande Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

1946-49  Denver, CO 

Negotiate the Upper Colorado River Basin 

Compact 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

2017 

Phoenix, AZ 

Propose rules for an Article V convention to 

propose a balanced budget 

1 State 1 Vote 

No

https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/list-conventions-states-colonies-american-history/ 

https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/no-a-convention-of-states-could-not-change-the-one-state-one-vot

rule/ 

 

2 

 

**The 1787 Constitutional Convention Call and Commissions **

**Date **

**State **

**Commission **

11/23/1786 

Virginia 

devising and discussing all such alterations and further provisions, as may be 

necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the 

Union.  [meet Second Monday in May 1787 in Philadelphia] 

11/24/1786 

New Jersey 

for the purpose of taking into consideration the state of the Union as to trade and 

other important objects, and of devising such further provisions as shall appear 

necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to the 

exigencies thereof 

12/3/1786 

Pennsylvania  devising, deliberating on, and discussing all such alterations and further provisions as 

may be necessary to render the foederal constitution fully adequate to the exigencies 

of the Union 

1/6/1787  North Carolina  To discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects of our 

foederal union, and to procure the enlarged purposes which it was intended to 

effect. 

2/3/1787 

Delaware 

devising, deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and further Provisions, as 

may be necessary to render the Foederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of 

the Union  [each State shall have one vote] 

2/10/1787 

Georgia 

Devising and discussing all such alterations and farther provisions, as may be 

necessary to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the union. 

2/21/1787  Confederation 

Congress 

the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting 

to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as 

shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal 

constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 

Union. 

3/6/1787 

New York 

the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting 

to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as 

shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal 

constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the 

Union. 

3/7/1787  Massachusetts  amend the Articles of Confederation to render the federal constitution adequate to 

the exigencies of government and the preservation of the union. 

3/8/1787  South Carolina  in devising and discussing all such alterations, clauses, articles and provisions as may 

be thought necessary to render the foederal constitution entirely adequate to the 

actual situation and future good government of the confederated states 

5/17/1787 

Connecticut  Such Alterations and Provisions, agreeable to the general Principles of Republican 

Government, as they shall think proper, to render the foederal Constitution adequate 

to the Exigencies of Government, and the Preservation of the Union. 

5/26/1787 

Maryland 

considering such alterations, and further provisions, as may be necessary to render 

the federal constitution adequate for the exigencies of the union. 

6/27/1787 

New 

Hampshire 

in devising and discussing all such alterations and further provisions as to render the 

federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union. 

 

Because it is first, the Virginia resolution is the call, placing limitations on the convention as a whole. 

These cannot be the call, because six states had already selected and instructed their commissioners. 

https:%%//%%conventionofstates.com/files/defying-conventional-wisdom-the-constitution-was-not-the-product-of-a-runaway-convention-by-michael-farris-1 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto016.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**16**

 

4 

 

 

**Selected Court Cases Related to Article V **

**Case **

**Holding **

//Barker v. Hazeltine//, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (D.S.D. 1998) 

  Article V is the only constitutional method of 

amending the US Constitution. 

//Dodge v. Woolsey//, 59 U.S. 331 (1855)  

Amendatory conventions may be single issue.

** **

**T**he States and/or the people cannot 

dictate the amendments. A state 

application is valid solely because it was 

made by the state. 

//Gralike v. Cooke//, 191 F. 3d 911 (8th Cir. 1999) 

Article V Conventions cannot be prohibited 

from deliberation and consideration of a 

proposed amendment and thereby limited to 

pre-written wording. 

//Hollingsworth v. Virginia, //3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798)   No signature of the President is required for a 

constitutional amendment to be valid and 

complete. 

//In Re Opinion of the Justices, //204 N.C. 306, 172 S.E. 

474 (1933)  

An Article V Convention may be limited in 

purpose to a single issue or to a fixed set of 

issues. 

//Leser v. Garnett, //258 U.S. 130 (1922) 

The state legislature’s discretion could not be 

supplanted by the rules imposed by a third 

party. 

//Opinion of the Justices to the Senate//, 373 Mass. 877, 

366 N.E. 2d 1226 (1977)  

The governor plays no role in the approval 

process of an Article V Convention application. 

//Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania//, 41 U.S. 539 

(1842) 

No one is authorized to question the validity 

of a state’s application for an Article V 

Convention. 

//Smith v. Union Bank of Georgetown, //30 U.S. 518 

(1831) 

An Article V Convention is a “convention of 

the States” and is therefore endowed with the 

powers of an interstate convention. 

//State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, //253 U.S. 320 (1920)   An Article V Convention will require only two-

thirds of the quorum present to conduct 

business. 

//Ullmann v. United States//, 350 U.S. 422 (1956)  

The amendment and ratification processes 

cannot be changed to circumvent the Article V 

Convention. 

//United States v. Thibault, //47 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1931) 

The federal or national government is not 

concerned with how an Article V Convention 

of a state legislature is constituted. Therefore, 

the Article V Convention is empowered to 

organize and conduct its business as the 

delegates or commissioners see fit.  

 

https:%%//%%rickbulow.com/Library/Books/Non-Fiction/ArticleV/FindingsOfCourtCasesRelatedToArticleVOfTheUnitedStatesConstitution.pdf 

 

PROBLEMS

IN THE TESTIMONY OF

ROBERT BROWN

//**By Professor Rob Natelson**//



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**17**

 

4 

 

 

**Selected Court Cases Related to Article V **

**Case **

**Holding **

//Barker v. Hazeltine//, 3 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (D.S.D. 1998) 

  Article V is the only constitutional method of 

amending the US Constitution. 

//Dodge v. Woolsey//, 59 U.S. 331 (1855)  

Amendatory conventions may be single issue.

** **

**T**he States and/or the people cannot 

dictate the amendments. A state 

application is valid solely because it was 

made by the state. 

//Gralike v. Cooke//, 191 F. 3d 911 (8th Cir. 1999) 

Article V Conventions cannot be prohibited 

from deliberation and consideration of a 

proposed amendment and thereby limited to 

pre-written wording. 

//Hollingsworth v. Virginia, //3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798)   No signature of the President is required for a 

constitutional amendment to be valid and 

complete. 

//In Re Opinion of the Justices, //204 N.C. 306, 172 S.E. 

474 (1933)  

An Article V Convention may be limited in 

purpose to a single issue or to a fixed set of 

issues. 

//Leser v. Garnett, //258 U.S. 130 (1922) 

The state legislature’s discretion could not be 

supplanted by the rules imposed by a third 

party. 

//Opinion of the Justices to the Senate//, 373 Mass. 877, 

366 N.E. 2d 1226 (1977)  

The governor plays no role in the approval 

process of an Article V Convention application. 

//Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania//, 41 U.S. 539 

(1842) 

No one is authorized to question the validity 

of a state’s application for an Article V 

Convention. 

//Smith v. Union Bank of Georgetown, //30 U.S. 518 

(1831) 

An Article V Convention is a “convention of 

the States” and is therefore endowed with the 

powers of an interstate convention. 

//State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, //253 U.S. 320 (1920)   An Article V Convention will require only two-

thirds of the quorum present to conduct 

business. 

//Ullmann v. United States//, 350 U.S. 422 (1956)  

The amendment and ratification processes 

cannot be changed to circumvent the Article V 

Convention. 

//United States v. Thibault, //47 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1931) 

The federal or national government is not 

concerned with how an Article V Convention 

of a state legislature is constituted. Therefore, 

the Article V Convention is empowered to 

organize and conduct its business as the 

delegates or commissioners see fit.  

 

https:%%//%%rickbulow.com/Library/Books/Non-Fiction/ArticleV/FindingsOfCourtCasesRelatedToArticleVOfTheUnitedStatesConstitution.pdf 

 

PROBLEMS

IN THE TESTIMONY OF

ROBERT BROWN

//**By Professor Rob Natelson**//



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**18**

//**Problems in the Testimony of Robert Brown**//

By Robert G. Natelson1

// 1//

About the Author:// Professor Natelson is the director of the Article V Information Center at the Independence Institute in //

//Denver and has published widely on many parts of the U.S. Constitution for the scholarly and popular markets. He is the most-//

//published active scholar on the Constitution’s amendment process, and the author of //THE LAW OF ARTICLE V//, a legal treatise. //

//His research studies have been relied on by the highest courts of 16 states, by federal appeals courts in fi ve cases, and by U.S. //

//Supreme Court Justices in seven cases.//

//Professor Natelson has a degrees in history and law, the latter from Cornell University (J.D. 1973), where he was elected to //

//both the //Cornell Law Review// and the University Senate. (He chose the latter.) After practicing law (1974-85), he served as a //

//tenure-track and tenured professor of law (1985-2010).//

//Professor Natelson has split his professional experience between the public and private sectors. He also has extensive political //

//experience: In Montana, he led several successful statewide ballot campaigns to restrain taxes and spending, and he placed //

//second in a fi ve-candidate fi eld in the open party primaries for governor (2000). A more complete biography is at https:%%//%%i2i.//

//org/about/our-people/rob-natelson/.//

//“It is much easier to alarm people than to inform them.” //

—William Davie

Constitutional Convention Delegate

//i//



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto019.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**19**

//**Problems in the Testimony of Robert Brown**//

By Robert G. Natelson1

// 1//

About the Author:// Professor Natelson is the director of the Article V Information Center at the Independence Institute in //

//Denver and has published widely on many parts of the U.S. Constitution for the scholarly and popular markets. He is the most-//

//published active scholar on the Constitution’s amendment process, and the author of //THE LAW OF ARTICLE V//, a legal treatise. //

//His research studies have been relied on by the highest courts of 16 states, by federal appeals courts in fi ve cases, and by U.S. //

//Supreme Court Justices in seven cases.//

//Professor Natelson has a degrees in history and law, the latter from Cornell University (J.D. 1973), where he was elected to //

//both the //Cornell Law Review// and the University Senate. (He chose the latter.) After practicing law (1974-85), he served as a //

//tenure-track and tenured professor of law (1985-2010).//

//Professor Natelson has split his professional experience between the public and private sectors. He also has extensive political //

//experience: In Montana, he led several successful statewide ballot campaigns to restrain taxes and spending, and he placed //

//second in a fi ve-candidate fi eld in the open party primaries for governor (2000). A more complete biography is at https:%%//%%i2i.//

//org/about/our-people/rob-natelson/.//

//“It is much easier to alarm people than to inform them.” //

—William Davie

Constitutional Convention Delegate

//i//



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**20**

//1//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

I was enjoying success placing research articles in 

academic journals on common legal topics. Then 

I researched and composed an article on the 

more exotic subject of classical Roman law, and I 

submitted it to a peer-reviewed legal history journal.

A “peer reviewed” journal is called that because 

other scholars anonymously examine and report 

on your article before the journal agrees to 

publish it. This ensures the contribution is well-

grounded and adds to human knowledge.

Based on peer review of my submission, the 

journal’s editor rejected it and provided me with 

a copy of the review to explain why.

The reviewer’s assessment was devastating. He 

said it was obvious that I was writing without prior 

education in Roman law—that I knew little about 

scholarship in the fi eld, and, frankly, I was clueless 

as to how much I didn’t know.

I was emotionally crushed, but I also recognized 

that the reviewer was correct. And although the 

reviewer could have remained anonymous, he 

kindly disclosed his identity to me. He helped me 

work through my disappointment. He outlined 

what I needed to do before I could contribute 

to the very specialized realm of Roman law. I 

don’t remember all his recommendations, but I 

do recall that one of them was to acquire some 

formal education on the subject.2 

The experience taught me that I had fallen into 

the common error of undervaluing other people’s 

specialties. (Think of all the disasters wrought by 

overconfi dent husbands who imagine they can do 

their own plumbing!) The experience also taught 

me that when researching a subject, you should 

gather as much information about it as possible: 

Never limit your universe of sources.

The experience had some implications for the 

reviewer as well. He told me he had a hard time 

writing his assessment, precisely because my 

paper lacked the foundation of basic knowledge 

of the fi eld. If he were responding to a scholar who 

had some foundational knowledge, the review 

could have simply pointed out the mistakes, and 

perhaps suggest ways to correct them. But to 

respond eff ectively to a beginner, he also had to 

outline and explain many of the fundamentals.

Later I learned how time consuming this is. For 

example, when a lawyer has to thoroughly explain 

a legal conclusion to a non-lawyer, the lawyer 

fi rst must outline basic concepts taught in law 

school before proceeding to the issue at hand. 

The diffi  culty increases exponentially when the 

non-lawyer thinks he’s already an “expert” in the 

subject, and has reached a diff erent conclusion. 

Such people never want to believe the truth, so 

the lawyer has to pile up sources to support the 

most elementary propositions.

This is one reason lawyers tell each other, “Never 

argue law with a non-lawyer.” Much the same is said 

in other specialties as well, and often less politely.

Early in my 25-year career as a legal academic I had an 

experience both humiliating and invaluable.

//2 //

//After additional research over several years, I was able to publish a related article that did not require as much specialized //

//knowledge: Robert G. Natelson, //The Government as Fiduciary: Lessons from the Reign of the Emperor Trajan//, 35 //

//RICHMOND L. REV. 191 (2001).//

//2//

CONVENTION OF STATES

This is such a case: Robert Brown is a novice who 

promotes himself as an expert. So to explain why 

his conclusions are incorrect you often have to 

review the basics understood by all true experts. 

That is why this paper is so long.

//Background//

Robert Brown is an employee of the John Birch 

Society (JBS). Videos of his performances 

before legislative committees show that he 

holds himself out as a “nationally known 

constitutional scholar.”3 He or JBS apparently 

used like representations of expertise to obtain 

an interview with Joshua Philipp of the //Epoch //

//Times//, an international newspaper.

However, Brown’s biography shows none of the 

background or hard work necessary to make one 

a constitutional scholar, much less a “nationally 

known” one.4 There is no evidence of formal, or 

even informal, training in law, history, or language. 

A search of an academic database revealed no 

evidence that he has published any scholarship 

on the Constitution or on anything else.5 

**Brown’s biography shows none of the background or hard work necessary to make one a \\
constitutional scholar, much less a “nationally known” one. There is no evidence of formal, or \\
even informal, training in law, history, or language. A search of an academic database revealed **

**no evidence that he has published any scholarship on the Constitution or on anything else.**

//3//

// https:%%//%%www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=aeaAfCdQk18. The video shows Mr. Brown representing himself as a //

//“nationally known constitutional scholar” at legislative hearings in North Dakota, South Dakota, and South Carolina.//

// //

//4//

// Mr. Brown’s offi  cial JBS biography is sketchy. It tells us only that “he and some buddies started a bicycle design company for a //

//few years,” that he has worked for JBS since 2009 and that he raises chickens and goats on two acres of land.//



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto021.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**21**

//1//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

I was enjoying success placing research articles in 

academic journals on common legal topics. Then 

I researched and composed an article on the 

more exotic subject of classical Roman law, and I 

submitted it to a peer-reviewed legal history journal.

A “peer reviewed” journal is called that because 

other scholars anonymously examine and report 

on your article before the journal agrees to 

publish it. This ensures the contribution is well-

grounded and adds to human knowledge.

Based on peer review of my submission, the 

journal’s editor rejected it and provided me with 

a copy of the review to explain why.

The reviewer’s assessment was devastating. He 

said it was obvious that I was writing without prior 

education in Roman law—that I knew little about 

scholarship in the fi eld, and, frankly, I was clueless 

as to how much I didn’t know.

I was emotionally crushed, but I also recognized 

that the reviewer was correct. And although the 

reviewer could have remained anonymous, he 

kindly disclosed his identity to me. He helped me 

work through my disappointment. He outlined 

what I needed to do before I could contribute 

to the very specialized realm of Roman law. I 

don’t remember all his recommendations, but I 

do recall that one of them was to acquire some 

formal education on the subject.2 

The experience taught me that I had fallen into 

the common error of undervaluing other people’s 

specialties. (Think of all the disasters wrought by 

overconfi dent husbands who imagine they can do 

their own plumbing!) The experience also taught 

me that when researching a subject, you should 

gather as much information about it as possible: 

Never limit your universe of sources.

The experience had some implications for the 

reviewer as well. He told me he had a hard time 

writing his assessment, precisely because my 

paper lacked the foundation of basic knowledge 

of the fi eld. If he were responding to a scholar who 

had some foundational knowledge, the review 

could have simply pointed out the mistakes, and 

perhaps suggest ways to correct them. But to 

respond eff ectively to a beginner, he also had to 

outline and explain many of the fundamentals.

Later I learned how time consuming this is. For 

example, when a lawyer has to thoroughly explain 

a legal conclusion to a non-lawyer, the lawyer 

fi rst must outline basic concepts taught in law 

school before proceeding to the issue at hand. 

The diffi  culty increases exponentially when the 

non-lawyer thinks he’s already an “expert” in the 

subject, and has reached a diff erent conclusion. 

Such people never want to believe the truth, so 

the lawyer has to pile up sources to support the 

most elementary propositions.

This is one reason lawyers tell each other, “Never 

argue law with a non-lawyer.” Much the same is said 

in other specialties as well, and often less politely.

Early in my 25-year career as a legal academic I had an 

experience both humiliating and invaluable.

//2 //

//After additional research over several years, I was able to publish a related article that did not require as much specialized //

//knowledge: Robert G. Natelson, //The Government as Fiduciary: Lessons from the Reign of the Emperor Trajan//, 35 //

//RICHMOND L. REV. 191 (2001).//

//2//

CONVENTION OF STATES

This is such a case: Robert Brown is a novice who 

promotes himself as an expert. So to explain why 

his conclusions are incorrect you often have to 

review the basics understood by all true experts. 

That is why this paper is so long.

//Background//

Robert Brown is an employee of the John Birch 

Society (JBS). Videos of his performances 

before legislative committees show that he 

holds himself out as a “nationally known 

constitutional scholar.”3 He or JBS apparently 

used like representations of expertise to obtain 

an interview with Joshua Philipp of the //Epoch //

//Times//, an international newspaper.

However, Brown’s biography shows none of the 

background or hard work necessary to make one 

a constitutional scholar, much less a “nationally 

known” one.4 There is no evidence of formal, or 

even informal, training in law, history, or language. 

A search of an academic database revealed no 

evidence that he has published any scholarship 

on the Constitution or on anything else.5 

**Brown’s biography shows none of the background or hard work necessary to make one a \\
constitutional scholar, much less a “nationally known” one. There is no evidence of formal, or \\
even informal, training in law, history, or language. A search of an academic database revealed **

**no evidence that he has published any scholarship on the Constitution or on anything else.**

//3//

// https:%%//%%www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=aeaAfCdQk18. The video shows Mr. Brown representing himself as a //

//“nationally known constitutional scholar” at legislative hearings in North Dakota, South Dakota, and South Carolina.//

// //

//4//

// Mr. Brown’s offi  cial JBS biography is sketchy. It tells us only that “he and some buddies started a bicycle design company for a //

//few years,” that he has worked for JBS since 2009 and that he raises chickens and goats on two acres of land.//



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto022.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**22**

//3//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

I recognize, of course, that everyone has a First 

Amendment right to express his or her opinion, 

expert or not. But no one has the right to mislead 

legislators on important matters of law and policy 

under the cover of false credentials.

To use an analogy: Suppose John Q. Quacker 

regularly infl uenced government health policy by 

holding himself out as a “nationally known cardiac 

surgeon”—but had never gone to medical school, 

never served a residency, and never performed 

an operation. We would be justifi ably concerned. 

We should be equally concerned when a person 

off ers constitutional and other legal advice, and 

aff ects legislative policy, without any reasonable 

basis for doing so.

Yet Brown has repeatedly purveyed constitutional 

and legal advice, frequently on the very important 

issue of whether state lawmakers should apply for 

a convention for proposing amendments to the 

United States Constitution. Brown’s statements 

are based on citations, sometimes out of 

context, from only a narrow sliver of the sources 

constitutional scholars employ in their work.6

//The Interview//

To illustrate the problems in Brown’s approach 

I have chosen his //Epoch Times// interview with 

Joshua Philipp. The interview is 30 minutes long. 

This paper quotes relevant excerpts, and then 

responds to each. The footnote below provides a 

link to the entire interview.7 

//* * * *//

**Suppose John Q. Quacker regularly influenced government health \\
policy by holding himself out as a “nationally known cardiac \\
surgeon”—but had never gone to medical school . . . We should be \\
equally concerned when a person offers constitutional and other \\
legal advice, and affects legislative policy, without any reasonable **

**basis for doing so.**

//5//

// Publishing in scholarly journals subjects one’s work to review and critique from others knowledgeable in the subject.//

//  \\
6//

// Constitutional scholars work with 18th century law books, cases and statutes; the 18th century educational canon (including //

//the Greco-Roman classics); British parliamentary records; political and philosophical works infl uential with the Founders, such //

//as those by Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Montesquieu and DeLolme; colonial charters and instructions to colonial governors; pre-//

//4//

CONVENTION OF STATES

It would have been correct to say that there 

are only two ways of //proposing// amendments. 

However, Brown and other convention critics 

often fudge the diff erence between proposal and 

ratifi cation to suggest, falsely, that a convention 

alone, without state ratifi cation, could impose 

constitutional change. The Constitution and 

many other sources (see //Notes//) make it absolutely 

clear this is not so.

Brown confl ates proposal and ratifi cation elsewhere 

in the interview as well, as explained below.

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“So, the second method has never been //

//used before. We’ve been well over 200 years under //

//the current constitution and it has been brought up //

//a number of times throughout our nation’s history.”//

Correction: This is a half-truth, because it 

understates the role the Constitution’s application-

and-convention process has played in American 

history. Although the process has not been used 

to  //completion//, states have adopted hundreds of 

“applications” for a convention, and on several 

occasions America has been quite close to one. 

On several occasions as well, application campaigns 

have forced Congress to propose amendments or 

take other action. Without the convention process, 

it is very likely neither the Bill of Rights nor the 17th 

nor 22nd amendments would have been adopted.

Joshua Philipp: //“Hey, welcome back everyone. . . . //

//Robert Brown. He’s a constitutional expert with the //

//John Birch Society. And Robert, it’s a real pleasure //

//to have you on Crossroads. . . . Now, I’m curious //

//from your standpoint, what is the Convention of //

//States? How would you describe it?”//

Robert Brown:  //“Convention of States is an //

//organization pushing to use the second method in //

//Article V for obtaining changes or amendments to //

//the Constitution. . . . . Yeah, in Article V it talks //

//about two diff erent ways of amending or changing //

//the Constitution.”//

Correction: Mr. Brown’s response is in-

accurate in two respects. First, he fails 

to distinguish between a “convention of 

states” as a constitutional mechanism and 

the movement of Convention of States 

Action, which is one of several organizations 

trying to bring about such a convention.

Second, he erroneously states that there are two 

ways of amending the Constitution. In fact, there 

are four: (1) proposal by Congress, ratifi cation 

by state legislatures, (2) proposal by interstate 

convention, ratifi cation by state legislatures, 

(3) proposal by Congress, ratifi cation by state 

conventions, and (4) proposal by interstate 

convention, ratifi cation by state conventions.

//1787 state constitutions; debates in the state legislatures and state ratifying conventions; newspaper articles and speeches; and //

//the records of the Continental, Confederation, and First Federal Congresses. These materials sprawl over hundreds of volumes. //

//Practicing constitutional lawyers increasingly use the full range of this material as well.//

// //

//Fully competent constitutional scholarship also requires some background in the Latin language. See //FORREST MCDONALD, 

NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM xi// (1985) (Professor McDonald was arguably our greatest 20th century constitutional historian).//

// 7 https:%%//%%m.theepochtimes.com/video-arguments-against-the-convention-of-states-interview-with-robert-brown_3754686.//

//html.//



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**23**

//3//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

I recognize, of course, that everyone has a First 

Amendment right to express his or her opinion, 

expert or not. But no one has the right to mislead 

legislators on important matters of law and policy 

under the cover of false credentials.

To use an analogy: Suppose John Q. Quacker 

regularly infl uenced government health policy by 

holding himself out as a “nationally known cardiac 

surgeon”—but had never gone to medical school, 

never served a residency, and never performed 

an operation. We would be justifi ably concerned. 

We should be equally concerned when a person 

off ers constitutional and other legal advice, and 

aff ects legislative policy, without any reasonable 

basis for doing so.

Yet Brown has repeatedly purveyed constitutional 

and legal advice, frequently on the very important 

issue of whether state lawmakers should apply for 

a convention for proposing amendments to the 

United States Constitution. Brown’s statements 

are based on citations, sometimes out of 

context, from only a narrow sliver of the sources 

constitutional scholars employ in their work.6

//The Interview//

To illustrate the problems in Brown’s approach 

I have chosen his //Epoch Times// interview with 

Joshua Philipp. The interview is 30 minutes long. 

This paper quotes relevant excerpts, and then 

responds to each. The footnote below provides a 

link to the entire interview.7 

//* * * *//

**Suppose John Q. Quacker regularly influenced government health \\
policy by holding himself out as a “nationally known cardiac \\
surgeon”—but had never gone to medical school . . . We should be \\
equally concerned when a person offers constitutional and other \\
legal advice, and affects legislative policy, without any reasonable **

**basis for doing so.**

//5//

// Publishing in scholarly journals subjects one’s work to review and critique from others knowledgeable in the subject.//

//  \\
6//

// Constitutional scholars work with 18th century law books, cases and statutes; the 18th century educational canon (including //

//the Greco-Roman classics); British parliamentary records; political and philosophical works infl uential with the Founders, such //

//as those by Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Montesquieu and DeLolme; colonial charters and instructions to colonial governors; pre-//

//4//

CONVENTION OF STATES

It would have been correct to say that there 

are only two ways of //proposing// amendments. 

However, Brown and other convention critics 

often fudge the diff erence between proposal and 

ratifi cation to suggest, falsely, that a convention 

alone, without state ratifi cation, could impose 

constitutional change. The Constitution and 

many other sources (see //Notes//) make it absolutely 

clear this is not so.

Brown confl ates proposal and ratifi cation elsewhere 

in the interview as well, as explained below.

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“So, the second method has never been //

//used before. We’ve been well over 200 years under //

//the current constitution and it has been brought up //

//a number of times throughout our nation’s history.”//

Correction: This is a half-truth, because it 

understates the role the Constitution’s application-

and-convention process has played in American 

history. Although the process has not been used 

to  //completion//, states have adopted hundreds of 

“applications” for a convention, and on several 

occasions America has been quite close to one. 

On several occasions as well, application campaigns 

have forced Congress to propose amendments or 

take other action. Without the convention process, 

it is very likely neither the Bill of Rights nor the 17th 

nor 22nd amendments would have been adopted.

Joshua Philipp: //“Hey, welcome back everyone. . . . //

//Robert Brown. He’s a constitutional expert with the //

//John Birch Society. And Robert, it’s a real pleasure //

//to have you on Crossroads. . . . Now, I’m curious //

//from your standpoint, what is the Convention of //

//States? How would you describe it?”//

Robert Brown:  //“Convention of States is an //

//organization pushing to use the second method in //

//Article V for obtaining changes or amendments to //

//the Constitution. . . . . Yeah, in Article V it talks //

//about two diff erent ways of amending or changing //

//the Constitution.”//

Correction: Mr. Brown’s response is in-

accurate in two respects. First, he fails 

to distinguish between a “convention of 

states” as a constitutional mechanism and 

the movement of Convention of States 

Action, which is one of several organizations 

trying to bring about such a convention.

Second, he erroneously states that there are two 

ways of amending the Constitution. In fact, there 

are four: (1) proposal by Congress, ratifi cation 

by state legislatures, (2) proposal by interstate 

convention, ratifi cation by state legislatures, 

(3) proposal by Congress, ratifi cation by state 

conventions, and (4) proposal by interstate 

convention, ratifi cation by state conventions.

//1787 state constitutions; debates in the state legislatures and state ratifying conventions; newspaper articles and speeches; and //

//the records of the Continental, Confederation, and First Federal Congresses. These materials sprawl over hundreds of volumes. //

//Practicing constitutional lawyers increasingly use the full range of this material as well.//

// //

//Fully competent constitutional scholarship also requires some background in the Latin language. See //FORREST MCDONALD, 

NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM xi// (1985) (Professor McDonald was arguably our greatest 20th century constitutional historian).//

// 7 https:%%//%%m.theepochtimes.com/video-arguments-against-the-convention-of-states-interview-with-robert-brown_3754686.//

//html.//



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**24**

//5//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

//* * * *//

Brown: //“James Madison in particular. . . . strongly //

//pushed against achieving the Bill of Rights through an //

//Article V Convention, saying it was a more dangerous //

//mode than Congress. He uh- in fact, a letter to //

//George Turberville, November 2, 1788, he says he //

//would //tremble// at the results of a convention. . . . .”//

Correction: JBS borrows many of its arguments 

from liberal sources opposed to a convention, 

and this is one example. 

The myth that Madison—the principal author of 

Article V—opposed its provision for conventions 

apparently was invented by liberal lawyer Arthur J. 

Goldberg in 1983.8 Madison’s full correspondence 

on this subject includes at least twelve other 

letters, and it tells quite a diff erent story.

 

Madison’s full correspondence tells us that he did 

not oppose Article V conventions in general; he 

opposed only a specifi c proposal for a convention 

to re-write the entire Constitution. In that 

correspondence, moreover, Madison also wrote 

he would be fully agreeable to holding a convention 

in a year or two, after some experience under the 

new government. In a letter written later in life, 

Madison endorsed an amendments convention 

over the favorite JBS “solution” of nullifi cation.9

//* * * *//

Philipp: //“Now, on the Convention of States, you //

//mentioned that you—you kind of see the same //

//problems but you—you don’t think that—that the //

//model of using it to amend the Constitution is a good //

//model. Why not? What is the argument against it? //

//What would you say?” //

Brown: //“. . . Given today’s political environment, if we //

//were to pull up the anchor of the U.S. Constitution and //

//drift to the //center// of political thought today, do you //

//feel that would move us closer to the views of Marx //

//or Madison? And obviously, our nation has moved far //

//more towards the socialist mentality than we were in //

//1787 when the Constitution was originally written . . . .”//

Correction: Convention advocates explicitly 

rule out “pull[ing] up the anchor of the 

U.S. Constitution.” They seek only (in the 

Constitution’s words) //“a convention for proposing //

//amendments” “to this Constitution.”//

JBS claims it is a bad time for a convention, and 

it has been making that claim for decades, no 

matter what the political conditions. It is clear 

that JBS does not consider any time to be good.

Practically speaking, right now probably //is// a good 

time for a convention to propose conservative-

leaning amendments: Thirty-one state 

legislatures are Republican. Congress is deeply 

unpopular, and its narrow Democratic majority 

is widely viewed as overreaching. The present 

justices on the Supreme Court and other federal 

courts are the most favorable in years.

//* * * *//

//8 //

//Arthur J. Goldberg, //Commentary: The Proposed Constitutional Convention//, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1983).//

//9 //

//I have collected Madison’s correspondence on the subject at the Article V Information Center webpage at https:%%//%%//

//articlevinfocenter.com/what-madison-really-said-in-1788-and-1789-about-holding-a-second-convention/. On a Montana //

//radio show several years ago, I informed Mr. Brown of this correspondence, what it said, and where to fi nd it.//

//6//

CONVENTION OF STATES

**Madison’s full correspondence tells us that he did **

**not oppose Article V conventions in general; he **

**opposed only a specific proposal for a convention **

**to re-write the entire Constitution. In that **

**correspondence, moreover, Madison also wrote he **

**would be fully agreeable to holding a convention **

**in a year or two, after some experience under the **

**new government.**



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**25**

//5//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

//* * * *//

Brown: //“James Madison in particular. . . . strongly //

//pushed against achieving the Bill of Rights through an //

//Article V Convention, saying it was a more dangerous //

//mode than Congress. He uh- in fact, a letter to //

//George Turberville, November 2, 1788, he says he //

//would //tremble// at the results of a convention. . . . .”//

Correction: JBS borrows many of its arguments 

from liberal sources opposed to a convention, 

and this is one example. 

The myth that Madison—the principal author of 

Article V—opposed its provision for conventions 

apparently was invented by liberal lawyer Arthur J. 

Goldberg in 1983.8 Madison’s full correspondence 

on this subject includes at least twelve other 

letters, and it tells quite a diff erent story.

 

Madison’s full correspondence tells us that he did 

not oppose Article V conventions in general; he 

opposed only a specifi c proposal for a convention 

to re-write the entire Constitution. In that 

correspondence, moreover, Madison also wrote 

he would be fully agreeable to holding a convention 

in a year or two, after some experience under the 

new government. In a letter written later in life, 

Madison endorsed an amendments convention 

over the favorite JBS “solution” of nullifi cation.9

//* * * *//

Philipp: //“Now, on the Convention of States, you //

//mentioned that you—you kind of see the same //

//problems but you—you don’t think that—that the //

//model of using it to amend the Constitution is a good //

//model. Why not? What is the argument against it? //

//What would you say?” //

Brown: //“. . . Given today’s political environment, if we //

//were to pull up the anchor of the U.S. Constitution and //

//drift to the //center// of political thought today, do you //

//feel that would move us closer to the views of Marx //

//or Madison? And obviously, our nation has moved far //

//more towards the socialist mentality than we were in //

//1787 when the Constitution was originally written . . . .”//

Correction: Convention advocates explicitly 

rule out “pull[ing] up the anchor of the 

U.S. Constitution.” They seek only (in the 

Constitution’s words) //“a convention for proposing //

//amendments” “to this Constitution.”//

JBS claims it is a bad time for a convention, and 

it has been making that claim for decades, no 

matter what the political conditions. It is clear 

that JBS does not consider any time to be good.

Practically speaking, right now probably //is// a good 

time for a convention to propose conservative-

leaning amendments: Thirty-one state 

legislatures are Republican. Congress is deeply 

unpopular, and its narrow Democratic majority 

is widely viewed as overreaching. The present 

justices on the Supreme Court and other federal 

courts are the most favorable in years.

//* * * *//

//8 //

//Arthur J. Goldberg, //Commentary: The Proposed Constitutional Convention//, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1983).//

//9 //

//I have collected Madison’s correspondence on the subject at the Article V Information Center webpage at https:%%//%%//

//articlevinfocenter.com/what-madison-really-said-in-1788-and-1789-about-holding-a-second-convention/. On a Montana //

//radio show several years ago, I informed Mr. Brown of this correspondence, what it said, and where to fi nd it.//

//6//

CONVENTION OF STATES

**Madison’s full correspondence tells us that he did **

**not oppose Article V conventions in general; he **

**opposed only a specific proposal for a convention **

**to re-write the entire Constitution. In that **

**correspondence, moreover, Madison also wrote he **

**would be fully agreeable to holding a convention **

**in a year or two, after some experience under the **

**new government.**



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**26**

//7//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

Philipp:  //“Now, I know proponents of it, they //

//argue that—y’know, they can preven- they can //

//propose amendments, but they’re saying that you //

//can’t //undo// current rights within the Constitution. //

//Is this accurate? What do you—what do you think //

//on this?”//

Brown: //“It’s really not [accurate] . . . . The problem //

//is,  //historical precedent// does say otherwise. And //

//this is probably //the// number one most important //

//argument between the two sides, is //what// does the //

//historical precedent say?”//

Correction: There is no “important argument 

between the two sides” about historical precedent, 

because opponents really don’t cite any.

Historical precedents include (1) about forty 

conventions of states and colonies since 1677, (2) 

hundreds of convention applications, and (3) a line 

of reported Article V court decisions dating back 

to 1798. (The case law is discussed in my treatise, 

//The Law of Article V//.) Out of all this material, Mr. 

Brown selects only one incident occurring more 

than 200 years ago—and as we shall see, even his 

understanding of that incident is wrong.

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“The 1787 Convention, where our //

//constitution was written, is really the //only// national //

//constitution amending convention we’ve ever had.”//

Correction: That’s not true. A national 

amending convention was held in Washington, 

D.C. in 1861. More states participated in that 

convention than at any before or since.//10// In 

addition, the Albany Congress of 1754 and 

the First Continental Congress of 1774 were 

national conventions that proposed what were 

then basic constitutional changes.

Even if Brown’s comment were technically 

true, it would be deceptive. This is because 

regional and national conventions of states 

operate under much the same protocols, 

including (1) limited and defined powers and (2) 

equal voting power for each state. The Article 

V Information Center provides a complete list 

of these conventions.//11//

//* * * *//

Brown: //“And in that case we have the existing //

//constitution as the Articles of Confederation.”//

Correction: The Articles of Confederation were 

not a constitution as we think of one, and the 

Confederation Congress was not a government. 

The Articles were a multilateral treaty something 

like NATO. The Confederation Congress was a 

limited coordinating body much like NATO’s 

North Atlantic Council.

In thinking of the Articles as a “constitution” in 

the modern sense, Mr. Brown commits a common 

error in historical method called //anachronism//.

//* * * *//

Brown: //“States sent delegates to the 1787 //

//Convention and gave them //specifi c delegate 

commissions//, or authority.”//

//10 //

//For a summary, see //It’s Been Done Before: A Convention of the States to Propose Constitutional Amendments//,  //

//https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/its-been-done-before-a-convention-of-the-states-to-propose-constitutional-amendments/.//

//11// 

List of Conventions of States and Colonies in American History//, https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/list-conventions-states-//

//colonies-american-history/.//

//8//

CONVENTION OF STATES

Correction: As noted above, the 1787 convention 

is the sole precedent opponents cite. Their 

fundamental argument is that the 1787 conclave 

exceeded its authority (“ran away”). From 

that, we are supposed to fear a more limited 

convention held under very diff erent conditions 

over 230 years later.

Even if it were true that the 1787 convention 

had exceeded its authority (and, as explained 

below, it is not true) that is not very good 

evidence of what would happen in an Article V 

convention today. 

First: There have been about forty conventions 

of states, many after 1787.//12  //They were governed 

by procedures that have become standardized, 

including rules limiting their authority. Everyone 

concedes that the other conventions remained 

within their authority. Certainly thirty-nine off er 

much more precedential weight than just one.

Second: The 1787 convention was not called 

under the Articles of Confederation. It 

operated outside of any legal restraint other 

than the delegates’ commissions. By contrast, a 

convention for proposing amendments is called 

under the Constitution and is subject to the rules 

of the Constitution. Over a century of decided 

case law affi  rms that. 

Third: On the modern convention fl oor, any 

commissioner raising issues outside the prescribed 

agenda can be reined in with a simple point of order.

Fourth: Modern technology enables the state 

legislatures commissioning delegates to use 

video oversight to track them 24/7. If a straying 

delegate somehow were not brought back to 

order, a supervising state legislative committee 

would see the incident in real time and could 

immediately re-instruct or recall.

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“States sent delegates to the 1787 //

//Convention and gave them //specifi c  delegate 

commissions//, or authority. You’re authorized to //

//make these types of changes, you’re not authorized //

//to change these things . . . Mark Meckler, //

//Convention of States, organizations like that, will //

//repeatedly claim those convention delegates were //

//given //full// authority to make //any //changes they felt //

//were necessary to the Articles of Confederation. //

//Now, //if// that were true, do you think that delegates //

//would have known that? And the reason I say that //

//is because, as you look through Madison’s notes //

//from the federal convention, you see this issue came //

//up //repeatedly// throughout the Convention: do we //

//actually have the authority to be creating a //new// //

//constitution, instead of just amending the Articles //

//of Confederation? . . . .  //

//“First side said things like, ‘We really don’t have the //

//authority and we should not proceed with changing //

//the Constitution this drastically without fi rst going //

//back to the States and getting further authority.’ //

//That was the argument of William Patterson, uh //

//Charles Pinckney, Elbridge Gerry13, John Lansing. //

//“The other side of the argument was //not// what //

//Mr. Meckler says, ‘They have full authority.’ The //

//12//

// See the previous footnote.//

//13 //

//In this interview Brown makes an error no genuine constitutional scholar would make: He pronounced Elbridge Gerry’s last //

//name with a soft “g” (like “Jerry”) rather than how Gerry actually pronounced it (with a hard “g”). It seems like a small mistake, //

//but such mistakes are clues to whether the speaker knows what he or she is talking about.//



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**27**

//7//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

Philipp:  //“Now, I know proponents of it, they //

//argue that—y’know, they can preven- they can //

//propose amendments, but they’re saying that you //

//can’t //undo// current rights within the Constitution. //

//Is this accurate? What do you—what do you think //

//on this?”//

Brown: //“It’s really not [accurate] . . . . The problem //

//is,  //historical precedent// does say otherwise. And //

//this is probably //the// number one most important //

//argument between the two sides, is //what// does the //

//historical precedent say?”//

Correction: There is no “important argument 

between the two sides” about historical precedent, 

because opponents really don’t cite any.

Historical precedents include (1) about forty 

conventions of states and colonies since 1677, (2) 

hundreds of convention applications, and (3) a line 

of reported Article V court decisions dating back 

to 1798. (The case law is discussed in my treatise, 

//The Law of Article V//.) Out of all this material, Mr. 

Brown selects only one incident occurring more 

than 200 years ago—and as we shall see, even his 

understanding of that incident is wrong.

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“The 1787 Convention, where our //

//constitution was written, is really the //only// national //

//constitution amending convention we’ve ever had.”//

Correction: That’s not true. A national 

amending convention was held in Washington, 

D.C. in 1861. More states participated in that 

convention than at any before or since.//10// In 

addition, the Albany Congress of 1754 and 

the First Continental Congress of 1774 were 

national conventions that proposed what were 

then basic constitutional changes.

Even if Brown’s comment were technically 

true, it would be deceptive. This is because 

regional and national conventions of states 

operate under much the same protocols, 

including (1) limited and defined powers and (2) 

equal voting power for each state. The Article 

V Information Center provides a complete list 

of these conventions.//11//

//* * * *//

Brown: //“And in that case we have the existing //

//constitution as the Articles of Confederation.”//

Correction: The Articles of Confederation were 

not a constitution as we think of one, and the 

Confederation Congress was not a government. 

The Articles were a multilateral treaty something 

like NATO. The Confederation Congress was a 

limited coordinating body much like NATO’s 

North Atlantic Council.

In thinking of the Articles as a “constitution” in 

the modern sense, Mr. Brown commits a common 

error in historical method called //anachronism//.

//* * * *//

Brown: //“States sent delegates to the 1787 //

//Convention and gave them //specifi c delegate 

commissions//, or authority.”//

//10 //

//For a summary, see //It’s Been Done Before: A Convention of the States to Propose Constitutional Amendments//,  //

//https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/its-been-done-before-a-convention-of-the-states-to-propose-constitutional-amendments/.//

//11// 

List of Conventions of States and Colonies in American History//, https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/list-conventions-states-//

//colonies-american-history/.//

//8//

CONVENTION OF STATES

Correction: As noted above, the 1787 convention 

is the sole precedent opponents cite. Their 

fundamental argument is that the 1787 conclave 

exceeded its authority (“ran away”). From 

that, we are supposed to fear a more limited 

convention held under very diff erent conditions 

over 230 years later.

Even if it were true that the 1787 convention 

had exceeded its authority (and, as explained 

below, it is not true) that is not very good 

evidence of what would happen in an Article V 

convention today. 

First: There have been about forty conventions 

of states, many after 1787.//12  //They were governed 

by procedures that have become standardized, 

including rules limiting their authority. Everyone 

concedes that the other conventions remained 

within their authority. Certainly thirty-nine off er 

much more precedential weight than just one.

Second: The 1787 convention was not called 

under the Articles of Confederation. It 

operated outside of any legal restraint other 

than the delegates’ commissions. By contrast, a 

convention for proposing amendments is called 

under the Constitution and is subject to the rules 

of the Constitution. Over a century of decided 

case law affi  rms that. 

Third: On the modern convention fl oor, any 

commissioner raising issues outside the prescribed 

agenda can be reined in with a simple point of order.

Fourth: Modern technology enables the state 

legislatures commissioning delegates to use 

video oversight to track them 24/7. If a straying 

delegate somehow were not brought back to 

order, a supervising state legislative committee 

would see the incident in real time and could 

immediately re-instruct or recall.

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“States sent delegates to the 1787 //

//Convention and gave them //specifi c  delegate 

commissions//, or authority. You’re authorized to //

//make these types of changes, you’re not authorized //

//to change these things . . . Mark Meckler, //

//Convention of States, organizations like that, will //

//repeatedly claim those convention delegates were //

//given //full// authority to make //any //changes they felt //

//were necessary to the Articles of Confederation. //

//Now, //if// that were true, do you think that delegates //

//would have known that? And the reason I say that //

//is because, as you look through Madison’s notes //

//from the federal convention, you see this issue came //

//up //repeatedly// throughout the Convention: do we //

//actually have the authority to be creating a //new// //

//constitution, instead of just amending the Articles //

//of Confederation? . . . .  //

//“First side said things like, ‘We really don’t have the //

//authority and we should not proceed with changing //

//the Constitution this drastically without fi rst going //

//back to the States and getting further authority.’ //

//That was the argument of William Patterson, uh //

//Charles Pinckney, Elbridge Gerry13, John Lansing. //

//“The other side of the argument was //not// what //

//Mr. Meckler says, ‘They have full authority.’ The //

//12//

// See the previous footnote.//

//13 //

//In this interview Brown makes an error no genuine constitutional scholar would make: He pronounced Elbridge Gerry’s last //

//name with a soft “g” (like “Jerry”) rather than how Gerry actually pronounced it (with a hard “g”). It seems like a small mistake, //

//but such mistakes are clues to whether the speaker knows what he or she is talking about.//



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**28**

//9//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

//other side of the argument represented by people //

//like Edmund Randolph, Alexander Hamilton, even //

//James Madison, was, ‘You’re right, we really //don’t 

//have the authorization to be doing this, but we //

//need to do it anyways. This is an //urgent// need of our //

//nation. . . . We must proceed.’//

//“Nobody stood up in the 1787 Convention and claimed, //

//‘Look at our commissions, we’re fully authorized to //

//make any changes we feel are necessary.’”//

Correction: These comments depart from the 

traditional JBS line, which is that //Congress// called 

the 1787 convention and limited it to proposing 

only amendments to the Articles. However, 

modern research has made that position untenable, 

so I am glad to see Mr. Brown abandon it. 

Madison points out in Federalist No. 40 that 

the state-issued commissions (or “credentials”) 

defi ned the scope of the convention’s authority. 

Founding-era law books confi rm this rule. Now, 

among the 12 states participating in the 1787 

convention, all but two (Massachusetts and 

New York) issued commissions conveying full 

power to propose a new form of government. 

The general public overwhelmingly shared the 

expectation that the convention would propose 

a new form of government—some imagined it 

might be a monarchy!

Brown points to statements by commissioners 

questioning the extent of their authority. //But //

//what determines whether the 1787 convention “ran //

//away” is what the commissioners’ credentials said, //

//not what anyone said they said! //

There were several reasons why commissioners 

might rhetorically question their authority. 

Some represented one of the two states granting 

narrower powers, such as New York’s John Lansing 

and Massachusetts’ Elbridge Gerry. Virginia’s 

**Madison points out \\
in Federalist No. \\
40 that the state-\\
issued commissions \\
(or “credentials”) \\
defined the scope \\
of the convention’s \\
authority. Founding-\\
era law books confirm \\
this rule. **

//10//

CONVENTION OF STATES

Edmund Randolph clearly did not buy the “no-

authority” argument, but like the good advocate 

he was, he conceded it //arguendo// (for sake of 

argument) and built his case on practical rather 

than technical legal grounds. William Paterson of 

New Jersey denigrated his authority for strategic 

reasons—to strengthen his case for equal state 

representation in the Senate. Once Paterson 

achieved his goal, he dropped the argument and 

urged creation of a strong government.

Brown’s restriction to a narrow range of sources 

prevented him from learning that during 

the ratifi cation debates the Constitution’s 

advocates addressed the issue. They vigorously 

defended the delegates’ actions as authorized 

by their commissions.//14// 

//* * * *//

Brown: //“In fact, one of the challenges I //repeatedly 

//put out to the other side, they never want to answer //

//this: show me the delegate. Show me the delegate //

//who made that claim, ‘We have full authority.’”//

Correction: Mr. Brown has never put the 

challenge to me. I would have responded by 

naming James Wilson, who told the Convention, 

“Relative to the powers of this convention—We 

have powers to conclude nothing; //we have power //

//to propose anything.”//

//* * * *//

Brown: //“Instead, what they did was, and this comes //

//directly from James Madison, I’m going to read it to  //

//ou directly. They said that //people// were in fact, the //

//fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all //

//diffi  culties were got over.”//

Correction: This is another example of 

opponents conflating proposal with ratification. 

As Madison (in Federalist No. 40) and other 

Founders made clear, the power to propose 

came from the states via their commissions to 

**“We have powers to **

**conclude nothing; **

**we have power to **

**propose anything.”**

**- James Wilson**

//14//

// See, e.g., //Carlisle Gazette//, Mar. 12, 1788, in //34 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1014, 1016//.//



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**29**

//9//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

//other side of the argument represented by people //

//like Edmund Randolph, Alexander Hamilton, even //

//James Madison, was, ‘You’re right, we really //don’t 

//have the authorization to be doing this, but we //

//need to do it anyways. This is an //urgent// need of our //

//nation. . . . We must proceed.’//

//“Nobody stood up in the 1787 Convention and claimed, //

//‘Look at our commissions, we’re fully authorized to //

//make any changes we feel are necessary.’”//

Correction: These comments depart from the 

traditional JBS line, which is that //Congress// called 

the 1787 convention and limited it to proposing 

only amendments to the Articles. However, 

modern research has made that position untenable, 

so I am glad to see Mr. Brown abandon it. 

Madison points out in Federalist No. 40 that 

the state-issued commissions (or “credentials”) 

defi ned the scope of the convention’s authority. 

Founding-era law books confi rm this rule. Now, 

among the 12 states participating in the 1787 

convention, all but two (Massachusetts and 

New York) issued commissions conveying full 

power to propose a new form of government. 

The general public overwhelmingly shared the 

expectation that the convention would propose 

a new form of government—some imagined it 

might be a monarchy!

Brown points to statements by commissioners 

questioning the extent of their authority. //But //

//what determines whether the 1787 convention “ran //

//away” is what the commissioners’ credentials said, //

//not what anyone said they said! //

There were several reasons why commissioners 

might rhetorically question their authority. 

Some represented one of the two states granting 

narrower powers, such as New York’s John Lansing 

and Massachusetts’ Elbridge Gerry. Virginia’s 

**Madison points out \\
in Federalist No. \\
40 that the state-\\
issued commissions \\
(or “credentials”) \\
defined the scope \\
of the convention’s \\
authority. Founding-\\
era law books confirm \\
this rule. **

//10//

CONVENTION OF STATES

Edmund Randolph clearly did not buy the “no-

authority” argument, but like the good advocate 

he was, he conceded it //arguendo// (for sake of 

argument) and built his case on practical rather 

than technical legal grounds. William Paterson of 

New Jersey denigrated his authority for strategic 

reasons—to strengthen his case for equal state 

representation in the Senate. Once Paterson 

achieved his goal, he dropped the argument and 

urged creation of a strong government.

Brown’s restriction to a narrow range of sources 

prevented him from learning that during 

the ratifi cation debates the Constitution’s 

advocates addressed the issue. They vigorously 

defended the delegates’ actions as authorized 

by their commissions.//14// 

//* * * *//

Brown: //“In fact, one of the challenges I //repeatedly 

//put out to the other side, they never want to answer //

//this: show me the delegate. Show me the delegate //

//who made that claim, ‘We have full authority.’”//

Correction: Mr. Brown has never put the 

challenge to me. I would have responded by 

naming James Wilson, who told the Convention, 

“Relative to the powers of this convention—We 

have powers to conclude nothing; //we have power //

//to propose anything.”//

//* * * *//

Brown: //“Instead, what they did was, and this comes //

//directly from James Madison, I’m going to read it to  //

//ou directly. They said that //people// were in fact, the //

//fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all //

//diffi  culties were got over.”//

Correction: This is another example of 

opponents conflating proposal with ratification. 

As Madison (in Federalist No. 40) and other 

Founders made clear, the power to propose 

came from the states via their commissions to 

**“We have powers to **

**conclude nothing; **

**we have power to **

**propose anything.”**

**- James Wilson**

//14//

// See, e.g., //Carlisle Gazette//, Mar. 12, 1788, in //34 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1014, 1016//.//



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**30**

//11//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

the delegates. The power to //ratify// came from 

the people, who elected delegates to their 

state ratifying conventions.

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“They were also given a constitutionally //

//defi ned ratifi cation process, they threw it out, //

//retroactively created a much lower bar . . . .”//

Correction: Mr. Brown’s claim is that (1) 

the Constitutional Convention provided for 

ratifi cation by nine states rather than the 

thirteen required by the Articles, so therefore 

(2) a modern amendments convention might 

alter the ratifi cation process as well.

Constitutional scholars consider this as one of 

the “runaway” alarmists’ loonier ideas. It is based 

on utter ignorance of governing law, both in 1787 

and now. Specifi cally:

•  As noted before, the 1787 convention was 

not held under the Articles of Confederation. 

It was held under reserved state powers 

retained by signatories of treaties and 

recognized explicitly by the Articles. The 

convention could, therefore, propose any 

method of ratifi cation it chose. Incidentally, 

the Confederation Congress approved the 

convention’s actions when it forwarded the 

Constitution to the states and urged them to 

hold ratifying conventions.//15 //

•  A convention for proposing amendments, 

by contrast, receives its power from the 

Constitution and is subject to its rules, 

including ratifi cation rules. One of the 

clearest principles from 223 years of Article 

V court decisions is that no participant in 

the amendment process may change the 

Constitution’s amendment rules. But Mr. 

Brown never mentions case law. From 

listening to him you’d think the courts never 

issued an Article V ruling and all we have to 

go on is what allegedly happened in 1787. Yet 

there are hundreds of cases defi ning general 

constitutional principles and dozens more 

interpreting Article V. 

•  Nor do alarmists tell us how, if a convention 

purported to change the ratifi cation rules, it 

could enforce its decision. Call out the army?

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“[T]he precedent they set was, these //

//types of conventions represent, not the States, //

//not the legislatures, but they represent the people //

themselves// . . . .”//

Correction: It is unclear what Mr. Brown means 

by “these types of conventions.” If he is referring 

to conventions that deal with constitutional 

issues, then his statement is only a half-truth. 

Conventions elected directly by the people within 

a particular state—sometimes called constituent 

conventions—represent the people. Constituent 

conventions were used to ratify the U.S. 

Constitution and the 21st amendment. They also are 

employed to propose and ratify state constitutions. 

Interstate conventions whose commissioners 

are selected as directed by state legislatures 

are called //conventions of states// or //conventions //

//of the states//. They answer to the states or state 

legislatures directly, so they represent the people 

//15//

// Did Congress Approve the Constitution? A Member’s Letter Says “Yes”, https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/did-congress-approve-//

//the-constitution-a-members-letter-says-yes/.//

//12//

CONVENTION OF STATES

only in a remote sense. When called under states’ 

reserved powers, conventions of states meet to 

propose solutions to common problems—such 

as coordinating state laws or negotiating water 

compacts. When called under Article V of the 

Constitution, they may propose amendments 

to the states for ratifi cation. My treatise, //The //

//Law of Article V//, discusses the legal diff erences 

among conventions.

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“. . . and as such their power cannot be //

//limited. Now, we’ve seen that same precedent //

//upheld //repeatedly// in state conventions ever since. I //

//mentioned the Montana one, for example.”//

Correction: This is legal nonsense. Conventions—

even those that represent the people directly—

usually //are// limited. Brown cites the 1972 Montana 

constitutional convention as an unlimited body. 

But the Montana Supreme Court specifi cally held 

that its powers were limited. //State of Montana ex rel. //

//Kvaalen v. Graybill//, 496 P.2d 1127 (Mont. 1972).

Unless a convention is acting in absence of an 

established government (as in some states at the 

opening of the American Revolution), it is always 

limited to some extent. For example, a state 

convention called under an existing constitution 

may not be subject to the legislature, but it is 

limited by the terms of the existing constitution. 

When state conventions were being considered to 

ratify the 21st amendment, some people argued 

they would be unlimited—but court adjudication 

determined otherwise. As noted earlier, the 

courts have ruled repeatedly that all assemblies 

operating under Article V are bound by the rules 

laid out in the Constitution.

//* * * *//

Brown: //“In fact, if you look to the—the law journal //

//that’s called //Corpus Juris Secundum//, that’s a //

//collection of various Supreme Court rulings from //

**If a convention purported to change the ratification rules, \\
how could it enforce its decision? Call out the army?**



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**31**

//11//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

the delegates. The power to //ratify// came from 

the people, who elected delegates to their 

state ratifying conventions.

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“They were also given a constitutionally //

//defi ned ratifi cation process, they threw it out, //

//retroactively created a much lower bar . . . .”//

Correction: Mr. Brown’s claim is that (1) 

the Constitutional Convention provided for 

ratifi cation by nine states rather than the 

thirteen required by the Articles, so therefore 

(2) a modern amendments convention might 

alter the ratifi cation process as well.

Constitutional scholars consider this as one of 

the “runaway” alarmists’ loonier ideas. It is based 

on utter ignorance of governing law, both in 1787 

and now. Specifi cally:

•  As noted before, the 1787 convention was 

not held under the Articles of Confederation. 

It was held under reserved state powers 

retained by signatories of treaties and 

recognized explicitly by the Articles. The 

convention could, therefore, propose any 

method of ratifi cation it chose. Incidentally, 

the Confederation Congress approved the 

convention’s actions when it forwarded the 

Constitution to the states and urged them to 

hold ratifying conventions.//15 //

•  A convention for proposing amendments, 

by contrast, receives its power from the 

Constitution and is subject to its rules, 

including ratifi cation rules. One of the 

clearest principles from 223 years of Article 

V court decisions is that no participant in 

the amendment process may change the 

Constitution’s amendment rules. But Mr. 

Brown never mentions case law. From 

listening to him you’d think the courts never 

issued an Article V ruling and all we have to 

go on is what allegedly happened in 1787. Yet 

there are hundreds of cases defi ning general 

constitutional principles and dozens more 

interpreting Article V. 

•  Nor do alarmists tell us how, if a convention 

purported to change the ratifi cation rules, it 

could enforce its decision. Call out the army?

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“[T]he precedent they set was, these //

//types of conventions represent, not the States, //

//not the legislatures, but they represent the people //

themselves// . . . .”//

Correction: It is unclear what Mr. Brown means 

by “these types of conventions.” If he is referring 

to conventions that deal with constitutional 

issues, then his statement is only a half-truth. 

Conventions elected directly by the people within 

a particular state—sometimes called constituent 

conventions—represent the people. Constituent 

conventions were used to ratify the U.S. 

Constitution and the 21st amendment. They also are 

employed to propose and ratify state constitutions. 

Interstate conventions whose commissioners 

are selected as directed by state legislatures 

are called //conventions of states// or //conventions //

//of the states//. They answer to the states or state 

legislatures directly, so they represent the people 

//15//

// Did Congress Approve the Constitution? A Member’s Letter Says “Yes”, https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/did-congress-approve-//

//the-constitution-a-members-letter-says-yes/.//

//12//

CONVENTION OF STATES

only in a remote sense. When called under states’ 

reserved powers, conventions of states meet to 

propose solutions to common problems—such 

as coordinating state laws or negotiating water 

compacts. When called under Article V of the 

Constitution, they may propose amendments 

to the states for ratifi cation. My treatise, //The //

//Law of Article V//, discusses the legal diff erences 

among conventions.

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“. . . and as such their power cannot be //

//limited. Now, we’ve seen that same precedent //

//upheld //repeatedly// in state conventions ever since. I //

//mentioned the Montana one, for example.”//

Correction: This is legal nonsense. Conventions—

even those that represent the people directly—

usually //are// limited. Brown cites the 1972 Montana 

constitutional convention as an unlimited body. 

But the Montana Supreme Court specifi cally held 

that its powers were limited. //State of Montana ex rel. //

//Kvaalen v. Graybill//, 496 P.2d 1127 (Mont. 1972).

Unless a convention is acting in absence of an 

established government (as in some states at the 

opening of the American Revolution), it is always 

limited to some extent. For example, a state 

convention called under an existing constitution 

may not be subject to the legislature, but it is 

limited by the terms of the existing constitution. 

When state conventions were being considered to 

ratify the 21st amendment, some people argued 

they would be unlimited—but court adjudication 

determined otherwise. As noted earlier, the 

courts have ruled repeatedly that all assemblies 

operating under Article V are bound by the rules 

laid out in the Constitution.

//* * * *//

Brown: //“In fact, if you look to the—the law journal //

//that’s called //Corpus Juris Secundum//, that’s a //

//collection of various Supreme Court rulings from //

**If a convention purported to change the ratification rules, \\
how could it enforce its decision? Call out the army?**



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**32**

//13//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

//the States all across the country and we’ve seen //

consistently// the same thing.”//

Correction: Where do we begin with this one? 

There is so much error from which to choose!

First: Contrary to Mr. Brown’s description, 

//Corpus Juris Secundum// (CJS) is not a “law 

journal.” It is a legal encyclopedia that attempts 

to summarize law on all topics.

Second: CJS is not a “collection of various 

Supreme Court rulings.” It is principally a legal 

text with supporting citations from federal and 

states appellate courts at all levels.

Third: Every fi rst-year law student learns that 

CJS’s text is not fully trustworthy and should 

never be cited as authority. It is used principally 

as a case fi nder. You have to read the cases it 

cites to fi nd out what the law is, then expand your 

research to fi nd other cases on the same topic.

Fourth: Mr. Brown apparently didn’t read 

the cases referenced in the part of CJS he 

mentions. If he did, he’d know they have 

nothing to do with Article V conventions. 

He would also learn that those cases are 

all very old. They were decided long 

before most Article V court rulings 

were issued. Thus:

•  In //Cox v. Robison//, 105 Tex. 426, 

150 S.W. 1149 (1912), the facts 

were that in 1866, the former 

Confederate state of Texas was 

under federal military occupation. As 

commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed 

forces, President Andrew Johnson called 

for a Texas state constitutional convention. 

The court held that the state constitution did 

not have to be ratifi ed by the people //because //

//the president had not required it//. (Presumably 

he could have limited the convention by 

requiring it.)

//•  Frantz v. Autry//, 18 Okla. 561, 91 P. 13 (1907) 

dealt with a local constitutional convention 

Congress had authorized in what was then the 

Territory of Oklahoma. The case held that the 

convention had all the power Congress gave 

it, and that Congress had imposed only a few 

limits. The cases said the convention needed 

to respect only the limits Congress imposed.

//•  Koehler & Lange v. Hill//, 60 Iowa 543, 14 N.W. 

738 (1883) held that when any constitution 

prescribes an amendment procedure, that 

procedure must be followed. It added “The 

powers of a convention are, of course, unlimited. 

The members thereof are the representatives 

of the people, called together for that purpose.” 

But the court was speaking of state constitutional 

conventions, not federal conventions, and this 

case is contradicted by later authority, such 

//Every //

//fi rst-year law //

//student learns that //

//Corpus Juris Secundum’s //

//text is not fully trustworthy //

//and should never be cited //

//as authority. It is used //

//principally as a case //

//fi nder. //

//14//

CONVENTION OF STATES

as State of //Montana ex rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill//, 

496 P.2d 1127 (Mont. 1972), mentioned above.

//•  Loomis v. Jackson//, 6 W.Va. 613 (1873) says 

that “A [state] constitutional convention, 

lawfully convened, does not derive its powers 

from the legislature; but from the people. 

The powers of such a convention are in the 

nature of sovereign powers.” But in this 

country, we frequently limit sovereignty, and 

a convention’s authority can be limited by an 

existing constitution.//16 //

//•  Sproule v. Fredericks//, 69 Miss. 898, 11 So. 

472 (1892) examined the power of a state 

constitutional convention called by the 

legislature. It ruled that the convention’s 

power was very broad, but also acknowledged 

that its power could have been limited.

Again, nothing in these fi ve decisions had 

anything to do with Article V.

So much for Mr. Brown’s cases. I’ve taken some 

time to examine his misuse of CJS because it 

illustrates the conceptual chaos that ensues 

when someone ignorant of law starts interpreting 

legal texts and spouting legal advice.

//* * * *//

Brown: //“Congress is essentially—they often //

//refer to it as a sitting constitutional convention //

//themselves. Madison diff erentiated between them. //

//Again, as I mentioned as he was putting out his //

//opposition to an Article V Convention, he said //

//that in his view, the //Convention// would feel much //

//greater latitude in making sweeping changes to //

//the Constitution than Congress would, which is //

//why he said Congress is the safer mode.”//

**An amendments convention **

**may do only what Congress **

**may do at any time: propose **

**amendments. But unlike a **

**convention, Congress has **

**unlimited, unrestricted **

**power to do so.**

//16//

// Incidentally, another line in the //Loomis// case contradicts the common JBS claim that Congress could control an amendments //

//convention: “That the legislature can neither limit or restrict [conventions] in the exercise of these powers . . . .”//



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**33**

//13//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

//the States all across the country and we’ve seen //

consistently// the same thing.”//

Correction: Where do we begin with this one? 

There is so much error from which to choose!

First: Contrary to Mr. Brown’s description, 

//Corpus Juris Secundum// (CJS) is not a “law 

journal.” It is a legal encyclopedia that attempts 

to summarize law on all topics.

Second: CJS is not a “collection of various 

Supreme Court rulings.” It is principally a legal 

text with supporting citations from federal and 

states appellate courts at all levels.

Third: Every fi rst-year law student learns that 

CJS’s text is not fully trustworthy and should 

never be cited as authority. It is used principally 

as a case fi nder. You have to read the cases it 

cites to fi nd out what the law is, then expand your 

research to fi nd other cases on the same topic.

Fourth: Mr. Brown apparently didn’t read 

the cases referenced in the part of CJS he 

mentions. If he did, he’d know they have 

nothing to do with Article V conventions. 

He would also learn that those cases are 

all very old. They were decided long 

before most Article V court rulings 

were issued. Thus:

•  In //Cox v. Robison//, 105 Tex. 426, 

150 S.W. 1149 (1912), the facts 

were that in 1866, the former 

Confederate state of Texas was 

under federal military occupation. As 

commander-in-chief of the U.S. armed 

forces, President Andrew Johnson called 

for a Texas state constitutional convention. 

The court held that the state constitution did 

not have to be ratifi ed by the people //because //

//the president had not required it//. (Presumably 

he could have limited the convention by 

requiring it.)

//•  Frantz v. Autry//, 18 Okla. 561, 91 P. 13 (1907) 

dealt with a local constitutional convention 

Congress had authorized in what was then the 

Territory of Oklahoma. The case held that the 

convention had all the power Congress gave 

it, and that Congress had imposed only a few 

limits. The cases said the convention needed 

to respect only the limits Congress imposed.

//•  Koehler & Lange v. Hill//, 60 Iowa 543, 14 N.W. 

738 (1883) held that when any constitution 

prescribes an amendment procedure, that 

procedure must be followed. It added “The 

powers of a convention are, of course, unlimited. 

The members thereof are the representatives 

of the people, called together for that purpose.” 

But the court was speaking of state constitutional 

conventions, not federal conventions, and this 

case is contradicted by later authority, such 

//Every //

//fi rst-year law //

//student learns that //

//Corpus Juris Secundum’s //

//text is not fully trustworthy //

//and should never be cited //

//as authority. It is used //

//principally as a case //

//fi nder. //

//14//

CONVENTION OF STATES

as State of //Montana ex rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill//, 

496 P.2d 1127 (Mont. 1972), mentioned above.

//•  Loomis v. Jackson//, 6 W.Va. 613 (1873) says 

that “A [state] constitutional convention, 

lawfully convened, does not derive its powers 

from the legislature; but from the people. 

The powers of such a convention are in the 

nature of sovereign powers.” But in this 

country, we frequently limit sovereignty, and 

a convention’s authority can be limited by an 

existing constitution.//16 //

//•  Sproule v. Fredericks//, 69 Miss. 898, 11 So. 

472 (1892) examined the power of a state 

constitutional convention called by the 

legislature. It ruled that the convention’s 

power was very broad, but also acknowledged 

that its power could have been limited.

Again, nothing in these fi ve decisions had 

anything to do with Article V.

So much for Mr. Brown’s cases. I’ve taken some 

time to examine his misuse of CJS because it 

illustrates the conceptual chaos that ensues 

when someone ignorant of law starts interpreting 

legal texts and spouting legal advice.

//* * * *//

Brown: //“Congress is essentially—they often //

//refer to it as a sitting constitutional convention //

//themselves. Madison diff erentiated between them. //

//Again, as I mentioned as he was putting out his //

//opposition to an Article V Convention, he said //

//that in his view, the //Convention// would feel much //

//greater latitude in making sweeping changes to //

//the Constitution than Congress would, which is //

//why he said Congress is the safer mode.”//

**An amendments convention **

**may do only what Congress **

**may do at any time: propose **

**amendments. But unlike a **

**convention, Congress has **

**unlimited, unrestricted **

**power to do so.**

//16//

// Incidentally, another line in the //Loomis// case contradicts the common JBS claim that Congress could control an amendments //

//convention: “That the legislature can neither limit or restrict [conventions] in the exercise of these powers . . . .”//



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**34**

//15//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

Correction: As already discussed, Madison was 

not opposed to amendments conventions. The 

reason he opposed New York’s 1788 proposal 

was because its scope was too wide and it came 

too early. But very few convention applications 

have been as broad as that. The applications 

being passed today are all quite focused.

In this passage Mr. Brown does inadvertently 

allude to an inconvenient fact: An amendments 

convention may do only what Congress may 

do at any time: propose amendments. But 

unlike a convention, Congress has unlimited, 

unrestricted power to do so.

**MR. BROWN CLAIMS **

**HE ORGANIZED **

**A GROUP TO **

**PRESSURE REP. **

**DENNY REHBERG... **

**BUT AFTER **

**BROWN STARTED **

**HARASSING HIM, **

**REHBERG’S RATING **

**DROPPED TO 80% **

**IN 2011 AND 76% IN **

**2012—HIS LOWEST **

**SCORES EVER.**

//16//

CONVENTION OF STATES

//* * * *//

Brown: //“Congress already pretty much does whatever //

//they want to with regards to what the Constitution //

//says, for the most part. And the only reason they get //

//away with that, is we the people don’t hold them to it . //

//. . .//

//“When I fi rst moved to Montana about a decade //

//ago, I organized a couple hundred people and we //

//started holding our congressman accountable to //

//his voting as it squared with the Constitution. At //

//the time, his “constitutional rating,” so to say, was //

//somewhere around 40-60%. He was always right //

//in the middle. About half the time he’d follow the //

//Constitution, half the time he wouldn’t. Within four //

//months, he was at 80% and thereafter he was stated //

//at 90%, because we started pushing on him on . . . .” //

Correction: This prescription for curing the 

federal government is terminally naïve. The 

majority of members of Congress, particularly 

the leadership, are long-time holders of “safe” 

seats and immune to popular, pro-Constitution 

lobbying. Indeed, they hold their seats largely by 

//violating// the Constitution.

The Congressman referred to is Rep. Denny 

Rehberg (R.-Mont.), who was in offi  ce from 

2001 to early January, 2013. Mr. Brown claims 

he organized a group to lobby Rehberg “about 

decade ago” — i.e., sometime between 2009 

and 2011. Now, if anyone was amenable to 

“constitutionalist” lobbying, Congressman 

Rehberg should have been. He served a swing 

district and I know from personal acquaintance 

that he has conservative values.

But did Brown’s lobbying really have any eff ect? 

The American Conservative Union ranks 

members of Congress by their commitment to 

smaller, constitutional government. The ranking 

is on a scale of zero to 100. 

Rehberg was rated for the years 2001 through 

2012. His ACU voting record for each year was 

as follows:

2001 - 84%

2002 - 100%

2003 - 84%

2004 - 96%

2005 - 92%

2006 - 83%

2007 - 88%

2008 - 84%

2009 - 92%

2010 - 96%

2011 - 80%

2012 - 76%

If there is any pattern in their fi gures at all—and I’m 

not sure there is—it suggests Brown’s eff orts may 

have been counterproductive. In the years including 

and up to 2010, Rep. Rehberg’s ACU score had 

ranged from 84% to 100%. But after Brown started 

harassing him, Rehberg’s rating dropped to 80% in 

2011 and 76% in 2012—his lowest scores ever.

In theory millions of Americans could pressure 

members of Congress to change. But as a matter 

of historical record, this does not happen: The 

organizational costs for conservative Americans 

are too high. Professional lobbyists concentrated 

in Washington, D.C. are paid big money to lobby, 

and they do it continuously. They off er concrete 

benefi ts beyond what the conservative grassroots 

can off er, such as connections to many large 

political donors. They enjoy the support of the 

national media, which has strong incentives to 

concentrate power at the federal level.

There are good people in Congress. But as they 

acknowledge, they need fi rm rules to restrain 

their behavior and enable them to justify voting 

against certain programs. Only constitutional 

amendments can provide those rules.



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**35**

//15//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

Correction: As already discussed, Madison was 

not opposed to amendments conventions. The 

reason he opposed New York’s 1788 proposal 

was because its scope was too wide and it came 

too early. But very few convention applications 

have been as broad as that. The applications 

being passed today are all quite focused.

In this passage Mr. Brown does inadvertently 

allude to an inconvenient fact: An amendments 

convention may do only what Congress may 

do at any time: propose amendments. But 

unlike a convention, Congress has unlimited, 

unrestricted power to do so.

**MR. BROWN CLAIMS **

**HE ORGANIZED **

**A GROUP TO **

**PRESSURE REP. **

**DENNY REHBERG... **

**BUT AFTER **

**BROWN STARTED **

**HARASSING HIM, **

**REHBERG’S RATING **

**DROPPED TO 80% **

**IN 2011 AND 76% IN **

**2012—HIS LOWEST **

**SCORES EVER.**

//16//

CONVENTION OF STATES

//* * * *//

Brown: //“Congress already pretty much does whatever //

//they want to with regards to what the Constitution //

//says, for the most part. And the only reason they get //

//away with that, is we the people don’t hold them to it . //

//. . .//

//“When I fi rst moved to Montana about a decade //

//ago, I organized a couple hundred people and we //

//started holding our congressman accountable to //

//his voting as it squared with the Constitution. At //

//the time, his “constitutional rating,” so to say, was //

//somewhere around 40-60%. He was always right //

//in the middle. About half the time he’d follow the //

//Constitution, half the time he wouldn’t. Within four //

//months, he was at 80% and thereafter he was stated //

//at 90%, because we started pushing on him on . . . .” //

Correction: This prescription for curing the 

federal government is terminally naïve. The 

majority of members of Congress, particularly 

the leadership, are long-time holders of “safe” 

seats and immune to popular, pro-Constitution 

lobbying. Indeed, they hold their seats largely by 

//violating// the Constitution.

The Congressman referred to is Rep. Denny 

Rehberg (R.-Mont.), who was in offi  ce from 

2001 to early January, 2013. Mr. Brown claims 

he organized a group to lobby Rehberg “about 

decade ago” — i.e., sometime between 2009 

and 2011. Now, if anyone was amenable to 

“constitutionalist” lobbying, Congressman 

Rehberg should have been. He served a swing 

district and I know from personal acquaintance 

that he has conservative values.

But did Brown’s lobbying really have any eff ect? 

The American Conservative Union ranks 

members of Congress by their commitment to 

smaller, constitutional government. The ranking 

is on a scale of zero to 100. 

Rehberg was rated for the years 2001 through 

2012. His ACU voting record for each year was 

as follows:

2001 - 84%

2002 - 100%

2003 - 84%

2004 - 96%

2005 - 92%

2006 - 83%

2007 - 88%

2008 - 84%

2009 - 92%

2010 - 96%

2011 - 80%

2012 - 76%

If there is any pattern in their fi gures at all—and I’m 

not sure there is—it suggests Brown’s eff orts may 

have been counterproductive. In the years including 

and up to 2010, Rep. Rehberg’s ACU score had 

ranged from 84% to 100%. But after Brown started 

harassing him, Rehberg’s rating dropped to 80% in 

2011 and 76% in 2012—his lowest scores ever.

In theory millions of Americans could pressure 

members of Congress to change. But as a matter 

of historical record, this does not happen: The 

organizational costs for conservative Americans 

are too high. Professional lobbyists concentrated 

in Washington, D.C. are paid big money to lobby, 

and they do it continuously. They off er concrete 

benefi ts beyond what the conservative grassroots 

can off er, such as connections to many large 

political donors. They enjoy the support of the 

national media, which has strong incentives to 

concentrate power at the federal level.

There are good people in Congress. But as they 

acknowledge, they need fi rm rules to restrain 

their behavior and enable them to justify voting 

against certain programs. Only constitutional 

amendments can provide those rules.



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**36**

//17//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“We look at Federalist 16, 26, and 33: //

//Alexander Hamilto-Hamilton talking about the //

//power that we the people and we the States have //

//to push back against federal tyranny. Madison //

//picks it up in Federalist 44 and 46, 46 especially. //

//And what’s interesting is, in all of those documents //

//where they’re talking about what to do to push back //

//against federal tyranny, they never mention Article //

//V. In fact, when you go onto Federalist 48 and 49, //

//Madison directly addresses that.”//

Correction: Notice how Mr. Brown’s sources 

for the ratifi cation debates consist solely of 

//The Federalist//—a minuscule fraction of the 

ratifi cation record. He never mentions the 

other founding-era commentators who spoke 

to the amendments convention process.//17// Even 

his use of //The Federalist// is clumsy. For example, 

at this point he overlooks references to the 

Article V convention process in Federalist No. 

43 and No. 85.

//* * * *//

Brown: //“In 49, [Madison] asks, ‘Is it appropriate //

//to use a Convention to address breaches in the //

//Constitution when the federal government ignores //

//it?’ And his answer is absolutely not . . . .”//

 

Correction: This is another example of Brown’s 

inept use of //The Federalist//. Trying to convert 

one of its essays into an argument against the 

Constitution’s amendment process makes no 

sense at all. //The Federalist// was written to support 

the Constitution, not trash it.

Here’s the real scoop on Federalist No. 49: When 

Madison was writing, Pennsylvania and Vermont 

had constitutions that provided for a “council of 

censors” to meet every seven years. The censors 

could decide whether their state constitution was 

working well. The censors could call a constitutional 

convention to address any problems.

In 1783, Thomas Jeff erson outlined his own ideas 

for a new Virginia constitution. In partial imitation 

of the Pennsylvania-Vermont approach, his draft 

would have permitted some state offi  cials to call 

a convention for “altering this Constitution or 

correcting breaches of it.” Strikingly, this new 

convention was to have all the powers enjoyed by a 

plenary constitutional convention—including power 

to write an entirely new document and impose all 

its changes without a ratifi cation procedure.

Madison had four objections: (1) A rogue state 

legislature could block the process in various ways; 

(2) “frequent appeals” for constitutional revision 

could reduce public respect for government; 

(3) frequent referrals to the citizenry might 

cause constitutional turbulence; and (4) the 

legislature—the branch most likely responsible 

for the problems—might highjack the process.

Notice that //none// of these objections is 

relevant to calling a convention under Article 

V. The states, not federal offi  cials, initiate 

and staff  the convention, thereby preventing 

congressional obstruction or control. Article 

V is very diffi  cult to trigger, eliminating the 

danger of “frequent appeals.” A convention 

for proposing amendments has power only to 

propose specifi ed amendments, not re-write 

17 

For collections of this material, see, for example, my following two articles: Is the Constitution’s Convention for 

Proposing Amendments a ‘Mystery’? Overlooked Evidence in the Narrative of Uncertainty, 104 MARQUETTE L. 

REV. 1 (2020) and Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing 

Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615 (2013). See also A Founder Gives Us a Lesson on the Constitution’s Amendment 

Process, https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/founder-gives-us-lesson-constitutions-amendment-process/.

//18//

CONVENTION OF STATES

the Constitution. And unlike Jeff erson’s idea for 

periodic plenary constitutional conventions, any 

proposal from an Article V convention is subject 

to a diffi  cult ratifi cation process.

In a portion of Federalist No. 49 Brown fails 

to quote, Madison assures us that, although he 

objects to Jeff erson’s plan, still “a constitutional 

road to the decision of the people ought to be 

marked out and kept open, for certain great and 

extraordinary occasions.”

Unlike the proposals Madison was criticizing, 

the convention procedure of Article V seems to 

meet his goal very well.

//* * * *//

Brown: //“Now, in Federalist uh, I think it was 43, //

//yeah, in Federalist 43, Madison does address the //

//Article V Convention. And in that case, he refers to //

//it as “the remedy for errors” in the Constitution.”//

Correction: Mr. Brown is repeating—perhaps 

is the author of—a common JBS claim that the 

only role for an amendments convention was to 

correct drafting errors in the Constitution.

This is still more nonsense. The fact that Madison 

stated one purpose of the convention procedure 

does not mean he excluded other purposes. 

Other Founders itemized additional purposes. 

One was the need to correct federal abuses 

and overreach. That was the reason George 

Mason gave at the Constitutional Convention. 

During the ratifi cation debates, prominent 

advocates cited the convention procedure again 

and again as a key safeguard against abuse.//18// 

//* * * *//

**Trying to convert one \\
of //The Federalist// essays \\
into an argument against \\
the Constitution’s \\
amendment process \\
makes no sense at all. \\
The Federalist was \\
written to support the \\
Constitution, not trash it.**

//18//

// See, e.g., //The Founders Pointed to Article V as a Cure for Federal Abuse//, https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/the-founders-//

//pointed-to-article-v-as-a-cure-for-federal-abuse/ (collecting examples).//



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**37**

//17//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“We look at Federalist 16, 26, and 33: //

//Alexander Hamilto-Hamilton talking about the //

//power that we the people and we the States have //

//to push back against federal tyranny. Madison //

//picks it up in Federalist 44 and 46, 46 especially. //

//And what’s interesting is, in all of those documents //

//where they’re talking about what to do to push back //

//against federal tyranny, they never mention Article //

//V. In fact, when you go onto Federalist 48 and 49, //

//Madison directly addresses that.”//

Correction: Notice how Mr. Brown’s sources 

for the ratifi cation debates consist solely of 

//The Federalist//—a minuscule fraction of the 

ratifi cation record. He never mentions the 

other founding-era commentators who spoke 

to the amendments convention process.//17// Even 

his use of //The Federalist// is clumsy. For example, 

at this point he overlooks references to the 

Article V convention process in Federalist No. 

43 and No. 85.

//* * * *//

Brown: //“In 49, [Madison] asks, ‘Is it appropriate //

//to use a Convention to address breaches in the //

//Constitution when the federal government ignores //

//it?’ And his answer is absolutely not . . . .”//

 

Correction: This is another example of Brown’s 

inept use of //The Federalist//. Trying to convert 

one of its essays into an argument against the 

Constitution’s amendment process makes no 

sense at all. //The Federalist// was written to support 

the Constitution, not trash it.

Here’s the real scoop on Federalist No. 49: When 

Madison was writing, Pennsylvania and Vermont 

had constitutions that provided for a “council of 

censors” to meet every seven years. The censors 

could decide whether their state constitution was 

working well. The censors could call a constitutional 

convention to address any problems.

In 1783, Thomas Jeff erson outlined his own ideas 

for a new Virginia constitution. In partial imitation 

of the Pennsylvania-Vermont approach, his draft 

would have permitted some state offi  cials to call 

a convention for “altering this Constitution or 

correcting breaches of it.” Strikingly, this new 

convention was to have all the powers enjoyed by a 

plenary constitutional convention—including power 

to write an entirely new document and impose all 

its changes without a ratifi cation procedure.

Madison had four objections: (1) A rogue state 

legislature could block the process in various ways; 

(2) “frequent appeals” for constitutional revision 

could reduce public respect for government; 

(3) frequent referrals to the citizenry might 

cause constitutional turbulence; and (4) the 

legislature—the branch most likely responsible 

for the problems—might highjack the process.

Notice that //none// of these objections is 

relevant to calling a convention under Article 

V. The states, not federal offi  cials, initiate 

and staff  the convention, thereby preventing 

congressional obstruction or control. Article 

V is very diffi  cult to trigger, eliminating the 

danger of “frequent appeals.” A convention 

for proposing amendments has power only to 

propose specifi ed amendments, not re-write 

17 

For collections of this material, see, for example, my following two articles: Is the Constitution’s Convention for 

Proposing Amendments a ‘Mystery’? Overlooked Evidence in the Narrative of Uncertainty, 104 MARQUETTE L. 

REV. 1 (2020) and Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing 

Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615 (2013). See also A Founder Gives Us a Lesson on the Constitution’s Amendment 

Process, https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/founder-gives-us-lesson-constitutions-amendment-process/.

//18//

CONVENTION OF STATES

the Constitution. And unlike Jeff erson’s idea for 

periodic plenary constitutional conventions, any 

proposal from an Article V convention is subject 

to a diffi  cult ratifi cation process.

In a portion of Federalist No. 49 Brown fails 

to quote, Madison assures us that, although he 

objects to Jeff erson’s plan, still “a constitutional 

road to the decision of the people ought to be 

marked out and kept open, for certain great and 

extraordinary occasions.”

Unlike the proposals Madison was criticizing, 

the convention procedure of Article V seems to 

meet his goal very well.

//* * * *//

Brown: //“Now, in Federalist uh, I think it was 43, //

//yeah, in Federalist 43, Madison does address the //

//Article V Convention. And in that case, he refers to //

//it as “the remedy for errors” in the Constitution.”//

Correction: Mr. Brown is repeating—perhaps 

is the author of—a common JBS claim that the 

only role for an amendments convention was to 

correct drafting errors in the Constitution.

This is still more nonsense. The fact that Madison 

stated one purpose of the convention procedure 

does not mean he excluded other purposes. 

Other Founders itemized additional purposes. 

One was the need to correct federal abuses 

and overreach. That was the reason George 

Mason gave at the Constitutional Convention. 

During the ratifi cation debates, prominent 

advocates cited the convention procedure again 

and again as a key safeguard against abuse.//18// 

//* * * *//

**Trying to convert one \\
of //The Federalist// essays \\
into an argument against \\
the Constitution’s \\
amendment process \\
makes no sense at all. \\
The Federalist was \\
written to support the \\
Constitution, not trash it.**

//18//

// See, e.g., //The Founders Pointed to Article V as a Cure for Federal Abuse//, https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/the-founders-//

//pointed-to-article-v-as-a-cure-for-federal-abuse/ (collecting examples).//



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**38**

//19//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

Brown: //“Article V has never been used //

//technically, as far as the convention mode. It has //

//no track record of any success other than, well, //

//it did pressure Congress into passing the 17th //

//amendment, which I wouldn’t really consider a good //

//thing but, on the other hand, nullifi cation is just //

one// of many tools in our quiver.”//

Correction: Mr. Brown incorrectly uses the term 

“nullifi cation” to refer to all methods of what 

Madison called “interposition.” In constitutional 

scholarship, “nullifi cation” usually refers to 

formally adopting a state law or state convention 

resolution declaring that a federal law is void 

within state boundaries. The Constitution has 

no provision for nullifi cation and, contrary 

to JBS claims, Madison fi rmly opposed it—

recommending an Article V convention instead.//19//

//* * * *//

Brown: //“Well, y’know, in that light, it really gives a //

//feeling of there’s a sense of urgency here: we’ve gotta //

//get something done, we’ve gotta do it soon. And if //

//we look at the timetable, Convention of States is the //

//example again, they’ve been around for seven years, //

//they’ve gotten less than halfway to the thirty-four //

//states mark. //If// they don’t lose momentum . . . we’re //

//looking at another 10 years before they get to 34 states. //

//“They also admit that there will be numerous legal //

//challenges stalling the process along the way. When //

//we eventually get to a convention, Congress calls //

//the convention, they fi nally conclude their—their //

//whatever amendment proposals they come up with, //

//and then it goes out to the States for ratifi cation. //

//. . . You’re looking at a //minimum// of 20 years for //

anything// to actually go into eff ect from a convention. //

//I don’t think we have 20 years to turn this around.”//

Correction: It ill behooves someone who had been 

slowing down a process to gripe about it being slow. 

On several occasions in recent American history, 

we have been at the cusp of a convention only to 

see JBS and other alarmists frighten people away.

**It also ill-behooves an organization to complain about length of time **

**when it has had over 50 years for its own “solutions” to work.**

//19//

// James Madison to Edward Everett, Aug. 28, 1830, https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/1830-0828-//

//JM-to-E-Everett.pdf.//

//20//

CONVENTION OF STATES

It also ill-behooves an organization to complain 

about length of time when it has had over 50 

years for its own “solutions” to work. Of course, 

they haven’t worked, and by any measure, the 

political system is more dysfunctional than ever.

History shows that once a popular amendment 

is proposed, it can be ratifi ed in fairly short 

order—depending on the proposal, 15 months is 

a reasonable estimate. The 26th amendment was 

ratifi ed in slightly more than three months. 

As for litigation: Mr. Brown probably is wrong on 

this one as well. The Convention of States Project 

application is designed in a way to minimize the 

chances of lengthy litigation. (That is not true of 

the non-uniform applications promoted by some 

other Article V organizations.)

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“... The moment... the balanced budget //

//becomes a higher priority than all these other //

//programs, then Congress will make it their highest //

//priority as well and will pass a balanced budget. //

//“So, the problem really isn’t Congress, it really isn’t //

//the federal government, it really comes down to //

//what we the people tolerate.”//

Correction: This refl ects Mr. Brown’s ignorance of 

how the federal government works. As the Public 

Choice school of economics has documented, 

politicians respond to incentives. Over the long 

term, these incentives are more important than 

the character of the politicians themselves. When 

the incentives are bad, the results usually are 

bad. When the incentives are good, the results 

usually are good. However, concentrated special 

interests, with media support, almost always can 

off er stronger incentives than the diff used public.

There are various ways to change incentives, but one 

of the most direct is to alter the system in which 

political actors work—by constitutional amendment.

When given the opportunity for constitutional 

change, people act diff erently than they do 

from day to day. Take the balanced budget 

amendment as an example: Right now, Congress 

has strong incentives to defi cit-spend and very 

weak incentives to balance the budget. Special 

interests fi ght for as much federal booty as 

they can, knowing that if they don’t do so, the 

spending will happen anyway—but it will go to 

someone else. Fiscal conservatives have never 

been able to match that clout, even though they 

probably comprise most of the U.S. population.

But when people are given a chance to adopt a rule 

that they know (1) is for the good of all and (2) will 

bind others as much as themselves, they act very 

diff erently. A carefully-worded Balanced Budget 

Amendment will //never// be proposed by Congress—

the incentives to defi cit spending are too strong. 

But if a convention of the states proposed it, it 

probably would be ratifi ed fairly quickly.

//Conclusion//

Mr. Brown has little knowledge of constitutional 

history, constitutional law, law in general, or 

government operations. But his claims to 

expertise have certainly helped to disable a 

key constitutional check-and-balance. Brown 

proposes other remedies, but he and his 

predecessors have argued for those remedies for 

decades, while federal dysfunction grows ever 

worse.

Our ability to extricate ourselves from our current 

political problems depends heavily on whether 

we use the most powerful tool the Founders gave 

us for correcting federal dysfunction and abuse. 

The time for using it is here—in fact, it has been 

here for a very long time.



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**39**

//19//

PROBLEMS IN THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT BROWN

Brown: //“Article V has never been used //

//technically, as far as the convention mode. It has //

//no track record of any success other than, well, //

//it did pressure Congress into passing the 17th //

//amendment, which I wouldn’t really consider a good //

//thing but, on the other hand, nullifi cation is just //

one// of many tools in our quiver.”//

Correction: Mr. Brown incorrectly uses the term 

“nullifi cation” to refer to all methods of what 

Madison called “interposition.” In constitutional 

scholarship, “nullifi cation” usually refers to 

formally adopting a state law or state convention 

resolution declaring that a federal law is void 

within state boundaries. The Constitution has 

no provision for nullifi cation and, contrary 

to JBS claims, Madison fi rmly opposed it—

recommending an Article V convention instead.//19//

//* * * *//

Brown: //“Well, y’know, in that light, it really gives a //

//feeling of there’s a sense of urgency here: we’ve gotta //

//get something done, we’ve gotta do it soon. And if //

//we look at the timetable, Convention of States is the //

//example again, they’ve been around for seven years, //

//they’ve gotten less than halfway to the thirty-four //

//states mark. //If// they don’t lose momentum . . . we’re //

//looking at another 10 years before they get to 34 states. //

//“They also admit that there will be numerous legal //

//challenges stalling the process along the way. When //

//we eventually get to a convention, Congress calls //

//the convention, they fi nally conclude their—their //

//whatever amendment proposals they come up with, //

//and then it goes out to the States for ratifi cation. //

//. . . You’re looking at a //minimum// of 20 years for //

anything// to actually go into eff ect from a convention. //

//I don’t think we have 20 years to turn this around.”//

Correction: It ill behooves someone who had been 

slowing down a process to gripe about it being slow. 

On several occasions in recent American history, 

we have been at the cusp of a convention only to 

see JBS and other alarmists frighten people away.

**It also ill-behooves an organization to complain about length of time **

**when it has had over 50 years for its own “solutions” to work.**

//19//

// James Madison to Edward Everett, Aug. 28, 1830, https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/1830-0828-//

//JM-to-E-Everett.pdf.//

//20//

CONVENTION OF STATES

It also ill-behooves an organization to complain 

about length of time when it has had over 50 

years for its own “solutions” to work. Of course, 

they haven’t worked, and by any measure, the 

political system is more dysfunctional than ever.

History shows that once a popular amendment 

is proposed, it can be ratifi ed in fairly short 

order—depending on the proposal, 15 months is 

a reasonable estimate. The 26th amendment was 

ratifi ed in slightly more than three months. 

As for litigation: Mr. Brown probably is wrong on 

this one as well. The Convention of States Project 

application is designed in a way to minimize the 

chances of lengthy litigation. (That is not true of 

the non-uniform applications promoted by some 

other Article V organizations.)

//* * * *//

Brown:  //“... The moment... the balanced budget //

//becomes a higher priority than all these other //

//programs, then Congress will make it their highest //

//priority as well and will pass a balanced budget. //

//“So, the problem really isn’t Congress, it really isn’t //

//the federal government, it really comes down to //

//what we the people tolerate.”//

Correction: This refl ects Mr. Brown’s ignorance of 

how the federal government works. As the Public 

Choice school of economics has documented, 

politicians respond to incentives. Over the long 

term, these incentives are more important than 

the character of the politicians themselves. When 

the incentives are bad, the results usually are 

bad. When the incentives are good, the results 

usually are good. However, concentrated special 

interests, with media support, almost always can 

off er stronger incentives than the diff used public.

There are various ways to change incentives, but one 

of the most direct is to alter the system in which 

political actors work—by constitutional amendment.

When given the opportunity for constitutional 

change, people act diff erently than they do 

from day to day. Take the balanced budget 

amendment as an example: Right now, Congress 

has strong incentives to defi cit-spend and very 

weak incentives to balance the budget. Special 

interests fi ght for as much federal booty as 

they can, knowing that if they don’t do so, the 

spending will happen anyway—but it will go to 

someone else. Fiscal conservatives have never 

been able to match that clout, even though they 

probably comprise most of the U.S. population.

But when people are given a chance to adopt a rule 

that they know (1) is for the good of all and (2) will 

bind others as much as themselves, they act very 

diff erently. A carefully-worded Balanced Budget 

Amendment will //never// be proposed by Congress—

the incentives to defi cit spending are too strong. 

But if a convention of the states proposed it, it 

probably would be ratifi ed fairly quickly.

//Conclusion//

Mr. Brown has little knowledge of constitutional 

history, constitutional law, law in general, or 

government operations. But his claims to 

expertise have certainly helped to disable a 

key constitutional check-and-balance. Brown 

proposes other remedies, but he and his 

predecessors have argued for those remedies for 

decades, while federal dysfunction grows ever 

worse.

Our ability to extricate ourselves from our current 

political problems depends heavily on whether 

we use the most powerful tool the Founders gave 

us for correcting federal dysfunction and abuse. 

The time for using it is here—in fact, it has been 

here for a very long time.



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**40**

This page is intentionally left blank

**Misled**

//**Liberal Establishment’s**//

//**By Professor Rob Natelson**//

**DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN**

**AGAINST**

**ARTICLE V**

**CONSERVATIVES**

//**the**//

//**and how it**//



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**41**

**Misled**

//**Liberal Establishment’s**//

//**By Professor Rob Natelson**//

**DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN**

**AGAINST**

**ARTICLE V**

**CONSERVATIVES**

//**the**//

//**and how it**//



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**42**

//**The Liberal Establishment’s Disinformation Campaign **//

//**Against Article V—and How It Misled Conservatives**//

By Robert G. Natelson1

//Executive Summary //

Some conservative organizations regularly lobby against using 

the Constitution’s procedure for a “convention for proposing 

amendments.” Those organizations may think they are defending the 

Constitution, but in fact they are unwittingly repeating misinformation 

deliberately injected into public discourse by their political opponents. 

This paper shows how liberal establishment fi gures fabricated and spread 

this misinformation. This paper also reveals the reasons they did so: to 

disable a vital constitutional check on the power of the federal government. 

//i//



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**43**

//**The Liberal Establishment’s Disinformation Campaign **//

//**Against Article V—and How It Misled Conservatives**//

By Robert G. Natelson1

//Executive Summary //

Some conservative organizations regularly lobby against using 

the Constitution’s procedure for a “convention for proposing 

amendments.” Those organizations may think they are defending the 

Constitution, but in fact they are unwittingly repeating misinformation 

deliberately injected into public discourse by their political opponents. 

This paper shows how liberal establishment fi gures fabricated and spread 

this misinformation. This paper also reveals the reasons they did so: to 

disable a vital constitutional check on the power of the federal government. 

//i//



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**44**

//1//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

The Framers adopted the convention procedure 

to ensure that Congress did not have a monopoly 

on the amendment process. The Framers saw the 

procedure as a way the people, acting through 

their state legislatures, could respond if the federal 

government became dysfunctional or abusive.

There is widespread public support for 

amendments to cure some of the real problems 

now plaguing the country. However, since repeal 

of Prohibition, Congress repeatedly has refused 

to propose any constitutional amendments 

limiting its own power and prerogatives. When 

reformers sought to check lavish congressional 

pay raises, for example, they could get nothing 

through Congress. Instead, they had to secure 

ratifi cation of an amendment (the 27th) that had 

been formally proposed in 1789!

Such unresponsiveness would seem to be exactly 

the occasion for which the Founders authorized 

the convention for proposing amendments. Yet 

a handful of conservative groups—including but 

not limited to, the John Birch Society and Eagle 

Forum—have uncompromisingly opposed any use 

of the convention procedure to bypass Congress. 

They assiduously lobby state legislatures to 

reject any and all proposals for a convention, no 

matter how worthwhile or necessary they may 

be. This uncompromising opposition has become 

a mainstay of those groups’ political identity and, 

perhaps, a useful fundraising device.

Although these groups bill themselves as 

conservative, their refl exive opposition to the 

convention process regularly allies them with the 

liberal establishment and with special interest 

lobbyists who seek only to protect the status 

quo. Since the 1980s, this strange coalition 

has blocked all constitutional eff orts to address 

federal dysfunction. As a result that dysfunction 

has become steadily worse. For example, their 

long-held opposition to a balanced budget 

convention is a principal reason America now 

labors under a $26 trillion national debt.

Under Article V of the U.S. Constitution, any 

constitutional amendment must be ratifi ed by three 

fourths of the states (now 38 of 50) to be eff ective. 

Before an amendment can be ratifi ed, however, it must be 

proposed either (1) by Congress or (2) by an interstate task 

force the Constitution calls a “convention for proposing 

amendments.” This gathering is convened when the people 

convince two thirds of the state legislatures (34 of 50) to pass 

resolutions demanding it. The convention itself is a meeting 

of the representatives of state legislatures—an assembly of 

the kind traditionally called a “convention of states.”

//2//

CONVENTION OF STATES

//THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST//

//A CONVENTION//

//AND THEIR  SOURCE//

Opponents present an array of stock arguments 

against using the Constitution’s convention 

procedure. One such argument—the claim 

that “amendments won’t work”—has been so 

resoundingly contradicted by history that it has 

little credibility.//2// The others can be distilled into 

the following propositions:

• Little is known about how the process is 

supposed to operate;

• a convention for proposing amendments would 

be an uncontrollable “constitutional convention;”

• a convention for proposing amendments could 

be controlled or manipulated by Congress 

under the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper 

Clause;//3// and

• a convention for proposing amendments could 

unilaterally impose radical constitutional changes 

on America. 

These arguments are largely inconsistent with 

established constitutional law and with historical 

precedent,//4// and (as the reader can see) some are 

inconsistent with each other. 

**Since repeal of Prohibition, Congress repeatedly has refused to propose \\
any constitutional amendments limiting its own power and prerogatives. **



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**45**

//1//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

The Framers adopted the convention procedure 

to ensure that Congress did not have a monopoly 

on the amendment process. The Framers saw the 

procedure as a way the people, acting through 

their state legislatures, could respond if the federal 

government became dysfunctional or abusive.

There is widespread public support for 

amendments to cure some of the real problems 

now plaguing the country. However, since repeal 

of Prohibition, Congress repeatedly has refused 

to propose any constitutional amendments 

limiting its own power and prerogatives. When 

reformers sought to check lavish congressional 

pay raises, for example, they could get nothing 

through Congress. Instead, they had to secure 

ratifi cation of an amendment (the 27th) that had 

been formally proposed in 1789!

Such unresponsiveness would seem to be exactly 

the occasion for which the Founders authorized 

the convention for proposing amendments. Yet 

a handful of conservative groups—including but 

not limited to, the John Birch Society and Eagle 

Forum—have uncompromisingly opposed any use 

of the convention procedure to bypass Congress. 

They assiduously lobby state legislatures to 

reject any and all proposals for a convention, no 

matter how worthwhile or necessary they may 

be. This uncompromising opposition has become 

a mainstay of those groups’ political identity and, 

perhaps, a useful fundraising device.

Although these groups bill themselves as 

conservative, their refl exive opposition to the 

convention process regularly allies them with the 

liberal establishment and with special interest 

lobbyists who seek only to protect the status 

quo. Since the 1980s, this strange coalition 

has blocked all constitutional eff orts to address 

federal dysfunction. As a result that dysfunction 

has become steadily worse. For example, their 

long-held opposition to a balanced budget 

convention is a principal reason America now 

labors under a $26 trillion national debt.

Under Article V of the U.S. Constitution, any 

constitutional amendment must be ratifi ed by three 

fourths of the states (now 38 of 50) to be eff ective. 

Before an amendment can be ratifi ed, however, it must be 

proposed either (1) by Congress or (2) by an interstate task 

force the Constitution calls a “convention for proposing 

amendments.” This gathering is convened when the people 

convince two thirds of the state legislatures (34 of 50) to pass 

resolutions demanding it. The convention itself is a meeting 

of the representatives of state legislatures—an assembly of 

the kind traditionally called a “convention of states.”

//2//

CONVENTION OF STATES

//THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST//

//A CONVENTION//

//AND THEIR  SOURCE//

Opponents present an array of stock arguments 

against using the Constitution’s convention 

procedure. One such argument—the claim 

that “amendments won’t work”—has been so 

resoundingly contradicted by history that it has 

little credibility.//2// The others can be distilled into 

the following propositions:

• Little is known about how the process is 

supposed to operate;

• a convention for proposing amendments would 

be an uncontrollable “constitutional convention;”

• a convention for proposing amendments could 

be controlled or manipulated by Congress 

under the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper 

Clause;//3// and

• a convention for proposing amendments could 

unilaterally impose radical constitutional changes 

on America. 

These arguments are largely inconsistent with 

established constitutional law and with historical 

precedent,//4// and (as the reader can see) some are 

inconsistent with each other. 

**Since repeal of Prohibition, Congress repeatedly has refused to propose \\
any constitutional amendments limiting its own power and prerogatives. **



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**46**

//3//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

This paper shows that these arguments did not 

originate with the conservative groups that rely 

on them. Rather, they were produced as part of a 

disinformation campaign run by America’s liberal 

establishment. Members of that establishment 

injected these arguments into public discourse to 

cripple an important constitutional check on the 

federal government.

This disinformation campaign dates from the mid-

20th century. Its participants included members 

of Congress who feared that a convention might 

propose amendments to limit their power, 

activist Supreme Court justices seeking to 

protect themselves from constitutional reversal, 

and left-of-center academic and popular writers 

who opposed restraints on federal authority.

The campaign succeeded because its publicists 

enjoyed privileged access to both the academic 

and the popular media. The fact that many 

conservatives swallowed the propaganda enabled 

liberal activists to recede into the background 

and rely on conservatives to obstruct reform.

//SOME ADDITIONAL //

//CONSTITUTIONAL //

//BACKGROUND//

The American Founders envisioned citizens and 

states using constitutional amendments to prevent 

federal overreach and abuse. They ratifi ed the 

Bill of Rights in 1791 precisely for this reason. By 

the same token, in 1795 they ratifi ed the 11th 

amendment to reverse an overreaching Supreme 

Court decision.

The Founders also recognized that federal offi  cials 

might resist amendments to curb their own power. 

The convention procedure was designed as a way 

to bypass those offi  cials. Tench Coxe, a leading 

advocate for the Constitution, explained the eff ect:

//It is provided, in the clearest words, //

//that Congress shall be obliged to call a //

//convention on the application of two thirds //

//of the legislatures; and all amendments //

//proposed by such convention, are to be //

//valid when approved by the conventions or //

//legislatures of three fourths of the states. It //

//must therefore be evident to every candid //

//man, that two thirds of the states can always //

//procure a general convention for the purpose //

//of amending the constitution, and that //

//three fourths of them can introduce those //

//amendments into the constitution, although //

//the President, Senate and Federal House //

//of Representatives, should be unanimously //

//opposed to each and all of them.5//

In adopting the convention mechanism, the 

Founders well understood what they were doing. 

Conventions among the states (and before 

independence, among the colonies) had been 

a fi xture of American life for a century.//6// The 

Founding-Era record renders it quite clear that 

a “convention for proposing amendments” was to 

be a meeting of representatives from the state 

legislatures, and that the procedure and protocols 

would be the same as in prior gatherings.//7// 

In the two centuries after the Founding, the 

judiciary, including the U.S. Supreme Court, 

decided over three dozen cases interpreting 

Article V, and in doing so generally followed 

historical practice. Thus, by the middle years of 

the 20th century, the composition and protocols 

of a convention for proposing amendments 

should have been clear to anyone who seriously 

examined the historical and legal record.

The trouble was that some people were not really 

interested in the facts. 

//4//

CONVENTION OF STATES

**It must therefore be **

**evident to every candid **

**man, that two thirds of **

**the states can always **

**procure a general **

**convention for the **

**purpose of amending the **

**constitution, and that **

**three fourths of them **

**can introduce those **

**amendments into the **

**constitution, although **

**the President, Senate **

**and Federal House of **

**Representatives, should **

**be unanimously opposed **

**to each and all of them.**

**”**

**“**



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto047.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**47**

//3//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

This paper shows that these arguments did not 

originate with the conservative groups that rely 

on them. Rather, they were produced as part of a 

disinformation campaign run by America’s liberal 

establishment. Members of that establishment 

injected these arguments into public discourse to 

cripple an important constitutional check on the 

federal government.

This disinformation campaign dates from the mid-

20th century. Its participants included members 

of Congress who feared that a convention might 

propose amendments to limit their power, 

activist Supreme Court justices seeking to 

protect themselves from constitutional reversal, 

and left-of-center academic and popular writers 

who opposed restraints on federal authority.

The campaign succeeded because its publicists 

enjoyed privileged access to both the academic 

and the popular media. The fact that many 

conservatives swallowed the propaganda enabled 

liberal activists to recede into the background 

and rely on conservatives to obstruct reform.

//SOME ADDITIONAL //

//CONSTITUTIONAL //

//BACKGROUND//

The American Founders envisioned citizens and 

states using constitutional amendments to prevent 

federal overreach and abuse. They ratifi ed the 

Bill of Rights in 1791 precisely for this reason. By 

the same token, in 1795 they ratifi ed the 11th 

amendment to reverse an overreaching Supreme 

Court decision.

The Founders also recognized that federal offi  cials 

might resist amendments to curb their own power. 

The convention procedure was designed as a way 

to bypass those offi  cials. Tench Coxe, a leading 

advocate for the Constitution, explained the eff ect:

//It is provided, in the clearest words, //

//that Congress shall be obliged to call a //

//convention on the application of two thirds //

//of the legislatures; and all amendments //

//proposed by such convention, are to be //

//valid when approved by the conventions or //

//legislatures of three fourths of the states. It //

//must therefore be evident to every candid //

//man, that two thirds of the states can always //

//procure a general convention for the purpose //

//of amending the constitution, and that //

//three fourths of them can introduce those //

//amendments into the constitution, although //

//the President, Senate and Federal House //

//of Representatives, should be unanimously //

//opposed to each and all of them.5//

In adopting the convention mechanism, the 

Founders well understood what they were doing. 

Conventions among the states (and before 

independence, among the colonies) had been 

a fi xture of American life for a century.//6// The 

Founding-Era record renders it quite clear that 

a “convention for proposing amendments” was to 

be a meeting of representatives from the state 

legislatures, and that the procedure and protocols 

would be the same as in prior gatherings.//7// 

In the two centuries after the Founding, the 

judiciary, including the U.S. Supreme Court, 

decided over three dozen cases interpreting 

Article V, and in doing so generally followed 

historical practice. Thus, by the middle years of 

the 20th century, the composition and protocols 

of a convention for proposing amendments 

should have been clear to anyone who seriously 

examined the historical and legal record.

The trouble was that some people were not really 

interested in the facts. 

//4//

CONVENTION OF STATES

**It must therefore be **

**evident to every candid **

**man, that two thirds of **

**the states can always **

**procure a general **

**convention for the **

**purpose of amending the **

**constitution, and that **

**three fourths of them **

**can introduce those **

**amendments into the **

**constitution, although **

**the President, Senate **

**and Federal House of **

**Representatives, should **

**be unanimously opposed **

**to each and all of them.**

**”**

**“**



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto048.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**48**

//5//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

//TWENTIETH CENTURY //

//EFFORTS TO ADDRESS //

//FEDERAL OVERREACH//

As the size, power, and dysfunction of the federal 

government grew, many Americans turned to 

the Founders’ solution: the convention process.//8//

The fi rst 20th century eff ort for a convention to 

address federal overreach began in 1939, with a 

drive to repeal the 16th Amendment.//9// By 1950, 

that drive had garnered the approval of 18 states. 

Another drive induced Congress to propose the 

22nd Amendment, mandating a two-term limit 

for the President.

Early in the 1960s, the Council of 

State Governments suggested three 

amendments: one to streamline Article 

V, one to reverse Supreme Court 

decisions forcing state legislatures to reapportion, 

and one to check the Supreme Court by adding 

a state-based tribunal to review that Court’s 

decisions. In the late 1960s, there was another, 

nearly-successful, push for a convention to 

address the Court’s reapportionment cases. 

In 1979, the fi rst eff ort for a balanced 

budget amendment began. Throughout 

the next two decades there were 

drives to overrule the Supreme 

Court’s abortion ruling in Roe v. 

Wade, to impose term limits 

on members of 

Congress, and to enact 

other reforms. Some of these 

movements enjoyed wide popular 

support. The convention procedure was 

endorsed by President Eisenhower, by President 

Reagan, and (before he became a Supreme 

Court Justice) by Antonin Scalia.//10//

//**Co**//

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//**etai**//

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//**ent**//

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//**onst**//

//**ituti**//

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//** wa**//

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//**res d**//

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//**rity**//

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//**than by **//

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//**ent racial a**//

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//**Representative**//

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//**al nat**//

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//**re **//

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//**of the**//

//** “con**//

//**vent**//

//**ion”**//

//** sig**//

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//**ntl**//

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//**    **//

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//**ng, the**//

//**n he **//

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//**ld**//

//**    **//

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//**su**//

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//**sti**//

//**fie**//

//**d in**//

//** veto**//

//**ing the**//

//** Reso**//

//**lutio**//

//**n.**//

**Charles Black, Yale law professor \\
and zealous defender of liberal \\
causes, penned a polemical article \\
in 1963 on the Article V process that \\
was lacking in history and case law. **

**If **

**all**

** th**

**is **

**ter**

**rai**

**n is**

** foug**

**ht over, t**

**hen the **

**Amer**

**ican**

** pe**

**op**

**le **

**wi**

**ll **

**su**

**rr**

**en**

**de**

**r t**

**hi**

**s u**

**lti**

**ma**

**te**

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**no**

**bo**

**dy**

** ca**

**n **

**st**

**op**

** th**

**em**

**.**

//5//

//6//

CONVENTION OF STATES

//THE RESPONSE FROM //

//THE ESTABLISHMENT: //

//COORDINATED //

//DISINFORMATION //

During the 1950s, ’60s and ’70s, establishment 

liberals were pleased with the growth of the 

federal government and the activist Supreme 

Court. They wanted no corrective amendments. 

Rather, they felt threatened by conservative and 

moderate eff orts to use the convention process. 

Liberals developed, therefore, a campaign to 

eff ectively disable it. 

Their project was highly successful. It not 

only gained traction among liberals, but it 

pitted conservatives against conservatives by 

persuading many of them to abandon one of the 

Constitution’s most important checks on federal 

overreaching. The campaign resulted in the 

defeat of every eff ort to propose amendments 

to reform or restrain the federal government. 

Its psychological and political force continued 

unabated for decades.//11//

The story begins in 1951. Faced with a conservative 

drive to repeal the 16th Amendment, liberal U.S. 

Rep. Wright Patman (D.-Tex.) attacked it 

as “fascist” and “reactionary.” He added the 

unsupported assertion that a convention for 

proposing amendments could not be limited—

that it could “rewrite the whole Constitution.”//12// 

The obvious goal behind that statement was to 

scare people into thinking that the convention, 

instead of focusing on a single amendment, might 

eff ectively stage a coup d’état.

A more coordinated campaign against Article 

V began in 1963, with an article in the Yale Law 

Journal. It was authored by a law professor named 

Charles Black, also of Yale, a zealous defender of 

liberal causes and of the activism of the Supreme 

Court, then led by Chief Justice Earl Warren. The 

occasion for Black’s article was the amendment 

proposal of the Council of State Governments.

Despite Black’s position as a professor at one of 

the nation’s premier law schools—and despite the 

nature of the journal that published it—Black’s 

article was polemical rather than scholarly. You 

can deduce its tenor from the title: The Proposed 

Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster.//13//

On its face, Black’s article was responding to 

the Council of State Government’s proposals. 

In fact, his propositions extended much further. 

Black objected to the whole idea of the states 

being allowed to overrule Congress or the 

Supreme Court. So he off ered a wide-ranging 

plan of constitutional obstruction. In a nutshell, 

his position was as follows: 

• The process enabled a tiny minority of the 

American people to amend the Constitution 

against the wishes of the majority, and 

• if allowed to do so, the state legislatures might 

radically rewrite the Constitution. They “could 

change the presidency to a committee of three, 

hobble the treaty power, make the federal 

judiciary elective, repeal the fourth amendment, 

//**Co**//

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//**[sh**//

//**oul**//

//**d] r**//

//**etai**//

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//**    **//

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//**ndate **//

//**of the**//

//** “con**//

//**vent**//

//**ion”**//

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//**nif**//

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//**ati**//

//**ona**//

//**l we**//

//**ll-bei**//

//**ng, the**//

//**n he **//

//**wou**//

//**ld**//

//**    **//

//**    **//

//**    **//

//**     **//

//**     **//

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//**re**//

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//** Reso**//

//**lutio**//

//**n.**//

**If **

**all**

** th**

**is **

**ter**

**rai**

**n is**

** foug**

**ht over, t**

**hen the **

**Amer**

**ican**

** pe**

**op**

**le **

**wi**

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**r t**

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**no**

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**dy**

** ca**

**n **

**st**

**op**

** th**

**em**

**.**



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto049.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**49**

//5//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

//TWENTIETH CENTURY //

//EFFORTS TO ADDRESS //

//FEDERAL OVERREACH//

As the size, power, and dysfunction of the federal 

government grew, many Americans turned to 

the Founders’ solution: the convention process.//8//

The fi rst 20th century eff ort for a convention to 

address federal overreach began in 1939, with a 

drive to repeal the 16th Amendment.//9// By 1950, 

that drive had garnered the approval of 18 states. 

Another drive induced Congress to propose the 

22nd Amendment, mandating a two-term limit 

for the President.

Early in the 1960s, the Council of 

State Governments suggested three 

amendments: one to streamline Article 

V, one to reverse Supreme Court 

decisions forcing state legislatures to reapportion, 

and one to check the Supreme Court by adding 

a state-based tribunal to review that Court’s 

decisions. In the late 1960s, there was another, 

nearly-successful, push for a convention to 

address the Court’s reapportionment cases. 

In 1979, the fi rst eff ort for a balanced 

budget amendment began. Throughout 

the next two decades there were 

drives to overrule the Supreme 

Court’s abortion ruling in Roe v. 

Wade, to impose term limits 

on members of 

Congress, and to enact 

other reforms. Some of these 

movements enjoyed wide popular 

support. The convention procedure was 

endorsed by President Eisenhower, by President 

Reagan, and (before he became a Supreme 

Court Justice) by Antonin Scalia.//10//

//**Co**//

//**ng**//

//**re**//

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//**[sh**//

//**oul**//

//**d] r**//

//**etai**//

//**n co**//

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//** ove**//

//**r th**//

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//**s.**//

//**    **//

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//**    **//

//**  It**//

//** w**//

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//**pro**//

//**bab**//

//**ly b**//

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//** that**//

//** the v**//

//**oting**//

//** in a**//

//**ny c**//

//**onv**//

//**ent**//

//**ion**//

//** m**//

//**us**//

//**t b**//

//**e **//

//**by**//

//** s**//

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//**s, **//

//**sin**//

//**ce**//

//** th**//

//**e v**//

//**oti**//

//**ng**//

//** in**//

//** th**//

//**e o**//

//**rigi**//

//**nal C**//

//**onst**//

//**ituti**//

//**ona**//

//**l Co**//

//**nve**//

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//**ate**//

//**ly **//

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//**es**//

//**en**//

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//** Ins**//

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//**uld be t**//

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//** veto**//

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//** Reso**//

//**lutio**//

//**n.**//

**Charles Black, Yale law professor \\
and zealous defender of liberal \\
causes, penned a polemical article \\
in 1963 on the Article V process that \\
was lacking in history and case law. **

**If **

**all**

** th**

**is **

**ter**

**rai**

**n is**

** foug**

**ht over, t**

**hen the **

**Amer**

**ican**

** pe**

**op**

**le **

**wi**

**ll **

**su**

**rr**

**en**

**de**

**r t**

**hi**

**s u**

**lti**

**ma**

**te**

** po**

**we**

**r i**

**nt**

**o t**

**he**

** ha**

**nd**

**s o**

**f**

**a m**

**ino**

**rity**

** onl**

**y if t**

**hey wa**

**nt to, and**

** if the**

**y wa**

**nt **

**to **

**no**

**bo**

**dy**

** ca**

**n **

**st**

**op**

** th**

**em**

**.**

//5//

//6//

CONVENTION OF STATES

//THE RESPONSE FROM //

//THE ESTABLISHMENT: //

//COORDINATED //

//DISINFORMATION //

During the 1950s, ’60s and ’70s, establishment 

liberals were pleased with the growth of the 

federal government and the activist Supreme 

Court. They wanted no corrective amendments. 

Rather, they felt threatened by conservative and 

moderate eff orts to use the convention process. 

Liberals developed, therefore, a campaign to 

eff ectively disable it. 

Their project was highly successful. It not 

only gained traction among liberals, but it 

pitted conservatives against conservatives by 

persuading many of them to abandon one of the 

Constitution’s most important checks on federal 

overreaching. The campaign resulted in the 

defeat of every eff ort to propose amendments 

to reform or restrain the federal government. 

Its psychological and political force continued 

unabated for decades.//11//

The story begins in 1951. Faced with a conservative 

drive to repeal the 16th Amendment, liberal U.S. 

Rep. Wright Patman (D.-Tex.) attacked it 

as “fascist” and “reactionary.” He added the 

unsupported assertion that a convention for 

proposing amendments could not be limited—

that it could “rewrite the whole Constitution.”//12// 

The obvious goal behind that statement was to 

scare people into thinking that the convention, 

instead of focusing on a single amendment, might 

eff ectively stage a coup d’état.

A more coordinated campaign against Article 

V began in 1963, with an article in the Yale Law 

Journal. It was authored by a law professor named 

Charles Black, also of Yale, a zealous defender of 

liberal causes and of the activism of the Supreme 

Court, then led by Chief Justice Earl Warren. The 

occasion for Black’s article was the amendment 

proposal of the Council of State Governments.

Despite Black’s position as a professor at one of 

the nation’s premier law schools—and despite the 

nature of the journal that published it—Black’s 

article was polemical rather than scholarly. You 

can deduce its tenor from the title: The Proposed 

Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster.//13//

On its face, Black’s article was responding to 

the Council of State Government’s proposals. 

In fact, his propositions extended much further. 

Black objected to the whole idea of the states 

being allowed to overrule Congress or the 

Supreme Court. So he off ered a wide-ranging 

plan of constitutional obstruction. In a nutshell, 

his position was as follows: 

• The process enabled a tiny minority of the 

American people to amend the Constitution 

against the wishes of the majority, and 

• if allowed to do so, the state legislatures might 

radically rewrite the Constitution. They “could 

change the presidency to a committee of three, 

hobble the treaty power, make the federal 

judiciary elective, repeal the fourth amendment, 

//**Co**//

//**ng**//

//**re**//

//**ss **//

//**[sh**//

//**oul**//

//**d] r**//

//**etai**//

//**n co**//

//**ntrol**//

//** ove**//

//**r th**//

//**e c**//

//**on**//

//**ve**//

//**nt**//

//**io**//

//**n **//

//**pr**//

//**oc**//

//**es**//

//**s.**//

//**    **//

//**    **//

//**    **//

//**  It**//

//** w**//

//**ill **//

//**pro**//

//**bab**//

//**ly b**//

//**e ar**//

//**gued**//

//** that**//

//** the v**//

//**oting**//

//** in a**//

//**ny c**//

//**onv**//

//**ent**//

//**ion**//

//** m**//

//**us**//

//**t b**//

//**e **//

//**by**//

//** s**//

//**ta**//

//**te**//

//**s, **//

//**sin**//

//**ce**//

//** th**//

//**e v**//

//**oti**//

//**ng**//

//** in**//

//** th**//

//**e o**//

//**rigi**//

//**nal C**//

//**onst**//

//**ituti**//

//**ona**//

//**l Co**//

//**nve**//

//**nti**//

//**on**//

//** wa**//

//**s b**//

//**y s**//

//**tat**//

//**es.**//

//**St**//

//**ate**//

//** le**//

//**gis**//

//**latu**//

//**res d**//

//**o not a**//

//**ccur**//

//**ate**//

//**ly **//

//**re**//

//**pr**//

//**es**//

//**en**//

//**t t**//

//**he**//

//** pe**//

//**opl**//

//**e of t**//

//**heir s**//

//**tate**//

//**s—t**//

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//** in**//

//**     **//

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//** Ins**//

//**isten**//

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//** alloca**//

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//**sts**//

//**.**//

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//** If the P**//

//**resid**//

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//** be**//

//**lie**//

//**ve**//

//**d **//

//**th**//

//**e s**//

//**tru**//

//**ctu**//

//**re **//

//**and**//

//** ma**//

//**ndate **//

//**of the**//

//** “con**//

//**vent**//

//**ion”**//

//** sig**//

//**nif**//

//**ica**//

//**ntl**//

//**y w**//

//**ron**//

//**g,**//

//**    **//

//**    **//

//**    **//

//**     **//

//**     **//

//**      **//

//**        **//

//**           **//

//**            **//

//**       a**//

//**nd d**//

//**an**//

//**ge**//

//**ro**//

//**us**//

//** to**//

//** th**//

//**e n**//

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//**ona**//

//**l we**//

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//**ng, the**//

//**n he **//

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//**ld**//

//**    **//

//**    **//

//**    **//

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//**     **//

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//**su**//

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//**d in**//

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//**ing the**//

//** Reso**//

//**lutio**//

//**n.**//

**If **

**all**

** th**

**is **

**ter**

**rai**

**n is**

** foug**

**ht over, t**

**hen the **

**Amer**

**ican**

** pe**

**op**

**le **

**wi**

**ll **

**su**

**rr**

**en**

**de**

**r t**

**hi**

**s u**

**lti**

**ma**

**te**

** po**

**we**

**r i**

**nt**

**o t**

**he**

** ha**

**nd**

**s o**

**f**

**a m**

**ino**

**rity**

** onl**

**y if t**

**hey wa**

**nt to, and**

** if the**

**y wa**

**nt **

**to **

**no**

**bo**

**dy**

** ca**

**n **

**st**

**op**

** th**

**em**

**.**



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto050.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**50**

//7//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

make Catholics ineligible for public offi  ce, and 

move the national capital to Topeka.”

To prevent such horrifi c developments, Black argued:

• that Congress should refuse to count state 

legislative resolutions that did not comply with 

standards he laid down;

• that “Congress [should] retain control over the 

convention process,” and dictate allocation of 

delegates and determine how they were selected; and

• that the President should veto any congressional 

resolution calling a convention if the measure did 

not meet Black’s standards.

It is clear to anyone familiar with the law and 

history of Article V that Black did virtually no 

research on the subject before putting pen to 

paper. Not only did he make no reference to 

the extensive American history of interstate 

conventions, but he recited little of the case 

law interpreting Article V. He also failed to 

read carefully the Necessary and Proper 

Clause, which actually grants Congress 

no power over Article V conventions.//14//

Later the same year, William F. 

Swindler, a law professor at the College 

of William and Mary, published 

an article in the Georgetown Law 

Journal.//15// Like Black’s contribution, 

it was largely polemical and short on 

history and case law. 

Swindler claimed that the Council 

of State Government’s proposed 

amendments were “alarmingly regressive” 

and would destroy the Constitution as we 

know it: “For it is clear,” he wrote, “that the 

eff ect of one or all of the proposals. . . would 

be to extinguish the very essence of federalism 

which distinguishes the Constitution from the 

Articles of Confederation.” Like Black, Swindler 

argued that Congress could and should control 

the convention and impose obstacles to the 

convention serving its constitutional purpose. 

Indeed, Swindler went even further, maintaining 

that because “only a federal agency (Congress, 

as provided by the Constitution) is competent to 

propose” amendments, the convention procedure 

should be disregarded as “no longer of any eff ect.” 

The placement of the Black and Swindler diatribes in 

two of the nation’s top law journals can be explained 

only by the authors’ institutional affi  liations//16// and/

or by the agenda harbored by the journals’ editors. 

That placement enabled them to reach a wide 

audience among the legal establishment.

Somewhat later, Chief Justice Warren, whose 

judicial activism was one of the targets of the 

Council of State Governments, mimicked Black 

and Swindler with the absurd declaration that 

//“The //

//placement of //

//the Black and Swindler //

//diatribes in two of the nation’s //

//top law journals can be explained //

//only by the authors’ institutional \\
affi  liations and/or by the agenda \\
harbored by the journals’ editors. //

//That placement enabled them to //

//reach a wide audience among //

//the legal establishment.”//

//8//

CONVENTION OF STATES

its amendment drive “could soon destroy the 

foundations of the Constitution.”//17//

When Senator Everett Dirksen (R.- Ill.) joined 

the fi ght for an amendment partially reversing 

the Warren Court’s reapportionment cases, his 

liberal colleagues pushed back hard. Senators 

Joseph Tydings (D.-Md) and Robert Kennedy 

(D.-NY) followed Black’s lead and advanced 

various “reasons” why Congress should 

disregard state legislative resolutions it did not 

care for.//18// Senator William Proxmire (D.-Wis.) 

and the liberal New York Republican, Senator 

Jacob Javits pressed the claim that a convention 

would be uncontrollable.//19//

Kennedy’s resistance was supplemented by other 

opinion leaders associated with the Kennedy 

clan. In 1967, Kennedy speech writer Theodore 

Sorensen wrote a Saturday Review article in which 

he repeated Black’s “minority will control the 

process” argument. In congressional testimony 

the same year, Sorensen speculated that an 

Article V convention might “amend the Bill of 

Rights . . . limit free speech . . . reopen the wars 

between church and state . . . limit the Supreme 

Court’s jurisdiction or the President’s veto power 

or the congressional war-making authority.”//20//

In 1968, University of Michigan law professor 

Paul G. Kauper contributed a piece to Michigan 

Law Review that likewise displayed almost 

complete disregard of Article V law and history.//21// 

Kauper admitted that Congress could not refuse 

to call a convention if 34 states applied for one. 

But he asserted that “Congress has broad power 

to fashion the ground rules for the calling of the 

convention and to prescribe basic procedures 

to be followed.” Kauper also stated that “The 

national legislature is obviously the most 

appropriate body for exercising a supervisory 

authority. . .”—a conclusion in direct confl ict with 

**Chief Justice Earl Warren (center), later parroted Black and \\
Swindler with the absurd declaration that a convention  “could \\
soon destroy the foundations of the Constitution.”**



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto051.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**51**

//7//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

make Catholics ineligible for public offi  ce, and 

move the national capital to Topeka.”

To prevent such horrifi c developments, Black argued:

• that Congress should refuse to count state 

legislative resolutions that did not comply with 

standards he laid down;

• that “Congress [should] retain control over the 

convention process,” and dictate allocation of 

delegates and determine how they were selected; and

• that the President should veto any congressional 

resolution calling a convention if the measure did 

not meet Black’s standards.

It is clear to anyone familiar with the law and 

history of Article V that Black did virtually no 

research on the subject before putting pen to 

paper. Not only did he make no reference to 

the extensive American history of interstate 

conventions, but he recited little of the case 

law interpreting Article V. He also failed to 

read carefully the Necessary and Proper 

Clause, which actually grants Congress 

no power over Article V conventions.//14//

Later the same year, William F. 

Swindler, a law professor at the College 

of William and Mary, published 

an article in the Georgetown Law 

Journal.//15// Like Black’s contribution, 

it was largely polemical and short on 

history and case law. 

Swindler claimed that the Council 

of State Government’s proposed 

amendments were “alarmingly regressive” 

and would destroy the Constitution as we 

know it: “For it is clear,” he wrote, “that the 

eff ect of one or all of the proposals. . . would 

be to extinguish the very essence of federalism 

which distinguishes the Constitution from the 

Articles of Confederation.” Like Black, Swindler 

argued that Congress could and should control 

the convention and impose obstacles to the 

convention serving its constitutional purpose. 

Indeed, Swindler went even further, maintaining 

that because “only a federal agency (Congress, 

as provided by the Constitution) is competent to 

propose” amendments, the convention procedure 

should be disregarded as “no longer of any eff ect.” 

The placement of the Black and Swindler diatribes in 

two of the nation’s top law journals can be explained 

only by the authors’ institutional affi  liations//16// and/

or by the agenda harbored by the journals’ editors. 

That placement enabled them to reach a wide 

audience among the legal establishment.

Somewhat later, Chief Justice Warren, whose 

judicial activism was one of the targets of the 

Council of State Governments, mimicked Black 

and Swindler with the absurd declaration that 

//“The //

//placement of //

//the Black and Swindler //

//diatribes in two of the nation’s //

//top law journals can be explained //

//only by the authors’ institutional \\
affi  liations and/or by the agenda \\
harbored by the journals’ editors. //

//That placement enabled them to //

//reach a wide audience among //

//the legal establishment.”//

//8//

CONVENTION OF STATES

its amendment drive “could soon destroy the 

foundations of the Constitution.”//17//

When Senator Everett Dirksen (R.- Ill.) joined 

the fi ght for an amendment partially reversing 

the Warren Court’s reapportionment cases, his 

liberal colleagues pushed back hard. Senators 

Joseph Tydings (D.-Md) and Robert Kennedy 

(D.-NY) followed Black’s lead and advanced 

various “reasons” why Congress should 

disregard state legislative resolutions it did not 

care for.//18// Senator William Proxmire (D.-Wis.) 

and the liberal New York Republican, Senator 

Jacob Javits pressed the claim that a convention 

would be uncontrollable.//19//

Kennedy’s resistance was supplemented by other 

opinion leaders associated with the Kennedy 

clan. In 1967, Kennedy speech writer Theodore 

Sorensen wrote a Saturday Review article in which 

he repeated Black’s “minority will control the 

process” argument. In congressional testimony 

the same year, Sorensen speculated that an 

Article V convention might “amend the Bill of 

Rights . . . limit free speech . . . reopen the wars 

between church and state . . . limit the Supreme 

Court’s jurisdiction or the President’s veto power 

or the congressional war-making authority.”//20//

In 1968, University of Michigan law professor 

Paul G. Kauper contributed a piece to Michigan 

Law Review that likewise displayed almost 

complete disregard of Article V law and history.//21// 

Kauper admitted that Congress could not refuse 

to call a convention if 34 states applied for one. 

But he asserted that “Congress has broad power 

to fashion the ground rules for the calling of the 

convention and to prescribe basic procedures 

to be followed.” Kauper also stated that “The 

national legislature is obviously the most 

appropriate body for exercising a supervisory 

authority. . .”—a conclusion in direct confl ict with 

**Chief Justice Earl Warren (center), later parroted Black and \\
Swindler with the absurd declaration that a convention  “could \\
soon destroy the foundations of the Constitution.”**



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto052.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**52**

//9//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

the convention’s fundamental purpose as a device 

to bypass Congress. Kauper added that Congress 

could mandate that delegates be elected one 

from each congressional district, revealing his 

disregard of the Supreme Court opinion and 

other sources//22// that specifi cally identifi ed the 

gathering as a “convention of the states” rather 

than a popular assembly.

In 1972, Black returned to the Yale Law Journal 

to oppose what he termed the “national 

calamity” threatened by a bill introduced in 

Congress by Senator Sam Ervin (D.-N.C.).//23// 

Ervin’s bill, while well intentioned, was almost 

certainly unconstitutional because it was based 

on an overly-expansive reading of the Necessary 

and Proper Clause. But that was not Black’s 

objection. Black’s objection was that the “bill 

would make amendment far too easy.” Black 

contended that the process permitted a minority 

to force amendments on the majority, that state 

legislatures should have no control over the 

procedure, and that the President could veto the 

congressional call.

Black’s 1972 article was characterized by the 

same haste and lack of scholarly curiosity that 

had characterized his 1963 piece. For example, in 

defi ance of precedent he claimed that governors 

should be permitted to veto state Article V 

resolutions. He also misinterpreted the founding-

era phrase “general convention,” assuming it 

meant a gathering unlimited by subject. A minimal 

amount of research would have informed him that 

a “general convention” was one that was national 

rather than limited to states in a particular region. 

Finally, in arguing that the convention could not be 

limited, Black stated that all legislative resolutions 

for a convention adopted during the Constitution’s 

fi rst century were unlimited as to subject. This was 

fl atly untrue, and could have been disproved be 

simply examining the resolutions themselves.//24 //

//10//

CONVENTION OF STATES

It is apparent that the goal of such writings was not to 

disseminate truth but to protect Congress and the 

Supreme Court from constitutional accountability 

for their actions. The campaign was successful in 

that it helped ensure the defeat of the eff orts to 

propose a reapportionment amendment.//25// 

In January, 1979, however, a new “national 

calamity” threatened. The National Tax 

Limitation Committee kicked off  its drive for a 

balanced budget amendment to limit somewhat 

Congress’s bottomless line of credit. In response, 

establishment spokesmen again resorted to the 

same misinformation propagated in the 1960s. 

Kennedy admirer and eulogist Richard Rovere 

terrifi ed the readers of the New Yorker magazine 

with the specter of a convention that might 

//reinstate segregation, and even slavery; //

//throw out all or much of the Bill of Rights //

//. . . eliminate the Fourteenth Amendment’s //

//due process clause and reverse any Supreme //

//Court decision the members didn’t like, //

//including the one-man-one-vote rule; and //

//perhaps for good measure, eliminate the //

//Supreme Court itself.26//

(Rovere failed to explain how 38 states could be 

induced to ratify such proposals.) 

Opponents amplifi ed the histrionics by branding 

the amendments convention with a diff erent, 

and more frightening, name. Rather than refer 

to it by the name given by the Constitution—

“Convention for proposing Amendments”—

opponents began to call it a “constitutional 

convention.” This re-labeling reinforced the 

mental image of a junta that would not merely 

propose an amendment or two, but re-write our 

entire Constitution. 

**Throughout American history, \\
conventions of states (and \\
before them, of colonies) \\
have been convened for \\
many different purposes. But \\
only two are referred to as \\
“constitutional conventions” \\
because only those two \\
proposed a complete remodeling \\
of the political system. The \\
federal convention of 1787, which \\
drafted the federal Constitution, \\
was one of those conventions.**



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto053.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**53**

//9//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

the convention’s fundamental purpose as a device 

to bypass Congress. Kauper added that Congress 

could mandate that delegates be elected one 

from each congressional district, revealing his 

disregard of the Supreme Court opinion and 

other sources//22// that specifi cally identifi ed the 

gathering as a “convention of the states” rather 

than a popular assembly.

In 1972, Black returned to the Yale Law Journal 

to oppose what he termed the “national 

calamity” threatened by a bill introduced in 

Congress by Senator Sam Ervin (D.-N.C.).//23// 

Ervin’s bill, while well intentioned, was almost 

certainly unconstitutional because it was based 

on an overly-expansive reading of the Necessary 

and Proper Clause. But that was not Black’s 

objection. Black’s objection was that the “bill 

would make amendment far too easy.” Black 

contended that the process permitted a minority 

to force amendments on the majority, that state 

legislatures should have no control over the 

procedure, and that the President could veto the 

congressional call.

Black’s 1972 article was characterized by the 

same haste and lack of scholarly curiosity that 

had characterized his 1963 piece. For example, in 

defi ance of precedent he claimed that governors 

should be permitted to veto state Article V 

resolutions. He also misinterpreted the founding-

era phrase “general convention,” assuming it 

meant a gathering unlimited by subject. A minimal 

amount of research would have informed him that 

a “general convention” was one that was national 

rather than limited to states in a particular region. 

Finally, in arguing that the convention could not be 

limited, Black stated that all legislative resolutions 

for a convention adopted during the Constitution’s 

fi rst century were unlimited as to subject. This was 

fl atly untrue, and could have been disproved be 

simply examining the resolutions themselves.//24 //

//10//

CONVENTION OF STATES

It is apparent that the goal of such writings was not to 

disseminate truth but to protect Congress and the 

Supreme Court from constitutional accountability 

for their actions. The campaign was successful in 

that it helped ensure the defeat of the eff orts to 

propose a reapportionment amendment.//25// 

In January, 1979, however, a new “national 

calamity” threatened. The National Tax 

Limitation Committee kicked off  its drive for a 

balanced budget amendment to limit somewhat 

Congress’s bottomless line of credit. In response, 

establishment spokesmen again resorted to the 

same misinformation propagated in the 1960s. 

Kennedy admirer and eulogist Richard Rovere 

terrifi ed the readers of the New Yorker magazine 

with the specter of a convention that might 

//reinstate segregation, and even slavery; //

//throw out all or much of the Bill of Rights //

//. . . eliminate the Fourteenth Amendment’s //

//due process clause and reverse any Supreme //

//Court decision the members didn’t like, //

//including the one-man-one-vote rule; and //

//perhaps for good measure, eliminate the //

//Supreme Court itself.26//

(Rovere failed to explain how 38 states could be 

induced to ratify such proposals.) 

Opponents amplifi ed the histrionics by branding 

the amendments convention with a diff erent, 

and more frightening, name. Rather than refer 

to it by the name given by the Constitution—

“Convention for proposing Amendments”—

opponents began to call it a “constitutional 

convention.” This re-labeling reinforced the 

mental image of a junta that would not merely 

propose an amendment or two, but re-write our 

entire Constitution. 

**Throughout American history, \\
conventions of states (and \\
before them, of colonies) \\
have been convened for \\
many different purposes. But \\
only two are referred to as \\
“constitutional conventions” \\
because only those two \\
proposed a complete remodeling \\
of the political system. The \\
federal convention of 1787, which \\
drafted the federal Constitution, \\
was one of those conventions.**



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto054.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**54**

//11//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

Some background may help explain the audacity 

of this re-branding. Throughout American 

history, conventions of states (and before them, 

of colonies) have been convened for many 

diff erent purposes. But only two are referred 

to as “constitutional conventions” because only 

those two proposed a complete remodeling of the 

political system. They were the federal convention 

of 1787, which drafted the federal Constitution, 

and the 1861 Montgomery, Alabama gathering 

that drafted the Confederate Constitution. 

The other 30-plus interstate conventions were 

summoned for more modest purposes. Among 

these were four that gathered to propose 

amendments or that did propose amendments: 

(1) the Hartford Convention of 1780, which 

recommended alteration of the Articles of 

Confederation, (2) the Annapolis Convention 

of 1786, called for the same purpose, (3) the 

Hartford Convention of 1814, which promoted 

several constitutional amendments, and (4) the 

Washington Convention of 1861, which proposed 

an amendment to stave off  the Civil War.  Although 

not convened to Article V, these assemblies were 

amendments conventions in every other respect. 

Yet to my knowledge, none had ever been 

referred to as a “constitutional convention.” They 

were empowered only to suggest amendments, 

not to write new constitutions. Through the re-

branding, however, Americans were encouraged 

to believe that a mere amendments convention 

was a constitutional convention. 

Confusion between a “convention for proposing 

amendments” and a constitutional convention 

appears to be wholly a product of the 20th 

century. I have found no 18th or 19th century 

state resolutions, nor any reported 18th or 

19th century state or federal court decision,//27// 

referring to an amendments convention as a 

“constitutional convention.” On the contrary, 

the usual practice was to refer to a convention 

for proposing amendments by its proper name or 

as a “convention of the states” or by a variation 

of the latter phrase. In other words, affi  xing the 

“con-con” label on an amendments convention 

was an eff ort to alter English usage. 

Where did the “dis-informants” get the idea of 

changing the convention’s name? Perhaps they 

were inspired by a misunderstanding arising 

during the movement for direct election of U.S. 

Senators, and the manner in which opponents of 

direct election seized on that misunderstanding. 

In 1901 a congressional compiler gave the 

erroneous title “constitutional convention” to a 

state legislative resolution, and after 1903, a few 

resolutions actually used that term. The most 

famous example of how opponents capitalized 

on the confusion was a 1911 speech of Senator 

Weldon B. Heyburn (R.-Idaho). Senator 

Heyburn passionately opposed direct election, so 

to dissuade states from demanding a convention, 

he argued that: 

//When the constitutional convention meets //

//it is the people, and it is the same people //

//who made the original constitution, and no //

//limit on the original constitution controls //

//the people when they meet again to consider //

//the Constitution.28 //

The Heyburn view was not legally sound and 

seems not to have been persuasive at the time. 

By the following year the applying states were 

only one shy of the then-necessary 32 (of 

48). The demand for a convention abated only 

because the U.S. Senate yielded, and Congress 

itself proposed a direct election amendment. 

But the mid-20th century disinformation 

campaign did change public perceptions: Many 

people came think that a convention for proposing 

amendments was a “con-con.” Professor Black bore 

some of the responsibility for this development as 

well. In his 1972 polemic he repeatedly referred 

to an amendments convention as a “constitutional 

//12//

CONVENTION OF STATES

convention.” He had not used the term in that 

way in his 1963 article. 

There were many additional contributions to 

the mislabeling campaign, particularly after the 

balanced budget drive began in 1979. An essay 

that year by Lawrence Tribe, a liberal Harvard 

law professor and Kennedy ally, referred to an 

amendments convention as a “constitutional 

convention.”//29// Tribe also asserted that such a 

gathering would be an “uncharted course,” and 

he issued a long list of questions about Article V 

Jared Soares/Redux

**PROF. LAWRENCE **

**TRIBE ISSUED A LONG **

**LIST OF QUESTIONS **

**ABOUT ARTICLE V **

**TO WHICH, HE SAID, **

**“GENUINE ANSWERS **

**SIMPLY DO NOT EXIST.” **

**ALTHOUGH NEARLY **

**ALL THOSE QUESTIONS **

**HAVE SINCE BEEN **

**ANSWERED, CONVENTION **

**OPPONENTS STILL **

**COMMONLY PRESENT **

**STATE LAWMAKERS **

**WITH VARIATIONS ON **

**PROFESSOR TRIBE’S LIST.**



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto055.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**55**

//11//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

Some background may help explain the audacity 

of this re-branding. Throughout American 

history, conventions of states (and before them, 

of colonies) have been convened for many 

diff erent purposes. But only two are referred 

to as “constitutional conventions” because only 

those two proposed a complete remodeling of the 

political system. They were the federal convention 

of 1787, which drafted the federal Constitution, 

and the 1861 Montgomery, Alabama gathering 

that drafted the Confederate Constitution. 

The other 30-plus interstate conventions were 

summoned for more modest purposes. Among 

these were four that gathered to propose 

amendments or that did propose amendments: 

(1) the Hartford Convention of 1780, which 

recommended alteration of the Articles of 

Confederation, (2) the Annapolis Convention 

of 1786, called for the same purpose, (3) the 

Hartford Convention of 1814, which promoted 

several constitutional amendments, and (4) the 

Washington Convention of 1861, which proposed 

an amendment to stave off  the Civil War.  Although 

not convened to Article V, these assemblies were 

amendments conventions in every other respect. 

Yet to my knowledge, none had ever been 

referred to as a “constitutional convention.” They 

were empowered only to suggest amendments, 

not to write new constitutions. Through the re-

branding, however, Americans were encouraged 

to believe that a mere amendments convention 

was a constitutional convention. 

Confusion between a “convention for proposing 

amendments” and a constitutional convention 

appears to be wholly a product of the 20th 

century. I have found no 18th or 19th century 

state resolutions, nor any reported 18th or 

19th century state or federal court decision,//27// 

referring to an amendments convention as a 

“constitutional convention.” On the contrary, 

the usual practice was to refer to a convention 

for proposing amendments by its proper name or 

as a “convention of the states” or by a variation 

of the latter phrase. In other words, affi  xing the 

“con-con” label on an amendments convention 

was an eff ort to alter English usage. 

Where did the “dis-informants” get the idea of 

changing the convention’s name? Perhaps they 

were inspired by a misunderstanding arising 

during the movement for direct election of U.S. 

Senators, and the manner in which opponents of 

direct election seized on that misunderstanding. 

In 1901 a congressional compiler gave the 

erroneous title “constitutional convention” to a 

state legislative resolution, and after 1903, a few 

resolutions actually used that term. The most 

famous example of how opponents capitalized 

on the confusion was a 1911 speech of Senator 

Weldon B. Heyburn (R.-Idaho). Senator 

Heyburn passionately opposed direct election, so 

to dissuade states from demanding a convention, 

he argued that: 

//When the constitutional convention meets //

//it is the people, and it is the same people //

//who made the original constitution, and no //

//limit on the original constitution controls //

//the people when they meet again to consider //

//the Constitution.28 //

The Heyburn view was not legally sound and 

seems not to have been persuasive at the time. 

By the following year the applying states were 

only one shy of the then-necessary 32 (of 

48). The demand for a convention abated only 

because the U.S. Senate yielded, and Congress 

itself proposed a direct election amendment. 

But the mid-20th century disinformation 

campaign did change public perceptions: Many 

people came think that a convention for proposing 

amendments was a “con-con.” Professor Black bore 

some of the responsibility for this development as 

well. In his 1972 polemic he repeatedly referred 

to an amendments convention as a “constitutional 

//12//

CONVENTION OF STATES

convention.” He had not used the term in that 

way in his 1963 article. 

There were many additional contributions to 

the mislabeling campaign, particularly after the 

balanced budget drive began in 1979. An essay 

that year by Lawrence Tribe, a liberal Harvard 

law professor and Kennedy ally, referred to an 

amendments convention as a “constitutional 

convention.”//29// Tribe also asserted that such a 

gathering would be an “uncharted course,” and 

he issued a long list of questions about Article V 

Jared Soares/Redux

**PROF. LAWRENCE **

**TRIBE ISSUED A LONG **

**LIST OF QUESTIONS **

**ABOUT ARTICLE V **

**TO WHICH, HE SAID, **

**“GENUINE ANSWERS **

**SIMPLY DO NOT EXIST.” **

**ALTHOUGH NEARLY **

**ALL THOSE QUESTIONS **

**HAVE SINCE BEEN **

**ANSWERED, CONVENTION **

**OPPONENTS STILL **

**COMMONLY PRESENT **

**STATE LAWMAKERS **

**WITH VARIATIONS ON **

**PROFESSOR TRIBE’S LIST.**



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto056.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**56**

//13//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

to which, he said, “genuine answers simply do not 

exist.” Although nearly all those questions have 

since been answered,//30// convention opponents 

still commonly present state lawmakers with 

variations on Professor Tribe’s list.//31 //

Gerald Gunther of Stanford University, yet 

another liberal law professor, had clerked for Chief 

Justice Earl Warren. Warren’s decisions had been, 

of course, targets of some of the conservative 

amendment drives. In 1979 Gunther published his 

own tract branding an amendments convention 

a “constitutional convention.”//32// He further 

asserted that the crusade for a balanced 

budget amendment was “an exercise 

in constitutional irresponsibility,” 

and that the “convention 

route promises uncertainty, 

controversy, and divisiveness 

at every turn.” Apparently 

unaware of the Supreme Court’s 

prior characterization of an 

amendments convention as a 

“convention of states,” 

Gunther said the 

assembly would be 

popularly elected. While 

claiming that “relevant 

historical materials” 

supported his arguments, 

he off ered relatively little 

history to support them. 

Yet another assault on 

Article V published in 

1979 came from the 

pen of Duke University 

law professor Walter 

E. Dellinger. Dellinger 

had clerked for Justice 

Hugo Black (not to be 

confused with Professor 

Charles Black), one 

of the stalwarts of the 

activist Earl Warren/Warren Burger Supreme 

Court. Dellinger later served as acting solicitor 

general in the Clinton administration. He also 

labeled a convention for proposing amendments 

a “constitutional convention.”//33// 

Like other writers in this fi eld, Dellinger did little 

original research but, like Charles Black, managed 

to get his essay published in the Yale Law Journal. 

Apparently the Journal was willing to compromise 

its supposedly rigorous standards of scholarship 

to accommodate such material. Like Charles 

Black as well, Dellinger inaccurately 

declared that all legislative resolutions 

submitted during the Constitution’s 

fi rst century were unlimited as to 

subject and asserted that any 

resolution imposing subject-

matter limits was invalid.//34//

The establishment’s war against 

Article V continued throughout 

the 1980s as its spokesmen resisted 

popular pressure for a balanced 

budget amendment and for 

amendments overruling 

the activist Supreme Court. 

Arthur Goldberg was 

another member of the 

Kennedy circle: President 

Kennedy had appointed 

him successively as 

Secretary of Labor and 

Supreme Court Justice. 

In a 1983 article he 

labeled an amendments 

convention a “constitutional 

convention” and declared 

that its agenda would be 

uncontrollable.//35// He also 

quoted out of context 

part of a 1788 letter 

written by James Madison 

**Supreme Court Justice Arthur \\
Goldberg quoted out of context \\
a 1788 letter written by James \\
Madison, attempting to show that \\
Madison opposed the Article V \\
convention process. Madison actually \\
supported the use of Article V for a \\
convention of the states. This was a \\
clear misuse of historical material, \\
but some anti-Article V activists \\
still follow Goldberg’s lead today. **

//14//

CONVENTION OF STATES

in which Madison opposed a contemporaneous 

eff ort by two states to call a convention to 

completely rewrite the new Constitution. The 

quotation was out of context because Madison’s 

letter criticized only that specifi c eff ort, not the 

process generally— a process Madison actually 

supported. This was a clear misuse of historical 

material by Goldberg, but some anti-Article V 

activists still follow Goldberg’s lead today. 

In 1986, New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, a 

liberal Republican, wrote an article characterized 

by the usual hysteria: A Constitutional 

Convention Would Threaten the Rights We 

have Cherished for 200 Years.//36// As the title 

indicates, Kean applied the phrase “constitutional 

convention” to an amendments convention. 

Relying on the same out-of-context letter cited 

by Goldberg, Kean stoked the fear that such a 

convention might “run away.” 

The same year, Senator Paul Simon (D.-Ill.), one 

of the most liberal members of Congress, called 

the convention process “a very dangerous path.”//37// 

Twice in 1986 and again in 1988, Chief Justice 

Warren Burger—a participant in Roe v. Wade 

and other cases that belied his prior reputation 

as a “conservative”—wrote letters opposing 

what he called a “constitutional convention.” 

Burger claimed the gathering might disregard its 

agenda. He based the latter speculation on the 

frequent, although inaccurate, assertion that the 

1787 gathering did the same. Burger off ered no 

other support for his claims, and I have found 

no evidence he ever researched the subject. He 

certainly never published anything on it. 

I believe Burger absorbed his anti-Article V views 

from William F. Swindler. As mentioned earlier, 

Swindler was the author of possibly the most 

outrageous academic attack on the convention 

process. Burger was a self-described personal 

**As the drive for a balanced budget amendment \\
started to grow in earnest in 1979, the liberal \\
establishment renewed efforts to push the \\
false “con-con” narrative about the \\
Article V amending process.**



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**57**

//13//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

to which, he said, “genuine answers simply do not 

exist.” Although nearly all those questions have 

since been answered,//30// convention opponents 

still commonly present state lawmakers with 

variations on Professor Tribe’s list.//31 //

Gerald Gunther of Stanford University, yet 

another liberal law professor, had clerked for Chief 

Justice Earl Warren. Warren’s decisions had been, 

of course, targets of some of the conservative 

amendment drives. In 1979 Gunther published his 

own tract branding an amendments convention 

a “constitutional convention.”//32// He further 

asserted that the crusade for a balanced 

budget amendment was “an exercise 

in constitutional irresponsibility,” 

and that the “convention 

route promises uncertainty, 

controversy, and divisiveness 

at every turn.” Apparently 

unaware of the Supreme Court’s 

prior characterization of an 

amendments convention as a 

“convention of states,” 

Gunther said the 

assembly would be 

popularly elected. While 

claiming that “relevant 

historical materials” 

supported his arguments, 

he off ered relatively little 

history to support them. 

Yet another assault on 

Article V published in 

1979 came from the 

pen of Duke University 

law professor Walter 

E. Dellinger. Dellinger 

had clerked for Justice 

Hugo Black (not to be 

confused with Professor 

Charles Black), one 

of the stalwarts of the 

activist Earl Warren/Warren Burger Supreme 

Court. Dellinger later served as acting solicitor 

general in the Clinton administration. He also 

labeled a convention for proposing amendments 

a “constitutional convention.”//33// 

Like other writers in this fi eld, Dellinger did little 

original research but, like Charles Black, managed 

to get his essay published in the Yale Law Journal. 

Apparently the Journal was willing to compromise 

its supposedly rigorous standards of scholarship 

to accommodate such material. Like Charles 

Black as well, Dellinger inaccurately 

declared that all legislative resolutions 

submitted during the Constitution’s 

fi rst century were unlimited as to 

subject and asserted that any 

resolution imposing subject-

matter limits was invalid.//34//

The establishment’s war against 

Article V continued throughout 

the 1980s as its spokesmen resisted 

popular pressure for a balanced 

budget amendment and for 

amendments overruling 

the activist Supreme Court. 

Arthur Goldberg was 

another member of the 

Kennedy circle: President 

Kennedy had appointed 

him successively as 

Secretary of Labor and 

Supreme Court Justice. 

In a 1983 article he 

labeled an amendments 

convention a “constitutional 

convention” and declared 

that its agenda would be 

uncontrollable.//35// He also 

quoted out of context 

part of a 1788 letter 

written by James Madison 

**Supreme Court Justice Arthur \\
Goldberg quoted out of context \\
a 1788 letter written by James \\
Madison, attempting to show that \\
Madison opposed the Article V \\
convention process. Madison actually \\
supported the use of Article V for a \\
convention of the states. This was a \\
clear misuse of historical material, \\
but some anti-Article V activists \\
still follow Goldberg’s lead today. **

//14//

CONVENTION OF STATES

in which Madison opposed a contemporaneous 

eff ort by two states to call a convention to 

completely rewrite the new Constitution. The 

quotation was out of context because Madison’s 

letter criticized only that specifi c eff ort, not the 

process generally— a process Madison actually 

supported. This was a clear misuse of historical 

material by Goldberg, but some anti-Article V 

activists still follow Goldberg’s lead today. 

In 1986, New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, a 

liberal Republican, wrote an article characterized 

by the usual hysteria: A Constitutional 

Convention Would Threaten the Rights We 

have Cherished for 200 Years.//36// As the title 

indicates, Kean applied the phrase “constitutional 

convention” to an amendments convention. 

Relying on the same out-of-context letter cited 

by Goldberg, Kean stoked the fear that such a 

convention might “run away.” 

The same year, Senator Paul Simon (D.-Ill.), one 

of the most liberal members of Congress, called 

the convention process “a very dangerous path.”//37// 

Twice in 1986 and again in 1988, Chief Justice 

Warren Burger—a participant in Roe v. Wade 

and other cases that belied his prior reputation 

as a “conservative”—wrote letters opposing 

what he called a “constitutional convention.” 

Burger claimed the gathering might disregard its 

agenda. He based the latter speculation on the 

frequent, although inaccurate, assertion that the 

1787 gathering did the same. Burger off ered no 

other support for his claims, and I have found 

no evidence he ever researched the subject. He 

certainly never published anything on it. 

I believe Burger absorbed his anti-Article V views 

from William F. Swindler. As mentioned earlier, 

Swindler was the author of possibly the most 

outrageous academic attack on the convention 

process. Burger was a self-described personal 

**As the drive for a balanced budget amendment \\
started to grow in earnest in 1979, the liberal \\
establishment renewed efforts to push the \\
false “con-con” narrative about the \\
Article V amending process.**



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**58**

//15//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

friend of Swindler and appointed him to two of 

the Supreme Court’s advisory and administrative 

committees.//38// Burger apparently enjoyed 

Swindler’s company, and upon Swindler’s death 

Burger publicly eulogized him as “an analyst of 

history and a historian of the fi rst rank.”//39//

//THE TURNING  POINT //

In the years since 2010, research by this author 

and other constitutional scholars has recaptured 

the history and law governing the amendments 

convention process. Arguments against that 

process have lost credibility among many 

conservatives//40// and moderates and among some 

honest progressives as well. This is refl ected in 

a spate of formal state legislative demands for a 

convention.//41// As a result, establishment publicists 

who previously could aff ord to remain quiet have 

been forced to rally their own forces against the 

movement for a convention. 

Illustrative is a December 4, 2013 posting in 

the Daily Kos, a left-wing website, which warns 

of the “threat” of a convention and repeats the 

Charles Black argument that it would represent 

only a minority of the population.//42// Illustrative 

also is an op-ed column in the Washington 

Post dated October 21, 2014. The column was 

entitled, “A constitutional convention could be 

the single most dangerous way to ‘fi x’ American 

**Progressives and right-wing groups such as the John Birch Society use the \\
same stock anti-convention of states arguments to spread disinformation **

**about the important constitutional check on the federal government.**

//16//

CONVENTION OF STATES

government.”//43// As the title suggests, the author 

opposed a convention using rhetoric almost 

precisely identical to that employed by groups 

such as the John Birch Society. 

The author was no Bircher, however, but 

Robert Greenstein, a former member of the 

Clinton administration and an Obama ally, who 

heads an infl uential left-wing policy center in 

Washington, D.C. reportedly funded by socialist 

fi nancier George Soros.//44// For reasons explained 

in this paper, the similarity between Greenstein’s 

argument and those of misguided conservative 

groups is not accidental. 

The identity of interest among left-wing and right-

wing opponents emerged in sharp relief during a 

recent Montana legislative session. On February 

2, 2015, a spokeswoman for the Montana 

Budget and Policy Center, a “progressive” state 

policy group with ties to Greenstein’s think tank, 

sent an e-mail to Democratic lawmakers advising 

them on how to defeat a proposed balanced 

budget resolution. The spokeswoman’s “Topline 

Message” (suggested talking points) closely 

mirrored those of conservative opponents and 

of Greenstein, including the use of the “con-

con” label. She further told Democratic state 

lawmakers, “We strongly urge committee 

members to AVOID talking about a balanced 

budget amendment, instead focusing on the 

lack of certainty in calling a convention.” She 

suggested that liberal lawmakers direct questions 

to John Birch Society lobbyists who would make 

the liberals’ arguments for them.//45// 

//CONCLUSION //

When conservatives and moderates use 

the stock anti-convention arguments, 

they merely repeat disinformation 

injected into American political life by their political 

opponents. The purpose of this disinformation was 

to weaken or disable an important constitutional 

check on the federal government. 

In recent years, the inaccuracies spread in that 

campaign have been corrected. Accordingly, many 

conservative and moderate convention opponents 

have become supporters. Groups that persist in 

spreading misinformation have lost credibility. 

To shore up the anti-convention position, therefore, 

spokespeople for the liberal establishment are 

now reemerging to rally their own allies with the 

same stock arguments. Conservatives, moderates, 

and responsible progressives should hold them 

accountable for doing so.

    

//Notes//

//1Robert G. Natelson, the Senior Fellow in Constitutional //

//Jurisprudence at the Independence Institute in Denver, was //

//a law professor for 25 years at three diff erent universities. //

//He has written extensively on the Constitution for both the //

//scholarly and popular markets, and since 2013 has been cited //

//increasingly at the U.S. Supreme Court, both by parties and //

//by justices. He is the nation’s most published active scholar //

//on the amendment process, and heads the Institute’s Article //

//V Information Center. For a biography and bibliography, see //

//http:%%//%%constitution.i2i.org/about.//

//2The Lamp of Experience: Constitutional Amendments //

//Work, http:%%//%%constitution.i2i.org/2014/03/09/thelamp-of-//

//experience-constitutionalamendments-work///

//3U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.//

//4For a survey of the law of Article V, see Robert G. Natelson, //

//A Treatise on the Law of Amendment Conventions: State //

//Initiation of Constitutional Amendments: A Guide for //

//Lawyers and Legislative Drafters (2014).//



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**59**

//15//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

friend of Swindler and appointed him to two of 

the Supreme Court’s advisory and administrative 

committees.//38// Burger apparently enjoyed 

Swindler’s company, and upon Swindler’s death 

Burger publicly eulogized him as “an analyst of 

history and a historian of the fi rst rank.”//39//

//THE TURNING  POINT //

In the years since 2010, research by this author 

and other constitutional scholars has recaptured 

the history and law governing the amendments 

convention process. Arguments against that 

process have lost credibility among many 

conservatives//40// and moderates and among some 

honest progressives as well. This is refl ected in 

a spate of formal state legislative demands for a 

convention.//41// As a result, establishment publicists 

who previously could aff ord to remain quiet have 

been forced to rally their own forces against the 

movement for a convention. 

Illustrative is a December 4, 2013 posting in 

the Daily Kos, a left-wing website, which warns 

of the “threat” of a convention and repeats the 

Charles Black argument that it would represent 

only a minority of the population.//42// Illustrative 

also is an op-ed column in the Washington 

Post dated October 21, 2014. The column was 

entitled, “A constitutional convention could be 

the single most dangerous way to ‘fi x’ American 

**Progressives and right-wing groups such as the John Birch Society use the \\
same stock anti-convention of states arguments to spread disinformation **

**about the important constitutional check on the federal government.**

//16//

CONVENTION OF STATES

government.”//43// As the title suggests, the author 

opposed a convention using rhetoric almost 

precisely identical to that employed by groups 

such as the John Birch Society. 

The author was no Bircher, however, but 

Robert Greenstein, a former member of the 

Clinton administration and an Obama ally, who 

heads an infl uential left-wing policy center in 

Washington, D.C. reportedly funded by socialist 

fi nancier George Soros.//44// For reasons explained 

in this paper, the similarity between Greenstein’s 

argument and those of misguided conservative 

groups is not accidental. 

The identity of interest among left-wing and right-

wing opponents emerged in sharp relief during a 

recent Montana legislative session. On February 

2, 2015, a spokeswoman for the Montana 

Budget and Policy Center, a “progressive” state 

policy group with ties to Greenstein’s think tank, 

sent an e-mail to Democratic lawmakers advising 

them on how to defeat a proposed balanced 

budget resolution. The spokeswoman’s “Topline 

Message” (suggested talking points) closely 

mirrored those of conservative opponents and 

of Greenstein, including the use of the “con-

con” label. She further told Democratic state 

lawmakers, “We strongly urge committee 

members to AVOID talking about a balanced 

budget amendment, instead focusing on the 

lack of certainty in calling a convention.” She 

suggested that liberal lawmakers direct questions 

to John Birch Society lobbyists who would make 

the liberals’ arguments for them.//45// 

//CONCLUSION //

When conservatives and moderates use 

the stock anti-convention arguments, 

they merely repeat disinformation 

injected into American political life by their political 

opponents. The purpose of this disinformation was 

to weaken or disable an important constitutional 

check on the federal government. 

In recent years, the inaccuracies spread in that 

campaign have been corrected. Accordingly, many 

conservative and moderate convention opponents 

have become supporters. Groups that persist in 

spreading misinformation have lost credibility. 

To shore up the anti-convention position, therefore, 

spokespeople for the liberal establishment are 

now reemerging to rally their own allies with the 

same stock arguments. Conservatives, moderates, 

and responsible progressives should hold them 

accountable for doing so.

    

//Notes//

//1Robert G. Natelson, the Senior Fellow in Constitutional //

//Jurisprudence at the Independence Institute in Denver, was //

//a law professor for 25 years at three diff erent universities. //

//He has written extensively on the Constitution for both the //

//scholarly and popular markets, and since 2013 has been cited //

//increasingly at the U.S. Supreme Court, both by parties and //

//by justices. He is the nation’s most published active scholar //

//on the amendment process, and heads the Institute’s Article //

//V Information Center. For a biography and bibliography, see //

//http:%%//%%constitution.i2i.org/about.//

//2The Lamp of Experience: Constitutional Amendments //

//Work, http:%%//%%constitution.i2i.org/2014/03/09/thelamp-of-//

//experience-constitutionalamendments-work///

//3U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.//

//4For a survey of the law of Article V, see Robert G. Natelson, //

//A Treatise on the Law of Amendment Conventions: State //

//Initiation of Constitutional Amendments: A Guide for //

//Lawyers and Legislative Drafters (2014).//



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**60**

//17//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

//5“A Friend of Society and Liberty,” Pa. Gazette, Jul. //

//23, 1788, reprinted in 18 Documentary History of the //

//Ratifi cation of the Constitution of the United States, 277, //

//283. Coxe’s writings were at least as infl uential with the //

//general public as The Federalist Papers. He was a member //

//of Congress and Pennsylvania’s delegate to the Annapolis //

//convention, and the fi rst Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. //

//By a “general convention,” Coxe meant a national rather //

//than a regional gathering.//

//6Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions and the //

//Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing //

//Amendments,” 65 Fla. L. Rev. 615 (2013).//

//7Id.//

//8Liberals occasionally crusaded for amendments as well, but //

//by and large their clout in Congress, the bureaucracy, and the //

//courts was suffi  cient for their purposes.//

//9Philip L. Martin, The Application Clause of Article Five, 85 //

//Pol. Sci. Q. 615, 623 (1970).//

//The Sixteenth Amendment did not, as some say, authorize the //

//federal income tax; it merely dropped the requirement that //

//federal income tax revenues be apportioned among the states //

//by population. //

//10Russell L. Caplan, Constitutional Brinksmanship (Oxford //

//Univ. Press 1988) [hereinafter “Caplan”], 74 (Eisenhower), //

//85 (Reagan), 71 (Scalia). There are reports that Scalia //

//changed his position after ascending to the Court. //

//11The disinformation has lost credibility in the last few //

//years, as explained below. In 1992, reformers did success //

//in obtaining ratifi cation of the 27th amendment, limiting //

//congressional pay raises, but that amendment had been //

//proposed in 1789 as part of the Bill of Rights.//

//12Caplan, p.69.//

//13Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article //

//V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 Yale L.J. 957 (1963). Black //

//engaged in similar histrionics in the title of another article: //

//Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They Would Return //

//Us to a Confederacy, 49 A.B.A J. 637 (1963).//

//14By its terms, the Necessary and Proper Clause applies //

//to the 17 preceding powers in Article I, Section 8 and to //

//powers granted to the government of the United States and //

//to “Offi  cers” and “Departments.” A convention fi ts none of //

//those categories. See The Constitution’s Grants to Persons //

//and Entities Outside the Federal Government, http:%%//%%//

//constitution.i2i.org/2014/12/18/theconstitutions-grants-//

//to-persons-andentities-outside-the-u-s-government/ and //

//No, the Necessary and Proper Clause Does NOT Empower //

//Congress to Control an Amendments Convention, http:%%//%%//

//constitution.i2i.org/2014/08/23/n o-the-necessary-and-//

//proper-clause-doesnot-empower-congress-to-control-//

//anamendments-convention/.//

//15William F. Swindler, The Current Challenge to Federalism: //

//The Confederating Proposals, 52 Geo. L. J. 1 (1963) //

//16The overwhelming majority of law reviews are student-//

//edited. Because students are often unable to judge the quality //

//of articles submitted to them, the relative prestige of the //

//author’s academic institution is infl uential in the decision of //

//whether to accept a submission. This is an open secret among //

//law professors and supported by empirical research. Jonathan //

//Gingerich, A Call for Blind Review: Student Edited Law //

//Reviews and Bias, 59 J. Legal Educ. 269 (2009).//

//17Caplan, p. 74.//

//18Caplan, pp. 75-76//

//19Caplan, p. 76. Javits was liberal not just for a Republican, //

//but (like some of his GOP colleagues at the time) liberal in //

//an absolute sense. His voting record was regularly marked as //

//above 80% by the left-of-center Americans for Democratic //

//Action.//

//20Caplan, p. 147. See below for other comments by associates //

//and allies of the Kennedy clan.//

//21Paul G. Kauper, The Alternate Amendment Process: Some //

//Observations, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 903 (1968).//

//22Smith v. Union Bank, 30 U.S. 518, 528 (1831). For //

//other sources, see http:%%//%%constitution.i2i.org/2014/03/28///

//howdo-we-know-an-article-v-amendmentsconvention-is-//

//a-%E2%80%9Cconventionof-the-states%E2%80%9D-//

//because-boththe-founders-and-the-supreme-court-saidso///

//23Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter //

//to a Congressman, 82 Yale L.J. 189 (1972)//

//24The 1832 resolution of Georgia and the 1833 resolution //

//of Alabama were both limited as to subject. The 1788 //

//Virginia resolution and the 1864 Oregon resolution were //

//18//

CONVENTION OF STATES

//both arguably limited. Robert G. Natelson, Amending //

//the Constitution by Convention: Lessons for Today from //

//the Constitution’s First Century, 3, 5 & 7 (Independence //

//Institute, 2011), available at http:%%//%%liberty.i2i.org///

//fi les/2012/03/IP_5_20 11_c.pdf//

//25Martin, p. 628.//

//26Caplan, p. Viii.//

//27According to the Westlaw database.//

//28Caplan, p. 64.//

//29Lawrence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress //

//to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced //

//Budget Amendment, 10 Pac.L.J. 627 (1979).//

//30Robert G. Natelson, The Article V Handbook 33-35 (2d //

//ed., 2013).//

//31See, e.g., http:%%//%%www.eagleforum.org/alert/2011/pdf/ //

//20Questions.pdf.//

//32Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the //

//United States Constitution, 14 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1979).//

//33Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the //

//“Limited” Constitutional Convention, 88 Yale L.J. 1623 //

//(1979).//

//34To give due credit: Four years later Dellinger also published //

//an article correctly pointing out that Article V issues were //

//justiciable in court. Walter E. Dellinger, The Legitimacy of //

//Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, //

//97 Harv. L. Rev 386 (1983)//

//35Arthur J. Goldberg, The Proposed Constitutional //

//Convention, 11 Hastings Const. L. Q. 1 (1983).//

//36Thomas H. Kean, A Constitutional Convention Would //

//Threaten the Rights We have Cherished for 200 Years, 1986 //

//Det. C.L. Rev. 1087 (1986)//

//37Caplan, p. 85.//

//38Warren Burger, William F. Swindler: A Tribute from the //

//Chief Justice of the United States, 20 Wm. & Mary L.J. 595 //

//(1979).//

//39William F. Swindler, 70, Dies; Scholar of U.S. Constitution, //

//New York Times, May 7, 1984, available at http:%%//%%www.//

//nytimes.com/1984/05/08/obitu aries/william-f-swindler-70-//

//dies-scholarof-us-constitution.html.//

//40One example of support for a convention by conservative \\
and libertarian legal scholars and opinion leaders, including //

//some former skeptics, is the “Jeff erson Statement,” http:%%//%%//

//www.conventionofstates.com/the_jef ferson_statement. //

//41For a scorecard of recent developments, see https:%%//%%www.\\
facebook.com/pages/FixWashington-By-Calling-an-Article-//

//VAmendmentsConvention/598865556818994.//

//42http:%%//%%www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/0 \\
4/1260066/-Alert-Art-V-ConventionThreat-Grows-Dec-7-//

//2013-Assembly.//

//43http:%%//%%www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything///

//wp/2014/10/21/a-constitutionalconvention-could-be-the-//

//single-mostdangerous-way-to-fi x-americangovernment/.//

//44http:%%//%%sorosfi les.com/soros/2011/10/center -on-budget-//

//and-policy-priorities.html.//

//45The email can be read at http:%%//%%constitution.i2i.org///

//fi les/2015/03/OL oughlin-email.pdf. The language quoted //

//here was underscored for emphasis.//



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**61**

//17//

THE LIBERAL ESTABLISHMENT’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARTICLE V—AND HOW IT MISLED CONSERVATIVES

//5“A Friend of Society and Liberty,” Pa. Gazette, Jul. //

//23, 1788, reprinted in 18 Documentary History of the //

//Ratifi cation of the Constitution of the United States, 277, //

//283. Coxe’s writings were at least as infl uential with the //

//general public as The Federalist Papers. He was a member //

//of Congress and Pennsylvania’s delegate to the Annapolis //

//convention, and the fi rst Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. //

//By a “general convention,” Coxe meant a national rather //

//than a regional gathering.//

//6Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions and the //

//Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing //

//Amendments,” 65 Fla. L. Rev. 615 (2013).//

//7Id.//

//8Liberals occasionally crusaded for amendments as well, but //

//by and large their clout in Congress, the bureaucracy, and the //

//courts was suffi  cient for their purposes.//

//9Philip L. Martin, The Application Clause of Article Five, 85 //

//Pol. Sci. Q. 615, 623 (1970).//

//The Sixteenth Amendment did not, as some say, authorize the //

//federal income tax; it merely dropped the requirement that //

//federal income tax revenues be apportioned among the states //

//by population. //

//10Russell L. Caplan, Constitutional Brinksmanship (Oxford //

//Univ. Press 1988) [hereinafter “Caplan”], 74 (Eisenhower), //

//85 (Reagan), 71 (Scalia). There are reports that Scalia //

//changed his position after ascending to the Court. //

//11The disinformation has lost credibility in the last few //

//years, as explained below. In 1992, reformers did success //

//in obtaining ratifi cation of the 27th amendment, limiting //

//congressional pay raises, but that amendment had been //

//proposed in 1789 as part of the Bill of Rights.//

//12Caplan, p.69.//

//13Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article //

//V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 Yale L.J. 957 (1963). Black //

//engaged in similar histrionics in the title of another article: //

//Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They Would Return //

//Us to a Confederacy, 49 A.B.A J. 637 (1963).//

//14By its terms, the Necessary and Proper Clause applies //

//to the 17 preceding powers in Article I, Section 8 and to //

//powers granted to the government of the United States and //

//to “Offi  cers” and “Departments.” A convention fi ts none of //

//those categories. See The Constitution’s Grants to Persons //

//and Entities Outside the Federal Government, http:%%//%%//

//constitution.i2i.org/2014/12/18/theconstitutions-grants-//

//to-persons-andentities-outside-the-u-s-government/ and //

//No, the Necessary and Proper Clause Does NOT Empower //

//Congress to Control an Amendments Convention, http:%%//%%//

//constitution.i2i.org/2014/08/23/n o-the-necessary-and-//

//proper-clause-doesnot-empower-congress-to-control-//

//anamendments-convention/.//

//15William F. Swindler, The Current Challenge to Federalism: //

//The Confederating Proposals, 52 Geo. L. J. 1 (1963) //

//16The overwhelming majority of law reviews are student-//

//edited. Because students are often unable to judge the quality //

//of articles submitted to them, the relative prestige of the //

//author’s academic institution is infl uential in the decision of //

//whether to accept a submission. This is an open secret among //

//law professors and supported by empirical research. Jonathan //

//Gingerich, A Call for Blind Review: Student Edited Law //

//Reviews and Bias, 59 J. Legal Educ. 269 (2009).//

//17Caplan, p. 74.//

//18Caplan, pp. 75-76//

//19Caplan, p. 76. Javits was liberal not just for a Republican, //

//but (like some of his GOP colleagues at the time) liberal in //

//an absolute sense. His voting record was regularly marked as //

//above 80% by the left-of-center Americans for Democratic //

//Action.//

//20Caplan, p. 147. See below for other comments by associates //

//and allies of the Kennedy clan.//

//21Paul G. Kauper, The Alternate Amendment Process: Some //

//Observations, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 903 (1968).//

//22Smith v. Union Bank, 30 U.S. 518, 528 (1831). For //

//other sources, see http:%%//%%constitution.i2i.org/2014/03/28///

//howdo-we-know-an-article-v-amendmentsconvention-is-//

//a-%E2%80%9Cconventionof-the-states%E2%80%9D-//

//because-boththe-founders-and-the-supreme-court-saidso///

//23Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter //

//to a Congressman, 82 Yale L.J. 189 (1972)//

//24The 1832 resolution of Georgia and the 1833 resolution //

//of Alabama were both limited as to subject. The 1788 //

//Virginia resolution and the 1864 Oregon resolution were //

//18//

CONVENTION OF STATES

//both arguably limited. Robert G. Natelson, Amending //

//the Constitution by Convention: Lessons for Today from //

//the Constitution’s First Century, 3, 5 & 7 (Independence //

//Institute, 2011), available at http:%%//%%liberty.i2i.org///

//fi les/2012/03/IP_5_20 11_c.pdf//

//25Martin, p. 628.//

//26Caplan, p. Viii.//

//27According to the Westlaw database.//

//28Caplan, p. 64.//

//29Lawrence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress //

//to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced //

//Budget Amendment, 10 Pac.L.J. 627 (1979).//

//30Robert G. Natelson, The Article V Handbook 33-35 (2d //

//ed., 2013).//

//31See, e.g., http:%%//%%www.eagleforum.org/alert/2011/pdf/ //

//20Questions.pdf.//

//32Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the //

//United States Constitution, 14 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1979).//

//33Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the //

//“Limited” Constitutional Convention, 88 Yale L.J. 1623 //

//(1979).//

//34To give due credit: Four years later Dellinger also published //

//an article correctly pointing out that Article V issues were //

//justiciable in court. Walter E. Dellinger, The Legitimacy of //

//Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, //

//97 Harv. L. Rev 386 (1983)//

//35Arthur J. Goldberg, The Proposed Constitutional //

//Convention, 11 Hastings Const. L. Q. 1 (1983).//

//36Thomas H. Kean, A Constitutional Convention Would //

//Threaten the Rights We have Cherished for 200 Years, 1986 //

//Det. C.L. Rev. 1087 (1986)//

//37Caplan, p. 85.//

//38Warren Burger, William F. Swindler: A Tribute from the //

//Chief Justice of the United States, 20 Wm. & Mary L.J. 595 //

//(1979).//

//39William F. Swindler, 70, Dies; Scholar of U.S. Constitution, //

//New York Times, May 7, 1984, available at http:%%//%%www.//

//nytimes.com/1984/05/08/obitu aries/william-f-swindler-70-//

//dies-scholarof-us-constitution.html.//

//40One example of support for a convention by conservative \\
and libertarian legal scholars and opinion leaders, including //

//some former skeptics, is the “Jeff erson Statement,” http:%%//%%//

//www.conventionofstates.com/the_jef ferson_statement. //

//41For a scorecard of recent developments, see https:%%//%%www.\\
facebook.com/pages/FixWashington-By-Calling-an-Article-//

//VAmendmentsConvention/598865556818994.//

//42http:%%//%%www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/0 \\
4/1260066/-Alert-Art-V-ConventionThreat-Grows-Dec-7-//

//2013-Assembly.//

//43http:%%//%%www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything///

//wp/2014/10/21/a-constitutionalconvention-could-be-the-//

//single-mostdangerous-way-to-fi x-americangovernment/.//

//44http:%%//%%sorosfi les.com/soros/2011/10/center -on-budget-//

//and-policy-priorities.html.//

//45The email can be read at http:%%//%%constitution.i2i.org///

//fi les/2015/03/OL oughlin-email.pdf. The language quoted //

//here was underscored for emphasis.//



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**62**

This page is intentionally left blank

HARVARD JOURNAL

//of //

LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

**VOLUME 40, NUMBER 1**

**APRIL 2017**

**POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND THE LAW**

THE 35TH ANNUAL FEDERALIST SOCIETY

NATIONAL STUDENT SYNOPSIS HIM ON LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY—2016

**ARTICLES**

DEFYING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM:

THE CONSTITUTION WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF A RUNAWAY CONVENTION

Michael Farris

DELEGATION RECONSIDERED:

A DELEGATION DOCTRINE FOR THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Ronald A. Cass

“CAN ARTIFICIAL BEING”:

JOHN MARSHALL AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD

Christopher J. Wolfe

**ESSAY**

A PROPOSAL TO RECONSTRUCT THE CLEMENCY PROCESS —

THE VICE PRESIDENT AS HEAD OF A WHITE HOUSE, CLEMENCY OFFICE

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. 

Ilya Somin

Clint C. Bolick

Julia D. Mohoney

John C. Eastman

Yaron Brook

Jason Scott Johnston

Robert Woodson



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto063.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**63**

HARVARD JOURNAL

//of //

LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

**VOLUME 40, NUMBER 1**

**APRIL 2017**

**POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND THE LAW**

THE 35TH ANNUAL FEDERALIST SOCIETY

NATIONAL STUDENT SYNOPSIS HIM ON LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY—2016

**ARTICLES**

DEFYING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM:

THE CONSTITUTION WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF A RUNAWAY CONVENTION

Michael Farris

DELEGATION RECONSIDERED:

A DELEGATION DOCTRINE FOR THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Ronald A. Cass

“CAN ARTIFICIAL BEING”:

JOHN MARSHALL AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD

Christopher J. Wolfe

**ESSAY**

A PROPOSAL TO RECONSTRUCT THE CLEMENCY PROCESS —

THE VICE PRESIDENT AS HEAD OF A WHITE HOUSE, CLEMENCY OFFICE

Paul J. Larkin, Jr. 

Ilya Somin

Clint C. Bolick

Julia D. Mohoney

John C. Eastman

Yaron Brook

Jason Scott Johnston

Robert Woodson



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto064.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**64**

 

 

**DEFYING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: THE **

**CONSTITUTION WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF A **

**RUNAWAY CONVENTION **

MICHAEL FARRIS* 

INTRODUCTION  .............................................................. 63 

I.  DID THE CONVENTION DELEGATES EXCEED  

 THEIR AUTHORITY? ................................................. 67 

A.  The Call of the Convention ............................ 67 

1.  The States Begin the Official Process ..... 70 

2.  Machinations in New York ...................... 73 

3.  Congress Responds to the Annapolis 

Convention  Report  ................................... 74 

4.  The Six Remaining States Appoint 

Delegates .................................................... 77 

B.  Arguments about Delegates’ Authority at  

 

the Constitutional  Convention ...................... 80 

C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress ....... 86 

D.  Debates in the State Ratification  

 

Convention  Process ......................................... 88 

1.  There was a General Consensus that 

 

the States, Not Congress Called the 

Convention  ................................................ 88 

2.  Who gave the delegates their 

instructions? ............................................... 90 

a.  Anti-Federalist  Views ........................ 91 

b.  Federalist  Views  ................................. 94 

3.  Was the Convention unlawful from  

 

the  beginning? ........................................... 97 

4.  The “Runaway Convention” theory  

                                                                      

 

* J.D. 1976, Gonzaga University, LL.M. 2011, University of London, (Public In-

ternational Law). Farris is the President, CEO, and General Counsel of Alliance 

Defending Freedom and Chancellor //Emeritus// at Patrick Henry College. 

This page is intentionally left blank

 

 

**DEFYING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: THE **

**CONSTITUTION WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF A **

**RUNAWAY CONVENTION **

MICHAEL FARRIS* 

INTRODUCTION  .............................................................. 63

I.  DID THE CONVENTION DELEGATES EXCEED  

 THEIR AUTHORITY? ................................................. 67

A.  The Call of the Convention ............................ 67

1.  The States Begin the Official Process ..... 70

2.  Machinations in New York ...................... 73

3.  Congress Responds to the Annapolis 

Convention  Report  ................................... 74

4.  The Six Remaining States Appoint 

Delegates .................................................... 77

B.  Arguments about Delegates’ Authority at  

 

the Constitutional  Convention ...................... 80

C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress ....... 86

D.  Debates in the State Ratification  

 

Convention  Process ......................................... 88

1.  There was a General Consensus that 

 

the States, Not Congress Called the 

Convention  ................................................ 88

2.  Who gave the delegates their 

instructions? ............................................... 90

a.  Anti-Federalist  Views ........................ 91

b.  Federalist  Views  ................................. 94

3.  Was the Convention unlawful from  

 

the  beginning? ........................................... 97

4.  The “Runaway Convention” theory  

                                                                      

 

* J.D. 1976, Gonzaga University, LL.M. 2011, University of London, (Public 

ternational Law). Farris is the President, CEO, and General Counsel of Alliance 

Defending Freedom and Chancellor //Emeritus// at Patrick Henry College. 



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**65**

 

 

**DEFYING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: THE **

**CONSTITUTION WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF A **

**RUNAWAY CONVENTION **

MICHAEL FARRIS* 

INTRODUCTION  .............................................................. 63 

I.  DID THE CONVENTION DELEGATES EXCEED  

 THEIR AUTHORITY? ................................................. 67 

A.  The Call of the Convention ............................ 67 

1.  The States Begin the Official Process ..... 70 

2.  Machinations in New York ...................... 73 

3.  Congress Responds to the Annapolis 

Convention  Report  ................................... 74 

4.  The Six Remaining States Appoint 

Delegates .................................................... 77 

B.  Arguments about Delegates’ Authority at  

 

the Constitutional  Convention ...................... 80 

C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress ....... 86 

D.  Debates in the State Ratification  

 

Convention  Process ......................................... 88 

1.  There was a General Consensus that 

 

the States, Not Congress Called the 

Convention  ................................................ 88 

2.  Who gave the delegates their 

instructions? ............................................... 90 

a.  Anti-Federalist  Views ........................ 91 

b.  Federalist  Views  ................................. 94 

3.  Was the Convention unlawful from  

 

the  beginning? ........................................... 97 

4.  The “Runaway Convention” theory  

                                                                      

 

* J.D. 1976, Gonzaga University, LL.M. 2011, University of London, (Public In-

ternational Law). Farris is the President, CEO, and General Counsel of Alliance 

Defending Freedom and Chancellor //Emeritus// at Patrick Henry College. 

 

 

**DEFYING CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: THE **

**CONSTITUTION WAS NOT THE PRODUCT OF A **

**RUNAWAY CONVENTION **

MICHAEL FARRIS* 

INTRODUCTION  .............................................................. 63

I.  DID THE CONVENTION DELEGATES EXCEED  

 THEIR AUTHORITY? ................................................. 67

A.  The Call of the Convention ............................ 67

1.  The States Begin the Official Process ..... 70

2.  Machinations in New York ...................... 73

3.  Congress Responds to the Annapolis 

Convention  Report  ................................... 74

4.  The Six Remaining States Appoint 

Delegates .................................................... 77

B.  Arguments about Delegates’ Authority at  

 

the Constitutional  Convention ...................... 80

C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress ....... 86

D.  Debates in the State Ratification  

 

Convention  Process ......................................... 88

1.  There was a General Consensus that 

 

the States, Not Congress Called the 

Convention  ................................................ 88

2.  Who gave the delegates their 

instructions? ............................................... 90

a.  Anti-Federalist  Views ........................ 91

b.  Federalist  Views  ................................. 94

3.  Was the Convention unlawful from  

 

the  beginning? ........................................... 97

4.  The “Runaway Convention” theory  

                                                                      

 

* J.D. 1976, Gonzaga University, LL.M. 2011, University of London, (Public 

ternational Law). Farris is the President, CEO, and General Counsel of Alliance 

Defending Freedom and Chancellor //Emeritus// at Patrick Henry College. 



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**66**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 63 

 

INTRODUCTION 

The Constitution stands at the pinnacle of our legal and po-

litical system as the “supreme Law of the Land,”1 but it is far 

more important than just a set of rules. We do not take oaths to 

defend our nation, our government, or our leaders. Our ulti-

mate oath of loyalty affirms that we “will to the best of [our] 

Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 

United States.”2 Each president, every member of the Supreme 

Court, legislators in both houses of Congress, all members of 

the military, countless state and federal officials, all new citi-

zens, and all members of the legal profession pledge our honor 

and duty to defend this document. 

Despite this formal and symbolic profession of devotion, many 

leaders, lawyers, and citizens repeat the apparently inconsistent 

claim that the Constitution was illegally adopted by a runaway 

convention. In the words of former Chief Justice Warren Burger, 

the Constitution’s Framers “didn’t pay much attention to any lim-

itations on their mandate.”3 The oft-repeated claim is that the 

Constitutional Convention was called by the Confederation Con-

gress “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of 

Confederation.”4 However, “the Convention departed from the 

mission that Congress had given it. The Convention did not simp-

ly draft ‘alterations’ for the Articles of Confederation as amend-

ments. Instead, it proposed an entirely new Constitution to re-

place the Articles of Confederation.”5 

Critics also assert that the Founders’ illegal behavior extend-

ed into the ratification process. “The Convention did not ask 

Congress or the state legislatures to approve the proposed 

Constitution. Instead, perhaps fearing delay and possible de-

                                                                      

  1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 

//  //2//. Id.// art. II, § 1, cl. 8; //see also// //id.// art. VI, cl. 3. 

  3. Warren Burger, Remarks at the Fifth Annual Judicial Conference of the Unit-

ed States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (May 8, 1987), //in// 119 F.R.D. 45, 79.  

  4. Resolution of Confederation Congress (February 21, 1787)//,// //reprinted in// 1 THE 

DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 185, 187 

(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter DHRC]. 

  5. Gregory E. Maggs, //A Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Constitutional //

//Convention of 1787 As A Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution//, 80 

GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1707, 1711 (2012). 

62 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

 

was tested and rejected ............................ 99 

II.  WAS THE CONSTITUTION PROPERLY RATIFIED?  . 101 

A.  The Source of Law for Ratification  

 

Authority ........................................................ 102 

B.  The Constitutional Convention’s 

Development of the Plan for Ratification... 103 

C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress ..... 112 

D.  Thirteen Legislatures Approve the New 

Process............................................................. 114 

III.  MOST MODERN SCHOLARSHIP FAILS TO  

 CONSIDER THE ACTUAL PROCESS EMPLOYED IN 

ADOPTING THE CONSTITUTION ............................ 119 

A.  Most Scholarly References to the Legality  

 

of the Adoption of the Constitution are 

Superficial and Conclusory .......................... 119 

B.  Answering Ackerman and Katyal .............. 125 

1.  The Contention that the Whole  

 

Process Was Illegal under the Articles  

 

of Confederation May Be Summarily 

Dismissed ................................................. 129 

2.  Conspiracy Theories and Character 

Attacks: Exploring the Legality of the 

Delegates’  Conduct ................................. 134 

a.  The  Call .............................................. 134 

b.  The Delegates’ Authority ................ 136 

c.  The Delaware Claim ........................ 139 

3.  The Legality of the Ratification  

 

Process ...................................................... 140 

a.  Article  XIII ......................................... 140 

b.  State  Constitutions  ........................... 142 

4.  The Professors’ Real Agenda ................. 144 

IV. CONCLUSION  ......................................................... 146 

 

 

 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

INTRODUCTION 

The Constitution stands at the pinnacle of our legal and po

litical system as the “supreme Law of the Land,”1 but it is f

more important than just a set of rules. We do not take oaths to 

defend our nation, our government, or our leaders. Our ulti-

mate oath of loyalty affirms that we “will to the best of [our

Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the

United States.”2 Each president, every member of the Suprem

Court, legislators in both houses of Congress, all members

the military, countless state and federal officials, all new c

zens, and all members of the legal profession pledge our honor 

and duty to defend this document. 

Despite this formal and symbolic profession of devotion, many 

leaders, lawyers, and citizens repeat the apparently inconsiste

claim that the Constitution was illegally adopted by a runaway

convention. In the words of former Chief Justice Warren Burge

the Constitution’s Framers “didn’t pay much attention to any li

itations on their mandate.”3 The oft-repeated claim is that t

Constitutional Convention was called by the Confederation Co

gress “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles 

Confederation.”4 However, “the Convention departed from 

mission that Congress had given it. The Convention did not simp-

ly draft ‘alterations’ for the Articles of Confederation as amen

ments. Instead, it proposed an entirely new Constitution to re-

place the Articles of Confederation.”5 

Critics also assert that the Founders’ illegal behavior exten

ed into the ratification process. “The Convention did not a

Congress or the state legislatures to approve the proposed 

Constitution. Instead, perhaps fearing delay and possible de-

                                                                      

  1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 

//  //2//. Id.// art. II, § 1, cl. 8; //see also// //id.// art. VI, cl. 3. 

  3. Warren Burger, Remarks at the Fifth Annual Judicial Conference of the Unit-

ed States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (May 8, 1987), //in// 119 F.R.D. 45, 79. 

  4. Resolution of Confederation Congress (February 21, 1787)//,// //reprinted in// 1 THE

DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 185, 187 

(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter DHRC]. 

  5. Gregory E. Maggs, //A Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Constitutiona//

//Convention of 1787 As A Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitutio//

GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1707, 1711 (2012). 

62 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

 

was tested and rejected ............................ 99 

II.  WAS THE CONSTITUTION PROPERLY RATIFIED?  . 101 

A.  The Source of Law for Ratification  

 

Authority ........................................................ 102 

B.  The Constitutional Convention’s 

Development of the Plan for Ratification... 103 

C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress ..... 112 

D.  Thirteen Legislatures Approve the New 

Process............................................................. 114 

III.  MOST MODERN SCHOLARSHIP FAILS TO  

 CONSIDER THE ACTUAL PROCESS EMPLOYED IN 

ADOPTING THE CONSTITUTION ............................ 119 

A.  Most Scholarly References to the Legality  

 

of the Adoption of the Constitution are 

Superficial and Conclusory .......................... 119 

B.  Answering Ackerman and Katyal .............. 125 

1.  The Contention that the Whole  

 

Process Was Illegal under the Articles  

 

of Confederation May Be Summarily 

Dismissed ................................................. 129 

2.  Conspiracy Theories and Character 

Attacks: Exploring the Legality of the 

Delegates’  Conduct ................................. 134 

a.  The  Call .............................................. 134 

b.  The Delegates’ Authority ................ 136 

c.  The Delaware Claim ........................ 139 

3.  The Legality of the Ratification  

 

Process ...................................................... 140 

a.  Article  XIII ......................................... 140 

b.  State  Constitutions  ........................... 142 

4.  The Professors’ Real Agenda ................. 144 

IV. CONCLUSION  ......................................................... 146 

 

 

 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto067.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**67**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 63 

 

INTRODUCTION 

The Constitution stands at the pinnacle of our legal and po-

litical system as the “supreme Law of the Land,”1 but it is far 

more important than just a set of rules. We do not take oaths to 

defend our nation, our government, or our leaders. Our ulti-

mate oath of loyalty affirms that we “will to the best of [our] 

Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 

United States.”2 Each president, every member of the Supreme 

Court, legislators in both houses of Congress, all members of 

the military, countless state and federal officials, all new citi-

zens, and all members of the legal profession pledge our honor 

and duty to defend this document. 

Despite this formal and symbolic profession of devotion, many 

leaders, lawyers, and citizens repeat the apparently inconsistent 

claim that the Constitution was illegally adopted by a runaway 

convention. In the words of former Chief Justice Warren Burger, 

the Constitution’s Framers “didn’t pay much attention to any lim-

itations on their mandate.”3 The oft-repeated claim is that the 

Constitutional Convention was called by the Confederation Con-

gress “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of 

Confederation.”4 However, “the Convention departed from the 

mission that Congress had given it. The Convention did not simp-

ly draft ‘alterations’ for the Articles of Confederation as amend-

ments. Instead, it proposed an entirely new Constitution to re-

place the Articles of Confederation.”5 

Critics also assert that the Founders’ illegal behavior extend-

ed into the ratification process. “The Convention did not ask 

Congress or the state legislatures to approve the proposed 

Constitution. Instead, perhaps fearing delay and possible de-

                                                                      

  1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 

//  //2//. Id.// art. II, § 1, cl. 8; //see also// //id.// art. VI, cl. 3. 

  3. Warren Burger, Remarks at the Fifth Annual Judicial Conference of the Unit-

ed States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (May 8, 1987), //in// 119 F.R.D. 45, 79.  

  4. Resolution of Confederation Congress (February 21, 1787)//,// //reprinted in// 1 THE 

DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 185, 187 

(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter DHRC]. 

  5. Gregory E. Maggs, //A Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Constitutional //

//Convention of 1787 As A Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution//, 80 

GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1707, 1711 (2012). 

62 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

 

was tested and rejected ............................ 99 

II.  WAS THE CONSTITUTION PROPERLY RATIFIED?  . 101 

A.  The Source of Law for Ratification  

 

Authority ........................................................ 102 

B.  The Constitutional Convention’s 

Development of the Plan for Ratification... 103 

C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress ..... 112 

D.  Thirteen Legislatures Approve the New 

Process............................................................. 114 

III.  MOST MODERN SCHOLARSHIP FAILS TO  

 CONSIDER THE ACTUAL PROCESS EMPLOYED IN 

ADOPTING THE CONSTITUTION ............................ 119 

A.  Most Scholarly References to the Legality  

 

of the Adoption of the Constitution are 

Superficial and Conclusory .......................... 119 

B.  Answering Ackerman and Katyal .............. 125 

1.  The Contention that the Whole  

 

Process Was Illegal under the Articles  

 

of Confederation May Be Summarily 

Dismissed ................................................. 129 

2.  Conspiracy Theories and Character 

Attacks: Exploring the Legality of the 

Delegates’  Conduct ................................. 134 

a.  The  Call .............................................. 134 

b.  The Delegates’ Authority ................ 136 

c.  The Delaware Claim ........................ 139 

3.  The Legality of the Ratification  

 

Process ...................................................... 140 

a.  Article  XIII ......................................... 140 

b.  State  Constitutions  ........................... 142 

4.  The Professors’ Real Agenda ................. 144 

IV. CONCLUSION  ......................................................... 146 

 

 

 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

INTRODUCTION 

The Constitution stands at the pinnacle of our legal and po

litical system as the “supreme Law of the Land,”1 but it is f

more important than just a set of rules. We do not take oaths to 

defend our nation, our government, or our leaders. Our ulti-

mate oath of loyalty affirms that we “will to the best of [our

Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the

United States.”2 Each president, every member of the Suprem

Court, legislators in both houses of Congress, all members

the military, countless state and federal officials, all new c

zens, and all members of the legal profession pledge our honor 

and duty to defend this document. 

Despite this formal and symbolic profession of devotion, many 

leaders, lawyers, and citizens repeat the apparently inconsiste

claim that the Constitution was illegally adopted by a runaway

convention. In the words of former Chief Justice Warren Burge

the Constitution’s Framers “didn’t pay much attention to any li

itations on their mandate.”3 The oft-repeated claim is that t

Constitutional Convention was called by the Confederation Co

gress “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles 

Confederation.”4 However, “the Convention departed from 

mission that Congress had given it. The Convention did not simp-

ly draft ‘alterations’ for the Articles of Confederation as amen

ments. Instead, it proposed an entirely new Constitution to re-

place the Articles of Confederation.”5 

Critics also assert that the Founders’ illegal behavior exten

ed into the ratification process. “The Convention did not a

Congress or the state legislatures to approve the proposed 

Constitution. Instead, perhaps fearing delay and possible de-

                                                                      

  1. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 

//  //2//. Id.// art. II, § 1, cl. 8; //see also// //id.// art. VI, cl. 3. 

  3. Warren Burger, Remarks at the Fifth Annual Judicial Conference of the Unit-

ed States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (May 8, 1987), //in// 119 F.R.D. 45, 79. 

  4. Resolution of Confederation Congress (February 21, 1787)//,// //reprinted in// 1 THE

DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 185, 187 

(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter DHRC]. 

  5. Gregory E. Maggs, //A Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Constitutiona//

//Convention of 1787 As A Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitutio//

GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1707, 1711 (2012). 

62 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

 

was tested and rejected ............................ 99 

II.  WAS THE CONSTITUTION PROPERLY RATIFIED?  . 101 

A.  The Source of Law for Ratification  

 

Authority ........................................................ 102 

B.  The Constitutional Convention’s 

Development of the Plan for Ratification... 103 

C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress ..... 112 

D.  Thirteen Legislatures Approve the New 

Process............................................................. 114 

III.  MOST MODERN SCHOLARSHIP FAILS TO  

 CONSIDER THE ACTUAL PROCESS EMPLOYED IN 

ADOPTING THE CONSTITUTION ............................ 119 

A.  Most Scholarly References to the Legality  

 

of the Adoption of the Constitution are 

Superficial and Conclusory .......................... 119 

B.  Answering Ackerman and Katyal .............. 125 

1.  The Contention that the Whole  

 

Process Was Illegal under the Articles  

 

of Confederation May Be Summarily 

Dismissed ................................................. 129 

2.  Conspiracy Theories and Character 

Attacks: Exploring the Legality of the 

Delegates’  Conduct ................................. 134 

a.  The  Call .............................................. 134 

b.  The Delegates’ Authority ................ 136 

c.  The Delaware Claim ........................ 139 

3.  The Legality of the Ratification  

 

Process ...................................................... 140 

a.  Article  XIII ......................................... 140 

b.  State  Constitutions  ........................... 142 

4.  The Professors’ Real Agenda ................. 144 

IV. CONCLUSION  ......................................................... 146 

 

 

 



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**68**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 65 

 

ample of Orwellian “double-think.” Our belief that the Constitu-

tion is Supreme Law deserving respect and oaths of allegiance is 

utterly inconsistent with the notion that it was crafted by an illegal 

convention and ratified by an unsanctioned process that bordered 

on treason. 

As we will see, the scholarship on this issue is inadequate. 

Only two articles have been dedicated to developing the ar-

gument that the Constitution was illegally adopted by revo-

lutionary action.14 Nearly all other scholarly references to the 

illegality of the adoption of the Constitution consist of either 

brief discussions or naked assertions.15 Professors Bruce 

Ackerman and Neal Katyal argue that the illegality of the 

Consitution justifies the constitutional “revolutions” of Re-

construction and twentieth-century judicial activism.16 

Despite the widespread belief that the Constitutional Con-

vention delegates viewed their instructions as mere sugges-

tions which could be ignored with impunity, the historical rec-

ord paints a different picture. In //Federalist No. 78, //Alexander 

Hamilton underlined the importance of acting within one’s au-

thority: “There is no position which depends on clearer princi-

ples, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to 

the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is 

void.”17 And in //Federalist No. 40//, James Madison had already 

answered the charge that the Convention delegates had ex-

ceeded their commissions.18 

Understanding the lawfulness of the adoption of the Consti-

tution is not merely of historical interest. State appellate courts 

have cited the allegedly unauthorized acts of the delegates as \\
                                                                      

  14. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, //Our Unconventional Founding//, 62. U. CHI. L. 

REV. 475 (1995); Richard S. Kay, //The Illegality of the Constitution, //4 CONST.  COM-

MENT

. 57 (1987). 

//  //15//. See, e.g.//, John C. Godbold, //“Lawyer”—A Title of Honor//, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 301, 

314 (1999); Kurt T. Lash, //The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Mean-//

//ing of the New Jurisprudential Deal//, 70 FORDHAM  L.  REV. 459, 523 (2001); L. Scott 

Smith, //From Promised Land to Tower of Babel: Religious Pluralism and the Future of the //

//Liberal Experiment in America//, 45 BRANDEIS  L.J. 527, 539–40 (2007); Lindsay K. 

Jonker, Note, //Learning from the Past: How the Events That Shaped the Constitutions of //

//the United States and Germany Play Out in the Abortion Controversy//, 23 REGENT U. L. 

REV. 447, 453–54 (2011). 

  16. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14, at 476.  

  17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 

1961). 

  18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison). 

64 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

feat, the Convention called for separate ratifying conventions 

to be held in each state.”6 

These criticisms are not new. Many of the Anti-Federalist op-

ponents of the Constitution unleashed a string of vile invectives 

aimed at the architects of this “outrageous violation.”7 The Fram-

ers employed “all the arts of insinuation, and influence, to betray 

the people of the United States.”8 “[T]hat vile conspirator, //the au-//

//thor of Publius:// I think he might be impeached for high treason.”9 

The Constitution itself was treated to similar opprobrium: 

Upon the whole I look upon the new system as a most ri-

diculous piece of business—something (//entre nouz//) like 

the legs of Nebuchadnezar’s image: It seems to have been 

formed by jumbling or compressing a number of ideas to-

gether, something like the manner in which poems were 

made in Swift’s flying Island.10 

  Modern legal writers level critiques that are equally harsh, albe-

it with less colorful language. One author contends that James 

Madison led the delegates “[i]n what might be termed a bloodless 

coup.”11 Another suggests that the intentional violation of their 

limited mandate “could likely have led to the participants being 

found guilty of treason in the event that their proceedings were 

publicized or unsuccessful.”12 Ironically, Chief Justice Burger’s 

critique of the legality of the Constitution was delivered in his ca-

pacity as Chairman of the National Commission on the Bicenten-

nial of the Constitution of the United States.13 This is a classic ex-\\
                                                                      

//  //6//. Id. //

 7. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20// //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153, 

1157. 

//  //8//. //A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION (1788), //reprint-//

//ed in //16 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 272, 277. 

//  //9//. Curtiopolis//, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 15 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 399, 402. 

  10. Letter from William Grayson to William Short (Nov. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 150, 151. 

  11. Paul Finkelman, //The First American Constitutions: State and Federal//, 59 TEXAS 

L. REV. 1141, 1162 n.43 (1981) (reviewing WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERI-

CAN 

CONSTITUTIONS:  REPUBLICAN  IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE 

CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY  ERA (1980) and WILLIAM  WINSLOW 

CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES (1980)). 

  12. Brian Kane, //Idaho’s Open Meetings Act: Government’s Guarantee of Openness or //

//the Toothless Promise?//, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 135, 137 (2007). 

  13. Burger, Remarks, //supra// note 3, at 77.  

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

ample of Orwellian “double-think.” Our belief that the Consti

tion is Supreme Law deserving respect and oaths of allegiance is 

utterly inconsistent with the notion that it was crafted by an illegal

convention and ratified by an unsanctioned process that border

on treason. 

As we will see, the scholarship on this issue is inadequat

Only two articles have been dedicated to developing the ar-

gument that the Constitution was illegally adopted by revo-

lutionary action.14 Nearly all other scholarly references to th

illegality of the adoption of the Constitution consist of eithe

brief discussions or naked assertions.15 Professors Bru

Ackerman and Neal Katyal argue that the illegality of the

Consitution justifies the constitutional “revolutions” of Re-

construction and twentieth-century judicial activism.16 

Despite the widespread belief that the Constitutional Con-

vention delegates viewed their instructions as mere sugges-

tions which could be ignored with impunity, the historical rec-

ord paints a different picture. In //Federalist No. 78, //Alexand

Hamilton underlined the importance of acting within one’s au-

thority: “There is no position which depends on clearer prin

ples, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to 

the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised,

void.”17 And in //Federalist No. 40//, James Madison had alrea

answered the charge that the Convention delegates had e

ceeded their commissions.18 

Understanding the lawfulness of the adoption of the Consti-

tution is not merely of historical interest. State appellate courts

have cited the allegedly unauthorized acts of the delegates as \\
                                                                      

  14. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, //Our Unconventional Founding//, 62. U. CHI. 

REV. 475 (1995); Richard S. Kay, //The Illegality of the Constitution, //4 CONST.  COM-

MENT

. 57 (1987). 

//  //15//. See, e.g.//, John C. Godbold, //“Lawyer”—A Title of Honor//, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 30

314 (1999); Kurt T. Lash, //The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Mean-//

//ing of the New Jurisprudential Deal//, 70 FORDHAM  L.  REV. 459, 523 (2001); L. Scott

Smith, //From Promised Land to Tower of Babel: Religious Pluralism and the Future of the //

//Liberal Experiment in America//, 45 BRANDEIS  L.J. 527, 539–40 (2007); Lindsay 

Jonker, Note, //Learning from the Past: How the Events That Shaped the Constitutions of//

//the United States and Germany Play Out in the Abortion Controversy//, 23 REGENT U.

REV. 447, 453–54 (2011). 

  16. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14, at 476.  

  17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961). 

  18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison). 

64 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

feat, the Convention called for separate ratifying conventions 

to be held in each state.”6 

These criticisms are not new. Many of the Anti-Federalist op-

ponents of the Constitution unleashed a string of vile invectives 

aimed at the architects of this “outrageous violation.”7 The Fram-

ers employed “all the arts of insinuation, and influence, to betray 

the people of the United States.”8 “[T]hat vile conspirator, //the au-//

//thor of Publius:// I think he might be impeached for high treason.”9 

The Constitution itself was treated to similar opprobrium: 

Upon the whole I look upon the new system as a most ri-

diculous piece of business—something (//entre nouz//) like 

the legs of Nebuchadnezar’s image: It seems to have been 

formed by jumbling or compressing a number of ideas to-

gether, something like the manner in which poems were 

made in Swift’s flying Island.10 

  Modern legal writers level critiques that are equally harsh, albe-

it with less colorful language. One author contends that James 

Madison led the delegates “[i]n what might be termed a bloodless 

coup.”11 Another suggests that the intentional violation of their 

limited mandate “could likely have led to the participants being 

found guilty of treason in the event that their proceedings were 

publicized or unsuccessful.”12 Ironically, Chief Justice Burger’s 

critique of the legality of the Constitution was delivered in his ca-

pacity as Chairman of the National Commission on the Bicenten-

nial of the Constitution of the United States.13 This is a classic ex-\\
                                                                      

//  //6//. Id. //

 7. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20// //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153, 

1157. 

//  //8//. //A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION (1788), //reprint-//

//ed in //16 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 272, 277. 

//  //9//. Curtiopolis//, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 15 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 399, 402. 

  10. Letter from William Grayson to William Short (Nov. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 150, 151. 

  11. Paul Finkelman, //The First American Constitutions: State and Federal//, 59 TEXAS 

L. REV. 1141, 1162 n.43 (1981) (reviewing WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERI-

CAN 

CONSTITUTIONS:  REPUBLICAN  IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE 

CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY  ERA (1980) and WILLIAM  WINSLOW 

CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES (1980)). 

  12. Brian Kane, //Idaho’s Open Meetings Act: Government’s Guarantee of Openness or //

//the Toothless Promise?//, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 135, 137 (2007). 

  13. Burger, Remarks, //supra// note 3, at 77.  



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto069.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**69**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 65 

 

ample of Orwellian “double-think.” Our belief that the Constitu-

tion is Supreme Law deserving respect and oaths of allegiance is 

utterly inconsistent with the notion that it was crafted by an illegal 

convention and ratified by an unsanctioned process that bordered 

on treason. 

As we will see, the scholarship on this issue is inadequate. 

Only two articles have been dedicated to developing the ar-

gument that the Constitution was illegally adopted by revo-

lutionary action.14 Nearly all other scholarly references to the 

illegality of the adoption of the Constitution consist of either 

brief discussions or naked assertions.15 Professors Bruce 

Ackerman and Neal Katyal argue that the illegality of the 

Consitution justifies the constitutional “revolutions” of Re-

construction and twentieth-century judicial activism.16 

Despite the widespread belief that the Constitutional Con-

vention delegates viewed their instructions as mere sugges-

tions which could be ignored with impunity, the historical rec-

ord paints a different picture. In //Federalist No. 78, //Alexander 

Hamilton underlined the importance of acting within one’s au-

thority: “There is no position which depends on clearer princi-

ples, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to 

the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is 

void.”17 And in //Federalist No. 40//, James Madison had already 

answered the charge that the Convention delegates had ex-

ceeded their commissions.18 

Understanding the lawfulness of the adoption of the Consti-

tution is not merely of historical interest. State appellate courts 

have cited the allegedly unauthorized acts of the delegates as \\
                                                                      

  14. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, //Our Unconventional Founding//, 62. U. CHI. L. 

REV. 475 (1995); Richard S. Kay, //The Illegality of the Constitution, //4 CONST.  COM-

MENT

. 57 (1987). 

//  //15//. See, e.g.//, John C. Godbold, //“Lawyer”—A Title of Honor//, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 301, 

314 (1999); Kurt T. Lash, //The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Mean-//

//ing of the New Jurisprudential Deal//, 70 FORDHAM  L.  REV. 459, 523 (2001); L. Scott 

Smith, //From Promised Land to Tower of Babel: Religious Pluralism and the Future of the //

//Liberal Experiment in America//, 45 BRANDEIS  L.J. 527, 539–40 (2007); Lindsay K. 

Jonker, Note, //Learning from the Past: How the Events That Shaped the Constitutions of //

//the United States and Germany Play Out in the Abortion Controversy//, 23 REGENT U. L. 

REV. 447, 453–54 (2011). 

  16. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14, at 476.  

  17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 

1961). 

  18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison). 

64 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

feat, the Convention called for separate ratifying conventions 

to be held in each state.”6 

These criticisms are not new. Many of the Anti-Federalist op-

ponents of the Constitution unleashed a string of vile invectives 

aimed at the architects of this “outrageous violation.”7 The Fram-

ers employed “all the arts of insinuation, and influence, to betray 

the people of the United States.”8 “[T]hat vile conspirator, //the au-//

//thor of Publius:// I think he might be impeached for high treason.”9 

The Constitution itself was treated to similar opprobrium: 

Upon the whole I look upon the new system as a most ri-

diculous piece of business—something (//entre nouz//) like 

the legs of Nebuchadnezar’s image: It seems to have been 

formed by jumbling or compressing a number of ideas to-

gether, something like the manner in which poems were 

made in Swift’s flying Island.10 

  Modern legal writers level critiques that are equally harsh, albe-

it with less colorful language. One author contends that James 

Madison led the delegates “[i]n what might be termed a bloodless 

coup.”11 Another suggests that the intentional violation of their 

limited mandate “could likely have led to the participants being 

found guilty of treason in the event that their proceedings were 

publicized or unsuccessful.”12 Ironically, Chief Justice Burger’s 

critique of the legality of the Constitution was delivered in his ca-

pacity as Chairman of the National Commission on the Bicenten-

nial of the Constitution of the United States.13 This is a classic ex-\\
                                                                      

//  //6//. Id. //

 7. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20// //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153, 

1157. 

//  //8//. //A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION (1788), //reprint-//

//ed in //16 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 272, 277. 

//  //9//. Curtiopolis//, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 15 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 399, 402. 

  10. Letter from William Grayson to William Short (Nov. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 150, 151. 

  11. Paul Finkelman, //The First American Constitutions: State and Federal//, 59 TEXAS 

L. REV. 1141, 1162 n.43 (1981) (reviewing WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERI-

CAN 

CONSTITUTIONS:  REPUBLICAN  IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE 

CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY  ERA (1980) and WILLIAM  WINSLOW 

CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES (1980)). 

  12. Brian Kane, //Idaho’s Open Meetings Act: Government’s Guarantee of Openness or //

//the Toothless Promise?//, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 135, 137 (2007). 

  13. Burger, Remarks, //supra// note 3, at 77.  

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

ample of Orwellian “double-think.” Our belief that the Consti

tion is Supreme Law deserving respect and oaths of allegiance is 

utterly inconsistent with the notion that it was crafted by an illegal

convention and ratified by an unsanctioned process that border

on treason. 

As we will see, the scholarship on this issue is inadequat

Only two articles have been dedicated to developing the ar-

gument that the Constitution was illegally adopted by revo-

lutionary action.14 Nearly all other scholarly references to th

illegality of the adoption of the Constitution consist of eithe

brief discussions or naked assertions.15 Professors Bru

Ackerman and Neal Katyal argue that the illegality of the

Consitution justifies the constitutional “revolutions” of Re-

construction and twentieth-century judicial activism.16 

Despite the widespread belief that the Constitutional Con-

vention delegates viewed their instructions as mere sugges-

tions which could be ignored with impunity, the historical rec-

ord paints a different picture. In //Federalist No. 78, //Alexand

Hamilton underlined the importance of acting within one’s au-

thority: “There is no position which depends on clearer prin

ples, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to 

the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised,

void.”17 And in //Federalist No. 40//, James Madison had alrea

answered the charge that the Convention delegates had e

ceeded their commissions.18 

Understanding the lawfulness of the adoption of the Consti-

tution is not merely of historical interest. State appellate courts

have cited the allegedly unauthorized acts of the delegates as \\
                                                                      

  14. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, //Our Unconventional Founding//, 62. U. CHI. 

REV. 475 (1995); Richard S. Kay, //The Illegality of the Constitution, //4 CONST.  COM-

MENT

. 57 (1987). 

//  //15//. See, e.g.//, John C. Godbold, //“Lawyer”—A Title of Honor//, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 30

314 (1999); Kurt T. Lash, //The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Mean-//

//ing of the New Jurisprudential Deal//, 70 FORDHAM  L.  REV. 459, 523 (2001); L. Scott

Smith, //From Promised Land to Tower of Babel: Religious Pluralism and the Future of the //

//Liberal Experiment in America//, 45 BRANDEIS  L.J. 527, 539–40 (2007); Lindsay 

Jonker, Note, //Learning from the Past: How the Events That Shaped the Constitutions of//

//the United States and Germany Play Out in the Abortion Controversy//, 23 REGENT U.

REV. 447, 453–54 (2011). 

  16. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14, at 476.  

  17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961). 

  18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison). 

64 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

feat, the Convention called for separate ratifying conventions 

to be held in each state.”6 

These criticisms are not new. Many of the Anti-Federalist op-

ponents of the Constitution unleashed a string of vile invectives 

aimed at the architects of this “outrageous violation.”7 The Fram-

ers employed “all the arts of insinuation, and influence, to betray 

the people of the United States.”8 “[T]hat vile conspirator, //the au-//

//thor of Publius:// I think he might be impeached for high treason.”9 

The Constitution itself was treated to similar opprobrium: 

Upon the whole I look upon the new system as a most ri-

diculous piece of business—something (//entre nouz//) like 

the legs of Nebuchadnezar’s image: It seems to have been 

formed by jumbling or compressing a number of ideas to-

gether, something like the manner in which poems were 

made in Swift’s flying Island.10 

  Modern legal writers level critiques that are equally harsh, albe-

it with less colorful language. One author contends that James 

Madison led the delegates “[i]n what might be termed a bloodless 

coup.”11 Another suggests that the intentional violation of their 

limited mandate “could likely have led to the participants being 

found guilty of treason in the event that their proceedings were 

publicized or unsuccessful.”12 Ironically, Chief Justice Burger’s 

critique of the legality of the Constitution was delivered in his ca-

pacity as Chairman of the National Commission on the Bicenten-

nial of the Constitution of the United States.13 This is a classic ex-\\
                                                                      

//  //6//. Id. //

 7. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20// //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153, 

1157. 

//  //8//. //A COLUMBIAN PATRIOT: OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION (1788), //reprint-//

//ed in //16 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 272, 277. 

//  //9//. Curtiopolis//, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 15 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 399, 402. 

  10. Letter from William Grayson to William Short (Nov. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 150, 151. 

  11. Paul Finkelman, //The First American Constitutions: State and Federal//, 59 TEXAS 

L. REV. 1141, 1162 n.43 (1981) (reviewing WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERI-

CAN 

CONSTITUTIONS:  REPUBLICAN  IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE 

CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY  ERA (1980) and WILLIAM  WINSLOW 

CROSSKEY & WILLIAM JEFFREY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES (1980)). 

  12. Brian Kane, //Idaho’s Open Meetings Act: Government’s Guarantee of Openness or //

//the Toothless Promise?//, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 135, 137 (2007). 

  13. Burger, Remarks, //supra// note 3, at 77.  



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**70**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 67 

 

Finally, after developing the legal issues surrounding the 

Framers’ allegedly illegal acts, this article examines modern 

scholarly literature to assess whether the critics have correctly 

analyzed each of these two related but distinct legal issues. 

I.  DID THE CONVENTION DELEGATES EXCEED THEIR 

AUTHORITY? 

//A.  The Call of the Convention //

The idea of “calling” the convention actually raises several 

distinct questions: (1) Who had the authority to convene the 

meeting? (2) When and where was it to be held? (3) Who ac-

tually invited the states to appoint delegates and attend the 

meeting? (4) Who chose the delegates? (5) Who gave the del-

egates their authority and instructions? (6) What were those 

instructions? (7) Who had the authority to determine the 

rules for the Convention? 

It might be thought that the place to begin our analysis of 

these questions would be Article XIII of the Articles of Con-

federation, which laid out the process for amending that 

document.22 However, this Article contains no provision 

whatsoever for holding a convention. Accordingly, the Con-

vention had to originate from other sources that are easily 

discovered by a sequential examination of the relevant 

events. We start with the Annapolis Convention. 

On November 30, 1785, the Virginia House of Delegates ap-

proved James Madison’s motion requesting Virginia’s congres-

sional delegates to seek an expansion of congressional authori-

ty to regulate commerce. However, on the following day the 

House reconsidered because “it does not, from a mistake, con-

tain the sense of the majority of this house that voted for the 

said resolutions.”23 On January 21, 1786, a similar effort was 

initiated. Rather than a solution in Congress, the Virginia 

                                                                      

  22. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII. (“[N]or shall any alteration 

at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to 

in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legisla-

tures of every State.”). 

  23. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 

THE 

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 

PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 115 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1891) [hereinafter EL-

LIOT

’S DEBATES]. 

66 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

legal precedent in lawsuits challenging the legitimacy of the 

process for the adoption of state constitutions.19 When critics 

claim that the Supreme Court’s judicial activism is tantamount 

to an improper revision of the Constitution’s text, some schol-

ars defend the Court by comparison to the “unauthorized acts” 

of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention.20 And as not-

ed by Professor Robert Natelson, the specter of the “runaway 

convention” of 1787 is a common argument employed by polit-

ical opponents of modern calls for an Article V Convention of 

States.21 If the Philadelphia Convention violated its mandate, a 

new convention will do so today, critics assert. Even without 

such pragmatic implications, this article respectfully suggests 

that in a nation that treats allegiance to the Constitution as the 

ultimate standard of national fidelity, it is a self-evident truth 

that we ought to be satisfied, if at all possible, that the Consti-

tution was lawfully and properly adopted. Yet, while this is 

obviously the preferred outcome, we must test this premise 

with fair-minded and thorough scholarship. 

To this end, this Article separately examines the two 

claims of illegal action by the Founders. First, it reviews the 

question of whether the delegates violated their commis-

sions by proposing “a whole new” Constitution rather than 

merely amending the Articles of Confederation. Second, it 

explores the legality of the ratification process that permitted 

the Constitution to become operational upon approval of 

nine state conventions rather than awaiting the unanimous 

approval of the thirteen state legislatures. 

Each issue will be developed in the following sequence: 



  Review of the timing and text of the official docu-

ments that are claimed to control the process. 



  Review of the discussion of the issue at the Constitu-

tional Convention. 



  Review of the debates on the issue during the ratifica-

tion process. 

                                                                      

//  //19//. See //Smith v. Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d 11, 14 (Idaho 1970); Wheeler v. Bd. of Trs. of 

Fargo Consol. Sch. Dist., 37 S.E.2d 322, 328–29 (Ga. 1946). 

//  //20//. See, e.g.//, Lash, //supra// note 15, at 523. 

  21. Robert G. Natelson, //Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules //

//Governing the Process//, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 719–23 (2011). 

 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

Finally, after developing the legal issues surrounding the 

Framers’ allegedly illegal acts, this article examines modern

scholarly literature to assess whether the critics have correctly 

analyzed each of these two related but distinct legal issues. 

I.  DID THE CONVENTION DELEGATES EXCEED THEIR 

AUTHORITY? 

//A.  The Call of the Convention //

The idea of “calling” the convention actually raises seve

distinct questions: (1) Who had the authority to convene the 

meeting? (2) When and where was it to be held? (3) Who a

tually invited the states to appoint delegates and attend the 

meeting? (4) Who chose the delegates? (5) Who gave the d

egates their authority and instructions? (6) What were tho

instructions? (7) Who had the authority to determine the

rules for the Convention? 

It might be thought that the place to begin our analysis 

these questions would be Article XIII of the Articles of Con-

federation, which laid out the process for amending that 

document.22 However, this Article contains no provision

whatsoever for holding a convention. Accordingly, the Con-

vention had to originate from other sources that are easily 

discovered by a sequential examination of the relevant 

events. We start with the Annapolis Convention. 

On November 30, 1785, the Virginia House of Delegates ap-

proved James Madison’s motion requesting Virginia’s congres-

sional delegates to seek an expansion of congressional authori-

ty to regulate commerce. However, on the following day the

House reconsidered because “it does not, from a mistake, con-

tain the sense of the majority of this house that voted for the 

said resolutions.”23 On January 21, 1786, a similar effort w

initiated. Rather than a solution in Congress, the Virgin

                                                                      

  22. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII. (“[N]or shall any alteration 

at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed

in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legisla-

tures of every State.”). 

  23. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION O

THE 

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 

PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 115 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1891) [hereinafter E

LIOT

’S DEBATES]. 

66 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

legal precedent in lawsuits challenging the legitimacy of the 

process for the adoption of state constitutions.19 When critics 

claim that the Supreme Court’s judicial activism is tantamount 

to an improper revision of the Constitution’s text, some schol-

ars defend the Court by comparison to the “unauthorized acts” 

of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention.20 And as not-

ed by Professor Robert Natelson, the specter of the “runaway 

convention” of 1787 is a common argument employed by polit-

ical opponents of modern calls for an Article V Convention of 

States.21 If the Philadelphia Convention violated its mandate, a 

new convention will do so today, critics assert. Even without 

such pragmatic implications, this article respectfully suggests 

that in a nation that treats allegiance to the Constitution as the 

ultimate standard of national fidelity, it is a self-evident truth 

that we ought to be satisfied, if at all possible, that the Consti-

tution was lawfully and properly adopted. Yet, while this is 

obviously the preferred outcome, we must test this premise 

with fair-minded and thorough scholarship. 

To this end, this Article separately examines the two 

claims of illegal action by the Founders. First, it reviews the 

question of whether the delegates violated their commis-

sions by proposing “a whole new” Constitution rather than 

merely amending the Articles of Confederation. Second, it 

explores the legality of the ratification process that permitted 

the Constitution to become operational upon approval of 

nine state conventions rather than awaiting the unanimous 

approval of the thirteen state legislatures. 

Each issue will be developed in the following sequence: 



  Review of the timing and text of the official docu-

ments that are claimed to control the process. 



  Review of the discussion of the issue at the Constitu-

tional Convention. 



  Review of the debates on the issue during the ratifica-

tion process. 

                                                                      

//  //19//. See //Smith v. Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d 11, 14 (Idaho 1970); Wheeler v. Bd. of Trs. of 

Fargo Consol. Sch. Dist., 37 S.E.2d 322, 328–29 (Ga. 1946). 

//  //20//. See, e.g.//, Lash, //supra// note 15, at 523. 

  21. Robert G. Natelson, //Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules //

//Governing the Process//, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 719–23 (2011). 

 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto071.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**71**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 67 

 

Finally, after developing the legal issues surrounding the 

Framers’ allegedly illegal acts, this article examines modern 

scholarly literature to assess whether the critics have correctly 

analyzed each of these two related but distinct legal issues. 

I.  DID THE CONVENTION DELEGATES EXCEED THEIR 

AUTHORITY? 

//A.  The Call of the Convention //

The idea of “calling” the convention actually raises several 

distinct questions: (1) Who had the authority to convene the 

meeting? (2) When and where was it to be held? (3) Who ac-

tually invited the states to appoint delegates and attend the 

meeting? (4) Who chose the delegates? (5) Who gave the del-

egates their authority and instructions? (6) What were those 

instructions? (7) Who had the authority to determine the 

rules for the Convention? 

It might be thought that the place to begin our analysis of 

these questions would be Article XIII of the Articles of Con-

federation, which laid out the process for amending that 

document.22 However, this Article contains no provision 

whatsoever for holding a convention. Accordingly, the Con-

vention had to originate from other sources that are easily 

discovered by a sequential examination of the relevant 

events. We start with the Annapolis Convention. 

On November 30, 1785, the Virginia House of Delegates ap-

proved James Madison’s motion requesting Virginia’s congres-

sional delegates to seek an expansion of congressional authori-

ty to regulate commerce. However, on the following day the 

House reconsidered because “it does not, from a mistake, con-

tain the sense of the majority of this house that voted for the 

said resolutions.”23 On January 21, 1786, a similar effort was 

initiated. Rather than a solution in Congress, the Virginia 

                                                                      

  22. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII. (“[N]or shall any alteration 

at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to 

in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legisla-

tures of every State.”). 

  23. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF 

THE 

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 

PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 115 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1891) [hereinafter EL-

LIOT

’S DEBATES]. 

66 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

legal precedent in lawsuits challenging the legitimacy of the 

process for the adoption of state constitutions.19 When critics 

claim that the Supreme Court’s judicial activism is tantamount 

to an improper revision of the Constitution’s text, some schol-

ars defend the Court by comparison to the “unauthorized acts” 

of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention.20 And as not-

ed by Professor Robert Natelson, the specter of the “runaway 

convention” of 1787 is a common argument employed by polit-

ical opponents of modern calls for an Article V Convention of 

States.21 If the Philadelphia Convention violated its mandate, a 

new convention will do so today, critics assert. Even without 

such pragmatic implications, this article respectfully suggests 

that in a nation that treats allegiance to the Constitution as the 

ultimate standard of national fidelity, it is a self-evident truth 

that we ought to be satisfied, if at all possible, that the Consti-

tution was lawfully and properly adopted. Yet, while this is 

obviously the preferred outcome, we must test this premise 

with fair-minded and thorough scholarship. 

To this end, this Article separately examines the two 

claims of illegal action by the Founders. First, it reviews the 

question of whether the delegates violated their commis-

sions by proposing “a whole new” Constitution rather than 

merely amending the Articles of Confederation. Second, it 

explores the legality of the ratification process that permitted 

the Constitution to become operational upon approval of 

nine state conventions rather than awaiting the unanimous 

approval of the thirteen state legislatures. 

Each issue will be developed in the following sequence: 



  Review of the timing and text of the official docu-

ments that are claimed to control the process. 



  Review of the discussion of the issue at the Constitu-

tional Convention. 



  Review of the debates on the issue during the ratifica-

tion process. 

                                                                      

//  //19//. See //Smith v. Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d 11, 14 (Idaho 1970); Wheeler v. Bd. of Trs. of 

Fargo Consol. Sch. Dist., 37 S.E.2d 322, 328–29 (Ga. 1946). 

//  //20//. See, e.g.//, Lash, //supra// note 15, at 523. 

  21. Robert G. Natelson, //Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules //

//Governing the Process//, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 719–23 (2011). 

 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

Finally, after developing the legal issues surrounding the 

Framers’ allegedly illegal acts, this article examines modern

scholarly literature to assess whether the critics have correctly 

analyzed each of these two related but distinct legal issues. 

I.  DID THE CONVENTION DELEGATES EXCEED THEIR 

AUTHORITY? 

//A.  The Call of the Convention //

The idea of “calling” the convention actually raises seve

distinct questions: (1) Who had the authority to convene the 

meeting? (2) When and where was it to be held? (3) Who a

tually invited the states to appoint delegates and attend the 

meeting? (4) Who chose the delegates? (5) Who gave the d

egates their authority and instructions? (6) What were tho

instructions? (7) Who had the authority to determine the

rules for the Convention? 

It might be thought that the place to begin our analysis 

these questions would be Article XIII of the Articles of Con-

federation, which laid out the process for amending that 

document.22 However, this Article contains no provision

whatsoever for holding a convention. Accordingly, the Con-

vention had to originate from other sources that are easily 

discovered by a sequential examination of the relevant 

events. We start with the Annapolis Convention. 

On November 30, 1785, the Virginia House of Delegates ap-

proved James Madison’s motion requesting Virginia’s congres-

sional delegates to seek an expansion of congressional authori-

ty to regulate commerce. However, on the following day the

House reconsidered because “it does not, from a mistake, con-

tain the sense of the majority of this house that voted for the 

said resolutions.”23 On January 21, 1786, a similar effort w

initiated. Rather than a solution in Congress, the Virgin

                                                                      

  22. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII. (“[N]or shall any alteration 

at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed

in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legisla-

tures of every State.”). 

  23. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION O

THE 

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 

PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 115 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1891) [hereinafter E

LIOT

’S DEBATES]. 

66 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

legal precedent in lawsuits challenging the legitimacy of the 

process for the adoption of state constitutions.19 When critics 

claim that the Supreme Court’s judicial activism is tantamount 

to an improper revision of the Constitution’s text, some schol-

ars defend the Court by comparison to the “unauthorized acts” 

of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention.20 And as not-

ed by Professor Robert Natelson, the specter of the “runaway 

convention” of 1787 is a common argument employed by polit-

ical opponents of modern calls for an Article V Convention of 

States.21 If the Philadelphia Convention violated its mandate, a 

new convention will do so today, critics assert. Even without 

such pragmatic implications, this article respectfully suggests 

that in a nation that treats allegiance to the Constitution as the 

ultimate standard of national fidelity, it is a self-evident truth 

that we ought to be satisfied, if at all possible, that the Consti-

tution was lawfully and properly adopted. Yet, while this is 

obviously the preferred outcome, we must test this premise 

with fair-minded and thorough scholarship. 

To this end, this Article separately examines the two 

claims of illegal action by the Founders. First, it reviews the 

question of whether the delegates violated their commis-

sions by proposing “a whole new” Constitution rather than 

merely amending the Articles of Confederation. Second, it 

explores the legality of the ratification process that permitted 

the Constitution to become operational upon approval of 

nine state conventions rather than awaiting the unanimous 

approval of the thirteen state legislatures. 

Each issue will be developed in the following sequence: 



  Review of the timing and text of the official docu-

ments that are claimed to control the process. 



  Review of the discussion of the issue at the Constitu-

tional Convention. 



  Review of the debates on the issue during the ratifica-

tion process. 

                                                                      

//  //19//. See //Smith v. Cenarrusa, 475 P.2d 11, 14 (Idaho 1970); Wheeler v. Bd. of Trs. of 

Fargo Consol. Sch. Dist., 37 S.E.2d 322, 328–29 (Ga. 1946). 

//  //20//. See, e.g.//, Lash, //supra// note 15, at 523. 

  21. Robert G. Natelson, //Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules //

//Governing the Process//, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693, 719–23 (2011). 

 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto072.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**72**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 69 

 

a future meeting it might “seem to exceed the strict bounds of 

their appointment.”31 Nonetheless, they passed a recommenda-

tion for a new convention “with more enlarged powers” necessi-

tated by a situation “so serious” as “to render the situation of the 

United States delicate and critical, calling for an exertion of the 

united virtue and wisdom of all the members of the confedera-

cy.”32 It was apparent to all that the act of these delegates was a 

mere political recommendation. 

The Annapolis report suggested the framework for the next 

convention of states in four specific ways. First, it set the date and 

place—Philadelphia, on the second Monday of May, 1787.33 Sec-

ond, it recommended a “convention of deputies from the different 

states” who would gather “for the special and sole purpose of en-

tering into [an] investigation [of the national government’s ills], 

and digesting a plan for supplying such defects as may be discov-

ered  to  exist . . . .”34 Third, it looked to the state legislatures to 

name the delegates and to give them their authorization. The An-

napolis commissioners “beg[ged] leave to suggest” that “the 

states, by whom [we] have been respectively delegated,” “concur” 

in this plan and send delegates “with more enlarged powers.”35 

Moreover, the commissioners recommended that the states “use 

their endeavors to procure the concurrence of the other states, in 

the appointment of commissioners.”36 The purpose of the next 

convention would be to “devise such further provisions as shall 

appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal 

government adequate to the exigencies of the Union . . . .”37 The 

next convention’s proposals would be adopted by a familiar pro-

cess. It would “report such an act for that purpose to the United 

States in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and 

afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State, will effec-

tually provide for the same.”38 

There was no request to Congress to authorize the Philadel-

phia Convention. But the Annapolis commissioners “neverthe-\\
                                                                      

//  //31//. Id. //

//  //32//. Id. //at 118. 

//  //33//. Id.// 

//  //34//. Id.// 

//  //35//. Id.// 

//  //36//. Id.// 

//  //37//. Id.// 

//  //38//. Id.// 

68 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

House proposed a convention of states—a meeting that would 

become known as the Annapolis Convention. Its purpose was: 

[T]o take into consideration the trade of the United States; to 

examine the relative situation and trade of the said states; to 

consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regu-

lations may be necessary to their common interest and their 

permanent harmony; and to report to the several states such 

an act relative to this great object as, when unanimously rati-

fied by them, will enable the United States in Congress as-

sembled effectually to provide for the same . . . .24 

It is clear that the Annapolis Convention was intended to 

propose a change to the Articles of Confederation using the 

power of the states and without involving Congress. Patrick 

Henry, who became an Anti-Federalist leader of the first 

rank, signed the resolution calling this Convention as Gov-

ernor of Virginia and it was communicated with the requi-

site formalities to the other states.25 The minutes of the An-

napolis Convention reflect that only five states (New York, 

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia) were in 

attendance.26 Four additional states appointed commission-

ers, but they did not arrive in a timely fashion and as such 

were not part of the proceedings.27 The credentials of the 

delegates were read and then the Convention turned to the 

issue of “what would be proper to be done by the commis-

sioners now assembled.”28 

The final Report of the Commissioners concluded that they 

“did not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business of their 

mission under the circumstance of so partial and defective a rep-

resentation.”29 They then expressed a desire “that speedy 

measures may be taken to effect a general meeting of the states, 

in a future convention, for the same and such other purposes as 

the situation of public affairs may be found to require.”30 The 

commissioners repeatedly mentioned the limits of their authori-

ty and even worried that by making a mere recommendation for \\
                                                                      

//  //24//. Id. //at 115–16. 

//  //25//. Id. //at 116. 

//  //26//. Id.// 

  27. 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 177. 

  28. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 116. 

//  //29//. Id.// at 117. 

//  //30//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

a future meeting it might “seem to exceed the strict bounds

their appointment.”31 Nonetheless, they passed a recommenda

tion for a new convention “with more enlarged powers” necessi-

tated by a situation “so serious” as “to render the situation of t

United States delicate and critical, calling for an exertion of t

united virtue and wisdom of all the members of the confedera-

cy.”32 It was apparent to all that the act of these delegates was 

mere political recommendation. 

The Annapolis report suggested the framework for the next

convention of states in four specific ways. First, it set the date and 

place—Philadelphia, on the second Monday of May, 1787.33 S

ond, it recommended a “convention of deputies from the differ

states” who would gather “for the special and sole purpose of en

tering into [an] investigation [of the national government’s ills],

and digesting a plan for supplying such defects as may be discov-

ered  to  exist . . . .”34 Third, it looked to the state legislatures

name the delegates and to give them their authorization. The An

napolis commissioners “beg[ged] leave to suggest” that “

states, by whom [we] have been respectively delegated,” “concur” 

in this plan and send delegates “with more enlarged powers.”

Moreover, the commissioners recommended that the states “use

their endeavors to procure the concurrence of the other states, in 

the appointment of commissioners.”36 The purpose of the next 

convention would be to “devise such further provisions as shall

appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal

government adequate to the exigencies of the Union . . . .”37 The 

next convention’s proposals would be adopted by a familiar pr

cess. It would “report such an act for that purpose to the Unit

States in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, a

afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State, will effec-

tually provide for the same.”38 

There was no request to Congress to authorize the Philadel-

phia Convention. But the Annapolis commissioners “nevert\\
                                                                      

//  //31//. Id. //

//  //32//. Id. //at 118. 

//  //33//. Id.// 

//  //34//. Id.// 

//  //35//. Id.// 

//  //36//. Id.// 

//  //37//. Id.// 

//  //38//. Id.// 

68 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

House proposed a convention of states—a meeting that would 

become known as the Annapolis Convention. Its purpose was: 

[T]o take into consideration the trade of the United States; to 

examine the relative situation and trade of the said states; to 

consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regu-

lations may be necessary to their common interest and their 

permanent harmony; and to report to the several states such 

an act relative to this great object as, when unanimously rati-

fied by them, will enable the United States in Congress as-

sembled effectually to provide for the same . . . .24 

It is clear that the Annapolis Convention was intended to 

propose a change to the Articles of Confederation using the 

power of the states and without involving Congress. Patrick 

Henry, who became an Anti-Federalist leader of the first 

rank, signed the resolution calling this Convention as Gov-

ernor of Virginia and it was communicated with the requi-

site formalities to the other states.25 The minutes of the An-

napolis Convention reflect that only five states (New York, 

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia) were in 

attendance.26 Four additional states appointed commission-

ers, but they did not arrive in a timely fashion and as such 

were not part of the proceedings.27 The credentials of the 

delegates were read and then the Convention turned to the 

issue of “what would be proper to be done by the commis-

sioners now assembled.”28 

The final Report of the Commissioners concluded that they 

“did not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business of their 

mission under the circumstance of so partial and defective a rep-

resentation.”29 They then expressed a desire “that speedy 

measures may be taken to effect a general meeting of the states, 

in a future convention, for the same and such other purposes as 

the situation of public affairs may be found to require.”30 The 

commissioners repeatedly mentioned the limits of their authori-

ty and even worried that by making a mere recommendation for \\
                                                                      

//  //24//. Id. //at 115–16. 

//  //25//. Id. //at 116. 

//  //26//. Id.// 

  27. 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 177. 

  28. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 116. 

//  //29//. Id.// at 117. 

//  //30//. Id.// 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto073.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**73**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 69 

 

a future meeting it might “seem to exceed the strict bounds of 

their appointment.”31 Nonetheless, they passed a recommenda-

tion for a new convention “with more enlarged powers” necessi-

tated by a situation “so serious” as “to render the situation of the 

United States delicate and critical, calling for an exertion of the 

united virtue and wisdom of all the members of the confedera-

cy.”32 It was apparent to all that the act of these delegates was a 

mere political recommendation. 

The Annapolis report suggested the framework for the next 

convention of states in four specific ways. First, it set the date and 

place—Philadelphia, on the second Monday of May, 1787.33 Sec-

ond, it recommended a “convention of deputies from the different 

states” who would gather “for the special and sole purpose of en-

tering into [an] investigation [of the national government’s ills], 

and digesting a plan for supplying such defects as may be discov-

ered  to  exist . . . .”34 Third, it looked to the state legislatures to 

name the delegates and to give them their authorization. The An-

napolis commissioners “beg[ged] leave to suggest” that “the 

states, by whom [we] have been respectively delegated,” “concur” 

in this plan and send delegates “with more enlarged powers.”35 

Moreover, the commissioners recommended that the states “use 

their endeavors to procure the concurrence of the other states, in 

the appointment of commissioners.”36 The purpose of the next 

convention would be to “devise such further provisions as shall 

appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal 

government adequate to the exigencies of the Union . . . .”37 The 

next convention’s proposals would be adopted by a familiar pro-

cess. It would “report such an act for that purpose to the United 

States in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and 

afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State, will effec-

tually provide for the same.”38 

There was no request to Congress to authorize the Philadel-

phia Convention. But the Annapolis commissioners “neverthe-\\
                                                                      

//  //31//. Id. //

//  //32//. Id. //at 118. 

//  //33//. Id.// 

//  //34//. Id.// 

//  //35//. Id.// 

//  //36//. Id.// 

//  //37//. Id.// 

//  //38//. Id.// 

68 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

House proposed a convention of states—a meeting that would 

become known as the Annapolis Convention. Its purpose was: 

[T]o take into consideration the trade of the United States; to 

examine the relative situation and trade of the said states; to 

consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regu-

lations may be necessary to their common interest and their 

permanent harmony; and to report to the several states such 

an act relative to this great object as, when unanimously rati-

fied by them, will enable the United States in Congress as-

sembled effectually to provide for the same . . . .24 

It is clear that the Annapolis Convention was intended to 

propose a change to the Articles of Confederation using the 

power of the states and without involving Congress. Patrick 

Henry, who became an Anti-Federalist leader of the first 

rank, signed the resolution calling this Convention as Gov-

ernor of Virginia and it was communicated with the requi-

site formalities to the other states.25 The minutes of the An-

napolis Convention reflect that only five states (New York, 

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia) were in 

attendance.26 Four additional states appointed commission-

ers, but they did not arrive in a timely fashion and as such 

were not part of the proceedings.27 The credentials of the 

delegates were read and then the Convention turned to the 

issue of “what would be proper to be done by the commis-

sioners now assembled.”28 

The final Report of the Commissioners concluded that they 

“did not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business of their 

mission under the circumstance of so partial and defective a rep-

resentation.”29 They then expressed a desire “that speedy 

measures may be taken to effect a general meeting of the states, 

in a future convention, for the same and such other purposes as 

the situation of public affairs may be found to require.”30 The 

commissioners repeatedly mentioned the limits of their authori-

ty and even worried that by making a mere recommendation for \\
                                                                      

//  //24//. Id. //at 115–16. 

//  //25//. Id. //at 116. 

//  //26//. Id.// 

  27. 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 177. 

  28. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 116. 

//  //29//. Id.// at 117. 

//  //30//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

a future meeting it might “seem to exceed the strict bounds

their appointment.”31 Nonetheless, they passed a recommenda

tion for a new convention “with more enlarged powers” necessi-

tated by a situation “so serious” as “to render the situation of t

United States delicate and critical, calling for an exertion of t

united virtue and wisdom of all the members of the confedera-

cy.”32 It was apparent to all that the act of these delegates was 

mere political recommendation. 

The Annapolis report suggested the framework for the next

convention of states in four specific ways. First, it set the date and 

place—Philadelphia, on the second Monday of May, 1787.33 S

ond, it recommended a “convention of deputies from the differ

states” who would gather “for the special and sole purpose of en

tering into [an] investigation [of the national government’s ills],

and digesting a plan for supplying such defects as may be discov-

ered  to  exist . . . .”34 Third, it looked to the state legislatures

name the delegates and to give them their authorization. The An

napolis commissioners “beg[ged] leave to suggest” that “

states, by whom [we] have been respectively delegated,” “concur” 

in this plan and send delegates “with more enlarged powers.”

Moreover, the commissioners recommended that the states “use

their endeavors to procure the concurrence of the other states, in 

the appointment of commissioners.”36 The purpose of the next 

convention would be to “devise such further provisions as shall

appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal

government adequate to the exigencies of the Union . . . .”37 The 

next convention’s proposals would be adopted by a familiar pr

cess. It would “report such an act for that purpose to the Unit

States in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, a

afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State, will effec-

tually provide for the same.”38 

There was no request to Congress to authorize the Philadel-

phia Convention. But the Annapolis commissioners “nevert\\
                                                                      

//  //31//. Id. //

//  //32//. Id. //at 118. 

//  //33//. Id.// 

//  //34//. Id.// 

//  //35//. Id.// 

//  //36//. Id.// 

//  //37//. Id.// 

//  //38//. Id.// 

68 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

House proposed a convention of states—a meeting that would 

become known as the Annapolis Convention. Its purpose was: 

[T]o take into consideration the trade of the United States; to 

examine the relative situation and trade of the said states; to 

consider how far a uniform system in their commercial regu-

lations may be necessary to their common interest and their 

permanent harmony; and to report to the several states such 

an act relative to this great object as, when unanimously rati-

fied by them, will enable the United States in Congress as-

sembled effectually to provide for the same . . . .24 

It is clear that the Annapolis Convention was intended to 

propose a change to the Articles of Confederation using the 

power of the states and without involving Congress. Patrick 

Henry, who became an Anti-Federalist leader of the first 

rank, signed the resolution calling this Convention as Gov-

ernor of Virginia and it was communicated with the requi-

site formalities to the other states.25 The minutes of the An-

napolis Convention reflect that only five states (New York, 

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia) were in 

attendance.26 Four additional states appointed commission-

ers, but they did not arrive in a timely fashion and as such 

were not part of the proceedings.27 The credentials of the 

delegates were read and then the Convention turned to the 

issue of “what would be proper to be done by the commis-

sioners now assembled.”28 

The final Report of the Commissioners concluded that they 

“did not conceive it advisable to proceed on the business of their 

mission under the circumstance of so partial and defective a rep-

resentation.”29 They then expressed a desire “that speedy 

measures may be taken to effect a general meeting of the states, 

in a future convention, for the same and such other purposes as 

the situation of public affairs may be found to require.”30 The 

commissioners repeatedly mentioned the limits of their authori-

ty and even worried that by making a mere recommendation for \\
                                                                      

//  //24//. Id. //at 115–16. 

//  //25//. Id. //at 116. 

//  //26//. Id.// 

  27. 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 177. 

  28. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 116. 

//  //29//. Id.// at 117. 

//  //30//. Id.// 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto074.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**74**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 71 

 

ument. On December 4th, Virginia elected seven delegates to 

the Philadelphia Convention.47 The act provided that “the Gov-

ernor is requested to transmit forthwith a copy of this Act to 

the United States in Congress, and to the Executives of each of 

the States in the Union.”48 Edmund Randolph, who became 

governor just four days earlier, complied with the request.49 

New Jersey voted on November 24th, 1786 to send author-

ized delegates “for the purpose of taking into consideration the 

state of the Union as to trade and other important objects, and 

of devising such further provisions as shall appear necessary to 

render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to 

the exigencies thereof.”50//  //Pennsylvania acted next, voting on 

December 30th to send delegates to the Philadelphia Conven-

tion. The legislature recited that it was “fully convinced of the 

necessity of revising the Foederal Constitution, for the purpose 

of making such alterations and amendments as the exigencies 

of our public affairs require.”51 Pennsylvania instructed their 

delegates “to join with [delegates from other states] in devis-

ing, deliberating on, and discussing all such alterations and 

further provisions as may be necessary to render the foederal 

constitution fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”52 

North Carolina’s legislature passed a measure on January 

6th, 1787 bearing the title “for the purpose of revising the foed-

eral constitution.”53 This state’s delegates were empowered “to 

discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove 

the defects of our foederal union, and to procure the enlarged 

purposes which it was intended to effect.”54 North Carolina re-

fers to the Articles of Confederation in the preamble of its reso-

lution but not in the delegates’ instructions.55 

                                                                      

//  //47//. Id. //

//  //48//. Id.// 

  49. 1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 192 (Randolph circulated the Virginia resolution).// //

  50. Resolution Authorizing and Empowering the Delegates (Nov. 24, 1786), 

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196. 

  51. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 199, 199. 

//  //52//. Id.// 

  53. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Jan. 6, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4,// //at 200, 200. 

//  //54//. Id. //at 201. 

//  //55//. Id.// at 200–201. 

70 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

less concluded, from motives of respect, to transmit copies of 

this report to the United States in Congress assembled, and to 

the executive of the other states.”39 Importantly, the term “Arti-

cles of Confederation” is totally absent from their report. In-

stead, the Annapolis report asked the states to appoint and au-

thorize delegates “to render the constitution of the federal 

government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”40 

//1.  The States Begin the Official Process //

The plan for the second convention was launched on No-

vember 23rd, 1786, once again by the Virginia General Assem-

bly.41 The measure recited that the Annapolis commissioners 

“have recommended” the proposed Philadelphia Convention.42 

Virginia gave its two-fold rationale for not pursuing this matter 

in Congress: (1) Congress “might be too much interrupted by 

the ordinary business before them;” (2) discussions in Congress 

might be “deprived of the valuable counsels of sundry indi-

viduals, who are disqualified [from Congress]” because of state 

laws or the circumstances of the individuals.43  George Wash-

ington was undoubtedly the best known example of the latter 

class of persons.44 Having Washington at such a convention 

would be invaluable to convey a sense of dignity and serious-

ness, but he was not willing to serve in Congress.45 

Seven commissioners were to be appointed “to meet such 

Deputies as may be appointed and authorised by other States” 

at the time and place specified “to join with them in devising 

and discussing all such alterations and further provisions, as 

may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate 

to the exigencies of the Union.”46 There was no mention of 

seeking the permission of Congress to hold the convention, nor 

does the phrase “Articles of Confederation” appear in the doc-

                                                                      

//  //39//. Id.// 

//  //40//. Id. //

  41. Virginia’s Appointment of Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 

23, 1786), //reprinted in //8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 540, 540. 

//  //42//. Id. //

//  //43//. Id.// 

 44. 

//See// Whit Ridgeway, //George Washington and the Constitution//, //in// A COMPANION 

TO 

GEORGE WASHINGTON 413, 421–24 (Edward G.Lengel ed., 2012).  

 45. 

//Id.// 

  46. 8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 541.// //

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

ument. On December 4th, Virginia elected seven delegates to 

the Philadelphia Convention.47 The act provided that “the Go

ernor is requested to transmit forthwith a copy of this Act to

the United States in Congress, and to the Executives of each 

the States in the Union.”48 Edmund Randolph, who became 

governor just four days earlier, complied with the request.49 

New Jersey voted on November 24th, 1786 to send author-

ized delegates “for the purpose of taking into consideration the 

state of the Union as to trade and other important objects, a

of devising such further provisions as shall appear necessary to

render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to 

the exigencies thereof.”50//  //Pennsylvania acted next, voting on

December 30th to send delegates to the Philadelphia Conven-

tion. The legislature recited that it was “fully convinced of the

necessity of revising the Foederal Constitution, for the purpose

of making such alterations and amendments as the exigencies 

of our public affairs require.”51 Pennsylvania instructed their 

delegates “to join with [delegates from other states] in devis-

ing, deliberating on, and discussing all such alterations and 

further provisions as may be necessary to render the foederal 

constitution fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”52 

North Carolina’s legislature passed a measure on January 

6th, 1787 bearing the title “for the purpose of revising the foed-

eral constitution.”53 This state’s delegates were empowered 

discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove 

the defects of our foederal union, and to procure the enlarged 

purposes which it was intended to effect.”54 North Carolina 

fers to the Articles of Confederation in the preamble of its re

lution but not in the delegates’ instructions.55 

                                                                      

//  //47//. Id. //

//  //48//. Id.// 

  49. 1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 192 (Randolph circulated the Virginia resolution).

  50. Resolution Authorizing and Empowering the Delegates (Nov. 24, 1786)

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196. 

  51. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in//

DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 199, 199. 

//  //52//. Id.// 

  53. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Jan. 6, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHR

//supra// note 4,// //at 200, 200. 

//  //54//. Id. //at 201. 

//  //55//. Id.// at 200–201. 

70 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

less concluded, from motives of respect, to transmit copies of 

this report to the United States in Congress assembled, and to 

the executive of the other states.”39 Importantly, the term “Arti-

cles of Confederation” is totally absent from their report. In-

stead, the Annapolis report asked the states to appoint and au-

thorize delegates “to render the constitution of the federal 

government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”40 

//1.  The States Begin the Official Process //

The plan for the second convention was launched on No-

vember 23rd, 1786, once again by the Virginia General Assem-

bly.41 The measure recited that the Annapolis commissioners 

“have recommended” the proposed Philadelphia Convention.42 

Virginia gave its two-fold rationale for not pursuing this matter 

in Congress: (1) Congress “might be too much interrupted by 

the ordinary business before them;” (2) discussions in Congress 

might be “deprived of the valuable counsels of sundry indi-

viduals, who are disqualified [from Congress]” because of state 

laws or the circumstances of the individuals.43  George Wash-

ington was undoubtedly the best known example of the latter 

class of persons.44 Having Washington at such a convention 

would be invaluable to convey a sense of dignity and serious-

ness, but he was not willing to serve in Congress.45 

Seven commissioners were to be appointed “to meet such 

Deputies as may be appointed and authorised by other States” 

at the time and place specified “to join with them in devising 

and discussing all such alterations and further provisions, as 

may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate 

to the exigencies of the Union.”46 There was no mention of 

seeking the permission of Congress to hold the convention, nor 

does the phrase “Articles of Confederation” appear in the doc-

                                                                      

//  //39//. Id.// 

//  //40//. Id. //

  41. Virginia’s Appointment of Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 

23, 1786), //reprinted in //8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 540, 540. 

//  //42//. Id. //

//  //43//. Id.// 

 44. 

//See// Whit Ridgeway, //George Washington and the Constitution//, //in// A COMPANION 

TO 

GEORGE WASHINGTON 413, 421–24 (Edward G.Lengel ed., 2012).  

 45. 

//Id.// 

  46. 8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 541.// //



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto075.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**75**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 71 

 

ument. On December 4th, Virginia elected seven delegates to 

the Philadelphia Convention.47 The act provided that “the Gov-

ernor is requested to transmit forthwith a copy of this Act to 

the United States in Congress, and to the Executives of each of 

the States in the Union.”48 Edmund Randolph, who became 

governor just four days earlier, complied with the request.49 

New Jersey voted on November 24th, 1786 to send author-

ized delegates “for the purpose of taking into consideration the 

state of the Union as to trade and other important objects, and 

of devising such further provisions as shall appear necessary to 

render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to 

the exigencies thereof.”50//  //Pennsylvania acted next, voting on 

December 30th to send delegates to the Philadelphia Conven-

tion. The legislature recited that it was “fully convinced of the 

necessity of revising the Foederal Constitution, for the purpose 

of making such alterations and amendments as the exigencies 

of our public affairs require.”51 Pennsylvania instructed their 

delegates “to join with [delegates from other states] in devis-

ing, deliberating on, and discussing all such alterations and 

further provisions as may be necessary to render the foederal 

constitution fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”52 

North Carolina’s legislature passed a measure on January 

6th, 1787 bearing the title “for the purpose of revising the foed-

eral constitution.”53 This state’s delegates were empowered “to 

discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove 

the defects of our foederal union, and to procure the enlarged 

purposes which it was intended to effect.”54 North Carolina re-

fers to the Articles of Confederation in the preamble of its reso-

lution but not in the delegates’ instructions.55 

                                                                      

//  //47//. Id. //

//  //48//. Id.// 

  49. 1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 192 (Randolph circulated the Virginia resolution).// //

  50. Resolution Authorizing and Empowering the Delegates (Nov. 24, 1786), 

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196. 

  51. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 199, 199. 

//  //52//. Id.// 

  53. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Jan. 6, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4,// //at 200, 200. 

//  //54//. Id. //at 201. 

//  //55//. Id.// at 200–201. 

70 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

less concluded, from motives of respect, to transmit copies of 

this report to the United States in Congress assembled, and to 

the executive of the other states.”39 Importantly, the term “Arti-

cles of Confederation” is totally absent from their report. In-

stead, the Annapolis report asked the states to appoint and au-

thorize delegates “to render the constitution of the federal 

government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”40 

//1.  The States Begin the Official Process //

The plan for the second convention was launched on No-

vember 23rd, 1786, once again by the Virginia General Assem-

bly.41 The measure recited that the Annapolis commissioners 

“have recommended” the proposed Philadelphia Convention.42 

Virginia gave its two-fold rationale for not pursuing this matter 

in Congress: (1) Congress “might be too much interrupted by 

the ordinary business before them;” (2) discussions in Congress 

might be “deprived of the valuable counsels of sundry indi-

viduals, who are disqualified [from Congress]” because of state 

laws or the circumstances of the individuals.43  George Wash-

ington was undoubtedly the best known example of the latter 

class of persons.44 Having Washington at such a convention 

would be invaluable to convey a sense of dignity and serious-

ness, but he was not willing to serve in Congress.45 

Seven commissioners were to be appointed “to meet such 

Deputies as may be appointed and authorised by other States” 

at the time and place specified “to join with them in devising 

and discussing all such alterations and further provisions, as 

may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate 

to the exigencies of the Union.”46 There was no mention of 

seeking the permission of Congress to hold the convention, nor 

does the phrase “Articles of Confederation” appear in the doc-

                                                                      

//  //39//. Id.// 

//  //40//. Id. //

  41. Virginia’s Appointment of Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 

23, 1786), //reprinted in //8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 540, 540. 

//  //42//. Id. //

//  //43//. Id.// 

 44. 

//See// Whit Ridgeway, //George Washington and the Constitution//, //in// A COMPANION 

TO 

GEORGE WASHINGTON 413, 421–24 (Edward G.Lengel ed., 2012).  

 45. 

//Id.// 

  46. 8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 541.// //

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

ument. On December 4th, Virginia elected seven delegates to 

the Philadelphia Convention.47 The act provided that “the Go

ernor is requested to transmit forthwith a copy of this Act to

the United States in Congress, and to the Executives of each 

the States in the Union.”48 Edmund Randolph, who became 

governor just four days earlier, complied with the request.49 

New Jersey voted on November 24th, 1786 to send author-

ized delegates “for the purpose of taking into consideration the 

state of the Union as to trade and other important objects, a

of devising such further provisions as shall appear necessary to

render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to 

the exigencies thereof.”50//  //Pennsylvania acted next, voting on

December 30th to send delegates to the Philadelphia Conven-

tion. The legislature recited that it was “fully convinced of the

necessity of revising the Foederal Constitution, for the purpose

of making such alterations and amendments as the exigencies 

of our public affairs require.”51 Pennsylvania instructed their 

delegates “to join with [delegates from other states] in devis-

ing, deliberating on, and discussing all such alterations and 

further provisions as may be necessary to render the foederal 

constitution fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”52 

North Carolina’s legislature passed a measure on January 

6th, 1787 bearing the title “for the purpose of revising the foed-

eral constitution.”53 This state’s delegates were empowered 

discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove 

the defects of our foederal union, and to procure the enlarged 

purposes which it was intended to effect.”54 North Carolina 

fers to the Articles of Confederation in the preamble of its re

lution but not in the delegates’ instructions.55 

                                                                      

//  //47//. Id. //

//  //48//. Id.// 

  49. 1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 192 (Randolph circulated the Virginia resolution).

  50. Resolution Authorizing and Empowering the Delegates (Nov. 24, 1786)

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196. 

  51. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in//

DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 199, 199. 

//  //52//. Id.// 

  53. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Jan. 6, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHR

//supra// note 4,// //at 200, 200. 

//  //54//. Id. //at 201. 

//  //55//. Id.// at 200–201. 

70 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

less concluded, from motives of respect, to transmit copies of 

this report to the United States in Congress assembled, and to 

the executive of the other states.”39 Importantly, the term “Arti-

cles of Confederation” is totally absent from their report. In-

stead, the Annapolis report asked the states to appoint and au-

thorize delegates “to render the constitution of the federal 

government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”40 

//1.  The States Begin the Official Process //

The plan for the second convention was launched on No-

vember 23rd, 1786, once again by the Virginia General Assem-

bly.41 The measure recited that the Annapolis commissioners 

“have recommended” the proposed Philadelphia Convention.42 

Virginia gave its two-fold rationale for not pursuing this matter 

in Congress: (1) Congress “might be too much interrupted by 

the ordinary business before them;” (2) discussions in Congress 

might be “deprived of the valuable counsels of sundry indi-

viduals, who are disqualified [from Congress]” because of state 

laws or the circumstances of the individuals.43  George Wash-

ington was undoubtedly the best known example of the latter 

class of persons.44 Having Washington at such a convention 

would be invaluable to convey a sense of dignity and serious-

ness, but he was not willing to serve in Congress.45 

Seven commissioners were to be appointed “to meet such 

Deputies as may be appointed and authorised by other States” 

at the time and place specified “to join with them in devising 

and discussing all such alterations and further provisions, as 

may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate 

to the exigencies of the Union.”46 There was no mention of 

seeking the permission of Congress to hold the convention, nor 

does the phrase “Articles of Confederation” appear in the doc-

                                                                      

//  //39//. Id.// 

//  //40//. Id. //

  41. Virginia’s Appointment of Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 

23, 1786), //reprinted in //8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 540, 540. 

//  //42//. Id. //

//  //43//. Id.// 

 44. 

//See// Whit Ridgeway, //George Washington and the Constitution//, //in// A COMPANION 

TO 

GEORGE WASHINGTON 413, 421–24 (Edward G.Lengel ed., 2012).  

 45. 

//Id.// 

  46. 8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 541.// //



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**76**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 73 

 

vote.63 Pennsylvania required a four-delegate quorum.64 Geor-

gia set the number at two delegates.65  

In chronological order, the next event was a February 21st 

resolution passed by the Confederation Congress that is widely 

proclaimed as the measure that “called” the Constitutional 

Convention. But, to understand the origins of this controversial 

and important measure, we need to turn our attention to the 

legislature of New York. 

//2.  Machinations in New York //

Congress’s inability to pay the debts from the War for Ameri-

can Independence was one of the key reasons that the states were 

looking to revise the federal system.66 Congress proposed a new 

system in April 1783 containing two important changes to the Ar-

ticles of Confederation.67 First, apportionment of debt would be 

based on population rather than the value of land.68 Second, the 

Impost of 1783 requested that the states permit Congress to im-

pose a five-percent tariff on imports for twenty-five years with the 

funds dedicated to paying off war debt.69 

The Impost of 1783 reveals the formalities the Confederation 

Congress employed when it requested that the states take offi-

cial action. Congress proclaimed that their measure was “rec-

ommended to the several states.”70 Moreover, “the several 

states are advised to authorize their respective delegates to 

subscribe and ratify the same as part of said instrument of un-

ion.”71 This was followed by a formal printed, six-page “Ad-

                                                                      

  63. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Nov. 23, 1786), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196; Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Jan. 6, 

1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 200, 200; Act Electing and Empowering 

Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787) //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 203, 203. 

//  //64//. //Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 199, 199.  

//  //65//. //Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 204, 204.// // 

 66. 

//See e.g.//, THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossit-

er ed., 1961).  

  67. 19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at xxxvi. 

//  //68//. Id. //

//  //69//. Id. //

  70. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 258 (Worthing-

ton C. Ford et al. eds., 1904–37) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF CONGRESS]. 

//  //71//. Id.// at 260. 

72 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

On February 3rd, Delaware became the fifth state to author-

ize the Philadelphia Convention with an act entitled “for the 

purpose of revising the federal Constitution.”56 The preamble 

recites that the legislature was “fully convinced of the Necessi-

ty of revising the Foederal Constitution, and adding thereto 

such further Provisions as may render the same more adequate 

to the Exigencies of the Union.”57 

Delaware employed the familiar language of international 

diplomacy in granting “powers” to its delegates.58 They were 

“hereby constituted and appointed Deputies from this State, 

with Powers to meet such Deputies as may be appointed and 

authorized by the other States . . . and to join with them in de-

vising, deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and 

further Provisions, as may be necessary to render the Foederal 

Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union.”59 Dela-

ware added one extremely important limitation to their dele-

gates’ authority. Their powers did “not extend to that Part of 

the Fifth Article of the Confederation . . . which  declares 

that . . . each State shall have one Vote.”60 

On February 10th, Georgia enacted a measure “for the Pur-

pose of revising the Federal Constitution.”61 Its delegates were 

empowered “to join with [delegates from other states] in devis-

ing and discussing all such alterations and farther [sic] provi-

sions, as may be necessary to render the federal constitution 

adequate to the exigencies of the union.”62 

  In addition to Delaware’s specific instruction on preserving 

the equality of the states, all six of the initial states issued for-

mal instruction to their delegates regarding voting. For exam-

ple, each state established its own rule for a minimum number 

of delegates authorized to cast a vote for the state. Virginia, 

New Jersey, North Carolina, and Delaware required a mini-

mum of three delegates to be present to cast the state’s single 

                                                                      

  56. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4,// //at 203, 203. 

//  //57//. Id.// 

//  //58//. Id. //

//  //59//. Id.// 

//  //60//. Id. //

  61. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4,// //at 204, 204. 

//  //62//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

vote.63 Pennsylvania required a four-delegate quorum.64 Geor-

gia set the number at two delegates.65  

In chronological order, the next event was a February 21

resolution passed by the Confederation Congress that is wide

proclaimed as the measure that “called” the Constitutional

Convention. But, to understand the origins of this controversial 

and important measure, we need to turn our attention to the

legislature of New York. 

//2.  Machinations in New York //

Congress’s inability to pay the debts from the War for Ameri

can Independence was one of the key reasons that the states w

looking to revise the federal system.66 Congress proposed a new 

system in April 1783 containing two important changes to the A

ticles of Confederation.67 First, apportionment of debt would be 

based on population rather than the value of land.68 Second, the 

Impost of 1783 requested that the states permit Congress to im

pose a five-percent tariff on imports for twenty-five years with t

funds dedicated to paying off war debt.69 

The Impost of 1783 reveals the formalities the Confederation

Congress employed when it requested that the states take offi-

cial action. Congress proclaimed that their measure was “r

ommended to the several states.”70 Moreover, “the sever

states are advised to authorize their respective delegates to

subscribe and ratify the same as part of said instrument of un-

ion.”71 This was followed by a formal printed, six-page “Ad-

                                                                      

  63. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Nov. 23, 1786), //reprinted in//

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196; Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Jan. 6, 

1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 200, 200; Act Electing and Empoweri

Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787) //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 203, 203. 

//  //64//. //Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in//

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 199, 199.  

//  //65//. //Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DH

//supra// note 4, at 204, 204.// // 

 66. 

//See e.g.//, THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ro

er ed., 1961).  

  67. 19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at xxxvi. 

//  //68//. Id. //

//  //69//. Id. //

  70. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 258 (Worthing-

ton C. Ford et al. eds., 1904–37) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF CONGRESS]. 

//  //71//. Id.// at 260. 

72 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

On February 3rd, Delaware became the fifth state to author-

ize the Philadelphia Convention with an act entitled “for the 

purpose of revising the federal Constitution.”56 The preamble 

recites that the legislature was “fully convinced of the Necessi-

ty of revising the Foederal Constitution, and adding thereto 

such further Provisions as may render the same more adequate 

to the Exigencies of the Union.”57 

Delaware employed the familiar language of international 

diplomacy in granting “powers” to its delegates.58 They were 

“hereby constituted and appointed Deputies from this State, 

with Powers to meet such Deputies as may be appointed and 

authorized by the other States . . . and to join with them in de-

vising, deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and 

further Provisions, as may be necessary to render the Foederal 

Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union.”59 Dela-

ware added one extremely important limitation to their dele-

gates’ authority. Their powers did “not extend to that Part of 

the Fifth Article of the Confederation . . . which  declares 

that . . . each State shall have one Vote.”60 

On February 10th, Georgia enacted a measure “for the Pur-

pose of revising the Federal Constitution.”61 Its delegates were 

empowered “to join with [delegates from other states] in devis-

ing and discussing all such alterations and farther [sic] provi-

sions, as may be necessary to render the federal constitution 

adequate to the exigencies of the union.”62 

  In addition to Delaware’s specific instruction on preserving 

the equality of the states, all six of the initial states issued for-

mal instruction to their delegates regarding voting. For exam-

ple, each state established its own rule for a minimum number 

of delegates authorized to cast a vote for the state. Virginia, 

New Jersey, North Carolina, and Delaware required a mini-

mum of three delegates to be present to cast the state’s single 

                                                                      

  56. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4,// //at 203, 203. 

//  //57//. Id.// 

//  //58//. Id. //

//  //59//. Id.// 

//  //60//. Id. //

  61. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4,// //at 204, 204. 

//  //62//. Id.// 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto077.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**77**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 73 

 

vote.63 Pennsylvania required a four-delegate quorum.64 Geor-

gia set the number at two delegates.65  

In chronological order, the next event was a February 21st 

resolution passed by the Confederation Congress that is widely 

proclaimed as the measure that “called” the Constitutional 

Convention. But, to understand the origins of this controversial 

and important measure, we need to turn our attention to the 

legislature of New York. 

//2.  Machinations in New York //

Congress’s inability to pay the debts from the War for Ameri-

can Independence was one of the key reasons that the states were 

looking to revise the federal system.66 Congress proposed a new 

system in April 1783 containing two important changes to the Ar-

ticles of Confederation.67 First, apportionment of debt would be 

based on population rather than the value of land.68 Second, the 

Impost of 1783 requested that the states permit Congress to im-

pose a five-percent tariff on imports for twenty-five years with the 

funds dedicated to paying off war debt.69 

The Impost of 1783 reveals the formalities the Confederation 

Congress employed when it requested that the states take offi-

cial action. Congress proclaimed that their measure was “rec-

ommended to the several states.”70 Moreover, “the several 

states are advised to authorize their respective delegates to 

subscribe and ratify the same as part of said instrument of un-

ion.”71 This was followed by a formal printed, six-page “Ad-

                                                                      

  63. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Nov. 23, 1786), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196; Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Jan. 6, 

1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 200, 200; Act Electing and Empowering 

Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787) //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 203, 203. 

//  //64//. //Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 199, 199.  

//  //65//. //Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 204, 204.// // 

 66. 

//See e.g.//, THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossit-

er ed., 1961).  

  67. 19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at xxxvi. 

//  //68//. Id. //

//  //69//. Id. //

  70. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 258 (Worthing-

ton C. Ford et al. eds., 1904–37) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF CONGRESS]. 

//  //71//. Id.// at 260. 

72 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

On February 3rd, Delaware became the fifth state to author-

ize the Philadelphia Convention with an act entitled “for the 

purpose of revising the federal Constitution.”56 The preamble 

recites that the legislature was “fully convinced of the Necessi-

ty of revising the Foederal Constitution, and adding thereto 

such further Provisions as may render the same more adequate 

to the Exigencies of the Union.”57 

Delaware employed the familiar language of international 

diplomacy in granting “powers” to its delegates.58 They were 

“hereby constituted and appointed Deputies from this State, 

with Powers to meet such Deputies as may be appointed and 

authorized by the other States . . . and to join with them in de-

vising, deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and 

further Provisions, as may be necessary to render the Foederal 

Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union.”59 Dela-

ware added one extremely important limitation to their dele-

gates’ authority. Their powers did “not extend to that Part of 

the Fifth Article of the Confederation . . . which  declares 

that . . . each State shall have one Vote.”60 

On February 10th, Georgia enacted a measure “for the Pur-

pose of revising the Federal Constitution.”61 Its delegates were 

empowered “to join with [delegates from other states] in devis-

ing and discussing all such alterations and farther [sic] provi-

sions, as may be necessary to render the federal constitution 

adequate to the exigencies of the union.”62 

  In addition to Delaware’s specific instruction on preserving 

the equality of the states, all six of the initial states issued for-

mal instruction to their delegates regarding voting. For exam-

ple, each state established its own rule for a minimum number 

of delegates authorized to cast a vote for the state. Virginia, 

New Jersey, North Carolina, and Delaware required a mini-

mum of three delegates to be present to cast the state’s single 

                                                                      

  56. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4,// //at 203, 203. 

//  //57//. Id.// 

//  //58//. Id. //

//  //59//. Id.// 

//  //60//. Id. //

  61. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4,// //at 204, 204. 

//  //62//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

vote.63 Pennsylvania required a four-delegate quorum.64 Geor-

gia set the number at two delegates.65  

In chronological order, the next event was a February 21

resolution passed by the Confederation Congress that is wide

proclaimed as the measure that “called” the Constitutional

Convention. But, to understand the origins of this controversial 

and important measure, we need to turn our attention to the

legislature of New York. 

//2.  Machinations in New York //

Congress’s inability to pay the debts from the War for Ameri

can Independence was one of the key reasons that the states w

looking to revise the federal system.66 Congress proposed a new 

system in April 1783 containing two important changes to the A

ticles of Confederation.67 First, apportionment of debt would be 

based on population rather than the value of land.68 Second, the 

Impost of 1783 requested that the states permit Congress to im

pose a five-percent tariff on imports for twenty-five years with t

funds dedicated to paying off war debt.69 

The Impost of 1783 reveals the formalities the Confederation

Congress employed when it requested that the states take offi-

cial action. Congress proclaimed that their measure was “r

ommended to the several states.”70 Moreover, “the sever

states are advised to authorize their respective delegates to

subscribe and ratify the same as part of said instrument of un-

ion.”71 This was followed by a formal printed, six-page “Ad-

                                                                      

  63. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Nov. 23, 1786), //reprinted in//

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196; Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Jan. 6, 

1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 200, 200; Act Electing and Empoweri

Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787) //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 203, 203. 

//  //64//. //Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in//

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 199, 199.  

//  //65//. //Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DH

//supra// note 4, at 204, 204.// // 

 66. 

//See e.g.//, THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ro

er ed., 1961).  

  67. 19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at xxxvi. 

//  //68//. Id. //

//  //69//. Id. //

  70. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 258 (Worthing-

ton C. Ford et al. eds., 1904–37) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF CONGRESS]. 

//  //71//. Id.// at 260. 

72 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

On February 3rd, Delaware became the fifth state to author-

ize the Philadelphia Convention with an act entitled “for the 

purpose of revising the federal Constitution.”56 The preamble 

recites that the legislature was “fully convinced of the Necessi-

ty of revising the Foederal Constitution, and adding thereto 

such further Provisions as may render the same more adequate 

to the Exigencies of the Union.”57 

Delaware employed the familiar language of international 

diplomacy in granting “powers” to its delegates.58 They were 

“hereby constituted and appointed Deputies from this State, 

with Powers to meet such Deputies as may be appointed and 

authorized by the other States . . . and to join with them in de-

vising, deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and 

further Provisions, as may be necessary to render the Foederal 

Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union.”59 Dela-

ware added one extremely important limitation to their dele-

gates’ authority. Their powers did “not extend to that Part of 

the Fifth Article of the Confederation . . . which  declares 

that . . . each State shall have one Vote.”60 

On February 10th, Georgia enacted a measure “for the Pur-

pose of revising the Federal Constitution.”61 Its delegates were 

empowered “to join with [delegates from other states] in devis-

ing and discussing all such alterations and farther [sic] provi-

sions, as may be necessary to render the federal constitution 

adequate to the exigencies of the union.”62 

  In addition to Delaware’s specific instruction on preserving 

the equality of the states, all six of the initial states issued for-

mal instruction to their delegates regarding voting. For exam-

ple, each state established its own rule for a minimum number 

of delegates authorized to cast a vote for the state. Virginia, 

New Jersey, North Carolina, and Delaware required a mini-

mum of three delegates to be present to cast the state’s single 

                                                                      

  56. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4,// //at 203, 203. 

//  //57//. Id.// 

//  //58//. Id. //

//  //59//. Id.// 

//  //60//. Id. //

  61. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4,// //at 204, 204. 

//  //62//. Id.// 



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**78**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 75 

 

the Annapolis report.80 It expressed the view that Congress 

“entirely coincide[ed]” with the report as “the inefficiency of 

the federal government and the necessity of devising such 

farther [sic] provisions as shall render the same adequate to 

the exigencies of the Union” and “strongly recommend[ed] 

to the different state legislatures to send forward delegates 

to meet the proposed convention . . . .”81 

However, before the resolution could be voted on by Con-

gress, New York’s delegates introduced a competing resolution 

as instructed by their state legislature.82 New York’s motion 

was limited to “revising the Articles of Confederation.”83 In 

light of the underlying acrimony, New York’s alternative 

measure was doomed. The final vote was five votes no, three 

votes yes, and two states divided.84 Neither Rhode Island nor 

New Hampshire was present or voting.85 

Massachusetts’ delegates—one of the three states voting to 

approve the New York measure—followed immediately with 

an alternative viewed as a compromise.86 Congress approved 

these fateful words: 

Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that 

on the second Monday in May next a convention of dele-

gates who shall have been appointed by the several states be 

held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of re-

vising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Con-

gress and the several legislatures such alterations and provi-

sions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and 

confirmed by the states render the federal constitution ade-

quate to the exigencies of government and the preservation 

of the Union.87 

While the language of this resolution has been oft-quoted, schol-

ars have generally failed to look at the resolution and its context to 

determine whether this was in fact the formal call for the Phila-\\
                                                                      

  80. Commentaries on the Constitution, //reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 36–

37. 

  81. 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70//,// at 71–72. 

//  //82//. Id.// at 72. 

//  //83//. Id.// 

//  //84//. Id. //at 73. 

//  //85//. Id.// 

//  //86//. Id. //at 73–74. 

  87. Confederation Congress Calls the Constitutional Convention (Feb. 21, 1787), 

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 185, 187. 

74 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

dress to the States, by the United States in Congress Assembled 

//to accompany the act of April 18, 1783//.”72 

The Impost measure was eventually adopted by twelve 

states.73 However, New York’s Senate defeated the Impost by a 

vote of 11-7 on April 14th, 1785.74 With no other solutions on 

the horizon, on February 15th, 1786, Congress urged the New 

York legislature to reconsider.75 Repeated requests from Con-

gress and rebuffs from New York left the dangerously divisive 

matter unsettled when the state’s legislature convened in Janu-

ary 1787.76 On February 15th, the legislature rejected an impas-

sioned plea by Alexander Hamilton to approve the Impost, vot-

ing 38 to 19 to send yet another deliberately unacceptable 

proposal back to Congress.77 

Rather than complying with the request of Congress to approve 

the Impost, the New York House voted on February 17th to in-

struct the state’s delegates in Congress to make a motion to call 

for a convention of states under very specific terms.78 After an ac-

rimonious attack from Senator Abraham Yates, Jr., the Senate ap-

proved the measure by a vote of 10-9 on February 20th.79 The con-

text strongly suggests that the New York legislature believed that 

this motion was an effort to not only respond to the ongoing dis-

pute about the Impost, but to attempt to control the upcoming 

convention of states to be held in Philadelphia on terms accepta-

ble to this most recalcitrant state. 

//3.  Congress Responds to the Annapolis Convention Report //

While the conflict with New York remained in a hostile 

stalemate, on February 19th, a committee in Congress voted 

by a one-vote margin to approve a resolution responding to 

                                                                      

  72. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra// note 23, at 96–100. Scholars of the era understood 

the importance of this document in the process of adopting the Constitution. The 

Impost of 1783 is cited in //Elliot’s Debates// in the chapter entitled: “Proceedings 

which led to the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States.” //Id.// at 92. 

  73. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEAN-

ING OF THE 

FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 224 (2005). 

  74. 19 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at xxxvi. 

//  //75//. Id.// 

//  //76//. Id.// at xxxvi–xxxix. 

//  //77//. Id//. at xl. 

  78. 31 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra// note 70, at 72.  

  79. 19  DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 507. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

the Annapolis report.80 It expressed the view that Congre

“entirely coincide[ed]” with the report as “the inefficiency of 

the federal government and the necessity of devising su

farther [sic] provisions as shall render the same adequate 

the exigencies of the Union” and “strongly recommend[ed] 

to the different state legislatures to send forward delegates

to meet the proposed convention . . . .”81 

However, before the resolution could be voted on by Con-

gress, New York’s delegates introduced a competing resolution 

as instructed by their state legislature.82 New York’s motion 

was limited to “revising the Articles of Confederation.”83 In

light of the underlying acrimony, New York’s alternative 

measure was doomed. The final vote was five votes no, three 

votes yes, and two states divided.84 Neither Rhode Island n

New Hampshire was present or voting.85 

Massachusetts’ delegates—one of the three states voting to 

approve the New York measure—followed immediately with

an alternative viewed as a compromise.86 Congress approved

these fateful words: 

Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that 

on the second Monday in May next a convention of dele-

gates who shall have been appointed by the several states be 

held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of re-

vising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Con-

gress and the several legislatures such alterations and provi-

sions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and 

confirmed by the states render the federal constitution ade-

quate to the exigencies of government and the preservation 

of the Union.87 

While the language of this resolution has been oft-quoted, schol-

ars have generally failed to look at the resolution and its context 

determine whether this was in fact the formal call for the Phila-\\
                                                                      

  80. Commentaries on the Constitution, //reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

37. 

  81. 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70//,// at 71–72. 

//  //82//. Id.// at 72. 

//  //83//. Id.// 

//  //84//. Id. //at 73. 

//  //85//. Id.// 

//  //86//. Id. //at 73–74. 

  87. Confederation Congress Calls the Constitutional Convention (Feb. 21, 1787)

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 185, 187. 

74 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

dress to the States, by the United States in Congress Assembled 

//to accompany the act of April 18, 1783//.”72 

The Impost measure was eventually adopted by twelve 

states.73 However, New York’s Senate defeated the Impost by a 

vote of 11-7 on April 14th, 1785.74 With no other solutions on 

the horizon, on February 15th, 1786, Congress urged the New 

York legislature to reconsider.75 Repeated requests from Con-

gress and rebuffs from New York left the dangerously divisive 

matter unsettled when the state’s legislature convened in Janu-

ary 1787.76 On February 15th, the legislature rejected an impas-

sioned plea by Alexander Hamilton to approve the Impost, vot-

ing 38 to 19 to send yet another deliberately unacceptable 

proposal back to Congress.77 

Rather than complying with the request of Congress to approve 

the Impost, the New York House voted on February 17th to in-

struct the state’s delegates in Congress to make a motion to call 

for a convention of states under very specific terms.78 After an ac-

rimonious attack from Senator Abraham Yates, Jr., the Senate ap-

proved the measure by a vote of 10-9 on February 20th.79 The con-

text strongly suggests that the New York legislature believed that 

this motion was an effort to not only respond to the ongoing dis-

pute about the Impost, but to attempt to control the upcoming 

convention of states to be held in Philadelphia on terms accepta-

ble to this most recalcitrant state. 

//3.  Congress Responds to the Annapolis Convention Report //

While the conflict with New York remained in a hostile 

stalemate, on February 19th, a committee in Congress voted 

by a one-vote margin to approve a resolution responding to 

                                                                      

  72. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra// note 23, at 96–100. Scholars of the era understood 

the importance of this document in the process of adopting the Constitution. The 

Impost of 1783 is cited in //Elliot’s Debates// in the chapter entitled: “Proceedings 

which led to the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States.” //Id.// at 92. 

  73. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEAN-

ING OF THE 

FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 224 (2005). 

  74. 19 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at xxxvi. 

//  //75//. Id.// 

//  //76//. Id.// at xxxvi–xxxix. 

//  //77//. Id//. at xl. 

  78. 31 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra// note 70, at 72.  

  79. 19  DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 507. 



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**79**

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 75 

 

the Annapolis report.80 It expressed the view that Congress 

“entirely coincide[ed]” with the report as “the inefficiency of 

the federal government and the necessity of devising such 

farther [sic] provisions as shall render the same adequate to 

the exigencies of the Union” and “strongly recommend[ed] 

to the different state legislatures to send forward delegates 

to meet the proposed convention . . . .”81 

However, before the resolution could be voted on by Con-

gress, New York’s delegates introduced a competing resolution 

as instructed by their state legislature.82 New York’s motion 

was limited to “revising the Articles of Confederation.”83 In 

light of the underlying acrimony, New York’s alternative 

measure was doomed. The final vote was five votes no, three 

votes yes, and two states divided.84 Neither Rhode Island nor 

New Hampshire was present or voting.85 

Massachusetts’ delegates—one of the three states voting to 

approve the New York measure—followed immediately with 

an alternative viewed as a compromise.86 Congress approved 

these fateful words: 

Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that 

on the second Monday in May next a convention of dele-

gates who shall have been appointed by the several states be 

held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of re-

vising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Con-

gress and the several legislatures such alterations and provi-

sions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and 

confirmed by the states render the federal constitution ade-

quate to the exigencies of government and the preservation 

of the Union.87 

While the language of this resolution has been oft-quoted, schol-

ars have generally failed to look at the resolution and its context to 

determine whether this was in fact the formal call for the Phila-\\
                                                                      

  80. Commentaries on the Constitution, //reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 36–

37. 

  81. 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70//,// at 71–72. 

//  //82//. Id.// at 72. 

//  //83//. Id.// 

//  //84//. Id. //at 73. 

//  //85//. Id.// 

//  //86//. Id. //at 73–74. 

  87. Confederation Congress Calls the Constitutional Convention (Feb. 21, 1787), 

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 185, 187. 

74 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

dress to the States, by the United States in Congress Assembled 

//to accompany the act of April 18, 1783//.”72 

The Impost measure was eventually adopted by twelve 

states.73 However, New York’s Senate defeated the Impost by a 

vote of 11-7 on April 14th, 1785.74 With no other solutions on 

the horizon, on February 15th, 1786, Congress urged the New 

York legislature to reconsider.75 Repeated requests from Con-

gress and rebuffs from New York left the dangerously divisive 

matter unsettled when the state’s legislature convened in Janu-

ary 1787.76 On February 15th, the legislature rejected an impas-

sioned plea by Alexander Hamilton to approve the Impost, vot-

ing 38 to 19 to send yet another deliberately unacceptable 

proposal back to Congress.77 

Rather than complying with the request of Congress to approve 

the Impost, the New York House voted on February 17th to in-

struct the state’s delegates in Congress to make a motion to call 

for a convention of states under very specific terms.78 After an ac-

rimonious attack from Senator Abraham Yates, Jr., the Senate ap-

proved the measure by a vote of 10-9 on February 20th.79 The con-

text strongly suggests that the New York legislature believed that 

this motion was an effort to not only respond to the ongoing dis-

pute about the Impost, but to attempt to control the upcoming 

convention of states to be held in Philadelphia on terms accepta-

ble to this most recalcitrant state. 

//3.  Congress Responds to the Annapolis Convention Report //

While the conflict with New York remained in a hostile 

stalemate, on February 19th, a committee in Congress voted 

by a one-vote margin to approve a resolution responding to 

                                                                      

  72. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra// note 23, at 96–100. Scholars of the era understood 

the importance of this document in the process of adopting the Constitution. The 

Impost of 1783 is cited in //Elliot’s Debates// in the chapter entitled: “Proceedings 

which led to the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States.” //Id.// at 92. 

  73. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEAN-

ING OF THE 

FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 224 (2005). 

  74. 19 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at xxxvi. 

//  //75//. Id.// 

//  //76//. Id.// at xxxvi–xxxix. 

//  //77//. Id//. at xl. 

  78. 31 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra// note 70, at 72.  

  79. 19  DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 507. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

the Annapolis report.80 It expressed the view that Congre

“entirely coincide[ed]” with the report as “the inefficiency of 

the federal government and the necessity of devising su

farther [sic] provisions as shall render the same adequate 

the exigencies of the Union” and “strongly recommend[ed] 

to the different state legislatures to send forward delegates

to meet the proposed convention . . . .”81 

However, before the resolution could be voted on by Con-

gress, New York’s delegates introduced a competing resolution 

as instructed by their state legislature.82 New York’s motion 

was limited to “revising the Articles of Confederation.”83 In

light of the underlying acrimony, New York’s alternative 

measure was doomed. The final vote was five votes no, three 

votes yes, and two states divided.84 Neither Rhode Island n

New Hampshire was present or voting.85 

Massachusetts’ delegates—one of the three states voting to 

approve the New York measure—followed immediately with

an alternative viewed as a compromise.86 Congress approved

these fateful words: 

Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that 

on the second Monday in May next a convention of dele-

gates who shall have been appointed by the several states be 

held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of re-

vising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Con-

gress and the several legislatures such alterations and provi-

sions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and 

confirmed by the states render the federal constitution ade-

quate to the exigencies of government and the preservation 

of the Union.87 

While the language of this resolution has been oft-quoted, schol-

ars have generally failed to look at the resolution and its context to 

determine whether this was in fact the formal call for the Phila-\\
                                                                      

  80. Commentaries on the Constitution, //reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

37. 

  81. 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70//,// at 71–72. 

//  //82//. Id.// at 72. 

//  //83//. Id.// 

//  //84//. Id. //at 73. 

//  //85//. Id.// 

//  //86//. Id. //at 73–74. 

  87. Confederation Congress Calls the Constitutional Convention (Feb. 21, 1787)

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 185, 187. 

74 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

dress to the States, by the United States in Congress Assembled 

//to accompany the act of April 18, 1783//.”72 

The Impost measure was eventually adopted by twelve 

states.73 However, New York’s Senate defeated the Impost by a 

vote of 11-7 on April 14th, 1785.74 With no other solutions on 

the horizon, on February 15th, 1786, Congress urged the New 

York legislature to reconsider.75 Repeated requests from Con-

gress and rebuffs from New York left the dangerously divisive 

matter unsettled when the state’s legislature convened in Janu-

ary 1787.76 On February 15th, the legislature rejected an impas-

sioned plea by Alexander Hamilton to approve the Impost, vot-

ing 38 to 19 to send yet another deliberately unacceptable 

proposal back to Congress.77 

Rather than complying with the request of Congress to approve 

the Impost, the New York House voted on February 17th to in-

struct the state’s delegates in Congress to make a motion to call 

for a convention of states under very specific terms.78 After an ac-

rimonious attack from Senator Abraham Yates, Jr., the Senate ap-

proved the measure by a vote of 10-9 on February 20th.79 The con-

text strongly suggests that the New York legislature believed that 

this motion was an effort to not only respond to the ongoing dis-

pute about the Impost, but to attempt to control the upcoming 

convention of states to be held in Philadelphia on terms accepta-

ble to this most recalcitrant state. 

//3.  Congress Responds to the Annapolis Convention Report //

While the conflict with New York remained in a hostile 

stalemate, on February 19th, a committee in Congress voted 

by a one-vote margin to approve a resolution responding to 

                                                                      

  72. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra// note 23, at 96–100. Scholars of the era understood 

the importance of this document in the process of adopting the Constitution. The 

Impost of 1783 is cited in //Elliot’s Debates// in the chapter entitled: “Proceedings 

which led to the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States.” //Id.// at 92. 

  73. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEAN-

ING OF THE 

FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 224 (2005). 

  74. 19 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at xxxvi. 

//  //75//. Id.// 

//  //76//. Id.// at xxxvi–xxxix. 

//  //77//. Id//. at xl. 

  78. 31 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra// note 70, at 72.  

  79. 19  DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 507. 



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76 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

delphia Convention. There are two attributes that would be found 

in a formal call that are completely absent here. First, the language 

of the resolution would be addressed to the states. Second, Con-

gress would follow its normal formal protocol for submitting 

measures for the consideration of the states. For example, when 

Congress asked the states to ratify the amendment to the Articles 

in the Impost of 1783, the language was directed to the states and 

there was formal communication to the chief executives of each 

state.88 There is no such language of invitation contained in the 

February 21st resolution of Congress and there is no record of any 

formal instruments of communication to the states inviting them 

to send delegates to Philadelphia. When Virginia called the Phila-

delphia Convention, it had sent such communications.89 Congress 

never did in this instance.  

The absence of the formalities is strong evidence that Congress 

was merely issuing its blessing on the convention planning al-

ready in progress at the initiative of Virginia and five other 

states. Congress expressed its “opinion” that “it is expedient” 

that a convention of delegates “be held.” On its face, it reads 

more like an endorsement than a formal request to the states to 

send delegates. Moreover, the question of the power of Congress 

to issue such a formal call cannot be overlooked. There is noth-

ing in the text of the Articles of Confederation (particularly Arti-

cle XIII) that suggests that Congress had any power to actually 

call a convention of states.90 

However, the historical record demonstrates that the states 

clearly believed that they could call conventions of states to dis-

cuss common problems. Natelson has catalogued ten such con-

ventions after the Declaration of Independence but prior to the 

Annapolis Convention.91 Congress was basically a bystander in 

this process. Virginia did not seek the approval of Congress when 

it invited the other states to the conventions held in Annapolis 

and Philadelphia. It is clear that the states believed, as the text of 

the Annapolis report makes plain, that notifying Congress arose 

                                                                      

  88. 24 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70//,// at 258. 

  89. Virginia’s Appointment of Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 

23, 1786), //reprinted in //8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 540, 540. 

//  //90//. See// //supra// note 22 and accompanying text.  

  91. Robert G. Natelson, //Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitu-//

//tion’s “Convention for Proposing Amendments//”, 65 FLA. L. REV. 615 (2013). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 77 

 

“from motives of respect”92 rather than from any sense that it was 

necessary to seek congressional approval. 

Calling a convention is a formal invitation to participate in 

an official gathering. A call to the states to take action at the 

request of Congress would have said so directly and would 

have been sent to the states with appropriate formalities. All 

such indicia of a formal call are missing from the February 21st 

resolution but are clearly present in the measure enacted the 

previous fall by the Virginia legislature. 

//4.  The Six Remaining States Appoint Delegates //

A February 22nd resolution by the Massachusetts legislature 

was enacted without knowledge that Congress had acted the 

prior day.93 It was repealed and replaced with another enact-

ment on March 7th.94 This resolution adopted the operative 

paragraph from the congressional resolution.95 Thus, Massa-

chusetts delegates were instructed to “solely” amend the Arti-

cles of Confederation to “render the federal constitution ade-

quate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of 

the union.”96// //Without specifically citing the Congressional reso-

lution, on March 6th, New York’s legislature appointed dele-

gates with the verbatim language used in the resolution.97 Con-

sequently, the Empire State’s delegates were under the same 

instructions as those from Massachusetts. 

South Carolina’s legislature ignored the language proffered 

by Congress. It essentially returned to the Virginia model with 

an enactment entitled “for the purpose of revising the foederal 

constitution.”98 On March 8th, its delegates were given the au-

thority “to join” with other delegates “in devising and discuss-

ing all such alterations, clauses, articles and provisions as may 

                                                                      

  92. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

  93. Resolution Authorizing the Appointment of Delegates and Providing In-

structions for Them (Feb. 22, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 205, 205. 

  94. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 1787), 

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207. 

//  //95//. Id.// 

//  //96//. Id.// 

  97. Assembly and Senate Authorize Election of Delegates (Feb. 26, 1787), //reprint-//

//ed in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 209, 209. 

  98. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Mar. 8, 1787), //reprinted//  //in  //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 213, 214. 

76 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

delphia Convention. There are two attributes that would be found 

in a formal call that are completely absent here. First, the language 

of the resolution would be addressed to the states. Second, Con-

gress would follow its normal formal protocol for submitting 

measures for the consideration of the states. For example, when 

Congress asked the states to ratify the amendment to the Articles 

in the Impost of 1783, the language was directed to the states and 

there was formal communication to the chief executives of each 

state.88 There is no such language of invitation contained in the 

February 21st resolution of Congress and there is no record of any 

formal instruments of communication to the states inviting them 

to send delegates to Philadelphia. When Virginia called the Phila-

delphia Convention, it had sent such communications.89 Congress 

never did in this instance.  

The absence of the formalities is strong evidence that Congress 

was merely issuing its blessing on the convention planning al-

ready in progress at the initiative of Virginia and five other 

states. Congress expressed its “opinion” that “it is expedient” 

that a convention of delegates “be held.” On its face, it reads 

more like an endorsement than a formal request to the states to 

send delegates. Moreover, the question of the power of Congress 

to issue such a formal call cannot be overlooked. There is noth-

ing in the text of the Articles of Confederation (particularly Arti-

cle XIII) that suggests that Congress had any power to actually 

call a convention of states.90 

However, the historical record demonstrates that the states 

clearly believed that they could call conventions of states to dis-

cuss common problems. Natelson has catalogued ten such con-

ventions after the Declaration of Independence but prior to the 

Annapolis Convention.91 Congress was basically a bystander in 

this process. Virginia did not seek the approval of Congress when 

it invited the other states to the conventions held in Annapolis 

and Philadelphia. It is clear that the states believed, as the text of 

the Annapolis report makes plain, that notifying Congress arose 

                                                                      

  88. 24 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70//,// at 258. 

  89. Virginia’s Appointment of Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 

23, 1786), //reprinted in //8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 540, 540. 

//  //90//. See// //supra// note 22 and accompanying text.  

  91. Robert G. Natelson, //Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitu-//

//tion’s “Convention for Proposing Amendments//”, 65 FLA. L. REV. 615 (2013). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

“from motives of respect”92 rather than from any sense that it w

necessary to seek congressional approval. 

Calling a convention is a formal invitation to participate i

an official gathering. A call to the states to take action at t

request of Congress would have said so directly and would 

have been sent to the states with appropriate formalities. A

such indicia of a formal call are missing from the February 21st 

resolution but are clearly present in the measure enacted t

previous fall by the Virginia legislature. 

//4.  The Six Remaining States Appoint Delegates //

A February 22nd resolution by the Massachusetts legislature 

was enacted without knowledge that Congress had acted t

prior day.93 It was repealed and replaced with another ena

ment on March 7th.94 This resolution adopted the operative

paragraph from the congressional resolution.95 Thus, Massa-

chusetts delegates were instructed to “solely” amend the Arti-

cles of Confederation to “render the federal constitution ade-

quate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of 

the union.”96// //Without specifically citing the Congressional reso-

lution, on March 6th, New York’s legislature appointed dele-

gates with the verbatim language used in the resolution.97 Con-

sequently, the Empire State’s delegates were under the same 

instructions as those from Massachusetts. 

South Carolina’s legislature ignored the language proffered 

by Congress. It essentially returned to the Virginia model with

an enactment entitled “for the purpose of revising the foederal 

constitution.”98 On March 8th, its delegates were given the au-

thority “to join” with other delegates “in devising and discuss-

ing all such alterations, clauses, articles and provisions as m

                                                                      

  92. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

  93. Resolution Authorizing the Appointment of Delegates and Providing In-

structions for Them (Feb. 22, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 205, 205.

  94. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 1787)

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207. 

//  //95//. Id.// 

//  //96//. Id.// 

  97. Assembly and Senate Authorize Election of Delegates (Feb. 26, 1787), //reprint-//

//ed in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 209, 209. 

  98. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Mar. 8, 1787), //reprinted//  //in //

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 213, 214. 



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**81**

76 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

delphia Convention. There are two attributes that would be found 

in a formal call that are completely absent here. First, the language 

of the resolution would be addressed to the states. Second, Con-

gress would follow its normal formal protocol for submitting 

measures for the consideration of the states. For example, when 

Congress asked the states to ratify the amendment to the Articles 

in the Impost of 1783, the language was directed to the states and 

there was formal communication to the chief executives of each 

state.88 There is no such language of invitation contained in the 

February 21st resolution of Congress and there is no record of any 

formal instruments of communication to the states inviting them 

to send delegates to Philadelphia. When Virginia called the Phila-

delphia Convention, it had sent such communications.89 Congress 

never did in this instance.  

The absence of the formalities is strong evidence that Congress 

was merely issuing its blessing on the convention planning al-

ready in progress at the initiative of Virginia and five other 

states. Congress expressed its “opinion” that “it is expedient” 

that a convention of delegates “be held.” On its face, it reads 

more like an endorsement than a formal request to the states to 

send delegates. Moreover, the question of the power of Congress 

to issue such a formal call cannot be overlooked. There is noth-

ing in the text of the Articles of Confederation (particularly Arti-

cle XIII) that suggests that Congress had any power to actually 

call a convention of states.90 

However, the historical record demonstrates that the states 

clearly believed that they could call conventions of states to dis-

cuss common problems. Natelson has catalogued ten such con-

ventions after the Declaration of Independence but prior to the 

Annapolis Convention.91 Congress was basically a bystander in 

this process. Virginia did not seek the approval of Congress when 

it invited the other states to the conventions held in Annapolis 

and Philadelphia. It is clear that the states believed, as the text of 

the Annapolis report makes plain, that notifying Congress arose 

                                                                      

  88. 24 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70//,// at 258. 

  89. Virginia’s Appointment of Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 

23, 1786), //reprinted in //8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 540, 540. 

//  //90//. See// //supra// note 22 and accompanying text.  

  91. Robert G. Natelson, //Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitu-//

//tion’s “Convention for Proposing Amendments//”, 65 FLA. L. REV. 615 (2013). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 77 

 

“from motives of respect”92 rather than from any sense that it was 

necessary to seek congressional approval. 

Calling a convention is a formal invitation to participate in 

an official gathering. A call to the states to take action at the 

request of Congress would have said so directly and would 

have been sent to the states with appropriate formalities. All 

such indicia of a formal call are missing from the February 21st 

resolution but are clearly present in the measure enacted the 

previous fall by the Virginia legislature. 

//4.  The Six Remaining States Appoint Delegates //

A February 22nd resolution by the Massachusetts legislature 

was enacted without knowledge that Congress had acted the 

prior day.93 It was repealed and replaced with another enact-

ment on March 7th.94 This resolution adopted the operative 

paragraph from the congressional resolution.95 Thus, Massa-

chusetts delegates were instructed to “solely” amend the Arti-

cles of Confederation to “render the federal constitution ade-

quate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of 

the union.”96// //Without specifically citing the Congressional reso-

lution, on March 6th, New York’s legislature appointed dele-

gates with the verbatim language used in the resolution.97 Con-

sequently, the Empire State’s delegates were under the same 

instructions as those from Massachusetts. 

South Carolina’s legislature ignored the language proffered 

by Congress. It essentially returned to the Virginia model with 

an enactment entitled “for the purpose of revising the foederal 

constitution.”98 On March 8th, its delegates were given the au-

thority “to join” with other delegates “in devising and discuss-

ing all such alterations, clauses, articles and provisions as may 

                                                                      

  92. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

  93. Resolution Authorizing the Appointment of Delegates and Providing In-

structions for Them (Feb. 22, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 205, 205. 

  94. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 1787), 

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207. 

//  //95//. Id.// 

//  //96//. Id.// 

  97. Assembly and Senate Authorize Election of Delegates (Feb. 26, 1787), //reprint-//

//ed in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 209, 209. 

  98. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Mar. 8, 1787), //reprinted//  //in  //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 213, 214. 

76 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

delphia Convention. There are two attributes that would be found 

in a formal call that are completely absent here. First, the language 

of the resolution would be addressed to the states. Second, Con-

gress would follow its normal formal protocol for submitting 

measures for the consideration of the states. For example, when 

Congress asked the states to ratify the amendment to the Articles 

in the Impost of 1783, the language was directed to the states and 

there was formal communication to the chief executives of each 

state.88 There is no such language of invitation contained in the 

February 21st resolution of Congress and there is no record of any 

formal instruments of communication to the states inviting them 

to send delegates to Philadelphia. When Virginia called the Phila-

delphia Convention, it had sent such communications.89 Congress 

never did in this instance.  

The absence of the formalities is strong evidence that Congress 

was merely issuing its blessing on the convention planning al-

ready in progress at the initiative of Virginia and five other 

states. Congress expressed its “opinion” that “it is expedient” 

that a convention of delegates “be held.” On its face, it reads 

more like an endorsement than a formal request to the states to 

send delegates. Moreover, the question of the power of Congress 

to issue such a formal call cannot be overlooked. There is noth-

ing in the text of the Articles of Confederation (particularly Arti-

cle XIII) that suggests that Congress had any power to actually 

call a convention of states.90 

However, the historical record demonstrates that the states 

clearly believed that they could call conventions of states to dis-

cuss common problems. Natelson has catalogued ten such con-

ventions after the Declaration of Independence but prior to the 

Annapolis Convention.91 Congress was basically a bystander in 

this process. Virginia did not seek the approval of Congress when 

it invited the other states to the conventions held in Annapolis 

and Philadelphia. It is clear that the states believed, as the text of 

the Annapolis report makes plain, that notifying Congress arose 

                                                                      

  88. 24 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70//,// at 258. 

  89. Virginia’s Appointment of Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Nov. 

23, 1786), //reprinted in //8 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 540, 540. 

//  //90//. See// //supra// note 22 and accompanying text.  

  91. Robert G. Natelson, //Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitu-//

//tion’s “Convention for Proposing Amendments//”, 65 FLA. L. REV. 615 (2013). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

“from motives of respect”92 rather than from any sense that it w

necessary to seek congressional approval. 

Calling a convention is a formal invitation to participate i

an official gathering. A call to the states to take action at t

request of Congress would have said so directly and would 

have been sent to the states with appropriate formalities. A

such indicia of a formal call are missing from the February 21st 

resolution but are clearly present in the measure enacted t

previous fall by the Virginia legislature. 

//4.  The Six Remaining States Appoint Delegates //

A February 22nd resolution by the Massachusetts legislature 

was enacted without knowledge that Congress had acted t

prior day.93 It was repealed and replaced with another ena

ment on March 7th.94 This resolution adopted the operative

paragraph from the congressional resolution.95 Thus, Massa-

chusetts delegates were instructed to “solely” amend the Arti-

cles of Confederation to “render the federal constitution ade-

quate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of 

the union.”96// //Without specifically citing the Congressional reso-

lution, on March 6th, New York’s legislature appointed dele-

gates with the verbatim language used in the resolution.97 Con-

sequently, the Empire State’s delegates were under the same 

instructions as those from Massachusetts. 

South Carolina’s legislature ignored the language proffered 

by Congress. It essentially returned to the Virginia model with

an enactment entitled “for the purpose of revising the foederal 

constitution.”98 On March 8th, its delegates were given the au-

thority “to join” with other delegates “in devising and discuss-

ing all such alterations, clauses, articles and provisions as m

                                                                      

  92. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

  93. Resolution Authorizing the Appointment of Delegates and Providing In-

structions for Them (Feb. 22, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 205, 205.

  94. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 1787)

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207. 

//  //95//. Id.// 

//  //96//. Id.// 

  97. Assembly and Senate Authorize Election of Delegates (Feb. 26, 1787), //reprint-//

//ed in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 209, 209. 

  98. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Mar. 8, 1787), //reprinted//  //in //

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 213, 214. 



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78 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

be thought necessary to render the foederal constitution entire-

ly adequate to the actual situation and future good government 

of the confederated states.”99 

Connecticut was the second state to formally acknowledge 

the Congressional measure in its appointment of delegates. Its 

enactment recited that the act of Congress was a recommenda-

tion.100 The measure specified that the delegates were “author-

ized and impowered . . . to confer with [other delegates] for the 

Purposes mentioned in the sd [sic] Act of Congress.”101 Howev-

er, it granted further authority under a different formula. Its 

delegates were “duly empowered” to discuss and report “such 

Alterations and Provisions, agreeable to the general Principles 

of Republican Government, as they shall think proper, to ren-

der the foederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of 

Government, and the Preservation of the Union.”102 Thus, the 

final phrasing is essentially the same as the Virginia formula. 

Connecticut appears to have been covering both alternatives 

when it finally acted on May 17th—two days after the sched-

uled start of the Convention. 

After prolonged discord between the House and Senate, on 

May 26th, Maryland appointed delegates authorized to meet 

and negotiate “for the purpose of revising the federal sys-

tem.”103 Working with other states, the delegates were sanc-

tioned to join in “considering such alterations, and further pro-

visions, as may be necessary to render the federal constitution 

adequate for the exigencies of the union.”104 Following the Vir-

ginia model, New Hampshire was the twelfth and final state to 

authorize delegates on June 27th—a month after the Convention 

was in full operation.105 Its delegates were to join with other states 

“in devising and discussing all such alterations and further provi-

                                                                      

//  //99//. Id.// 

  100. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

//  //101//. Id.// at 216. 

//  //102//. Id.// 

  103. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 222, 222. 

//  //104//. Id.// 

  105. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (June 27, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 79 

 

sions as to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigen-

cies of the Union.”106 

Like the first six states, each of the final six states imposed an in-

ternal quorum rule that was strictly observed by the Convention. 

Massachusetts and South Carolina required the presence of at 

least three delegates.107 New Hampshire permitted two delegates 

to represent the state.108 Connecticut and Maryland allowed one 

delegate to suffice.109 New York, in its ongoing obstinate ap-

proach, appointed three delegates but made no provision for any 

lesser number to suffice to cast the state’s vote.110 Every other state 

appointed more delegates than the minimum number required by 

that state’s quorum rule. 

Only two states, Massachusetts and Connecticut, actually cit-

ed the Congressional resolution in their formal appointment of 

delegates.111 Connecticut described the Congressional resolu-

tion as a “recommend[ation]” but did not limit its delegates to 

the merely amending the Articles of Confederation.112 New 

York and Massachusetts appointed delegates employing the 

verbatim language of the Congressional resolution.113 From the 

context, however, it was clear to all that these delegates were to 

“solely amend the Articles” as specified by their states—not 

because of the language from Congress. 

On the other hand, both Pennsylvania and Delaware spe-

cifically cite the Virginia resolution as the impetus for their 

                                                                      

  106. Resolution Electing and Empowering Delegates (Jan. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

  107. 3 RECORDS OF  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 584 (Max Far-

rand ed., 1st ed. 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].  

 108. 

//Id//. at 572–73.  

 109. 

//Id//. at 585–86. 

 110. 

//Id//. at 579–81. 

  111. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 

1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207; Act Electing and Empowering 

Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

  112. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

  113. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 

1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207; Assembly and Senate Author-

ize Election of Delegates (Feb. 26, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 209, 

209. 

78 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

be thought necessary to render the foederal constitution entire-

ly adequate to the actual situation and future good government 

of the confederated states.”99 

Connecticut was the second state to formally acknowledge 

the Congressional measure in its appointment of delegates. Its 

enactment recited that the act of Congress was a recommenda-

tion.100 The measure specified that the delegates were “author-

ized and impowered . . . to confer with [other delegates] for the 

Purposes mentioned in the sd [sic] Act of Congress.”101 Howev-

er, it granted further authority under a different formula. Its 

delegates were “duly empowered” to discuss and report “such 

Alterations and Provisions, agreeable to the general Principles 

of Republican Government, as they shall think proper, to ren-

der the foederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of 

Government, and the Preservation of the Union.”102 Thus, the 

final phrasing is essentially the same as the Virginia formula. 

Connecticut appears to have been covering both alternatives 

when it finally acted on May 17th—two days after the sched-

uled start of the Convention. 

After prolonged discord between the House and Senate, on 

May 26th, Maryland appointed delegates authorized to meet 

and negotiate “for the purpose of revising the federal sys-

tem.”103 Working with other states, the delegates were sanc-

tioned to join in “considering such alterations, and further pro-

visions, as may be necessary to render the federal constitution 

adequate for the exigencies of the union.”104 Following the Vir-

ginia model, New Hampshire was the twelfth and final state to 

authorize delegates on June 27th—a month after the Convention 

was in full operation.105 Its delegates were to join with other states 

“in devising and discussing all such alterations and further provi-

                                                                      

//  //99//. Id.// 

  100. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

//  //101//. Id.// at 216. 

//  //102//. Id.// 

  103. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 222, 222. 

//  //104//. Id.// 

  105. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (June 27, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

sions as to render the federal constitution adequate to the exige

cies of the Union.”106 

Like the first six states, each of the final six states imposed an i

ternal quorum rule that was strictly observed by the Conventi

Massachusetts and South Carolina required the presence of at 

least three delegates.107 New Hampshire permitted two delega

to represent the state.108 Connecticut and Maryland allowed o

delegate to suffice.109 New York, in its ongoing obstinate ap

proach, appointed three delegates but made no provision for any 

lesser number to suffice to cast the state’s vote.110 Every other state 

appointed more delegates than the minimum number required by 

that state’s quorum rule. 

Only two states, Massachusetts and Connecticut, actually cit-

ed the Congressional resolution in their formal appointment of 

delegates.111 Connecticut described the Congressional resolu-

tion as a “recommend[ation]” but did not limit its delegates to 

the merely amending the Articles of Confederation.112 New

York and Massachusetts appointed delegates employing the 

verbatim language of the Congressional resolution.113 From the

context, however, it was clear to all that these delegates were

“solely amend the Articles” as specified by their states—n

because of the language from Congress. 

On the other hand, both Pennsylvania and Delaware sp

cifically cite the Virginia resolution as the impetus for th

                                                                      

  106. Resolution Electing and Empowering Delegates (Jan. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

  107. 3 RECORDS OF  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 584 (Max Far-

rand ed., 1st ed. 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].  

 108. 

//Id//. at 572–73.  

 109. 

//Id//. at 585–86. 

 110. 

//Id//. at 579–81. 

  111. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar.

1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207; Act Electing and Empoweri

Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

  112. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

  113. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar.

1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207; Assembly and Senate Aut

ize Election of Delegates (Feb. 26, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

209. 



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**83**

78 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

be thought necessary to render the foederal constitution entire-

ly adequate to the actual situation and future good government 

of the confederated states.”99 

Connecticut was the second state to formally acknowledge 

the Congressional measure in its appointment of delegates. Its 

enactment recited that the act of Congress was a recommenda-

tion.100 The measure specified that the delegates were “author-

ized and impowered . . . to confer with [other delegates] for the 

Purposes mentioned in the sd [sic] Act of Congress.”101 Howev-

er, it granted further authority under a different formula. Its 

delegates were “duly empowered” to discuss and report “such 

Alterations and Provisions, agreeable to the general Principles 

of Republican Government, as they shall think proper, to ren-

der the foederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of 

Government, and the Preservation of the Union.”102 Thus, the 

final phrasing is essentially the same as the Virginia formula. 

Connecticut appears to have been covering both alternatives 

when it finally acted on May 17th—two days after the sched-

uled start of the Convention. 

After prolonged discord between the House and Senate, on 

May 26th, Maryland appointed delegates authorized to meet 

and negotiate “for the purpose of revising the federal sys-

tem.”103 Working with other states, the delegates were sanc-

tioned to join in “considering such alterations, and further pro-

visions, as may be necessary to render the federal constitution 

adequate for the exigencies of the union.”104 Following the Vir-

ginia model, New Hampshire was the twelfth and final state to 

authorize delegates on June 27th—a month after the Convention 

was in full operation.105 Its delegates were to join with other states 

“in devising and discussing all such alterations and further provi-

                                                                      

//  //99//. Id.// 

  100. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

//  //101//. Id.// at 216. 

//  //102//. Id.// 

  103. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 222, 222. 

//  //104//. Id.// 

  105. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (June 27, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 79 

 

sions as to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigen-

cies of the Union.”106 

Like the first six states, each of the final six states imposed an in-

ternal quorum rule that was strictly observed by the Convention. 

Massachusetts and South Carolina required the presence of at 

least three delegates.107 New Hampshire permitted two delegates 

to represent the state.108 Connecticut and Maryland allowed one 

delegate to suffice.109 New York, in its ongoing obstinate ap-

proach, appointed three delegates but made no provision for any 

lesser number to suffice to cast the state’s vote.110 Every other state 

appointed more delegates than the minimum number required by 

that state’s quorum rule. 

Only two states, Massachusetts and Connecticut, actually cit-

ed the Congressional resolution in their formal appointment of 

delegates.111 Connecticut described the Congressional resolu-

tion as a “recommend[ation]” but did not limit its delegates to 

the merely amending the Articles of Confederation.112 New 

York and Massachusetts appointed delegates employing the 

verbatim language of the Congressional resolution.113 From the 

context, however, it was clear to all that these delegates were to 

“solely amend the Articles” as specified by their states—not 

because of the language from Congress. 

On the other hand, both Pennsylvania and Delaware spe-

cifically cite the Virginia resolution as the impetus for their 

                                                                      

  106. Resolution Electing and Empowering Delegates (Jan. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

  107. 3 RECORDS OF  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 584 (Max Far-

rand ed., 1st ed. 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].  

 108. 

//Id//. at 572–73.  

 109. 

//Id//. at 585–86. 

 110. 

//Id//. at 579–81. 

  111. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 

1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207; Act Electing and Empowering 

Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

  112. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

  113. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 

1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207; Assembly and Senate Author-

ize Election of Delegates (Feb. 26, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 209, 

209. 

78 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

be thought necessary to render the foederal constitution entire-

ly adequate to the actual situation and future good government 

of the confederated states.”99 

Connecticut was the second state to formally acknowledge 

the Congressional measure in its appointment of delegates. Its 

enactment recited that the act of Congress was a recommenda-

tion.100 The measure specified that the delegates were “author-

ized and impowered . . . to confer with [other delegates] for the 

Purposes mentioned in the sd [sic] Act of Congress.”101 Howev-

er, it granted further authority under a different formula. Its 

delegates were “duly empowered” to discuss and report “such 

Alterations and Provisions, agreeable to the general Principles 

of Republican Government, as they shall think proper, to ren-

der the foederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of 

Government, and the Preservation of the Union.”102 Thus, the 

final phrasing is essentially the same as the Virginia formula. 

Connecticut appears to have been covering both alternatives 

when it finally acted on May 17th—two days after the sched-

uled start of the Convention. 

After prolonged discord between the House and Senate, on 

May 26th, Maryland appointed delegates authorized to meet 

and negotiate “for the purpose of revising the federal sys-

tem.”103 Working with other states, the delegates were sanc-

tioned to join in “considering such alterations, and further pro-

visions, as may be necessary to render the federal constitution 

adequate for the exigencies of the union.”104 Following the Vir-

ginia model, New Hampshire was the twelfth and final state to 

authorize delegates on June 27th—a month after the Convention 

was in full operation.105 Its delegates were to join with other states 

“in devising and discussing all such alterations and further provi-

                                                                      

//  //99//. Id.// 

  100. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

//  //101//. Id.// at 216. 

//  //102//. Id.// 

  103. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 222, 222. 

//  //104//. Id.// 

  105. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (June 27, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

sions as to render the federal constitution adequate to the exige

cies of the Union.”106 

Like the first six states, each of the final six states imposed an i

ternal quorum rule that was strictly observed by the Conventi

Massachusetts and South Carolina required the presence of at 

least three delegates.107 New Hampshire permitted two delega

to represent the state.108 Connecticut and Maryland allowed o

delegate to suffice.109 New York, in its ongoing obstinate ap

proach, appointed three delegates but made no provision for any 

lesser number to suffice to cast the state’s vote.110 Every other state 

appointed more delegates than the minimum number required by 

that state’s quorum rule. 

Only two states, Massachusetts and Connecticut, actually cit-

ed the Congressional resolution in their formal appointment of 

delegates.111 Connecticut described the Congressional resolu-

tion as a “recommend[ation]” but did not limit its delegates to 

the merely amending the Articles of Confederation.112 New

York and Massachusetts appointed delegates employing the 

verbatim language of the Congressional resolution.113 From the

context, however, it was clear to all that these delegates were

“solely amend the Articles” as specified by their states—n

because of the language from Congress. 

On the other hand, both Pennsylvania and Delaware sp

cifically cite the Virginia resolution as the impetus for th

                                                                      

  106. Resolution Electing and Empowering Delegates (Jan. 17, 1787), //reprinted//

1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

  107. 3 RECORDS OF  THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 584 (Max Far-

rand ed., 1st ed. 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS].  

 108. 

//Id//. at 572–73.  

 109. 

//Id//. at 585–86. 

 110. 

//Id//. at 579–81. 

  111. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar.

1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207; Act Electing and Empoweri

Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

  112. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 215. 

  113. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar.

1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 207, 207; Assembly and Senate Aut

ize Election of Delegates (Feb. 26, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

209. 



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action.114 Moreover, in the official communications between 

the Maryland House and Senate, the Senate cited the Virgin-

ia resolution as the basis for action by the Maryland legisla-

ture.115 Nine states essentially followed the Virginia language 

in the grant of authority to their delegates. Connecticut 

adopted broad language of its own creation. One thing is 

clear about all twelve states: every legislature acted on the 

premise that it was the body that would decide what author-

ity it would give its own delegates. 

//B.  Arguments about Delegates’ Authority at the Constitutional //

//Convention //

On the second Monday in May, in the eleventh year of the 

independence of the United States of America, “in virtue of ap-

pointments from their respective States, sundry Deputies to the 

foederal-Convention appeared.”116 No quorum of states mate-

rialized until May 25th.117 On that day, the first order of busi-

ness was the election of George Washington as President of the 

Convention followed by the election of a secretary.118 The next 

order of business was for each state to produce its creden-

tials.119 The credentials of the seven states in attendance were 

read.120 We know this from the following entry: 

On reading the Credentials of the deputies it was noticed 

that those from Delaware were prohibited from changing 

the Article in the Confederation establishing an equality of 

votes among the states.121 

Through the remainder of the Convention, upon the arrival 

of a new state, or a new delegate, the record repeatedly reflects 

that the credentials were produced and read.122 The Delaware 

                                                                      

  114. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC,  //supra// note 4,//  //199, 199; Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 

1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 203, 203. 

  115. Senate Message to House Objecting to Adjournment (Jan. 20, 1787), //reprint-//

//ed in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 217, 217–18. 

  116. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 1. 

//  //117//. Id.// 

//  //118//. Id.// at 2. 

//  //119//. Id.// 

//  //120//. Id.// 

//  //121//. Id.// at 4. 

//  //122//. See id.// at 7, 45, 62, 76, 115, 334, 353. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 81 

 

example indicates clearly that the Convention understood that 

these deputies were agents of their state and subject to the in-

structions contained in their credentials. 

On May 29th, 1789, Edmund Randolph introduced his plan 

for a truly national government.123 It was met with immediate 

resistance on various grounds. General Charles Cotesworth 

Pinckney, a delegate from South Carolina, “expressed a doubt 

whether the act of Congs. recommending the Convention, or 

the Commissions of the deputies to it, could authorize a dis-

cussion of a System founded on different principles from the 

federal Constitution.”124 Elbridge Gerry, from Massachusetts, 

expressed the same doubt. “The commission from Massachu-

setts empowers the deputies to proceed agreeably to the rec-

ommendation of Congress. This [sic] the foundation of the 

convention. If we have a right to pass this resolution we have a 

right to annihilate the confederation.”125 Both objectors—who 

became leading Anti-Federalists after the Convention—

described the act of Congress as a “recommendation.”126 Both 

cited their state commissions as the formal source of their au-

thority.127 There was no motion made and no vote taken in re-

sponse to these arguments. On June 7th, George Mason, who 

ultimately refused to sign the Constitution and became a lead-

ing Anti-Federalist,128 described the authority of the convention 

somewhat more broadly. The delegates were “appointed for 

the special purpose of revising and amending the federal con-

stitution, so as to obtain and preserve the important objects for 

which it was instituted.”129  

William Paterson rose on June 9th in opposition to the pro-

posal to adopt a system of proportional representation for the 

legislative chamber. He contended that the Convention “was 

formed in pursuance of an Act of Congs. that this act was recit-

ed in several of the Commissions, particularly that of Massts. 

                                                                      

//  //123//. Id.// at 20. 

//  //124//. Id.// at 34. 

//  //125//. Id.// at 43. 

//  //126//. Id.// at 41, 43. 

//  //127//. Id.// at 34, 43. 

  128. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788), //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra //

note 4, at 811–813. 

  129. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 160–61. 

80 

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action.114 Moreover, in the official communications between 

the Maryland House and Senate, the Senate cited the Virgin-

ia resolution as the basis for action by the Maryland legisla-

ture.115 Nine states essentially followed the Virginia language 

in the grant of authority to their delegates. Connecticut 

adopted broad language of its own creation. One thing is 

clear about all twelve states: every legislature acted on the 

premise that it was the body that would decide what author-

ity it would give its own delegates. 

//B.  Arguments about Delegates’ Authority at the Constitutional //

//Convention //

On the second Monday in May, in the eleventh year of the 

independence of the United States of America, “in virtue of ap-

pointments from their respective States, sundry Deputies to the 

foederal-Convention appeared.”116 No quorum of states mate-

rialized until May 25th.117 On that day, the first order of busi-

ness was the election of George Washington as President of the 

Convention followed by the election of a secretary.118 The next 

order of business was for each state to produce its creden-

tials.119 The credentials of the seven states in attendance were 

read.120 We know this from the following entry: 

On reading the Credentials of the deputies it was noticed 

that those from Delaware were prohibited from changing 

the Article in the Confederation establishing an equality of 

votes among the states.121 

Through the remainder of the Convention, upon the arrival 

of a new state, or a new delegate, the record repeatedly reflects 

that the credentials were produced and read.122 The Delaware 

                                                                      

  114. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC,  //supra// note 4,//  //199, 199; Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 

1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 203, 203. 

  115. Senate Message to House Objecting to Adjournment (Jan. 20, 1787), //reprint-//

//ed in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 217, 217–18. 

  116. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 1. 

//  //117//. Id.// 

//  //118//. Id.// at 2. 

//  //119//. Id.// 

//  //120//. Id.// 

//  //121//. Id.// at 4. 

//  //122//. See id.// at 7, 45, 62, 76, 115, 334, 353. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

example indicates clearly that the Convention understood that

these deputies were agents of their state and subject to the 

structions contained in their credentials. 

On May 29th, 1789, Edmund Randolph introduced his pla

for a truly national government.123 It was met with immedia

resistance on various grounds. General Charles Coteswo

Pinckney, a delegate from South Carolina, “expressed a doubt

whether the act of Congs. recommending the Convention, or 

the Commissions of the deputies to it, could authorize a dis-

cussion of a System founded on different principles from t

federal Constitution.”124 Elbridge Gerry, from Massachusetts, 

expressed the same doubt. “The commission from Massachu-

setts empowers the deputies to proceed agreeably to the rec-

ommendation of Congress. This [sic] the foundation of the

convention. If we have a right to pass this resolution we hav

right to annihilate the confederation.”125 Both objectors—who

became leading Anti-Federalists after the Convention—

described the act of Congress as a “recommendation.”126 Both 

cited their state commissions as the formal source of their au-

thority.127 There was no motion made and no vote taken in r

sponse to these arguments. On June 7th, George Mason, who 

ultimately refused to sign the Constitution and became a lea

ing Anti-Federalist,128 described the authority of the convention

somewhat more broadly. The delegates were “appointed 

the special purpose of revising and amending the federal con-

stitution, so as to obtain and preserve the important objects f

which it was instituted.”129  

William Paterson rose on June 9th in opposition to the pro-

posal to adopt a system of proportional representation for the

legislative chamber. He contended that the Convention “w

formed in pursuance of an Act of Congs. that this act was recit-

ed in several of the Commissions, particularly that of Mass

                                                                      

//  //123//. Id.// at 20. 

//  //124//. Id.// at 34. 

//  //125//. Id.// at 43. 

//  //126//. Id.// at 41, 43. 

//  //127//. Id.// at 34, 43. 

  128. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788), //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra//

note 4, at 811–813. 

  129. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 160–61. 



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action.114 Moreover, in the official communications between 

the Maryland House and Senate, the Senate cited the Virgin-

ia resolution as the basis for action by the Maryland legisla-

ture.115 Nine states essentially followed the Virginia language 

in the grant of authority to their delegates. Connecticut 

adopted broad language of its own creation. One thing is 

clear about all twelve states: every legislature acted on the 

premise that it was the body that would decide what author-

ity it would give its own delegates. 

//B.  Arguments about Delegates’ Authority at the Constitutional //

//Convention //

On the second Monday in May, in the eleventh year of the 

independence of the United States of America, “in virtue of ap-

pointments from their respective States, sundry Deputies to the 

foederal-Convention appeared.”116 No quorum of states mate-

rialized until May 25th.117 On that day, the first order of busi-

ness was the election of George Washington as President of the 

Convention followed by the election of a secretary.118 The next 

order of business was for each state to produce its creden-

tials.119 The credentials of the seven states in attendance were 

read.120 We know this from the following entry: 

On reading the Credentials of the deputies it was noticed 

that those from Delaware were prohibited from changing 

the Article in the Confederation establishing an equality of 

votes among the states.121 

Through the remainder of the Convention, upon the arrival 

of a new state, or a new delegate, the record repeatedly reflects 

that the credentials were produced and read.122 The Delaware 

                                                                      

  114. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC,  //supra// note 4,//  //199, 199; Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 

1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 203, 203. 

  115. Senate Message to House Objecting to Adjournment (Jan. 20, 1787), //reprint-//

//ed in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 217, 217–18. 

  116. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 1. 

//  //117//. Id.// 

//  //118//. Id.// at 2. 

//  //119//. Id.// 

//  //120//. Id.// 

//  //121//. Id.// at 4. 

//  //122//. See id.// at 7, 45, 62, 76, 115, 334, 353. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 81 

 

example indicates clearly that the Convention understood that 

these deputies were agents of their state and subject to the in-

structions contained in their credentials. 

On May 29th, 1789, Edmund Randolph introduced his plan 

for a truly national government.123 It was met with immediate 

resistance on various grounds. General Charles Cotesworth 

Pinckney, a delegate from South Carolina, “expressed a doubt 

whether the act of Congs. recommending the Convention, or 

the Commissions of the deputies to it, could authorize a dis-

cussion of a System founded on different principles from the 

federal Constitution.”124 Elbridge Gerry, from Massachusetts, 

expressed the same doubt. “The commission from Massachu-

setts empowers the deputies to proceed agreeably to the rec-

ommendation of Congress. This [sic] the foundation of the 

convention. If we have a right to pass this resolution we have a 

right to annihilate the confederation.”125 Both objectors—who 

became leading Anti-Federalists after the Convention—

described the act of Congress as a “recommendation.”126 Both 

cited their state commissions as the formal source of their au-

thority.127 There was no motion made and no vote taken in re-

sponse to these arguments. On June 7th, George Mason, who 

ultimately refused to sign the Constitution and became a lead-

ing Anti-Federalist,128 described the authority of the convention 

somewhat more broadly. The delegates were “appointed for 

the special purpose of revising and amending the federal con-

stitution, so as to obtain and preserve the important objects for 

which it was instituted.”129  

William Paterson rose on June 9th in opposition to the pro-

posal to adopt a system of proportional representation for the 

legislative chamber. He contended that the Convention “was 

formed in pursuance of an Act of Congs. that this act was recit-

ed in several of the Commissions, particularly that of Massts. 

                                                                      

//  //123//. Id.// at 20. 

//  //124//. Id.// at 34. 

//  //125//. Id.// at 43. 

//  //126//. Id.// at 41, 43. 

//  //127//. Id.// at 34, 43. 

  128. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788), //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra //

note 4, at 811–813. 

  129. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 160–61. 

80 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

action.114 Moreover, in the official communications between 

the Maryland House and Senate, the Senate cited the Virgin-

ia resolution as the basis for action by the Maryland legisla-

ture.115 Nine states essentially followed the Virginia language 

in the grant of authority to their delegates. Connecticut 

adopted broad language of its own creation. One thing is 

clear about all twelve states: every legislature acted on the 

premise that it was the body that would decide what author-

ity it would give its own delegates. 

//B.  Arguments about Delegates’ Authority at the Constitutional //

//Convention //

On the second Monday in May, in the eleventh year of the 

independence of the United States of America, “in virtue of ap-

pointments from their respective States, sundry Deputies to the 

foederal-Convention appeared.”116 No quorum of states mate-

rialized until May 25th.117 On that day, the first order of busi-

ness was the election of George Washington as President of the 

Convention followed by the election of a secretary.118 The next 

order of business was for each state to produce its creden-

tials.119 The credentials of the seven states in attendance were 

read.120 We know this from the following entry: 

On reading the Credentials of the deputies it was noticed 

that those from Delaware were prohibited from changing 

the Article in the Confederation establishing an equality of 

votes among the states.121 

Through the remainder of the Convention, upon the arrival 

of a new state, or a new delegate, the record repeatedly reflects 

that the credentials were produced and read.122 The Delaware 

                                                                      

  114. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 

DHRC,  //supra// note 4,//  //199, 199; Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 

1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 203, 203. 

  115. Senate Message to House Objecting to Adjournment (Jan. 20, 1787), //reprint-//

//ed in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 217, 217–18. 

  116. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 1. 

//  //117//. Id.// 

//  //118//. Id.// at 2. 

//  //119//. Id.// 

//  //120//. Id.// 

//  //121//. Id.// at 4. 

//  //122//. See id.// at 7, 45, 62, 76, 115, 334, 353. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

example indicates clearly that the Convention understood that

these deputies were agents of their state and subject to the 

structions contained in their credentials. 

On May 29th, 1789, Edmund Randolph introduced his pla

for a truly national government.123 It was met with immedia

resistance on various grounds. General Charles Coteswo

Pinckney, a delegate from South Carolina, “expressed a doubt

whether the act of Congs. recommending the Convention, or 

the Commissions of the deputies to it, could authorize a dis-

cussion of a System founded on different principles from t

federal Constitution.”124 Elbridge Gerry, from Massachusetts, 

expressed the same doubt. “The commission from Massachu-

setts empowers the deputies to proceed agreeably to the rec-

ommendation of Congress. This [sic] the foundation of the

convention. If we have a right to pass this resolution we hav

right to annihilate the confederation.”125 Both objectors—who

became leading Anti-Federalists after the Convention—

described the act of Congress as a “recommendation.”126 Both 

cited their state commissions as the formal source of their au-

thority.127 There was no motion made and no vote taken in r

sponse to these arguments. On June 7th, George Mason, who 

ultimately refused to sign the Constitution and became a lea

ing Anti-Federalist,128 described the authority of the convention

somewhat more broadly. The delegates were “appointed 

the special purpose of revising and amending the federal con-

stitution, so as to obtain and preserve the important objects f

which it was instituted.”129  

William Paterson rose on June 9th in opposition to the pro-

posal to adopt a system of proportional representation for the

legislative chamber. He contended that the Convention “w

formed in pursuance of an Act of Congs. that this act was recit-

ed in several of the Commissions, particularly that of Mass

                                                                      

//  //123//. Id.// at 20. 

//  //124//. Id.// at 34. 

//  //125//. Id.// at 43. 

//  //126//. Id.// at 41, 43. 

//  //127//. Id.// at 34, 43. 

  128. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788), //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra//

note 4, at 811–813. 

  129. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 160–61. 



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which he required to be read.”130 Of course, the formula created 

by Congress was only followed precisely by New York and 

Massachusetts. Paterson cleverly avoided asking for a reading 

of his own New Jersey credentials, which contained a much 

broader statement of authority.131 He was attempting to defeat 

proportional representation, and he carefully selected the cre-

dentials he thought would bolster his political argument. Pat-

erson elaborated on his view of the delegates’ authority: 

Our powers do not extend to the abolition of the State Gov-

ernments, and the Erection of a national Govt. —They only au-

thorise amendments in the present System, and have for yr. Ba-

sis the present Confederation which establishes the principle 

that each State has an equal vote in Congress . . . .132 

Six days later, Paterson introduced his well-known New Jer-

sey plan which contained nine points: (1) federal powers were 

to be enlarged; (2) Congress should be given the power to tax; 

(3) enforcement powers should be given to collect delinquen-

cies from the states; (4) Congress would appoint an executive; 

(5) a federal judiciary would be created; (6) a supremacy clause 

was included; (7) a process was created for admission of new 

states; (8) a uniform rule of naturalization should be adopted in 

each state; and (9) full faith and credit observed between the 

states with regard to criminal convictions.133 

The New Jersey Plan was no minor revision of the Articles of 

Confederation. It contained a radical expansion of power com-

pared with the existing system. Paterson did not include any 

change in the system of voting in Congress. However, Congress 

would remain one-state, one-vote. And, he did not propose the 

direct election of any branch of government by the people. If the 

New Jersey Plan had formed the ultimate framework from the 

Convention, it would have almost certainly required a compre-

hensive rewrite of the Articles of Confederation—a “whole new 

document”—rather than discrete amendments. Paterson and the 

other Anti-Federalists did not object to massive changes or a new 

document; rather they contended that the delegates were unau-

                                                                      

//  //130//. Id. //at 177. 

//  //131//. See// Resolution Authorizing and Empowering the Delegates (Nov. 24, 1786), 

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196. 

  132. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 184. 

//  //133//. Id. //at// //242–45. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 83 

 

thorized to adopt a different theory of government. When the ad-

vocates of the New Jersey Plan raised arguments about the scope 

of the delegates’ authority, they were not making technical legal 

arguments. Their contention was one of political philosophy. Any 

plan that they deemed insufficiently “federalist” in character was 

beyond the scope of their view of the delegates’ authority. 

This is clearly shown by debates on the following day, Sat-

urday, June 16th. John Lansing, Jr., an ardent Anti-Federalist 

from New York, asked for a reading of the first resolutions of 

both Paterson’s plan and Randolph’s Virginia Plan.134 Lansing 

contended that Paterson’s plan sustained the sovereignty of the 

states, while Randolph’s destroyed state sovereignty.135 He 

picked up Paterson’s earlier contention that the Convention 

had the authority to adopt the New Jersey Plan but not the Vir-

ginia Plan.136 “He was decidedly of opinion that the power of 

the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal na-

ture, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being.”137 

Then he asserted, “The Act of Congress[, t]he tenor of the Acts 

of the States, the commissions produced by the several deputa-

tions all proved this.”138 

While Lansing’s own New York credentials followed the lim-

ited formula of Congress, he was playing fast and loose with the 

facts to assert that this was a fair description of the authority of 

any other state except Massachusetts. However, one component 

of his argument was more than disingenuous political spin. He 

emphasized the concept that the Convention must propose a 

federal, not national government.139 Every state’s credentials had 

explicit language embracing the view that the revised govern-

ment should be federal in character since they were to deliver an 

adequate “federal constitution.” Like Randolph’s plan, the Anti-

Federalists’ plan would have required a substantial rewrite of 

the Articles of Confederation. Their continued objection was not 

to the writing of a “whole new document” but to a form of gov-

ernment that they personally deemed to be insufficiently “feder-

al” in character. James Wilson took the floor immediately follow-\\
                                                                      

//  //134//. Id.// at 249. 

//  //135//. Id.// 

//  //136//. Id.// 

//  //137//. Id.// 

//  //138//. Id. //

//  //139//. Id. //at 246. 

82 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

which he required to be read.”130 Of course, the formula created 

by Congress was only followed precisely by New York and 

Massachusetts. Paterson cleverly avoided asking for a reading 

of his own New Jersey credentials, which contained a much 

broader statement of authority.131 He was attempting to defeat 

proportional representation, and he carefully selected the cre-

dentials he thought would bolster his political argument. Pat-

erson elaborated on his view of the delegates’ authority: 

Our powers do not extend to the abolition of the State Gov-

ernments, and the Erection of a national Govt. —They only au-

thorise amendments in the present System, and have for yr. Ba-

sis the present Confederation which establishes the principle 

that each State has an equal vote in Congress . . . .132 

Six days later, Paterson introduced his well-known New Jer-

sey plan which contained nine points: (1) federal powers were 

to be enlarged; (2) Congress should be given the power to tax; 

(3) enforcement powers should be given to collect delinquen-

cies from the states; (4) Congress would appoint an executive; 

(5) a federal judiciary would be created; (6) a supremacy clause 

was included; (7) a process was created for admission of new 

states; (8) a uniform rule of naturalization should be adopted in 

each state; and (9) full faith and credit observed between the 

states with regard to criminal convictions.133 

The New Jersey Plan was no minor revision of the Articles of 

Confederation. It contained a radical expansion of power com-

pared with the existing system. Paterson did not include any 

change in the system of voting in Congress. However, Congress 

would remain one-state, one-vote. And, he did not propose the 

direct election of any branch of government by the people. If the 

New Jersey Plan had formed the ultimate framework from the 

Convention, it would have almost certainly required a compre-

hensive rewrite of the Articles of Confederation—a “whole new 

document”—rather than discrete amendments. Paterson and the 

other Anti-Federalists did not object to massive changes or a new 

document; rather they contended that the delegates were unau-

                                                                      

//  //130//. Id. //at 177. 

//  //131//. See// Resolution Authorizing and Empowering the Delegates (Nov. 24, 1786), 

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196. 

  132. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 184. 

//  //133//. Id. //at// //242–45. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

thorized to adopt a different theory of government. When the ad-

vocates of the New Jersey Plan raised arguments about the scop

of the delegates’ authority, they were not making technical le

arguments. Their contention was one of political philosophy. Any 

plan that they deemed insufficiently “federalist” in character w

beyond the scope of their view of the delegates’ authority. 

This is clearly shown by debates on the following day, Sat

urday, June 16th. John Lansing, Jr., an ardent Anti-Federalist 

from New York, asked for a reading of the first resolutions of 

both Paterson’s plan and Randolph’s Virginia Plan.134 Lansi

contended that Paterson’s plan sustained the sovereignty of t

states, while Randolph’s destroyed state sovereignty.135 He 

picked up Paterson’s earlier contention that the Conventi

had the authority to adopt the New Jersey Plan but not the Vir-

ginia Plan.136 “He was decidedly of opinion that the power o

the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal na-

ture, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being.”137

Then he asserted, “The Act of Congress[, t]he tenor of the Acts

of the States, the commissions produced by the several deputa-

tions all proved this.”138 

While Lansing’s own New York credentials followed the li

ited formula of Congress, he was playing fast and loose with the 

facts to assert that this was a fair description of the authority of 

any other state except Massachusetts. However, one component

of his argument was more than disingenuous political spin. He 

emphasized the concept that the Convention must propose 

federal, not national government.139 Every state’s credentials ha

explicit language embracing the view that the revised gove

ment should be federal in character since they were to deliver

adequate “federal constitution.” Like Randolph’s plan, the Ant

Federalists’ plan would have required a substantial rewrite

the Articles of Confederation. Their continued objection was

to the writing of a “whole new document” but to a form of 

ernment that they personally deemed to be insufficiently “fe

al” in character. James Wilson took the floor immediately foll\\
                                                                      

//  //134//. Id.// at 249. 

//  //135//. Id.// 

//  //136//. Id.// 

//  //137//. Id.// 

//  //138//. Id. //

//  //139//. Id. //at 246. 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto087.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**87**

82 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

which he required to be read.”130 Of course, the formula created 

by Congress was only followed precisely by New York and 

Massachusetts. Paterson cleverly avoided asking for a reading 

of his own New Jersey credentials, which contained a much 

broader statement of authority.131 He was attempting to defeat 

proportional representation, and he carefully selected the cre-

dentials he thought would bolster his political argument. Pat-

erson elaborated on his view of the delegates’ authority: 

Our powers do not extend to the abolition of the State Gov-

ernments, and the Erection of a national Govt. —They only au-

thorise amendments in the present System, and have for yr. Ba-

sis the present Confederation which establishes the principle 

that each State has an equal vote in Congress . . . .132 

Six days later, Paterson introduced his well-known New Jer-

sey plan which contained nine points: (1) federal powers were 

to be enlarged; (2) Congress should be given the power to tax; 

(3) enforcement powers should be given to collect delinquen-

cies from the states; (4) Congress would appoint an executive; 

(5) a federal judiciary would be created; (6) a supremacy clause 

was included; (7) a process was created for admission of new 

states; (8) a uniform rule of naturalization should be adopted in 

each state; and (9) full faith and credit observed between the 

states with regard to criminal convictions.133 

The New Jersey Plan was no minor revision of the Articles of 

Confederation. It contained a radical expansion of power com-

pared with the existing system. Paterson did not include any 

change in the system of voting in Congress. However, Congress 

would remain one-state, one-vote. And, he did not propose the 

direct election of any branch of government by the people. If the 

New Jersey Plan had formed the ultimate framework from the 

Convention, it would have almost certainly required a compre-

hensive rewrite of the Articles of Confederation—a “whole new 

document”—rather than discrete amendments. Paterson and the 

other Anti-Federalists did not object to massive changes or a new 

document; rather they contended that the delegates were unau-

                                                                      

//  //130//. Id. //at 177. 

//  //131//. See// Resolution Authorizing and Empowering the Delegates (Nov. 24, 1786), 

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196. 

  132. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 184. 

//  //133//. Id. //at// //242–45. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 83 

 

thorized to adopt a different theory of government. When the ad-

vocates of the New Jersey Plan raised arguments about the scope 

of the delegates’ authority, they were not making technical legal 

arguments. Their contention was one of political philosophy. Any 

plan that they deemed insufficiently “federalist” in character was 

beyond the scope of their view of the delegates’ authority. 

This is clearly shown by debates on the following day, Sat-

urday, June 16th. John Lansing, Jr., an ardent Anti-Federalist 

from New York, asked for a reading of the first resolutions of 

both Paterson’s plan and Randolph’s Virginia Plan.134 Lansing 

contended that Paterson’s plan sustained the sovereignty of the 

states, while Randolph’s destroyed state sovereignty.135 He 

picked up Paterson’s earlier contention that the Convention 

had the authority to adopt the New Jersey Plan but not the Vir-

ginia Plan.136 “He was decidedly of opinion that the power of 

the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal na-

ture, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being.”137 

Then he asserted, “The Act of Congress[, t]he tenor of the Acts 

of the States, the commissions produced by the several deputa-

tions all proved this.”138 

While Lansing’s own New York credentials followed the lim-

ited formula of Congress, he was playing fast and loose with the 

facts to assert that this was a fair description of the authority of 

any other state except Massachusetts. However, one component 

of his argument was more than disingenuous political spin. He 

emphasized the concept that the Convention must propose a 

federal, not national government.139 Every state’s credentials had 

explicit language embracing the view that the revised govern-

ment should be federal in character since they were to deliver an 

adequate “federal constitution.” Like Randolph’s plan, the Anti-

Federalists’ plan would have required a substantial rewrite of 

the Articles of Confederation. Their continued objection was not 

to the writing of a “whole new document” but to a form of gov-

ernment that they personally deemed to be insufficiently “feder-

al” in character. James Wilson took the floor immediately follow-\\
                                                                      

//  //134//. Id.// at 249. 

//  //135//. Id.// 

//  //136//. Id.// 

//  //137//. Id.// 

//  //138//. Id. //

//  //139//. Id. //at 246. 

82 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

which he required to be read.”130 Of course, the formula created 

by Congress was only followed precisely by New York and 

Massachusetts. Paterson cleverly avoided asking for a reading 

of his own New Jersey credentials, which contained a much 

broader statement of authority.131 He was attempting to defeat 

proportional representation, and he carefully selected the cre-

dentials he thought would bolster his political argument. Pat-

erson elaborated on his view of the delegates’ authority: 

Our powers do not extend to the abolition of the State Gov-

ernments, and the Erection of a national Govt. —They only au-

thorise amendments in the present System, and have for yr. Ba-

sis the present Confederation which establishes the principle 

that each State has an equal vote in Congress . . . .132 

Six days later, Paterson introduced his well-known New Jer-

sey plan which contained nine points: (1) federal powers were 

to be enlarged; (2) Congress should be given the power to tax; 

(3) enforcement powers should be given to collect delinquen-

cies from the states; (4) Congress would appoint an executive; 

(5) a federal judiciary would be created; (6) a supremacy clause 

was included; (7) a process was created for admission of new 

states; (8) a uniform rule of naturalization should be adopted in 

each state; and (9) full faith and credit observed between the 

states with regard to criminal convictions.133 

The New Jersey Plan was no minor revision of the Articles of 

Confederation. It contained a radical expansion of power com-

pared with the existing system. Paterson did not include any 

change in the system of voting in Congress. However, Congress 

would remain one-state, one-vote. And, he did not propose the 

direct election of any branch of government by the people. If the 

New Jersey Plan had formed the ultimate framework from the 

Convention, it would have almost certainly required a compre-

hensive rewrite of the Articles of Confederation—a “whole new 

document”—rather than discrete amendments. Paterson and the 

other Anti-Federalists did not object to massive changes or a new 

document; rather they contended that the delegates were unau-

                                                                      

//  //130//. Id. //at 177. 

//  //131//. See// Resolution Authorizing and Empowering the Delegates (Nov. 24, 1786), 

//reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 196, 196. 

  132. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 184. 

//  //133//. Id. //at// //242–45. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

thorized to adopt a different theory of government. When the ad-

vocates of the New Jersey Plan raised arguments about the scop

of the delegates’ authority, they were not making technical le

arguments. Their contention was one of political philosophy. Any 

plan that they deemed insufficiently “federalist” in character w

beyond the scope of their view of the delegates’ authority. 

This is clearly shown by debates on the following day, Sat

urday, June 16th. John Lansing, Jr., an ardent Anti-Federalist 

from New York, asked for a reading of the first resolutions of 

both Paterson’s plan and Randolph’s Virginia Plan.134 Lansi

contended that Paterson’s plan sustained the sovereignty of t

states, while Randolph’s destroyed state sovereignty.135 He 

picked up Paterson’s earlier contention that the Conventi

had the authority to adopt the New Jersey Plan but not the Vir-

ginia Plan.136 “He was decidedly of opinion that the power o

the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal na-

ture, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being.”137

Then he asserted, “The Act of Congress[, t]he tenor of the Acts

of the States, the commissions produced by the several deputa-

tions all proved this.”138 

While Lansing’s own New York credentials followed the li

ited formula of Congress, he was playing fast and loose with the 

facts to assert that this was a fair description of the authority of 

any other state except Massachusetts. However, one component

of his argument was more than disingenuous political spin. He 

emphasized the concept that the Convention must propose 

federal, not national government.139 Every state’s credentials ha

explicit language embracing the view that the revised gove

ment should be federal in character since they were to deliver

adequate “federal constitution.” Like Randolph’s plan, the Ant

Federalists’ plan would have required a substantial rewrite

the Articles of Confederation. Their continued objection was

to the writing of a “whole new document” but to a form of 

ernment that they personally deemed to be insufficiently “fe

al” in character. James Wilson took the floor immediately foll\\
                                                                      

//  //134//. Id.// at 249. 

//  //135//. Id.// 

//  //136//. Id.// 

//  //137//. Id.// 

//  //138//. Id. //

//  //139//. Id. //at 246. 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto088.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**88**

84 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ing Lansing and Paterson on this Saturday session. He began 

with a side-by-side comparison of the two comprehensive plans. 

He contended that his powers allowed him to “agree to either 

plan or none.”140 

On the following Monday, June 18th, Madison picked up the 

argument. He contended that the New Jersey Plan itself varied 

from some delegates’ views of a federal system “since it is to 

operate eventually on individuals.”141 Madison contended that 

the States “sent us here to provide for the exigences [sic] of the 

Union. To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these 

exigences [sic], merely because it was not clearly within our 

powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end.”142 Here, 

and in other speeches and writings, Madison embraced the no-

tion that the delegates would be justified in exceeding their 

strict instructions if necessary. But his moral argument was not 

a concession by him that, in fact, their proposed actions were a 

legal violation of their credentials. His argument was clearly in 

the alternative. He bolstered his argument based on the lan-

guage adopted by ten states. This recitation makes it clear that 

he believed that their actions were justified under the language 

of their credentials. 

Hamilton followed Madison in defense of the delegates’ 

authority to consider the Virginia Plan. They had been “ap-

pointed for the //sole// and //express// purpose of revising the con-

federation, and to //alter// or //amend// it, so as to render it effectual 

for the purposes of a good government.”143 He concluded 

with a reminder that the Convention could only “propose 

and recommend.”144 The power of ratifying or rejecting lay 

solely with the states.145 

On the following day, June 19th, Madison again defended 

the Virginia Plan against the charge that it was not sufficiently 

“federal” in character.146 Madison focused on the claimed dif-

ferences between a federal system and a national system to 

demonstrate that the Virginia Plan was indeed federal in char-\\
                                                                      

//  //140//. Id.// at 261. 

//  //141//. Id.// at 283. 

//  //142//. Id.//  

//  //143//. Id.// at 294. 

//  //144//. Id.// at 295. 

//  //145//. Id//.  

//  //146//. Id. //at 313–22. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 85 

 

acter.147 The Anti-Federalists claimed that a federal government 

could not operate directly on individuals.148 Madison demon-

strated that in certain instances both the existing Articles and 

the New Jersey Plan would permit direct governance of indi-

viduals.149 Second, it was contended that to qualify as a federal 

plan the delegates to Congress had to be chosen by the state 

legislatures.150 But, as Madison pointed out, Connecticut and 

Rhode Island currently selected their members in the Confed-

eration Congress by a vote of the people rather than by the leg-

islature.151 Thus, Madison convincingly argued that if the New 

Jersey Plan was “federal” in character and fell within the dele-

gates’ credentials, the Virginia Plan was likewise a federal pro-

posal and could be properly considered. 

About two weeks later, when the contentious issue of the 

method of voting in the two houses of Congress hit a stalemate, 

on July 2nd, Robert Yates, an Anti-Federalist from New York, 

was appointed to the committee to discuss a proposal from Ol-

iver Ellsworth that has come to be known as the Connecticut 

Compromise.152 That committee, headed by Elbridge Gerry, 

reported its recommendations on July 5th. Two days later, Ger-

ry explained that the “new Govern[ment] would be partly na-

tional, partly federal.”153 

The Convention approved equal representation for each state in 

the Senate on July 7th.154 And on July 10th, as they were hammer-

ing out the details for popular representation in the House of Rep-

resentatives, Lansing and Yates left the Convention for good.155 

This left New York without a vote from that point on in the Con-

vention. Hamilton remained and participated in the debates, but 

New York never cast another vote. 

During the Convention, every allegation that delegates were 

exceeding their credentials was directed at the Virginia Plan 

and not the final product. Thus, it is simply not true to suggest \\
                                                                      

//  //147//. Id.// at 314. 

//  //148//. Id.// 

//  //149//. Id.// 

//  //150//. Id. //

//  //151//. Id.// 

//  //152//. Id.// at 509. 

//  //153//. Id.// at 551 (statement of Gouverneur Morris quoting Gerry). 

//  //154//. Id.// at 548–49. 

//  //155//. Id. //at 536. 

84 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ing Lansing and Paterson on this Saturday session. He began 

with a side-by-side comparison of the two comprehensive plans. 

He contended that his powers allowed him to “agree to either 

plan or none.”140 

On the following Monday, June 18th, Madison picked up the 

argument. He contended that the New Jersey Plan itself varied 

from some delegates’ views of a federal system “since it is to 

operate eventually on individuals.”141 Madison contended that 

the States “sent us here to provide for the exigences [sic] of the 

Union. To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these 

exigences [sic], merely because it was not clearly within our 

powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end.”142 Here, 

and in other speeches and writings, Madison embraced the no-

tion that the delegates would be justified in exceeding their 

strict instructions if necessary. But his moral argument was not 

a concession by him that, in fact, their proposed actions were a 

legal violation of their credentials. His argument was clearly in 

the alternative. He bolstered his argument based on the lan-

guage adopted by ten states. This recitation makes it clear that 

he believed that their actions were justified under the language 

of their credentials. 

Hamilton followed Madison in defense of the delegates’ 

authority to consider the Virginia Plan. They had been “ap-

pointed for the //sole// and //express// purpose of revising the con-

federation, and to //alter// or //amend// it, so as to render it effectual 

for the purposes of a good government.”143 He concluded 

with a reminder that the Convention could only “propose 

and recommend.”144 The power of ratifying or rejecting lay 

solely with the states.145 

On the following day, June 19th, Madison again defended 

the Virginia Plan against the charge that it was not sufficiently 

“federal” in character.146 Madison focused on the claimed dif-

ferences between a federal system and a national system to 

demonstrate that the Virginia Plan was indeed federal in char-\\
                                                                      

//  //140//. Id.// at 261. 

//  //141//. Id.// at 283. 

//  //142//. Id.//  

//  //143//. Id.// at 294. 

//  //144//. Id.// at 295. 

//  //145//. Id//.  

//  //146//. Id. //at 313–22. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

acter.147 The Anti-Federalists claimed that a federal governmen

could not operate directly on individuals.148 Madison demon-

strated that in certain instances both the existing Articles and

the New Jersey Plan would permit direct governance of indi-

viduals.149 Second, it was contended that to qualify as a feder

plan the delegates to Congress had to be chosen by the st

legislatures.150 But, as Madison pointed out, Connecticut and 

Rhode Island currently selected their members in the Confe

eration Congress by a vote of the people rather than by the leg-

islature.151 Thus, Madison convincingly argued that if the Ne

Jersey Plan was “federal” in character and fell within the de

gates’ credentials, the Virginia Plan was likewise a federal pro-

posal and could be properly considered. 

About two weeks later, when the contentious issue of th

method of voting in the two houses of Congress hit a stalemate,

on July 2nd, Robert Yates, an Anti-Federalist from New Yo

was appointed to the committee to discuss a proposal from Ol-

iver Ellsworth that has come to be known as the Connectic

Compromise.152 That committee, headed by Elbridge Gerry, 

reported its recommendations on July 5th. Two days later, Ger-

ry explained that the “new Govern[ment] would be partly na-

tional, partly federal.”153 

The Convention approved equal representation for each state i

the Senate on July 7th.154 And on July 10th, as they were hamm

ing out the details for popular representation in the House of Rep-

resentatives, Lansing and Yates left the Convention for good 155

This left New York without a vote from that point on in the Co

vention. Hamilton remained and participated in the debates, but 

New York never cast another vote. 

During the Convention, every allegation that delegates wer

exceeding their credentials was directed at the Virginia Plan 

and not the final product. Thus, it is simply not true to suggest\\
                                                                      

//  //147//. Id.// at 314. 

//  //148//. Id.// 

//  //149//. Id.// 

//  //150//. Id. //

//  //151//. Id.// 

//  //152//. Id.// at 509. 

//  //153//. Id.// at 551 (statement of Gouverneur Morris quoting Gerry). 

//  //154//. Id.// at 548–49. 

//  //155//. Id. //at 536. 



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//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ing Lansing and Paterson on this Saturday session. He began 

with a side-by-side comparison of the two comprehensive plans. 

He contended that his powers allowed him to “agree to either 

plan or none.”140 

On the following Monday, June 18th, Madison picked up the 

argument. He contended that the New Jersey Plan itself varied 

from some delegates’ views of a federal system “since it is to 

operate eventually on individuals.”141 Madison contended that 

the States “sent us here to provide for the exigences [sic] of the 

Union. To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these 

exigences [sic], merely because it was not clearly within our 

powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end.”142 Here, 

and in other speeches and writings, Madison embraced the no-

tion that the delegates would be justified in exceeding their 

strict instructions if necessary. But his moral argument was not 

a concession by him that, in fact, their proposed actions were a 

legal violation of their credentials. His argument was clearly in 

the alternative. He bolstered his argument based on the lan-

guage adopted by ten states. This recitation makes it clear that 

he believed that their actions were justified under the language 

of their credentials. 

Hamilton followed Madison in defense of the delegates’ 

authority to consider the Virginia Plan. They had been “ap-

pointed for the //sole// and //express// purpose of revising the con-

federation, and to //alter// or //amend// it, so as to render it effectual 

for the purposes of a good government.”143 He concluded 

with a reminder that the Convention could only “propose 

and recommend.”144 The power of ratifying or rejecting lay 

solely with the states.145 

On the following day, June 19th, Madison again defended 

the Virginia Plan against the charge that it was not sufficiently 

“federal” in character.146 Madison focused on the claimed dif-

ferences between a federal system and a national system to 

demonstrate that the Virginia Plan was indeed federal in char-\\
                                                                      

//  //140//. Id.// at 261. 

//  //141//. Id.// at 283. 

//  //142//. Id.//  

//  //143//. Id.// at 294. 

//  //144//. Id.// at 295. 

//  //145//. Id//.  

//  //146//. Id. //at 313–22. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 85 

 

acter.147 The Anti-Federalists claimed that a federal government 

could not operate directly on individuals.148 Madison demon-

strated that in certain instances both the existing Articles and 

the New Jersey Plan would permit direct governance of indi-

viduals.149 Second, it was contended that to qualify as a federal 

plan the delegates to Congress had to be chosen by the state 

legislatures.150 But, as Madison pointed out, Connecticut and 

Rhode Island currently selected their members in the Confed-

eration Congress by a vote of the people rather than by the leg-

islature.151 Thus, Madison convincingly argued that if the New 

Jersey Plan was “federal” in character and fell within the dele-

gates’ credentials, the Virginia Plan was likewise a federal pro-

posal and could be properly considered. 

About two weeks later, when the contentious issue of the 

method of voting in the two houses of Congress hit a stalemate, 

on July 2nd, Robert Yates, an Anti-Federalist from New York, 

was appointed to the committee to discuss a proposal from Ol-

iver Ellsworth that has come to be known as the Connecticut 

Compromise.152 That committee, headed by Elbridge Gerry, 

reported its recommendations on July 5th. Two days later, Ger-

ry explained that the “new Govern[ment] would be partly na-

tional, partly federal.”153 

The Convention approved equal representation for each state in 

the Senate on July 7th.154 And on July 10th, as they were hammer-

ing out the details for popular representation in the House of Rep-

resentatives, Lansing and Yates left the Convention for good.155 

This left New York without a vote from that point on in the Con-

vention. Hamilton remained and participated in the debates, but 

New York never cast another vote. 

During the Convention, every allegation that delegates were 

exceeding their credentials was directed at the Virginia Plan 

and not the final product. Thus, it is simply not true to suggest \\
                                                                      

//  //147//. Id.// at 314. 

//  //148//. Id.// 

//  //149//. Id.// 

//  //150//. Id. //

//  //151//. Id.// 

//  //152//. Id.// at 509. 

//  //153//. Id.// at 551 (statement of Gouverneur Morris quoting Gerry). 

//  //154//. Id.// at 548–49. 

//  //155//. Id. //at 536. 

84 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ing Lansing and Paterson on this Saturday session. He began 

with a side-by-side comparison of the two comprehensive plans. 

He contended that his powers allowed him to “agree to either 

plan or none.”140 

On the following Monday, June 18th, Madison picked up the 

argument. He contended that the New Jersey Plan itself varied 

from some delegates’ views of a federal system “since it is to 

operate eventually on individuals.”141 Madison contended that 

the States “sent us here to provide for the exigences [sic] of the 

Union. To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these 

exigences [sic], merely because it was not clearly within our 

powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end.”142 Here, 

and in other speeches and writings, Madison embraced the no-

tion that the delegates would be justified in exceeding their 

strict instructions if necessary. But his moral argument was not 

a concession by him that, in fact, their proposed actions were a 

legal violation of their credentials. His argument was clearly in 

the alternative. He bolstered his argument based on the lan-

guage adopted by ten states. This recitation makes it clear that 

he believed that their actions were justified under the language 

of their credentials. 

Hamilton followed Madison in defense of the delegates’ 

authority to consider the Virginia Plan. They had been “ap-

pointed for the //sole// and //express// purpose of revising the con-

federation, and to //alter// or //amend// it, so as to render it effectual 

for the purposes of a good government.”143 He concluded 

with a reminder that the Convention could only “propose 

and recommend.”144 The power of ratifying or rejecting lay 

solely with the states.145 

On the following day, June 19th, Madison again defended 

the Virginia Plan against the charge that it was not sufficiently 

“federal” in character.146 Madison focused on the claimed dif-

ferences between a federal system and a national system to 

demonstrate that the Virginia Plan was indeed federal in char-\\
                                                                      

//  //140//. Id.// at 261. 

//  //141//. Id.// at 283. 

//  //142//. Id.//  

//  //143//. Id.// at 294. 

//  //144//. Id.// at 295. 

//  //145//. Id//.  

//  //146//. Id. //at 313–22. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

acter.147 The Anti-Federalists claimed that a federal governmen

could not operate directly on individuals.148 Madison demon-

strated that in certain instances both the existing Articles and

the New Jersey Plan would permit direct governance of indi-

viduals.149 Second, it was contended that to qualify as a feder

plan the delegates to Congress had to be chosen by the st

legislatures.150 But, as Madison pointed out, Connecticut and 

Rhode Island currently selected their members in the Confe

eration Congress by a vote of the people rather than by the leg-

islature.151 Thus, Madison convincingly argued that if the Ne

Jersey Plan was “federal” in character and fell within the de

gates’ credentials, the Virginia Plan was likewise a federal pro-

posal and could be properly considered. 

About two weeks later, when the contentious issue of th

method of voting in the two houses of Congress hit a stalemate,

on July 2nd, Robert Yates, an Anti-Federalist from New Yo

was appointed to the committee to discuss a proposal from Ol-

iver Ellsworth that has come to be known as the Connectic

Compromise.152 That committee, headed by Elbridge Gerry, 

reported its recommendations on July 5th. Two days later, Ger-

ry explained that the “new Govern[ment] would be partly na-

tional, partly federal.”153 

The Convention approved equal representation for each state i

the Senate on July 7th.154 And on July 10th, as they were hamm

ing out the details for popular representation in the House of Rep-

resentatives, Lansing and Yates left the Convention for good 155

This left New York without a vote from that point on in the Co

vention. Hamilton remained and participated in the debates, but 

New York never cast another vote. 

During the Convention, every allegation that delegates wer

exceeding their credentials was directed at the Virginia Plan 

and not the final product. Thus, it is simply not true to suggest\\
                                                                      

//  //147//. Id.// at 314. 

//  //148//. Id.// 

//  //149//. Id.// 

//  //150//. Id. //

//  //151//. Id.// 

//  //152//. Id.// at 509. 

//  //153//. Id.// at 551 (statement of Gouverneur Morris quoting Gerry). 

//  //154//. Id.// at 548–49. 

//  //155//. Id. //at 536. 



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//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

that the Convention believed it was intentionally violating its 

credentials when voting to adopt the Constitution. Even during 

the earlier stages of the Convention, the Federalists defended 

the Virginia Plan as being within the scope of their authority. 

The final product—the actual Constitution—was more bal-

anced toward true federalism than the Virginia Plan. Thus, at 

no stage of the Convention was there a consensus that the del-

egates were acting in an //ultra vires //manner. 

//C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress //

The Constitution was carried by William Jackson, secretary 

of the Convention, to New York where he delivered it to Con-

gress on September 19th.156 The debates over the Constitution 

began the following week on September 26th.157 

On the first day of debate, Nathan Dane made a motion con-

tending that it was beyond the power of Congress to recom-

mend approval of the new Constitution.158 Congress was lim-

ited to proposing amendments to the Articles of Confederation 

rather than recommending a new system of government.159 

Dane’s motion acknowledges that the delegates’ powers were 

found in their state credentials.160 Dane referred to the February 

21st action of Congress as having “resolved that it was expedi-

ent that a Convention of the States should be held for the Sole 

and express purpose of revising the articles of Confedera-

tion.”161 A fair reading of Dane’s motion suggests that he was 

surprised by the outcome. Nothing he said implied that the 

delegates had violated their credentials from the states. Dane 

contended that Congress should simply forward the Constitu-

tion to the state legislatures for their consideration.162 He ar-

gued that this was neutral toward the Constitution, though he 

clearly opposed the document.163 

Richard Henry Lee vigorously contended that the Constitu-

tion could be amended by the Confederation Congress before it \\
                                                                      

  156. 13 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 229. 

//  //157//. Id.// at 231. 

//  //158//. Id.// 

//  //159//. Id.// 

//  //160//. Id//. 

//  //161//. Id.// 

//  //162//. Id.// at 232. 

//  //163//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 87 

 

was sent to the states.164 He ultimately proposed a series of 

amendments outlining many provisions in the nature of a bill 

of rights and various changes in the structure of government.165 

He also sought to establish the Senate on the basis of propor-

tional representation rather than the equality of the states.166 

Rufus King of Massachusetts argued that Congress could not 

“constitutionally make alterations” and that “[t]he idea of [the] 

Convention originated in the states.”167 Madison followed this 

argument almost immediately contending that “[t]he Conven-

tion was not appointed by Congress, but by the people from 

whom Congress derive their power.”168 

It must be noted there were substantial conflicts in Congress 

over the mode of ratification (which will be considered in section 

II) and it is was fair to conclude that some members of Congress 

were surprised with the outcome of the Convention. Nonetheless, 

there was no serious contention that the delegates had violated 

their instructions from the states. Notably absent from the record 

is any claim that Congress had called the Convention and given 

the delegates their instructions and authority. This silence is pow-

erful evidence that Congress did not believe that it had called the 

Convention or had issued binding instructions. 

Every attempt to propose amendments or to express a sub-

stantive opinion on the merits of the Constitution was unsuc-

cessful. On September 28th, Congress (voting by states) unan-

imously approved the following resolution: 

Resolved unanimously, That the said report with the resolu-

tions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to 

the several legislatures in order to be submitted to a conven-

tion of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof 

in conformity to the resolves of the Convention made and 

provided in that case.169 

The only recommendation coming from Congress was that the 

state legislatures should send the matter to state conventions. This \\
                                                                      

//  //164//. Id.// at 237–38. 

//  //165//. Id.// at 238–240. 

//  //166//. Id.// at 240. 

  167. Melancton Smith’s Notes (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 335, 335–36. 

//  //168//. Id.// at 336. 

  169. Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

340, 340. 

86 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

that the Convention believed it was intentionally violating its 

credentials when voting to adopt the Constitution. Even during 

the earlier stages of the Convention, the Federalists defended 

the Virginia Plan as being within the scope of their authority. 

The final product—the actual Constitution—was more bal-

anced toward true federalism than the Virginia Plan. Thus, at 

no stage of the Convention was there a consensus that the del-

egates were acting in an //ultra vires //manner. 

//C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress //

The Constitution was carried by William Jackson, secretary 

of the Convention, to New York where he delivered it to Con-

gress on September 19th.156 The debates over the Constitution 

began the following week on September 26th.157 

On the first day of debate, Nathan Dane made a motion con-

tending that it was beyond the power of Congress to recom-

mend approval of the new Constitution.158 Congress was lim-

ited to proposing amendments to the Articles of Confederation 

rather than recommending a new system of government.159 

Dane’s motion acknowledges that the delegates’ powers were 

found in their state credentials.160 Dane referred to the February 

21st action of Congress as having “resolved that it was expedi-

ent that a Convention of the States should be held for the Sole 

and express purpose of revising the articles of Confedera-

tion.”161 A fair reading of Dane’s motion suggests that he was 

surprised by the outcome. Nothing he said implied that the 

delegates had violated their credentials from the states. Dane 

contended that Congress should simply forward the Constitu-

tion to the state legislatures for their consideration.162 He ar-

gued that this was neutral toward the Constitution, though he 

clearly opposed the document.163 

Richard Henry Lee vigorously contended that the Constitu-

tion could be amended by the Confederation Congress before it \\
                                                                      

  156. 13 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 229. 

//  //157//. Id.// at 231. 

//  //158//. Id.// 

//  //159//. Id.// 

//  //160//. Id//. 

//  //161//. Id.// 

//  //162//. Id.// at 232. 

//  //163//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

was sent to the states.164 He ultimately proposed a series o

amendments outlining many provisions in the nature of a bill 

of rights and various changes in the structure of government.165

He also sought to establish the Senate on the basis of propor-

tional representation rather than the equality of the states 166

Rufus King of Massachusetts argued that Congress could not 

“constitutionally make alterations” and that “[t]he idea of [the] 

Convention originated in the states.”167 Madison followed this

argument almost immediately contending that “[t]he Conven-

tion was not appointed by Congress, but by the people from 

whom Congress derive their power.”168 

It must be noted there were substantial conflicts in Congr

over the mode of ratification (which will be considered in section 

II) and it is was fair to conclude that some members of Congres

were surprised with the outcome of the Convention. Nonetheless,

there was no serious contention that the delegates had violat

their instructions from the states. Notably absent from the reco

is any claim that Congress had called the Convention and giv

the delegates their instructions and authority. This silence is pow-

erful evidence that Congress did not believe that it had called the

Convention or had issued binding instructions. 

Every attempt to propose amendments or to express a sub-

stantive opinion on the merits of the Constitution was unsuc-

cessful. On September 28th, Congress (voting by states) unan-

imously approved the following resolution: 

Resolved unanimously, That the said report with the resolu-

tions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to 

the several legislatures in order to be submitted to a conven-

tion of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof 

in conformity to the resolves of the Convention made and 

provided in that case.169 

The only recommendation coming from Congress was that t

state legislatures should send the matter to state conventions. This\\
                                                                      

//  //164//. Id.// at 237–38. 

//  //165//. Id.// at 238–240. 

//  //166//. Id.// at 240. 

  167. Melancton Smith’s Notes (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note

at 335, 335–36. 

//  //168//. Id.// at 336. 

  169. Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4,

340, 340. 



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**91**

86 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

that the Convention believed it was intentionally violating its 

credentials when voting to adopt the Constitution. Even during 

the earlier stages of the Convention, the Federalists defended 

the Virginia Plan as being within the scope of their authority. 

The final product—the actual Constitution—was more bal-

anced toward true federalism than the Virginia Plan. Thus, at 

no stage of the Convention was there a consensus that the del-

egates were acting in an //ultra vires //manner. 

//C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress //

The Constitution was carried by William Jackson, secretary 

of the Convention, to New York where he delivered it to Con-

gress on September 19th.156 The debates over the Constitution 

began the following week on September 26th.157 

On the first day of debate, Nathan Dane made a motion con-

tending that it was beyond the power of Congress to recom-

mend approval of the new Constitution.158 Congress was lim-

ited to proposing amendments to the Articles of Confederation 

rather than recommending a new system of government.159 

Dane’s motion acknowledges that the delegates’ powers were 

found in their state credentials.160 Dane referred to the February 

21st action of Congress as having “resolved that it was expedi-

ent that a Convention of the States should be held for the Sole 

and express purpose of revising the articles of Confedera-

tion.”161 A fair reading of Dane’s motion suggests that he was 

surprised by the outcome. Nothing he said implied that the 

delegates had violated their credentials from the states. Dane 

contended that Congress should simply forward the Constitu-

tion to the state legislatures for their consideration.162 He ar-

gued that this was neutral toward the Constitution, though he 

clearly opposed the document.163 

Richard Henry Lee vigorously contended that the Constitu-

tion could be amended by the Confederation Congress before it \\
                                                                      

  156. 13 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 229. 

//  //157//. Id.// at 231. 

//  //158//. Id.// 

//  //159//. Id.// 

//  //160//. Id//. 

//  //161//. Id.// 

//  //162//. Id.// at 232. 

//  //163//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 87 

 

was sent to the states.164 He ultimately proposed a series of 

amendments outlining many provisions in the nature of a bill 

of rights and various changes in the structure of government.165 

He also sought to establish the Senate on the basis of propor-

tional representation rather than the equality of the states.166 

Rufus King of Massachusetts argued that Congress could not 

“constitutionally make alterations” and that “[t]he idea of [the] 

Convention originated in the states.”167 Madison followed this 

argument almost immediately contending that “[t]he Conven-

tion was not appointed by Congress, but by the people from 

whom Congress derive their power.”168 

It must be noted there were substantial conflicts in Congress 

over the mode of ratification (which will be considered in section 

II) and it is was fair to conclude that some members of Congress 

were surprised with the outcome of the Convention. Nonetheless, 

there was no serious contention that the delegates had violated 

their instructions from the states. Notably absent from the record 

is any claim that Congress had called the Convention and given 

the delegates their instructions and authority. This silence is pow-

erful evidence that Congress did not believe that it had called the 

Convention or had issued binding instructions. 

Every attempt to propose amendments or to express a sub-

stantive opinion on the merits of the Constitution was unsuc-

cessful. On September 28th, Congress (voting by states) unan-

imously approved the following resolution: 

Resolved unanimously, That the said report with the resolu-

tions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to 

the several legislatures in order to be submitted to a conven-

tion of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof 

in conformity to the resolves of the Convention made and 

provided in that case.169 

The only recommendation coming from Congress was that the 

state legislatures should send the matter to state conventions. This \\
                                                                      

//  //164//. Id.// at 237–38. 

//  //165//. Id.// at 238–240. 

//  //166//. Id.// at 240. 

  167. Melancton Smith’s Notes (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 335, 335–36. 

//  //168//. Id.// at 336. 

  169. Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

340, 340. 

86 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

that the Convention believed it was intentionally violating its 

credentials when voting to adopt the Constitution. Even during 

the earlier stages of the Convention, the Federalists defended 

the Virginia Plan as being within the scope of their authority. 

The final product—the actual Constitution—was more bal-

anced toward true federalism than the Virginia Plan. Thus, at 

no stage of the Convention was there a consensus that the del-

egates were acting in an //ultra vires //manner. 

//C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress //

The Constitution was carried by William Jackson, secretary 

of the Convention, to New York where he delivered it to Con-

gress on September 19th.156 The debates over the Constitution 

began the following week on September 26th.157 

On the first day of debate, Nathan Dane made a motion con-

tending that it was beyond the power of Congress to recom-

mend approval of the new Constitution.158 Congress was lim-

ited to proposing amendments to the Articles of Confederation 

rather than recommending a new system of government.159 

Dane’s motion acknowledges that the delegates’ powers were 

found in their state credentials.160 Dane referred to the February 

21st action of Congress as having “resolved that it was expedi-

ent that a Convention of the States should be held for the Sole 

and express purpose of revising the articles of Confedera-

tion.”161 A fair reading of Dane’s motion suggests that he was 

surprised by the outcome. Nothing he said implied that the 

delegates had violated their credentials from the states. Dane 

contended that Congress should simply forward the Constitu-

tion to the state legislatures for their consideration.162 He ar-

gued that this was neutral toward the Constitution, though he 

clearly opposed the document.163 

Richard Henry Lee vigorously contended that the Constitu-

tion could be amended by the Confederation Congress before it \\
                                                                      

  156. 13 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 229. 

//  //157//. Id.// at 231. 

//  //158//. Id.// 

//  //159//. Id.// 

//  //160//. Id//. 

//  //161//. Id.// 

//  //162//. Id.// at 232. 

//  //163//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

was sent to the states.164 He ultimately proposed a series o

amendments outlining many provisions in the nature of a bill 

of rights and various changes in the structure of government.165

He also sought to establish the Senate on the basis of propor-

tional representation rather than the equality of the states 166

Rufus King of Massachusetts argued that Congress could not 

“constitutionally make alterations” and that “[t]he idea of [the] 

Convention originated in the states.”167 Madison followed this

argument almost immediately contending that “[t]he Conven-

tion was not appointed by Congress, but by the people from 

whom Congress derive their power.”168 

It must be noted there were substantial conflicts in Congr

over the mode of ratification (which will be considered in section 

II) and it is was fair to conclude that some members of Congres

were surprised with the outcome of the Convention. Nonetheless,

there was no serious contention that the delegates had violat

their instructions from the states. Notably absent from the reco

is any claim that Congress had called the Convention and giv

the delegates their instructions and authority. This silence is pow-

erful evidence that Congress did not believe that it had called the

Convention or had issued binding instructions. 

Every attempt to propose amendments or to express a sub-

stantive opinion on the merits of the Constitution was unsuc-

cessful. On September 28th, Congress (voting by states) unan-

imously approved the following resolution: 

Resolved unanimously, That the said report with the resolu-

tions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to 

the several legislatures in order to be submitted to a conven-

tion of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof 

in conformity to the resolves of the Convention made and 

provided in that case.169 

The only recommendation coming from Congress was that t

state legislatures should send the matter to state conventions. This\\
                                                                      

//  //164//. Id.// at 237–38. 

//  //165//. Id.// at 238–240. 

//  //166//. Id.// at 240. 

  167. Melancton Smith’s Notes (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note

at 335, 335–36. 

//  //168//. Id.// at 336. 

  169. Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4,

340, 340. 



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**92**

88 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

was an approval of the new ratification process only, and not an 

approval of the merits of the Constitution. 

//D.  Debates in the State Ratification Convention Process //

Many people—even some scholars—contend that the Consti-

tution was sent straight from the Constitutional Convention in 

Philadelphia to the ratification conventions in the several 

states.170 Such “history” obviously misses two important steps. 

First, Congress dealt with the issue as we have just seen. Sec-

ond, Congress sent the Constitution together with its recom-

mendation for following the new process to the state legisla-

tures—not the state ratification conventions. Each legislature 

had to decide whether it would follow this new process by call-

ing a ratification convention within the state. Some of the most 

important discussions of the propriety of the actions of the 

Constitutional Convention are found in these state legislative 

debates. In some states, the issue spilled over into the ratifica-

tion conventions and public debates as well. We consider the 

evidence from all such sources below. 

//1.  There was a General Consensus that the States, Not Congress //

//Called the Convention //

While modern scholars generally assert that the Philadelphia 

Convention was called by Congress on February 21st, 1787, the 

contemporary view was decidedly different.171 As we shall see, 

the friends and opponents of the Constitution widely agreed that 

the origins and authority for the Convention came from the States. 

During the Pennsylvania legislative debates over calling the 

state ratification convention, an important Federalist, Hugh 

Breckenridge, explained the origins of the Convention: 

How did this business first originate? Did Virginia wait the 

recommendation of Congress? Did Pennsylvania, who fol-

lowed her in the appointment of delegates, wait the recom-

mendation of Congress? The Assembly of New York, when 

they found they had not the honor of being foremost in the 

measure, revived the idea of its being necessary to have it 

                                                                      

//  //170//. See, e.g.//, Brian C. Murchison, //The Concept of Independence in Public Law//, 41 

EMORY L.J. 961, 976 (1992) (“Moreover, the Convention did not present the pro-

posed Constitution to Congress for approval, or to the legislatures of the states, 

but called for ratification by ‘specially elected conventions’ in the states.’”). 

 171. 

//See// //supra //notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 89 

 

recommended by Congress, as an excuse for their tardiness 

(being the seat of the federal government), and Congress, to 

humor them, complied with their suggestions . . . .** **But we 

never heard, that it was supposed necessary to wait [for 

Congress’s] recommendations.172 

George Washington described the origins of the Convention 

in similar terms in a letter to Marquis de Lafayette on 

March 25th, 1787: 

[M]ost of the Legislatures have appointed, & the rest it is 

said will appoint, delegates to meet at Philadelphia the 

second monday [sic] in may [sic] next in general Conven-

tion of the States to revise, and correct the defects of the 

federal System. Congress have also recognized, & recom-

mended the measure.173 

Madison echoed this theme in a letter to Washington sent on 

September 30th, 1787. “[E]very circumstance indicated that the 

introduction of Congress as a party to the reform was intended 

by the states merely as a matter of form and respect,” he 

wrote.174 Federalists, as may be expected, consistently adhered 

to the view that the Convention had been called by the states 

and the action of Congress was a mere endorsement. 

Even in the midst of their assertions that the Convention 

had violated its instructions, leading Anti-Federalists repeat-

edly admitted that the Convention was called by the states 

and not by Congress. In the Pennsylvania legislature, an Anti-

Federalist leader read the credentials granted to that state’s 

delegates to the Constitutional Convention, followed by the 

contention that “no other power was given to the delegates 

from this state (and I believe the power given by the other 

states was of the same nature and extent).”175 An Anti-

Federalist writer—who took the unpopular tack of attacking 

George Washington—admitted this point as well. “[T]he mo-

tion made by Virginia for a General Convention, was so readily 

                                                                      

  172. Assembly Debates, A.M. (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at XX, 79–80. 

  173. Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (Mar. 25, 1787), 

//reprinted in //THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL EDITION 106 (Theodore 

J. Crackel ed., 2008). 

  174. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, New York (Sept. 30, 

1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 343, 343–44. 

  175. Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 2 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

382, 394. 

88 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

was an approval of the new ratification process only, and not an 

approval of the merits of the Constitution. 

//D.  Debates in the State Ratification Convention Process //

Many people—even some scholars—contend that the Consti-

tution was sent straight from the Constitutional Convention in 

Philadelphia to the ratification conventions in the several 

states.170 Such “history” obviously misses two important steps. 

First, Congress dealt with the issue as we have just seen. Sec-

ond, Congress sent the Constitution together with its recom-

mendation for following the new process to the state legisla-

tures—not the state ratification conventions. Each legislature 

had to decide whether it would follow this new process by call-

ing a ratification convention within the state. Some of the most 

important discussions of the propriety of the actions of the 

Constitutional Convention are found in these state legislative 

debates. In some states, the issue spilled over into the ratifica-

tion conventions and public debates as well. We consider the 

evidence from all such sources below. 

//1.  There was a General Consensus that the States, Not Congress //

//Called the Convention //

While modern scholars generally assert that the Philadelphia 

Convention was called by Congress on February 21st, 1787, the 

contemporary view was decidedly different.171 As we shall see, 

the friends and opponents of the Constitution widely agreed that 

the origins and authority for the Convention came from the States. 

During the Pennsylvania legislative debates over calling the 

state ratification convention, an important Federalist, Hugh 

Breckenridge, explained the origins of the Convention: 

How did this business first originate? Did Virginia wait the 

recommendation of Congress? Did Pennsylvania, who fol-

lowed her in the appointment of delegates, wait the recom-

mendation of Congress? The Assembly of New York, when 

they found they had not the honor of being foremost in the 

measure, revived the idea of its being necessary to have it 

                                                                      

//  //170//. See, e.g.//, Brian C. Murchison, //The Concept of Independence in Public Law//, 41 

EMORY L.J. 961, 976 (1992) (“Moreover, the Convention did not present the pro-

posed Constitution to Congress for approval, or to the legislatures of the states, 

but called for ratification by ‘specially elected conventions’ in the states.’”). 

 171. 

//See// //supra //notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

recommended by Congress, as an excuse for their tardiness 

(being the seat of the federal government), and Congress, to 

humor them, complied with their suggestions . . . .** **But we 

never heard, that it was supposed necessary to wait [for 

Congress’s] recommendations.172 

George Washington described the origins of the Conventi

in similar terms in a letter to Marquis de Lafayette on 

March 25th, 1787: 

[M]ost of the Legislatures have appointed, & the rest it is 

said will appoint, delegates to meet at Philadelphia the 

second monday [sic] in may [sic] next in general Conven-

tion of the States to revise, and correct the defects of the 

federal System. Congress have also recognized, & recom-

mended the measure.173 

Madison echoed this theme in a letter to Washington sent 

September 30th, 1787. “[E]very circumstance indicated that t

introduction of Congress as a party to the reform was intend

by the states merely as a matter of form and respect,” h

wrote.174 Federalists, as may be expected, consistently adhere

to the view that the Convention had been called by the states 

and the action of Congress was a mere endorsement. 

Even in the midst of their assertions that the Conventi

had violated its instructions, leading Anti-Federalists repea

edly admitted that the Convention was called by the states

and not by Congress. In the Pennsylvania legislature, an Anti-

Federalist leader read the credentials granted to that stat

delegates to the Constitutional Convention, followed by the

contention that “no other power was given to the delega

from this state (and I believe the power given by the other 

states was of the same nature and extent).”175 An An

Federalist writer—who took the unpopular tack of attacking 

George Washington—admitted this point as well. “[T]he mo-

tion made by Virginia for a General Convention, was so readily 

                                                                      

  172. Assembly Debates, A.M. (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4

at XX, 79–80. 

  173. Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (Mar. 25, 178

//reprinted in //THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL EDITION 106 (Theodore 

J. Crackel ed., 2008). 

  174. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, New York (Sept. 30, 

1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 343, 343–44. 

  175. Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 2 DHRC, //supra// note 4,

382, 394. 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto093.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**93**

88 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

was an approval of the new ratification process only, and not an 

approval of the merits of the Constitution. 

//D.  Debates in the State Ratification Convention Process //

Many people—even some scholars—contend that the Consti-

tution was sent straight from the Constitutional Convention in 

Philadelphia to the ratification conventions in the several 

states.170 Such “history” obviously misses two important steps. 

First, Congress dealt with the issue as we have just seen. Sec-

ond, Congress sent the Constitution together with its recom-

mendation for following the new process to the state legisla-

tures—not the state ratification conventions. Each legislature 

had to decide whether it would follow this new process by call-

ing a ratification convention within the state. Some of the most 

important discussions of the propriety of the actions of the 

Constitutional Convention are found in these state legislative 

debates. In some states, the issue spilled over into the ratifica-

tion conventions and public debates as well. We consider the 

evidence from all such sources below. 

//1.  There was a General Consensus that the States, Not Congress //

//Called the Convention //

While modern scholars generally assert that the Philadelphia 

Convention was called by Congress on February 21st, 1787, the 

contemporary view was decidedly different.171 As we shall see, 

the friends and opponents of the Constitution widely agreed that 

the origins and authority for the Convention came from the States. 

During the Pennsylvania legislative debates over calling the 

state ratification convention, an important Federalist, Hugh 

Breckenridge, explained the origins of the Convention: 

How did this business first originate? Did Virginia wait the 

recommendation of Congress? Did Pennsylvania, who fol-

lowed her in the appointment of delegates, wait the recom-

mendation of Congress? The Assembly of New York, when 

they found they had not the honor of being foremost in the 

measure, revived the idea of its being necessary to have it 

                                                                      

//  //170//. See, e.g.//, Brian C. Murchison, //The Concept of Independence in Public Law//, 41 

EMORY L.J. 961, 976 (1992) (“Moreover, the Convention did not present the pro-

posed Constitution to Congress for approval, or to the legislatures of the states, 

but called for ratification by ‘specially elected conventions’ in the states.’”). 

 171. 

//See// //supra //notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 89 

 

recommended by Congress, as an excuse for their tardiness 

(being the seat of the federal government), and Congress, to 

humor them, complied with their suggestions . . . .** **But we 

never heard, that it was supposed necessary to wait [for 

Congress’s] recommendations.172 

George Washington described the origins of the Convention 

in similar terms in a letter to Marquis de Lafayette on 

March 25th, 1787: 

[M]ost of the Legislatures have appointed, & the rest it is 

said will appoint, delegates to meet at Philadelphia the 

second monday [sic] in may [sic] next in general Conven-

tion of the States to revise, and correct the defects of the 

federal System. Congress have also recognized, & recom-

mended the measure.173 

Madison echoed this theme in a letter to Washington sent on 

September 30th, 1787. “[E]very circumstance indicated that the 

introduction of Congress as a party to the reform was intended 

by the states merely as a matter of form and respect,” he 

wrote.174 Federalists, as may be expected, consistently adhered 

to the view that the Convention had been called by the states 

and the action of Congress was a mere endorsement. 

Even in the midst of their assertions that the Convention 

had violated its instructions, leading Anti-Federalists repeat-

edly admitted that the Convention was called by the states 

and not by Congress. In the Pennsylvania legislature, an Anti-

Federalist leader read the credentials granted to that state’s 

delegates to the Constitutional Convention, followed by the 

contention that “no other power was given to the delegates 

from this state (and I believe the power given by the other 

states was of the same nature and extent).”175 An Anti-

Federalist writer—who took the unpopular tack of attacking 

George Washington—admitted this point as well. “[T]he mo-

tion made by Virginia for a General Convention, was so readily 

                                                                      

  172. Assembly Debates, A.M. (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at XX, 79–80. 

  173. Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (Mar. 25, 1787), 

//reprinted in //THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL EDITION 106 (Theodore 

J. Crackel ed., 2008). 

  174. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, New York (Sept. 30, 

1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 343, 343–44. 

  175. Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 2 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

382, 394. 

88 

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was an approval of the new ratification process only, and not an 

approval of the merits of the Constitution. 

//D.  Debates in the State Ratification Convention Process //

Many people—even some scholars—contend that the Consti-

tution was sent straight from the Constitutional Convention in 

Philadelphia to the ratification conventions in the several 

states.170 Such “history” obviously misses two important steps. 

First, Congress dealt with the issue as we have just seen. Sec-

ond, Congress sent the Constitution together with its recom-

mendation for following the new process to the state legisla-

tures—not the state ratification conventions. Each legislature 

had to decide whether it would follow this new process by call-

ing a ratification convention within the state. Some of the most 

important discussions of the propriety of the actions of the 

Constitutional Convention are found in these state legislative 

debates. In some states, the issue spilled over into the ratifica-

tion conventions and public debates as well. We consider the 

evidence from all such sources below. 

//1.  There was a General Consensus that the States, Not Congress //

//Called the Convention //

While modern scholars generally assert that the Philadelphia 

Convention was called by Congress on February 21st, 1787, the 

contemporary view was decidedly different.171 As we shall see, 

the friends and opponents of the Constitution widely agreed that 

the origins and authority for the Convention came from the States. 

During the Pennsylvania legislative debates over calling the 

state ratification convention, an important Federalist, Hugh 

Breckenridge, explained the origins of the Convention: 

How did this business first originate? Did Virginia wait the 

recommendation of Congress? Did Pennsylvania, who fol-

lowed her in the appointment of delegates, wait the recom-

mendation of Congress? The Assembly of New York, when 

they found they had not the honor of being foremost in the 

measure, revived the idea of its being necessary to have it 

                                                                      

//  //170//. See, e.g.//, Brian C. Murchison, //The Concept of Independence in Public Law//, 41 

EMORY L.J. 961, 976 (1992) (“Moreover, the Convention did not present the pro-

posed Constitution to Congress for approval, or to the legislatures of the states, 

but called for ratification by ‘specially elected conventions’ in the states.’”). 

 171. 

//See// //supra //notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

recommended by Congress, as an excuse for their tardiness 

(being the seat of the federal government), and Congress, to 

humor them, complied with their suggestions . . . .** **But we 

never heard, that it was supposed necessary to wait [for 

Congress’s] recommendations.172 

George Washington described the origins of the Conventi

in similar terms in a letter to Marquis de Lafayette on 

March 25th, 1787: 

[M]ost of the Legislatures have appointed, & the rest it is 

said will appoint, delegates to meet at Philadelphia the 

second monday [sic] in may [sic] next in general Conven-

tion of the States to revise, and correct the defects of the 

federal System. Congress have also recognized, & recom-

mended the measure.173 

Madison echoed this theme in a letter to Washington sent 

September 30th, 1787. “[E]very circumstance indicated that t

introduction of Congress as a party to the reform was intend

by the states merely as a matter of form and respect,” h

wrote.174 Federalists, as may be expected, consistently adhere

to the view that the Convention had been called by the states 

and the action of Congress was a mere endorsement. 

Even in the midst of their assertions that the Conventi

had violated its instructions, leading Anti-Federalists repea

edly admitted that the Convention was called by the states

and not by Congress. In the Pennsylvania legislature, an Anti-

Federalist leader read the credentials granted to that stat

delegates to the Constitutional Convention, followed by the

contention that “no other power was given to the delega

from this state (and I believe the power given by the other 

states was of the same nature and extent).”175 An An

Federalist writer—who took the unpopular tack of attacking 

George Washington—admitted this point as well. “[T]he mo-

tion made by Virginia for a General Convention, was so readily 

                                                                      

  172. Assembly Debates, A.M. (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4

at XX, 79–80. 

  173. Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (Mar. 25, 178

//reprinted in //THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL EDITION 106 (Theodore 

J. Crackel ed., 2008). 

  174. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, New York (Sept. 30, 

1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 343, 343–44. 

  175. Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 2 DHRC, //supra// note 4,

382, 394. 



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agreed to by all the States; and that as the people were so very 

zealous for a good Federal Government . . . .”176 A series of An-

ti-Federalist articles appeared in the Massachusetts Centinel 

from December 29th, 1787 through February 6th, 1788.177 In the 

first installment, this writer admitted that the Constitutional 

Convention originated in the Virginia legislature: 

  The Federal Convention was first proposed by the legisla-

ture of Virginia, to whom America is much indebted for 

having taken the lead on the most important occasions.—

She first sounded the alarm respecting the intended usurpa-

tion and tyranny of Great-Britain, and has now proclaimed 

the necessity of more //power// and //energy// in our federal gov-

ernment . . . .  \\
  In consequence of the measures of Virginia respecting the 

calling a federal Convention, the legislature of this State on 

the 21st of February last, //Resolved//, “That five Commissioners 

be appointed by the General Court, who, or any three of 

whom, are hereby impowered to meet such commissioners 

as are or may be appointed by the legislatures of the other 

States . . . .178 

Even in a state that formally adopted Congressional language, a 

major Anti-Federalist advocate admitted that its legislature was 

prompted to act “in consequence” of the call from Virginia. 

//2.  Who gave the delegates their instructions? //

An article in the New York Daily Advertiser on May 24, 

1787, may provide us the most objective view on the source of 

the delegates’ authority since it was published the day before 

the Convention began its work. No one yet had a reason to 

claim that the delegates had violated their instructions. 

[W]e are informed, that the authority granted to their dele-

gates, by some states, are very extensive; by others even 

general, and by all much enlarged. Upon the whole we may 

                                                                      

 176. 

//An American//, AM. HERALD, Jan. 28, 1788, //reprinted in //5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 792, 792. 

//  //177//. See// 5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 549, 589, 661, 698, 833, 843, 869. 

 178. 

//The Republican Federalist I//, MASS.  CENTINEL, Dec. 29, 1787, //reprinted in// 5 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 549, 551–52. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 91 

 

conclude that they will find their authority equal to the im-

portant work that will lay before them . . . .179

** **

This writer—opining before sides were formed—agreed with 

both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists after the Conven-

tion that the relevant instructions to the delegates were issued 

by their respective states. 

//a.  Anti-Federalist Views //

Perhaps the most famous Anti-Federalist was Virginia’s Pat-

rick Henry. He led a nearly successful effort to defeat the ratifi-

cation of the Constitution in that state’s convention.180 But, ear-

ly in the process, as a superb trial lawyer, Henry sought to lay 

the documentary record before the Virginia convention to 

prove that the delegates had violated their instructions. 

Mr. //Henry// moved, That the Act of Assembly appointing Depu-

ties to meet at Annapolis, to consult with those from some oth-

er States, on the situation of the commerce of the United 

States—The Act of Assembly for appointing Deputies to meet 

at Philadelphia, to revise the Articles of Confederation—and 

other public papers relative thereto—should be read.181 

Henry’s maneuver demonstrates that he believed that the con-

trolling instructions were to be found, not in a congressional 

measure, but in the two Virginia acts which appointed dele-

gates to Annapolis and Philadelphia. 

One of the most widely circulated Anti-Federalist attacks 

against the legitimacy of the Convention was a letter from Robert 

Yates and John Lansing, Jr. explaining their early exit from the 

Convention.182 The core of their argument was that the Conven-

tion had violated its restricted purpose. After reciting the familiar 

language that the convention had been confined to the “//sole and //

//express purpose of revising the articles of Confederation//,”183 their letter 

identifies what they believed to be the controlling source of those \\
                                                                      

 179. 

//To the Political Freethinkers of America//, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 24, 1787, 

//reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 113, 114. 

  180. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788), //reprinted//  //in  //9 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 897–900. 

  181. Virginia Convention Debates (June 4, 1788), //reprinted// //in //9 DHRC, //supra// note 

4, at 915, 917. 

 182. 

//The Report of New York’s Delegates to the Constitutional Convention//, N.Y. DAI-

LY 

ADVERTISER, Jan. 14, 1788, //reprinted in //15 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at// //366. 

//  //183//. Id.// at 369. 

90 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

agreed to by all the States; and that as the people were so very 

zealous for a good Federal Government . . . .”176 A series of An-

ti-Federalist articles appeared in the Massachusetts Centinel 

from December 29th, 1787 through February 6th, 1788.177 In the 

first installment, this writer admitted that the Constitutional 

Convention originated in the Virginia legislature: 

  The Federal Convention was first proposed by the legisla-

ture of Virginia, to whom America is much indebted for 

having taken the lead on the most important occasions.—

She first sounded the alarm respecting the intended usurpa-

tion and tyranny of Great-Britain, and has now proclaimed 

the necessity of more //power// and //energy// in our federal gov-

ernment . . . .  \\
  In consequence of the measures of Virginia respecting the 

calling a federal Convention, the legislature of this State on 

the 21st of February last, //Resolved//, “That five Commissioners 

be appointed by the General Court, who, or any three of 

whom, are hereby impowered to meet such commissioners 

as are or may be appointed by the legislatures of the other 

States . . . .178 

Even in a state that formally adopted Congressional language, a 

major Anti-Federalist advocate admitted that its legislature was 

prompted to act “in consequence” of the call from Virginia. 

//2.  Who gave the delegates their instructions? //

An article in the New York Daily Advertiser on May 24, 

1787, may provide us the most objective view on the source of 

the delegates’ authority since it was published the day before 

the Convention began its work. No one yet had a reason to 

claim that the delegates had violated their instructions. 

[W]e are informed, that the authority granted to their dele-

gates, by some states, are very extensive; by others even 

general, and by all much enlarged. Upon the whole we may 

                                                                      

 176. 

//An American//, AM. HERALD, Jan. 28, 1788, //reprinted in //5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 792, 792. 

//  //177//. See// 5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 549, 589, 661, 698, 833, 843, 869. 

 178. 

//The Republican Federalist I//, MASS.  CENTINEL, Dec. 29, 1787, //reprinted in// 5 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 549, 551–52. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

conclude that they will find their authority equal to the im-

portant work that will lay before them . . . .179

** **

This writer—opining before sides were formed—agreed with 

both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists after the Conven-

tion that the relevant instructions to the delegates were issued 

by their respective states. 

//a.  Anti-Federalist Views //

Perhaps the most famous Anti-Federalist was Virginia’s P

rick Henry. He led a nearly successful effort to defeat the rat

cation of the Constitution in that state’s convention.180 But, e

ly in the process, as a superb trial lawyer, Henry sought to lay 

the documentary record before the Virginia convention to

prove that the delegates had violated their instructions. 

Mr. //Henry// moved, That the Act of Assembly appointing Depu-

ties to meet at Annapolis, to consult with those from some oth-

er States, on the situation of the commerce of the United 

States—The Act of Assembly for appointing Deputies to meet 

at Philadelphia, to revise the Articles of Confederation—and 

other public papers relative thereto—should be read.181 

Henry’s maneuver demonstrates that he believed that the con-

trolling instructions were to be found, not in a congressional

measure, but in the two Virginia acts which appointed dele-

gates to Annapolis and Philadelphia. 

One of the most widely circulated Anti-Federalist attacks 

against the legitimacy of the Convention was a letter from Rober

Yates and John Lansing, Jr. explaining their early exit from 

Convention.182 The core of their argument was that the Conve

tion had violated its restricted purpose. After reciting the famil

language that the convention had been confined to the “//sole and //

//express purpose of revising the articles of Confederation//,”183 their lett

identifies what they believed to be the controlling source of tho\\
                                                                      

 179. 

//To the Political Freethinkers of America//, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 24, 1787

//reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 113, 114. 

  180. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788), //reprinted//  //in  //9 DHRC, //supra//

note 4, at 897–900. 

  181. Virginia Convention Debates (June 4, 1788), //reprinted// //in //9 DHRC, //supra// no

4, at 915, 917. 

 182. 

//The Report of New York’s Delegates to the Constitutional Convention//, N.Y

LY 

ADVERTISER, Jan. 14, 1788, //reprinted in //15 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at// //366. 

//  //183//. Id.// at 369. 



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90 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

agreed to by all the States; and that as the people were so very 

zealous for a good Federal Government . . . .”176 A series of An-

ti-Federalist articles appeared in the Massachusetts Centinel 

from December 29th, 1787 through February 6th, 1788.177 In the 

first installment, this writer admitted that the Constitutional 

Convention originated in the Virginia legislature: 

  The Federal Convention was first proposed by the legisla-

ture of Virginia, to whom America is much indebted for 

having taken the lead on the most important occasions.—

She first sounded the alarm respecting the intended usurpa-

tion and tyranny of Great-Britain, and has now proclaimed 

the necessity of more //power// and //energy// in our federal gov-

ernment . . . .  \\
  In consequence of the measures of Virginia respecting the 

calling a federal Convention, the legislature of this State on 

the 21st of February last, //Resolved//, “That five Commissioners 

be appointed by the General Court, who, or any three of 

whom, are hereby impowered to meet such commissioners 

as are or may be appointed by the legislatures of the other 

States . . . .178 

Even in a state that formally adopted Congressional language, a 

major Anti-Federalist advocate admitted that its legislature was 

prompted to act “in consequence” of the call from Virginia. 

//2.  Who gave the delegates their instructions? //

An article in the New York Daily Advertiser on May 24, 

1787, may provide us the most objective view on the source of 

the delegates’ authority since it was published the day before 

the Convention began its work. No one yet had a reason to 

claim that the delegates had violated their instructions. 

[W]e are informed, that the authority granted to their dele-

gates, by some states, are very extensive; by others even 

general, and by all much enlarged. Upon the whole we may 

                                                                      

 176. 

//An American//, AM. HERALD, Jan. 28, 1788, //reprinted in //5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 792, 792. 

//  //177//. See// 5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 549, 589, 661, 698, 833, 843, 869. 

 178. 

//The Republican Federalist I//, MASS.  CENTINEL, Dec. 29, 1787, //reprinted in// 5 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 549, 551–52. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 91 

 

conclude that they will find their authority equal to the im-

portant work that will lay before them . . . .179

** **

This writer—opining before sides were formed—agreed with 

both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists after the Conven-

tion that the relevant instructions to the delegates were issued 

by their respective states. 

//a.  Anti-Federalist Views //

Perhaps the most famous Anti-Federalist was Virginia’s Pat-

rick Henry. He led a nearly successful effort to defeat the ratifi-

cation of the Constitution in that state’s convention.180 But, ear-

ly in the process, as a superb trial lawyer, Henry sought to lay 

the documentary record before the Virginia convention to 

prove that the delegates had violated their instructions. 

Mr. //Henry// moved, That the Act of Assembly appointing Depu-

ties to meet at Annapolis, to consult with those from some oth-

er States, on the situation of the commerce of the United 

States—The Act of Assembly for appointing Deputies to meet 

at Philadelphia, to revise the Articles of Confederation—and 

other public papers relative thereto—should be read.181 

Henry’s maneuver demonstrates that he believed that the con-

trolling instructions were to be found, not in a congressional 

measure, but in the two Virginia acts which appointed dele-

gates to Annapolis and Philadelphia. 

One of the most widely circulated Anti-Federalist attacks 

against the legitimacy of the Convention was a letter from Robert 

Yates and John Lansing, Jr. explaining their early exit from the 

Convention.182 The core of their argument was that the Conven-

tion had violated its restricted purpose. After reciting the familiar 

language that the convention had been confined to the “//sole and //

//express purpose of revising the articles of Confederation//,”183 their letter 

identifies what they believed to be the controlling source of those \\
                                                                      

 179. 

//To the Political Freethinkers of America//, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 24, 1787, 

//reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 113, 114. 

  180. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788), //reprinted//  //in  //9 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 897–900. 

  181. Virginia Convention Debates (June 4, 1788), //reprinted// //in //9 DHRC, //supra// note 

4, at 915, 917. 

 182. 

//The Report of New York’s Delegates to the Constitutional Convention//, N.Y. DAI-

LY 

ADVERTISER, Jan. 14, 1788, //reprinted in //15 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at// //366. 

//  //183//. Id.// at 369. 

90 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

agreed to by all the States; and that as the people were so very 

zealous for a good Federal Government . . . .”176 A series of An-

ti-Federalist articles appeared in the Massachusetts Centinel 

from December 29th, 1787 through February 6th, 1788.177 In the 

first installment, this writer admitted that the Constitutional 

Convention originated in the Virginia legislature: 

  The Federal Convention was first proposed by the legisla-

ture of Virginia, to whom America is much indebted for 

having taken the lead on the most important occasions.—

She first sounded the alarm respecting the intended usurpa-

tion and tyranny of Great-Britain, and has now proclaimed 

the necessity of more //power// and //energy// in our federal gov-

ernment . . . .  \\
  In consequence of the measures of Virginia respecting the 

calling a federal Convention, the legislature of this State on 

the 21st of February last, //Resolved//, “That five Commissioners 

be appointed by the General Court, who, or any three of 

whom, are hereby impowered to meet such commissioners 

as are or may be appointed by the legislatures of the other 

States . . . .178 

Even in a state that formally adopted Congressional language, a 

major Anti-Federalist advocate admitted that its legislature was 

prompted to act “in consequence” of the call from Virginia. 

//2.  Who gave the delegates their instructions? //

An article in the New York Daily Advertiser on May 24, 

1787, may provide us the most objective view on the source of 

the delegates’ authority since it was published the day before 

the Convention began its work. No one yet had a reason to 

claim that the delegates had violated their instructions. 

[W]e are informed, that the authority granted to their dele-

gates, by some states, are very extensive; by others even 

general, and by all much enlarged. Upon the whole we may 

                                                                      

 176. 

//An American//, AM. HERALD, Jan. 28, 1788, //reprinted in //5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 792, 792. 

//  //177//. See// 5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 549, 589, 661, 698, 833, 843, 869. 

 178. 

//The Republican Federalist I//, MASS.  CENTINEL, Dec. 29, 1787, //reprinted in// 5 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 549, 551–52. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

conclude that they will find their authority equal to the im-

portant work that will lay before them . . . .179

** **

This writer—opining before sides were formed—agreed with 

both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists after the Conven-

tion that the relevant instructions to the delegates were issued 

by their respective states. 

//a.  Anti-Federalist Views //

Perhaps the most famous Anti-Federalist was Virginia’s P

rick Henry. He led a nearly successful effort to defeat the rat

cation of the Constitution in that state’s convention.180 But, e

ly in the process, as a superb trial lawyer, Henry sought to lay 

the documentary record before the Virginia convention to

prove that the delegates had violated their instructions. 

Mr. //Henry// moved, That the Act of Assembly appointing Depu-

ties to meet at Annapolis, to consult with those from some oth-

er States, on the situation of the commerce of the United 

States—The Act of Assembly for appointing Deputies to meet 

at Philadelphia, to revise the Articles of Confederation—and 

other public papers relative thereto—should be read.181 

Henry’s maneuver demonstrates that he believed that the con-

trolling instructions were to be found, not in a congressional

measure, but in the two Virginia acts which appointed dele-

gates to Annapolis and Philadelphia. 

One of the most widely circulated Anti-Federalist attacks 

against the legitimacy of the Convention was a letter from Rober

Yates and John Lansing, Jr. explaining their early exit from 

Convention.182 The core of their argument was that the Conve

tion had violated its restricted purpose. After reciting the famil

language that the convention had been confined to the “//sole and //

//express purpose of revising the articles of Confederation//,”183 their lett

identifies what they believed to be the controlling source of tho\\
                                                                      

 179. 

//To the Political Freethinkers of America//, N.Y. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 24, 1787

//reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 113, 114. 

  180. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788), //reprinted//  //in  //9 DHRC, //supra//

note 4, at 897–900. 

  181. Virginia Convention Debates (June 4, 1788), //reprinted// //in //9 DHRC, //supra// no

4, at 915, 917. 

 182. 

//The Report of New York’s Delegates to the Constitutional Convention//, N.Y

LY 

ADVERTISER, Jan. 14, 1788, //reprinted in //15 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at// //366. 

//  //183//. Id.// at 369. 



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**96**

92 

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[Vol. 40 

 

instructions: “From these expressions, we were led to believe that 

a system of consolidated Government, could not, in the remotest 

degree, have been in contemplation of the Legislature of this 

State.”184 Their admission should lay to rest any suggestion that 

the Anti-Federalists believed that Congress gave the Convention 

its authority and instructions. 

The New York Journal published a series of Anti-Federalist ar-

ticles penned by Hugh Hughes under the pen name of “A Coun-

tryman.”185 He decries what seemed to be “a Predetermination of 

a Majority of the Members to reject their Instructions, and all au-

thority under which they acted.”186 But earlier in the same para-

graph he recites “the Resolutions of several of the States, for call-

ing a Convention to //amend// the Confederation”187 as the source of 

the delegates’ instructions. His argument strongly suggests that 

all of the delegates violated their instructions. However, he recites 

only a paraphrase of the New York instructions in support of his 

contention. Again, he assumes that the state legislatures, not Con-

gress, were the source for the delegates’ instructions. 

An Anti-Federalist writer from Georgia admitted the correct 

legal standard even in the midst of an assertion that played fast 

and loose with the facts: 

[I]t is to be observed, delegates from all the states, except 

Rhode Island, were appointed by the legislatures, with this 

power only, “to meet in Convention, to join in devising and 

discussing all such ALTERATIONS and farther [sic] provi-

sions as may be necessary to render the articles of the con-

federation adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”188 

Not a single state appointed delegates with the exact language set 

out in this writer’s alleged quotation. His own state’s resolution 

does not even mention the Articles of Confederation.189 He begins \\
                                                                      

//  //184//. Id.// 

//  //185//. See// 19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 271, 291, 347, 424. 

  186. Hugh Hughes, //A Countryman I//, N.Y.J., Nov. 21, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 271, 273. 

//  //187//. Id//. 

 188. 

//A Georgian//, GAZETTE ST. GA., Nov. 15, 1787, //reprinted in// 3 DHRC, //supra// note 

4, at 236, 237. 

  189. The operative language from the Georgia legislature instructed the dele-

gates: “to join with [other delegates] in devising and discussing all such altera-

tions and farther [sic] provisions, as may be necessary to render the federal consti-

tution adequate to the exigencies of the union.” Act Electing and Empowering 

Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 204, 204. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 93 

 

by accurately citing the states as the source of the instructions and 

then, as was commonly the case, went from fact to fantasy when 

he purported to quote the delegates’ instructions. 

Letters from a Federal Farmer, which are widely recognized 

as the pinnacle of Anti-Federalist writing, contains the same 

admission—even in the midst of attacking the legitimacy of the 

convention. The Farmer accuses the Annapolis Convention of 

launching a plan aimed at “destroying the old constitution, and 

making a new one.”190 The states were duped and fell in line. 

“The states still unsuspecting, and not aware that, they were 

passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new conven-

tion, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amend-

ing the confederation.”191 The Farmer’s political purpose was 

served by selectively quoting the language used only by two 

states. But his argument about the states being unaware they 

were passing the Rubicon applied to all twelve states—

including the six that named their delegates and gave them 

their instructions before this phrase was ever drafted in the 

Confederation Congress. Again, the Farmer blames the states 

for being duped when they gave instructions to their delegates. 

The Anti-Federalist Cato also contended that the process em-

ployed was improper. However, in a classic straw man argument, 

he decried a process that never happened. According to Cato, “a 

short history of the rise and progress of the Convention” starts 

with Congress determining that there were problems in the Arti-

cles of Confederation that could be fixed in a convention of 

states.192 He contends that Congress was the initiator and that the 

states were in the role of responders.193 All citizens were entitled 

to their own opinions, but several Anti-Federalists seemed to be-

lieve they were also entitled to their own facts. 

As we can see, while Anti-Federalists had serious doubts about 

the propriety of the actions of the Convention’s delegates, there 

was an overriding acknowledgement within their ranks of one 

key legal issue: the sources of the authority for the delegates were 

the enactments of each of the several state legislatures. 

                                                                      

  190. Federal Farmer, //Letters to the Republican//, Nov. 8, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 203, 211. 

//  //191//. Id.// 

//  //192//. Cato II//, N.Y.J., Oct. 11, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 79, 81. 

//  //193//. Id.// at 79–82. 

92 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

instructions: “From these expressions, we were led to believe that 

a system of consolidated Government, could not, in the remotest 

degree, have been in contemplation of the Legislature of this 

State.”184 Their admission should lay to rest any suggestion that 

the Anti-Federalists believed that Congress gave the Convention 

its authority and instructions. 

The New York Journal published a series of Anti-Federalist ar-

ticles penned by Hugh Hughes under the pen name of “A Coun-

tryman.”185 He decries what seemed to be “a Predetermination of 

a Majority of the Members to reject their Instructions, and all au-

thority under which they acted.”186 But earlier in the same para-

graph he recites “the Resolutions of several of the States, for call-

ing a Convention to //amend// the Confederation”187 as the source of 

the delegates’ instructions. His argument strongly suggests that 

all of the delegates violated their instructions. However, he recites 

only a paraphrase of the New York instructions in support of his 

contention. Again, he assumes that the state legislatures, not Con-

gress, were the source for the delegates’ instructions. 

An Anti-Federalist writer from Georgia admitted the correct 

legal standard even in the midst of an assertion that played fast 

and loose with the facts: 

[I]t is to be observed, delegates from all the states, except 

Rhode Island, were appointed by the legislatures, with this 

power only, “to meet in Convention, to join in devising and 

discussing all such ALTERATIONS and farther [sic] provi-

sions as may be necessary to render the articles of the con-

federation adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”188 

Not a single state appointed delegates with the exact language set 

out in this writer’s alleged quotation. His own state’s resolution 

does not even mention the Articles of Confederation.189 He begins \\
                                                                      

//  //184//. Id.// 

//  //185//. See// 19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 271, 291, 347, 424. 

  186. Hugh Hughes, //A Countryman I//, N.Y.J., Nov. 21, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 271, 273. 

//  //187//. Id//. 

 188. 

//A Georgian//, GAZETTE ST. GA., Nov. 15, 1787, //reprinted in// 3 DHRC, //supra// note 

4, at 236, 237. 

  189. The operative language from the Georgia legislature instructed the dele-

gates: “to join with [other delegates] in devising and discussing all such altera-

tions and farther [sic] provisions, as may be necessary to render the federal consti-

tution adequate to the exigencies of the union.” Act Electing and Empowering 

Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 204, 204. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

by accurately citing the states as the source of the instructions a

then, as was commonly the case, went from fact to fantasy whe

he purported to quote the delegates’ instructions. 

Letters from a Federal Farmer, which are widely recognized 

as the pinnacle of Anti-Federalist writing, contains the same 

admission—even in the midst of attacking the legitimacy of the 

convention. The Farmer accuses the Annapolis Convention 

launching a plan aimed at “destroying the old constitution, and 

making a new one.”190 The states were duped and fell in line. 

“The states still unsuspecting, and not aware that, they were

passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new conven-

tion, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amen

ing the confederation.”191 The Farmer’s political purpose was 

served by selectively quoting the language used only by two 

states. But his argument about the states being unaware the

were passing the Rubicon applied to all twelve states

including the six that named their delegates and gave them 

their instructions before this phrase was ever drafted in t

Confederation Congress. Again, the Farmer blames the states

for being duped when they gave instructions to their delegates. 

The Anti-Federalist Cato also contended that the process em-

ployed was improper. However, in a classic straw man argume

he decried a process that never happened. According to Cato, “a 

short history of the rise and progress of the Convention” starts 

with Congress determining that there were problems in the Art

cles of Confederation that could be fixed in a convention of 

states.192 He contends that Congress was the initiator and that th

states were in the role of responders.193 All citizens were entitl

to their own opinions, but several Anti-Federalists seemed to be-

lieve they were also entitled to their own facts. 

As we can see, while Anti-Federalists had serious doubts abou

the propriety of the actions of the Convention’s delegates, the

was an overriding acknowledgement within their ranks of o

key legal issue: the sources of the authority for the delegates 

the enactments of each of the several state legislatures. 

                                                                      

  190. Federal Farmer, //Letters to the Republican//, Nov. 8, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 203, 211. 

//  //191//. Id.// 

//  //192//. Cato II//, N.Y.J., Oct. 11, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 79, 

//  //193//. Id.// at 79–82. 



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//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

instructions: “From these expressions, we were led to believe that 

a system of consolidated Government, could not, in the remotest 

degree, have been in contemplation of the Legislature of this 

State.”184 Their admission should lay to rest any suggestion that 

the Anti-Federalists believed that Congress gave the Convention 

its authority and instructions. 

The New York Journal published a series of Anti-Federalist ar-

ticles penned by Hugh Hughes under the pen name of “A Coun-

tryman.”185 He decries what seemed to be “a Predetermination of 

a Majority of the Members to reject their Instructions, and all au-

thority under which they acted.”186 But earlier in the same para-

graph he recites “the Resolutions of several of the States, for call-

ing a Convention to //amend// the Confederation”187 as the source of 

the delegates’ instructions. His argument strongly suggests that 

all of the delegates violated their instructions. However, he recites 

only a paraphrase of the New York instructions in support of his 

contention. Again, he assumes that the state legislatures, not Con-

gress, were the source for the delegates’ instructions. 

An Anti-Federalist writer from Georgia admitted the correct 

legal standard even in the midst of an assertion that played fast 

and loose with the facts: 

[I]t is to be observed, delegates from all the states, except 

Rhode Island, were appointed by the legislatures, with this 

power only, “to meet in Convention, to join in devising and 

discussing all such ALTERATIONS and farther [sic] provi-

sions as may be necessary to render the articles of the con-

federation adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”188 

Not a single state appointed delegates with the exact language set 

out in this writer’s alleged quotation. His own state’s resolution 

does not even mention the Articles of Confederation.189 He begins \\
                                                                      

//  //184//. Id.// 

//  //185//. See// 19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 271, 291, 347, 424. 

  186. Hugh Hughes, //A Countryman I//, N.Y.J., Nov. 21, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 271, 273. 

//  //187//. Id//. 

 188. 

//A Georgian//, GAZETTE ST. GA., Nov. 15, 1787, //reprinted in// 3 DHRC, //supra// note 

4, at 236, 237. 

  189. The operative language from the Georgia legislature instructed the dele-

gates: “to join with [other delegates] in devising and discussing all such altera-

tions and farther [sic] provisions, as may be necessary to render the federal consti-

tution adequate to the exigencies of the union.” Act Electing and Empowering 

Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 204, 204. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 93 

 

by accurately citing the states as the source of the instructions and 

then, as was commonly the case, went from fact to fantasy when 

he purported to quote the delegates’ instructions. 

Letters from a Federal Farmer, which are widely recognized 

as the pinnacle of Anti-Federalist writing, contains the same 

admission—even in the midst of attacking the legitimacy of the 

convention. The Farmer accuses the Annapolis Convention of 

launching a plan aimed at “destroying the old constitution, and 

making a new one.”190 The states were duped and fell in line. 

“The states still unsuspecting, and not aware that, they were 

passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new conven-

tion, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amend-

ing the confederation.”191 The Farmer’s political purpose was 

served by selectively quoting the language used only by two 

states. But his argument about the states being unaware they 

were passing the Rubicon applied to all twelve states—

including the six that named their delegates and gave them 

their instructions before this phrase was ever drafted in the 

Confederation Congress. Again, the Farmer blames the states 

for being duped when they gave instructions to their delegates. 

The Anti-Federalist Cato also contended that the process em-

ployed was improper. However, in a classic straw man argument, 

he decried a process that never happened. According to Cato, “a 

short history of the rise and progress of the Convention” starts 

with Congress determining that there were problems in the Arti-

cles of Confederation that could be fixed in a convention of 

states.192 He contends that Congress was the initiator and that the 

states were in the role of responders.193 All citizens were entitled 

to their own opinions, but several Anti-Federalists seemed to be-

lieve they were also entitled to their own facts. 

As we can see, while Anti-Federalists had serious doubts about 

the propriety of the actions of the Convention’s delegates, there 

was an overriding acknowledgement within their ranks of one 

key legal issue: the sources of the authority for the delegates were 

the enactments of each of the several state legislatures. 

                                                                      

  190. Federal Farmer, //Letters to the Republican//, Nov. 8, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 203, 211. 

//  //191//. Id.// 

//  //192//. Cato II//, N.Y.J., Oct. 11, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 79, 81. 

//  //193//. Id.// at 79–82. 

92 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

instructions: “From these expressions, we were led to believe that 

a system of consolidated Government, could not, in the remotest 

degree, have been in contemplation of the Legislature of this 

State.”184 Their admission should lay to rest any suggestion that 

the Anti-Federalists believed that Congress gave the Convention 

its authority and instructions. 

The New York Journal published a series of Anti-Federalist ar-

ticles penned by Hugh Hughes under the pen name of “A Coun-

tryman.”185 He decries what seemed to be “a Predetermination of 

a Majority of the Members to reject their Instructions, and all au-

thority under which they acted.”186 But earlier in the same para-

graph he recites “the Resolutions of several of the States, for call-

ing a Convention to //amend// the Confederation”187 as the source of 

the delegates’ instructions. His argument strongly suggests that 

all of the delegates violated their instructions. However, he recites 

only a paraphrase of the New York instructions in support of his 

contention. Again, he assumes that the state legislatures, not Con-

gress, were the source for the delegates’ instructions. 

An Anti-Federalist writer from Georgia admitted the correct 

legal standard even in the midst of an assertion that played fast 

and loose with the facts: 

[I]t is to be observed, delegates from all the states, except 

Rhode Island, were appointed by the legislatures, with this 

power only, “to meet in Convention, to join in devising and 

discussing all such ALTERATIONS and farther [sic] provi-

sions as may be necessary to render the articles of the con-

federation adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”188 

Not a single state appointed delegates with the exact language set 

out in this writer’s alleged quotation. His own state’s resolution 

does not even mention the Articles of Confederation.189 He begins \\
                                                                      

//  //184//. Id.// 

//  //185//. See// 19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 271, 291, 347, 424. 

  186. Hugh Hughes, //A Countryman I//, N.Y.J., Nov. 21, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 271, 273. 

//  //187//. Id//. 

 188. 

//A Georgian//, GAZETTE ST. GA., Nov. 15, 1787, //reprinted in// 3 DHRC, //supra// note 

4, at 236, 237. 

  189. The operative language from the Georgia legislature instructed the dele-

gates: “to join with [other delegates] in devising and discussing all such altera-

tions and farther [sic] provisions, as may be necessary to render the federal consti-

tution adequate to the exigencies of the union.” Act Electing and Empowering 

Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 204, 204. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

by accurately citing the states as the source of the instructions a

then, as was commonly the case, went from fact to fantasy whe

he purported to quote the delegates’ instructions. 

Letters from a Federal Farmer, which are widely recognized 

as the pinnacle of Anti-Federalist writing, contains the same 

admission—even in the midst of attacking the legitimacy of the 

convention. The Farmer accuses the Annapolis Convention 

launching a plan aimed at “destroying the old constitution, and 

making a new one.”190 The states were duped and fell in line. 

“The states still unsuspecting, and not aware that, they were

passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new conven-

tion, for the sole and express purpose of revising and amen

ing the confederation.”191 The Farmer’s political purpose was 

served by selectively quoting the language used only by two 

states. But his argument about the states being unaware the

were passing the Rubicon applied to all twelve states

including the six that named their delegates and gave them 

their instructions before this phrase was ever drafted in t

Confederation Congress. Again, the Farmer blames the states

for being duped when they gave instructions to their delegates. 

The Anti-Federalist Cato also contended that the process em-

ployed was improper. However, in a classic straw man argume

he decried a process that never happened. According to Cato, “a 

short history of the rise and progress of the Convention” starts 

with Congress determining that there were problems in the Art

cles of Confederation that could be fixed in a convention of 

states.192 He contends that Congress was the initiator and that th

states were in the role of responders.193 All citizens were entitl

to their own opinions, but several Anti-Federalists seemed to be-

lieve they were also entitled to their own facts. 

As we can see, while Anti-Federalists had serious doubts abou

the propriety of the actions of the Convention’s delegates, the

was an overriding acknowledgement within their ranks of o

key legal issue: the sources of the authority for the delegates 

the enactments of each of the several state legislatures. 

                                                                      

  190. Federal Farmer, //Letters to the Republican//, Nov. 8, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 203, 211. 

//  //191//. Id.// 

//  //192//. Cato II//, N.Y.J., Oct. 11, 1787, //reprinted in //19 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 79, 

//  //193//. Id.// at 79–82. 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto098.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**98**

94 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//b.  Federalist Views //

In //Federalist No. 40//, Madison posed the question “whether the 

convention [was] authorized to frame and propose this mixed 

Constitution[?]”194 His response was to the point: “The powers 

of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an 

inspection of the commissions given to the members by their 

respective constituents.”195 Even though Madison discusses the 

language from the Annapolis Report and the Congressional 

Resolution of February 21st, he establishes that his examination 

of those two documents is predicated on the idea that all the 

states essentially followed one formula or the other. Publius 

was clear: the states gave the delegates their instructions.196 

During the debate in the Massachusetts legislature over calling 

a state ratification convention, one Federalist member proclaimed, 

“Twelve States have appointed Deputies for the sole purpose of 

forming a system of federal government, adequate to the purpos-

es of the union.”197 The states gave the instructions, and the lan-

guage he cites is the most common element of all state appoint-

ments.198 John Marshall gave the ultimate answer to Henry’s 

claim that the delegates had exceeded their powers: 

The Convention did not in fact assume any power. They 

have proposed to our consideration a scheme of Govern-

ment which they thought advisable. We are not bound to 

adopt it, if we disapprove of it. Had not every individual in 

this community a right to tender that scheme which he 

thought most conducive to the welfare of his country? Have 

                                                                      

  194. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 

//  //195//. Id.// 

//  //196//. Id.// at 254. 

 197. 

//House Proceedings and Debates of 24 October//, MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, 

//reprinted in //4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 136. 

//  //198//. See A Friend to Good Government//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Apr. 8, 1788, 

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 902, 905 (“[T]he Convention that framed the 

Constitution, in question; they were appointed by the State Legislatures, and em-

powered by the letter of the authority under which they acted . . . .”); Oliver Ells-

worth and William Samuel Johnson, Speeches in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 

4, 1788), //reprinted in //15 DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 243, 249, (“As to the old system, we 

can go no further with it; experience has shewn [sic] it to be utterly inefficient. The 

States were sensible of this, to remedy the evil they appointed the convention.”) 

(statement of William Samuel Johnson). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 95 

 

not several Gentlemen already demonstrated, that the Con-

vention did not exceed their powers?199 

Federalist authors defended the charge that the delegates ex-

ceeded their authority in several publications. Curtius II 

mocked Cato for making the allegation.200 “One of the People,” 

writing in the Pennsylvania Gazette, recited that the delegates 

had been authorized by their states to make alterations—an 

inherent right of the people.201 “A Friend to Good Govern-

ment,” in the Poughkeepsie Country Journal, defended the le-

gitimacy of the convention with an accurate review of the 

events and documents.202 

The most stinging defenses of the legitimacy of the actions of 

the Convention were aimed at New York’s Robert Yates and John 

Lansing, who had left the convention early and had widely at-

tacked the Constitution as the result of unauthorized action. “A 

Dutchess County Farmer” argued that the Convention was: 

[I]mpowered to make such alterations and provisions there-

in, as will render the federal Government (not Confedera-

tion) adequate to the exigencies of the Government and the 

preservation of the Union[.] In the discharge of this im-

portant trust, I am bold to say, that the Convention have not 

                                                                      

  199. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

 200. 

//Curtius II//, N.Y.  DAILY  ADVERTISER, Oct. 18, 1787, //reprinted in// 19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 97, 97–102. 

 201. 

//See One of the People//, PENN.  GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1787, //reprinted in //2 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 186, 189–190 (“The deputies from this state were empowered, they 

had power to make such //alterations// and //further provisions as may be necessary to //

//render the federal government fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union//. Had objec-

tions such as these prevailed, America never would have had a Congress, nor had 

America been independent. Alterations in government are always made by the 

people.”). 

 202. 

//See A Friend to Good Government//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Apr. 8, 1788, 

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 902, 902 (“[T]hey were appointed by the 

State Legislatures, and empowered by the letter of the authority under which they 

acted to report such alterations and amendments in the Confederation as would 

render the federal government adequate to the exigencies of government and //the //

//preservation of the Union//—you will here perceive that the latitude given in the in-

struction, were amply large enough to justify the measures the Convention have 

taken. The objects in view were the welfare and preservation of the Union, and 

their business so far to new model our government as to encompass those ob-

jects.”). 

94 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//b.  Federalist Views //

In //Federalist No. 40//, Madison posed the question “whether the 

convention [was] authorized to frame and propose this mixed 

Constitution[?]”194 His response was to the point: “The powers 

of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an 

inspection of the commissions given to the members by their 

respective constituents.”195 Even though Madison discusses the 

language from the Annapolis Report and the Congressional 

Resolution of February 21st, he establishes that his examination 

of those two documents is predicated on the idea that all the 

states essentially followed one formula or the other. Publius 

was clear: the states gave the delegates their instructions.196 

During the debate in the Massachusetts legislature over calling 

a state ratification convention, one Federalist member proclaimed, 

“Twelve States have appointed Deputies for the sole purpose of 

forming a system of federal government, adequate to the purpos-

es of the union.”197 The states gave the instructions, and the lan-

guage he cites is the most common element of all state appoint-

ments.198 John Marshall gave the ultimate answer to Henry’s 

claim that the delegates had exceeded their powers: 

The Convention did not in fact assume any power. They 

have proposed to our consideration a scheme of Govern-

ment which they thought advisable. We are not bound to 

adopt it, if we disapprove of it. Had not every individual in 

this community a right to tender that scheme which he 

thought most conducive to the welfare of his country? Have 

                                                                      

  194. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 

//  //195//. Id.// 

//  //196//. Id.// at 254. 

 197. 

//House Proceedings and Debates of 24 October//, MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, 

//reprinted in //4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 136. 

//  //198//. See A Friend to Good Government//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Apr. 8, 1788, 

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 902, 905 (“[T]he Convention that framed the 

Constitution, in question; they were appointed by the State Legislatures, and em-

powered by the letter of the authority under which they acted . . . .”); Oliver Ells-

worth and William Samuel Johnson, Speeches in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 

4, 1788), //reprinted in //15 DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 243, 249, (“As to the old system, we 

can go no further with it; experience has shewn [sic] it to be utterly inefficient. The 

States were sensible of this, to remedy the evil they appointed the convention.”) 

(statement of William Samuel Johnson). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

not several Gentlemen already demonstrated, that the Con-

vention did not exceed their powers?199 

Federalist authors defended the charge that the delegates 

ceeded their authority in several publications. Curtius I

mocked Cato for making the allegation.200 “One of the People,

writing in the Pennsylvania Gazette, recited that the delega

had been authorized by their states to make alterations—

inherent right of the people.201 “A Friend to Good Gove

ment,” in the Poughkeepsie Country Journal, defended the le-

gitimacy of the convention with an accurate review of the 

events and documents.202 

The most stinging defenses of the legitimacy of the actions of 

the Convention were aimed at New York’s Robert Yates and Jo

Lansing, who had left the convention early and had widely at-

tacked the Constitution as the result of unauthorized action. “A 

Dutchess County Farmer” argued that the Convention was: 

[I]mpowered to make such alterations and provisions there-

in, as will render the federal Government (not Confedera-

tion) adequate to the exigencies of the Government and the 

preservation of the Union[.] In the discharge of this im-

portant trust, I am bold to say, that the Convention have not 

                                                                      

  199. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra//

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

 200. 

//Curtius II//, N.Y.  DAILY  ADVERTISER, Oct. 18, 1787, //reprinted in// 19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 97, 97–102. 

 201. 

//See One of the People//, PENN.  GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1787, //reprinted in //2 DHR

//supra// note 4, at 186, 189–190 (“The deputies from this state were empowered, they 

had power to make such //alterations// and //further provisions as may be necessary //

//render the federal government fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union//. Had objec-

tions such as these prevailed, America never would have had a Congress, nor ha

America been independent. Alterations in government are always made by the 

people.”). 

 202. 

//See A Friend to Good Government//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Apr. 8, 1788, 

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 902, 902 (“[T]hey were appointed by the 

State Legislatures, and empowered by the letter of the authority under which they 

acted to report such alterations and amendments in the Confederation as woul

render the federal government adequate to the exigencies of government and 

//preservation of the Union//—you will here perceive that the latitude given in the i

struction, were amply large enough to justify the measures the Convention have

taken. The objects in view were the welfare and preservation of the Union, and

their business so far to new model our government as to encompass those 

jects.”). 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto099.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**99**

94 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//b.  Federalist Views //

In //Federalist No. 40//, Madison posed the question “whether the 

convention [was] authorized to frame and propose this mixed 

Constitution[?]”194 His response was to the point: “The powers 

of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an 

inspection of the commissions given to the members by their 

respective constituents.”195 Even though Madison discusses the 

language from the Annapolis Report and the Congressional 

Resolution of February 21st, he establishes that his examination 

of those two documents is predicated on the idea that all the 

states essentially followed one formula or the other. Publius 

was clear: the states gave the delegates their instructions.196 

During the debate in the Massachusetts legislature over calling 

a state ratification convention, one Federalist member proclaimed, 

“Twelve States have appointed Deputies for the sole purpose of 

forming a system of federal government, adequate to the purpos-

es of the union.”197 The states gave the instructions, and the lan-

guage he cites is the most common element of all state appoint-

ments.198 John Marshall gave the ultimate answer to Henry’s 

claim that the delegates had exceeded their powers: 

The Convention did not in fact assume any power. They 

have proposed to our consideration a scheme of Govern-

ment which they thought advisable. We are not bound to 

adopt it, if we disapprove of it. Had not every individual in 

this community a right to tender that scheme which he 

thought most conducive to the welfare of his country? Have 

                                                                      

  194. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 

//  //195//. Id.// 

//  //196//. Id.// at 254. 

 197. 

//House Proceedings and Debates of 24 October//, MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, 

//reprinted in //4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 136. 

//  //198//. See A Friend to Good Government//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Apr. 8, 1788, 

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 902, 905 (“[T]he Convention that framed the 

Constitution, in question; they were appointed by the State Legislatures, and em-

powered by the letter of the authority under which they acted . . . .”); Oliver Ells-

worth and William Samuel Johnson, Speeches in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 

4, 1788), //reprinted in //15 DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 243, 249, (“As to the old system, we 

can go no further with it; experience has shewn [sic] it to be utterly inefficient. The 

States were sensible of this, to remedy the evil they appointed the convention.”) 

(statement of William Samuel Johnson). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 95 

 

not several Gentlemen already demonstrated, that the Con-

vention did not exceed their powers?199 

Federalist authors defended the charge that the delegates ex-

ceeded their authority in several publications. Curtius II 

mocked Cato for making the allegation.200 “One of the People,” 

writing in the Pennsylvania Gazette, recited that the delegates 

had been authorized by their states to make alterations—an 

inherent right of the people.201 “A Friend to Good Govern-

ment,” in the Poughkeepsie Country Journal, defended the le-

gitimacy of the convention with an accurate review of the 

events and documents.202 

The most stinging defenses of the legitimacy of the actions of 

the Convention were aimed at New York’s Robert Yates and John 

Lansing, who had left the convention early and had widely at-

tacked the Constitution as the result of unauthorized action. “A 

Dutchess County Farmer” argued that the Convention was: 

[I]mpowered to make such alterations and provisions there-

in, as will render the federal Government (not Confedera-

tion) adequate to the exigencies of the Government and the 

preservation of the Union[.] In the discharge of this im-

portant trust, I am bold to say, that the Convention have not 

                                                                      

  199. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

 200. 

//Curtius II//, N.Y.  DAILY  ADVERTISER, Oct. 18, 1787, //reprinted in// 19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 97, 97–102. 

 201. 

//See One of the People//, PENN.  GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1787, //reprinted in //2 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 186, 189–190 (“The deputies from this state were empowered, they 

had power to make such //alterations// and //further provisions as may be necessary to //

//render the federal government fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union//. Had objec-

tions such as these prevailed, America never would have had a Congress, nor had 

America been independent. Alterations in government are always made by the 

people.”). 

 202. 

//See A Friend to Good Government//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Apr. 8, 1788, 

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 902, 902 (“[T]hey were appointed by the 

State Legislatures, and empowered by the letter of the authority under which they 

acted to report such alterations and amendments in the Confederation as would 

render the federal government adequate to the exigencies of government and //the //

//preservation of the Union//—you will here perceive that the latitude given in the in-

struction, were amply large enough to justify the measures the Convention have 

taken. The objects in view were the welfare and preservation of the Union, and 

their business so far to new model our government as to encompass those ob-

jects.”). 

94 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//b.  Federalist Views //

In //Federalist No. 40//, Madison posed the question “whether the 

convention [was] authorized to frame and propose this mixed 

Constitution[?]”194 His response was to the point: “The powers 

of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an 

inspection of the commissions given to the members by their 

respective constituents.”195 Even though Madison discusses the 

language from the Annapolis Report and the Congressional 

Resolution of February 21st, he establishes that his examination 

of those two documents is predicated on the idea that all the 

states essentially followed one formula or the other. Publius 

was clear: the states gave the delegates their instructions.196 

During the debate in the Massachusetts legislature over calling 

a state ratification convention, one Federalist member proclaimed, 

“Twelve States have appointed Deputies for the sole purpose of 

forming a system of federal government, adequate to the purpos-

es of the union.”197 The states gave the instructions, and the lan-

guage he cites is the most common element of all state appoint-

ments.198 John Marshall gave the ultimate answer to Henry’s 

claim that the delegates had exceeded their powers: 

The Convention did not in fact assume any power. They 

have proposed to our consideration a scheme of Govern-

ment which they thought advisable. We are not bound to 

adopt it, if we disapprove of it. Had not every individual in 

this community a right to tender that scheme which he 

thought most conducive to the welfare of his country? Have 

                                                                      

  194. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 

//  //195//. Id.// 

//  //196//. Id.// at 254. 

 197. 

//House Proceedings and Debates of 24 October//, MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, 

//reprinted in //4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 136. 

//  //198//. See A Friend to Good Government//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Apr. 8, 1788, 

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 902, 905 (“[T]he Convention that framed the 

Constitution, in question; they were appointed by the State Legislatures, and em-

powered by the letter of the authority under which they acted . . . .”); Oliver Ells-

worth and William Samuel Johnson, Speeches in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 

4, 1788), //reprinted in //15 DHRC, //supra// note 4,// //at 243, 249, (“As to the old system, we 

can go no further with it; experience has shewn [sic] it to be utterly inefficient. The 

States were sensible of this, to remedy the evil they appointed the convention.”) 

(statement of William Samuel Johnson). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

not several Gentlemen already demonstrated, that the Con-

vention did not exceed their powers?199 

Federalist authors defended the charge that the delegates 

ceeded their authority in several publications. Curtius I

mocked Cato for making the allegation.200 “One of the People,

writing in the Pennsylvania Gazette, recited that the delega

had been authorized by their states to make alterations—

inherent right of the people.201 “A Friend to Good Gove

ment,” in the Poughkeepsie Country Journal, defended the le-

gitimacy of the convention with an accurate review of the 

events and documents.202 

The most stinging defenses of the legitimacy of the actions of 

the Convention were aimed at New York’s Robert Yates and Jo

Lansing, who had left the convention early and had widely at-

tacked the Constitution as the result of unauthorized action. “A 

Dutchess County Farmer” argued that the Convention was: 

[I]mpowered to make such alterations and provisions there-

in, as will render the federal Government (not Confedera-

tion) adequate to the exigencies of the Government and the 

preservation of the Union[.] In the discharge of this im-

portant trust, I am bold to say, that the Convention have not 

                                                                      

  199. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra//

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

 200. 

//Curtius II//, N.Y.  DAILY  ADVERTISER, Oct. 18, 1787, //reprinted in// 19 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 97, 97–102. 

 201. 

//See One of the People//, PENN.  GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1787, //reprinted in //2 DHR

//supra// note 4, at 186, 189–190 (“The deputies from this state were empowered, they 

had power to make such //alterations// and //further provisions as may be necessary //

//render the federal government fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union//. Had objec-

tions such as these prevailed, America never would have had a Congress, nor ha

America been independent. Alterations in government are always made by the 

people.”). 

 202. 

//See A Friend to Good Government//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Apr. 8, 1788, 

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 902, 902 (“[T]hey were appointed by the 

State Legislatures, and empowered by the letter of the authority under which they 

acted to report such alterations and amendments in the Confederation as woul

render the federal government adequate to the exigencies of government and 

//preservation of the Union//—you will here perceive that the latitude given in the i

struction, were amply large enough to justify the measures the Convention have

taken. The objects in view were the welfare and preservation of the Union, and

their business so far to new model our government as to encompass those 

jects.”). 



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96 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

gone beyond the spirit and letter of the authority under 

which they acted . . . .203 

But it was the critique of Lansing and Yates that was the most 

contentious charge. They had justified their early exit on the 

basis that it was impractical to establish a general government. 

The Farmer asked: 

[I]f you were convinced of the impracticability of establish-

ing a general Government, what lead you to a Convention 

appointed for the sole and express purpose of establishing 

one; //could you suppose it was the intention of the Legislature// to 

send you to Philadelphia, to stalk down through Water 

street, cross over by the way of Chesnut, into Second street, 

and so return to Albany? [T]he public are well acquainted 

with what you have not done. Now good Sirs, in the name 

of humanity, tell us what you have done, or do you suppose 

that the //limited and well defined powers under which you acted//, 

made your business only //negative?//204// //

Lansing and Yates were also strongly criticized by “A Citizen” 

writing in the Lansingburg Northern Centinel: 

The powers given to the Convention were for the purpose of 

proposing amendments to an old Constitution; and I con-

ceive, with powers so defined, if this body saw the necessity 

of amending the whole, as well as any of its parts, which 

they undoubtedly had an equal right to do, thence it follows, 

that an amendment of every article from the first to the last, 

inclusive, is such a one as is comprehended within the pow-

ers of the Convention, and differs only from an entire new 

Constitution in this, that the one is an old one made new, the 

other new originally.205 

“The Citizen” turned out to be a lawyer from Albany named 

George Metcalf.206 Lansing and Yates were so incensed at his 

effective attacks on their actions and character that they 

commenced a legal action against him.207 They also sought, 

                                                                      

 203. 

//A Dutchess County Farmer//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Feb. 26, 1788, //reprint-//

//ed in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 815, 816. 

//  //204//. Id.// at 817. 

 205. 

//A Citizen//, LANSINGBURGH NORTHERN CENTINEL, Jan. 29, 1788, //reprinted in// 

20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 674, 676–77. 

//  //206//. See id.// at 674. 

 207. 

//George Metcalf Defends Himself//, ALBANY  J., Mar. 1, 1788, //reprinted in //20 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 832, 832–33. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 97 

 

apparently unsuccessfully, to determine the identity of the 

Duchess County Farmer.208 

The charge that the Convention exceeded its authority was 

leveled in state legislatures, ratification conventions, and in 

the public debates in the papers. In every one of those ven-

ues, the Federalists responded to the charges with timely 

and effective arguments. The overwhelming evidence is that 

the Federalists believed that they had repeatedly and suc-

cessfully defeated these claims. As John Marshall said: 

“Have not several Gentlemen already demonstrated, that the 

Convention did not exceed their powers?”209 

//3.  Was the Convention unlawful from the beginning? //

The most extreme Anti-Federalist argument was proffered by 

Abraham Yates, Jr., of New York. He argued that every stage of 

the process was illegal. The New York legislature violated the 

state constitution, when on February 19th, 1787, it voted to in-

struct the state’s delegates in Congress to recommend a conven-

tion to propose amendments to the articles.210 Congress violated 

Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation when it voted on Feb-

ruary 21st “to recommend a convention to the several legisla-

tures.”211 The New York Senate and Assembly violated the state 

constitution yet again, he contended, by voting on March 27th to 

appoint delegates to the convention in Philadelphia.212 

Yates continued the list of alleged violations to include the Sep-

tember 17th vote of the Convention to approve the Constitution, 

the refusal of Congress to defeat the Constitution on September 

28th, and the action of the New York legislature in February 1788 

to call the ratification convention.213 Yates’ argument was not 

based on the parsing of the language of state instructions and 

congressional resolutions. He contended that “to attempt a con-

solidation of the union and utterly destroy the confederation, and \\
                                                                      

//  //208//. See// Letter from Abraham G. Lansing to Abraham Yates, Jr. (Mar. 2, 1788), 

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 835. 

  209. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

 210. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153, 

1156. 

//  //211//. Id.// 

//  //212//. Id.// at 1156–57. 

//  //213//. Id.// at 1157. 

96 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

gone beyond the spirit and letter of the authority under 

which they acted . . . .203 

But it was the critique of Lansing and Yates that was the most 

contentious charge. They had justified their early exit on the 

basis that it was impractical to establish a general government. 

The Farmer asked: 

[I]f you were convinced of the impracticability of establish-

ing a general Government, what lead you to a Convention 

appointed for the sole and express purpose of establishing 

one; //could you suppose it was the intention of the Legislature// to 

send you to Philadelphia, to stalk down through Water 

street, cross over by the way of Chesnut, into Second street, 

and so return to Albany? [T]he public are well acquainted 

with what you have not done. Now good Sirs, in the name 

of humanity, tell us what you have done, or do you suppose 

that the //limited and well defined powers under which you acted//, 

made your business only //negative?//204// //

Lansing and Yates were also strongly criticized by “A Citizen” 

writing in the Lansingburg Northern Centinel: 

The powers given to the Convention were for the purpose of 

proposing amendments to an old Constitution; and I con-

ceive, with powers so defined, if this body saw the necessity 

of amending the whole, as well as any of its parts, which 

they undoubtedly had an equal right to do, thence it follows, 

that an amendment of every article from the first to the last, 

inclusive, is such a one as is comprehended within the pow-

ers of the Convention, and differs only from an entire new 

Constitution in this, that the one is an old one made new, the 

other new originally.205 

“The Citizen” turned out to be a lawyer from Albany named 

George Metcalf.206 Lansing and Yates were so incensed at his 

effective attacks on their actions and character that they 

commenced a legal action against him.207 They also sought, 

                                                                      

 203. 

//A Dutchess County Farmer//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Feb. 26, 1788, //reprint-//

//ed in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 815, 816. 

//  //204//. Id.// at 817. 

 205. 

//A Citizen//, LANSINGBURGH NORTHERN CENTINEL, Jan. 29, 1788, //reprinted in// 

20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 674, 676–77. 

//  //206//. See id.// at 674. 

 207. 

//George Metcalf Defends Himself//, ALBANY  J., Mar. 1, 1788, //reprinted in //20 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 832, 832–33. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

apparently unsuccessfully, to determine the identity of t

Duchess County Farmer.208 

The charge that the Convention exceeded its authority wa

leveled in state legislatures, ratification conventions, and

the public debates in the papers. In every one of those ve

ues, the Federalists responded to the charges with time

and effective arguments. The overwhelming evidence is that 

the Federalists believed that they had repeatedly and su

cessfully defeated these claims. As John Marshall sa

“Have not several Gentlemen already demonstrated, that t

Convention did not exceed their powers?”209 

//3.  Was the Convention unlawful from the beginning? //

The most extreme Anti-Federalist argument was proffered 

Abraham Yates, Jr., of New York. He argued that every stage

the process was illegal. The New York legislature violated the 

state constitution, when on February 19th, 1787, it voted to i

struct the state’s delegates in Congress to recommend a conve

tion to propose amendments to the articles.210 Congress violated 

Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation when it voted on F

ruary 21st “to recommend a convention to the several legisla-

tures.”211 The New York Senate and Assembly violated the st

constitution yet again, he contended, by voting on March 27th

appoint delegates to the convention in Philadelphia.212 

Yates continued the list of alleged violations to include the Se

tember 17th vote of the Convention to approve the Constitution,

the refusal of Congress to defeat the Constitution on September 

28th, and the action of the New York legislature in February 1788

to call the ratification convention.213 Yates’ argument was n

based on the parsing of the language of state instructions an

congressional resolutions. He contended that “to attempt a co

solidation of the union and utterly destroy the confederation, a\\
                                                                      

//  //208//. See// Letter from Abraham G. Lansing to Abraham Yates, Jr. (Mar. 2, 1788)

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 835. 

  209. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra//

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

 210. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153

1156. 

//  //211//. Id.// 

//  //212//. Id.// at 1156–57. 

//  //213//. Id.// at 1157. 



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**101**

96 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

gone beyond the spirit and letter of the authority under 

which they acted . . . .203 

But it was the critique of Lansing and Yates that was the most 

contentious charge. They had justified their early exit on the 

basis that it was impractical to establish a general government. 

The Farmer asked: 

[I]f you were convinced of the impracticability of establish-

ing a general Government, what lead you to a Convention 

appointed for the sole and express purpose of establishing 

one; //could you suppose it was the intention of the Legislature// to 

send you to Philadelphia, to stalk down through Water 

street, cross over by the way of Chesnut, into Second street, 

and so return to Albany? [T]he public are well acquainted 

with what you have not done. Now good Sirs, in the name 

of humanity, tell us what you have done, or do you suppose 

that the //limited and well defined powers under which you acted//, 

made your business only //negative?//204// //

Lansing and Yates were also strongly criticized by “A Citizen” 

writing in the Lansingburg Northern Centinel: 

The powers given to the Convention were for the purpose of 

proposing amendments to an old Constitution; and I con-

ceive, with powers so defined, if this body saw the necessity 

of amending the whole, as well as any of its parts, which 

they undoubtedly had an equal right to do, thence it follows, 

that an amendment of every article from the first to the last, 

inclusive, is such a one as is comprehended within the pow-

ers of the Convention, and differs only from an entire new 

Constitution in this, that the one is an old one made new, the 

other new originally.205 

“The Citizen” turned out to be a lawyer from Albany named 

George Metcalf.206 Lansing and Yates were so incensed at his 

effective attacks on their actions and character that they 

commenced a legal action against him.207 They also sought, 

                                                                      

 203. 

//A Dutchess County Farmer//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Feb. 26, 1788, //reprint-//

//ed in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 815, 816. 

//  //204//. Id.// at 817. 

 205. 

//A Citizen//, LANSINGBURGH NORTHERN CENTINEL, Jan. 29, 1788, //reprinted in// 

20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 674, 676–77. 

//  //206//. See id.// at 674. 

 207. 

//George Metcalf Defends Himself//, ALBANY  J., Mar. 1, 1788, //reprinted in //20 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 832, 832–33. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 97 

 

apparently unsuccessfully, to determine the identity of the 

Duchess County Farmer.208 

The charge that the Convention exceeded its authority was 

leveled in state legislatures, ratification conventions, and in 

the public debates in the papers. In every one of those ven-

ues, the Federalists responded to the charges with timely 

and effective arguments. The overwhelming evidence is that 

the Federalists believed that they had repeatedly and suc-

cessfully defeated these claims. As John Marshall said: 

“Have not several Gentlemen already demonstrated, that the 

Convention did not exceed their powers?”209 

//3.  Was the Convention unlawful from the beginning? //

The most extreme Anti-Federalist argument was proffered by 

Abraham Yates, Jr., of New York. He argued that every stage of 

the process was illegal. The New York legislature violated the 

state constitution, when on February 19th, 1787, it voted to in-

struct the state’s delegates in Congress to recommend a conven-

tion to propose amendments to the articles.210 Congress violated 

Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation when it voted on Feb-

ruary 21st “to recommend a convention to the several legisla-

tures.”211 The New York Senate and Assembly violated the state 

constitution yet again, he contended, by voting on March 27th to 

appoint delegates to the convention in Philadelphia.212 

Yates continued the list of alleged violations to include the Sep-

tember 17th vote of the Convention to approve the Constitution, 

the refusal of Congress to defeat the Constitution on September 

28th, and the action of the New York legislature in February 1788 

to call the ratification convention.213 Yates’ argument was not 

based on the parsing of the language of state instructions and 

congressional resolutions. He contended that “to attempt a con-

solidation of the union and utterly destroy the confederation, and \\
                                                                      

//  //208//. See// Letter from Abraham G. Lansing to Abraham Yates, Jr. (Mar. 2, 1788), 

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 835. 

  209. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

 210. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153, 

1156. 

//  //211//. Id.// 

//  //212//. Id.// at 1156–57. 

//  //213//. Id.// at 1157. 

96 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

gone beyond the spirit and letter of the authority under 

which they acted . . . .203 

But it was the critique of Lansing and Yates that was the most 

contentious charge. They had justified their early exit on the 

basis that it was impractical to establish a general government. 

The Farmer asked: 

[I]f you were convinced of the impracticability of establish-

ing a general Government, what lead you to a Convention 

appointed for the sole and express purpose of establishing 

one; //could you suppose it was the intention of the Legislature// to 

send you to Philadelphia, to stalk down through Water 

street, cross over by the way of Chesnut, into Second street, 

and so return to Albany? [T]he public are well acquainted 

with what you have not done. Now good Sirs, in the name 

of humanity, tell us what you have done, or do you suppose 

that the //limited and well defined powers under which you acted//, 

made your business only //negative?//204// //

Lansing and Yates were also strongly criticized by “A Citizen” 

writing in the Lansingburg Northern Centinel: 

The powers given to the Convention were for the purpose of 

proposing amendments to an old Constitution; and I con-

ceive, with powers so defined, if this body saw the necessity 

of amending the whole, as well as any of its parts, which 

they undoubtedly had an equal right to do, thence it follows, 

that an amendment of every article from the first to the last, 

inclusive, is such a one as is comprehended within the pow-

ers of the Convention, and differs only from an entire new 

Constitution in this, that the one is an old one made new, the 

other new originally.205 

“The Citizen” turned out to be a lawyer from Albany named 

George Metcalf.206 Lansing and Yates were so incensed at his 

effective attacks on their actions and character that they 

commenced a legal action against him.207 They also sought, 

                                                                      

 203. 

//A Dutchess County Farmer//, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Feb. 26, 1788, //reprint-//

//ed in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 815, 816. 

//  //204//. Id.// at 817. 

 205. 

//A Citizen//, LANSINGBURGH NORTHERN CENTINEL, Jan. 29, 1788, //reprinted in// 

20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 674, 676–77. 

//  //206//. See id.// at 674. 

 207. 

//George Metcalf Defends Himself//, ALBANY  J., Mar. 1, 1788, //reprinted in //20 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 832, 832–33. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

apparently unsuccessfully, to determine the identity of t

Duchess County Farmer.208 

The charge that the Convention exceeded its authority wa

leveled in state legislatures, ratification conventions, and

the public debates in the papers. In every one of those ve

ues, the Federalists responded to the charges with time

and effective arguments. The overwhelming evidence is that 

the Federalists believed that they had repeatedly and su

cessfully defeated these claims. As John Marshall sa

“Have not several Gentlemen already demonstrated, that t

Convention did not exceed their powers?”209 

//3.  Was the Convention unlawful from the beginning? //

The most extreme Anti-Federalist argument was proffered 

Abraham Yates, Jr., of New York. He argued that every stage

the process was illegal. The New York legislature violated the 

state constitution, when on February 19th, 1787, it voted to i

struct the state’s delegates in Congress to recommend a conve

tion to propose amendments to the articles.210 Congress violated 

Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation when it voted on F

ruary 21st “to recommend a convention to the several legisla-

tures.”211 The New York Senate and Assembly violated the st

constitution yet again, he contended, by voting on March 27th

appoint delegates to the convention in Philadelphia.212 

Yates continued the list of alleged violations to include the Se

tember 17th vote of the Convention to approve the Constitution,

the refusal of Congress to defeat the Constitution on September 

28th, and the action of the New York legislature in February 1788

to call the ratification convention.213 Yates’ argument was n

based on the parsing of the language of state instructions an

congressional resolutions. He contended that “to attempt a co

solidation of the union and utterly destroy the confederation, a\\
                                                                      

//  //208//. See// Letter from Abraham G. Lansing to Abraham Yates, Jr. (Mar. 2, 1788)

//reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 835. 

  209. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra//

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

 210. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153

1156. 

//  //211//. Id.// 

//  //212//. Id.// at 1156–57. 

//  //213//. Id.// at 1157. 



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**102**

98 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

the sovereignty of particular states” was beyond the authority 

granted to any state legislature in their respective constitutions 

and beyond the power of Congress in the Articles of Confedera-

tion.214 To justify the kind of government created by the Constitu-

tion, Yates apparently believed that the people of every state 

would first need to amend their state constitutions to give their 

legislatures the power to enter into such a government. Then the 

states would be authorized to direct their delegates in Congress to 

propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation in accord 

with the new state constitutional provisions.  Finally, Congress 

would be required to approve the new measure followed by the 

unanimous consent of the legislatures of every state. This position 

was echoed in delegate instructions drafted by the town of Great 

Barrington, Massachusetts215—a community that was at the center 

of Shay’s Rebellion.216 

Yates does help us understand the true nature of the Anti-

Federalist argument. They were not contending that they ex-

pected a series of discrete amendments to the Articles of Con-

federation. The New Jersey Plan would have also required a 

wholesale revision of that document. Anti-Federalists contend-

ed that no one was authorized at any point to adopt a govern-

ment that was national rather than federal in character.217 The 

Convention was condemned not for creating a whole new doc-

ument, but for creating a government with a new nature. Anti-

Federalists conceded the key procedural points—the states 

called the convention and the states gave their delegates their 

instructions. To have contended otherwise would have turned 

Anti-Federalist doctrine on its head. Advocates for state su-

premacy simply could not argue that Congress had an implied 

power to call a convention and that the states’ delegates were 

bound to follow the will of Congress. Contemporary practice 

was exactly the opposite. State legislatures routinely instructed 

their delegations in Congress.218 No one would have the audac-

                                                                      

//  //214//. Id.// 

  215. Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 959. 

  216. Stephen T. Riley, //Dr. William Whiting and Shays’ Rebellion//, 66 PROC. OF THE 

AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 119, 120 (1957). 

//  //217//. See, e.g., //1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 34, 42–43. 

 218. 

//See, e.g.//, 5 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 231–34 (William T. Hutchinson et 

al. eds., 1962). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 99 

 

ity to contend the reverse was true—especially not a self-

respecting Anti-Federalist. 

//4.  The “Runaway Convention” theory was tested and rejected //

The Anti-Federalists’ claim that the delegates to the Conven-

tion exceeded their authority was put to a vote in New York 

and Massachusetts—the only two states that tracked the con-

gressional language in their delegates’ instructions. 

The New York legislature was decidedly anti-reform—it 

systematically rejected amendments to the Articles of Con-

federation and had done its best to derail the Philadelphia 

Convention by proposing a limited alternative in Con-

gress.219 It is unsurprising, therefore, that there was a motion 

in the New York legislature to condemn the work of the 

Constitutional Convention as an //ultra vires// proposal. On 

January 31st, 1788, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker and Samuel 

Jones proposed a resolution which recited that “the Senate 

and Assembly of this State” had “appointed Delegates” to 

the Philadelphia convention “for the sole and express pur-

pose of revising the articles of confederation.”220 To this 

point, the resolution was correct since it focused solely on 

the language employed by the New York legislature. How-

ever, the resolution then claimed that the “Delegates from 

several of the States” met in Philadelphia “for the purpose 

aforesaid.”221 Based on this inaccurate recitation of the cre-

dentials from the other states, the resolution claimed that 

“instead of revising and reporting alterations and provisions 

in the Articles of Confederation” the delegates “have report-

ed a new Constitution for the United States” which “will ma-

terially alter the Constitution and Government of this 

State.”222 A contentious debate ensued, but ultimately the 

legislature of this Anti-Federalist-leaning state defeated the 

motion by a vote of 27 to 25.223 

                                                                      

 219. 

//See// //supra// notes 81–84 and accompanying text; 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, 

//supra //note 70, at 72–73.   

  220. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

703, 703. 

//  //221//. Id.// 

//  //222//. Id.// at 704. 

//  //223//. Id. //

98 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

the sovereignty of particular states” was beyond the authority 

granted to any state legislature in their respective constitutions 

and beyond the power of Congress in the Articles of Confedera-

tion.214 To justify the kind of government created by the Constitu-

tion, Yates apparently believed that the people of every state 

would first need to amend their state constitutions to give their 

legislatures the power to enter into such a government. Then the 

states would be authorized to direct their delegates in Congress to 

propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation in accord 

with the new state constitutional provisions.  Finally, Congress 

would be required to approve the new measure followed by the 

unanimous consent of the legislatures of every state. This position 

was echoed in delegate instructions drafted by the town of Great 

Barrington, Massachusetts215—a community that was at the center 

of Shay’s Rebellion.216 

Yates does help us understand the true nature of the Anti-

Federalist argument. They were not contending that they ex-

pected a series of discrete amendments to the Articles of Con-

federation. The New Jersey Plan would have also required a 

wholesale revision of that document. Anti-Federalists contend-

ed that no one was authorized at any point to adopt a govern-

ment that was national rather than federal in character.217 The 

Convention was condemned not for creating a whole new doc-

ument, but for creating a government with a new nature. Anti-

Federalists conceded the key procedural points—the states 

called the convention and the states gave their delegates their 

instructions. To have contended otherwise would have turned 

Anti-Federalist doctrine on its head. Advocates for state su-

premacy simply could not argue that Congress had an implied 

power to call a convention and that the states’ delegates were 

bound to follow the will of Congress. Contemporary practice 

was exactly the opposite. State legislatures routinely instructed 

their delegations in Congress.218 No one would have the audac-

                                                                      

//  //214//. Id.// 

  215. Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 959. 

  216. Stephen T. Riley, //Dr. William Whiting and Shays’ Rebellion//, 66 PROC. OF THE 

AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 119, 120 (1957). 

//  //217//. See, e.g., //1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 34, 42–43. 

 218. 

//See, e.g.//, 5 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 231–34 (William T. Hutchinson et 

al. eds., 1962). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

ity to contend the reverse was true—especially not a self-

respecting Anti-Federalist. 

//4.  The “Runaway Convention” theory was tested and rejected //

The Anti-Federalists’ claim that the delegates to the Conven-

tion exceeded their authority was put to a vote in New York 

and Massachusetts—the only two states that tracked the con-

gressional language in their delegates’ instructions. 

The New York legislature was decidedly anti-reform—it

systematically rejected amendments to the Articles of Con-

federation and had done its best to derail the Philadelphia

Convention by proposing a limited alternative in Con-

gress.219 It is unsurprising, therefore, that there was a motion

in the New York legislature to condemn the work of the

Constitutional Convention as an //ultra vires// proposal. On 

January 31st, 1788, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker and Samu

Jones proposed a resolution which recited that “the Senat

and Assembly of this State” had “appointed Delegates” t

the Philadelphia convention “for the sole and express pur-

pose of revising the articles of confederation.”220 To th

point, the resolution was correct since it focused solely 

the language employed by the New York legislature. Ho

ever, the resolution then claimed that the “Delegates from

several of the States” met in Philadelphia “for the purpos

aforesaid.”221 Based on this inaccurate recitation of the cre-

dentials from the other states, the resolution claimed that 

“instead of revising and reporting alterations and provisio

in the Articles of Confederation” the delegates “have report-

ed a new Constitution for the United States” which “will ma-

terially alter the Constitution and Government of this 

State.”222 A contentious debate ensued, but ultimately th

legislature of this Anti-Federalist-leaning state defeated the 

motion by a vote of 27 to 25.223 

                                                                      

 219. 

//See// //supra// notes 81–84 and accompanying text; 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS

//supra //note 70, at 72–73.   

  220. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note

703, 703. 

//  //221//. Id.// 

//  //222//. Id.// at 704. 

//  //223//. Id. //



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto103.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**103**

98 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

the sovereignty of particular states” was beyond the authority 

granted to any state legislature in their respective constitutions 

and beyond the power of Congress in the Articles of Confedera-

tion.214 To justify the kind of government created by the Constitu-

tion, Yates apparently believed that the people of every state 

would first need to amend their state constitutions to give their 

legislatures the power to enter into such a government. Then the 

states would be authorized to direct their delegates in Congress to 

propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation in accord 

with the new state constitutional provisions.  Finally, Congress 

would be required to approve the new measure followed by the 

unanimous consent of the legislatures of every state. This position 

was echoed in delegate instructions drafted by the town of Great 

Barrington, Massachusetts215—a community that was at the center 

of Shay’s Rebellion.216 

Yates does help us understand the true nature of the Anti-

Federalist argument. They were not contending that they ex-

pected a series of discrete amendments to the Articles of Con-

federation. The New Jersey Plan would have also required a 

wholesale revision of that document. Anti-Federalists contend-

ed that no one was authorized at any point to adopt a govern-

ment that was national rather than federal in character.217 The 

Convention was condemned not for creating a whole new doc-

ument, but for creating a government with a new nature. Anti-

Federalists conceded the key procedural points—the states 

called the convention and the states gave their delegates their 

instructions. To have contended otherwise would have turned 

Anti-Federalist doctrine on its head. Advocates for state su-

premacy simply could not argue that Congress had an implied 

power to call a convention and that the states’ delegates were 

bound to follow the will of Congress. Contemporary practice 

was exactly the opposite. State legislatures routinely instructed 

their delegations in Congress.218 No one would have the audac-

                                                                      

//  //214//. Id.// 

  215. Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 959. 

  216. Stephen T. Riley, //Dr. William Whiting and Shays’ Rebellion//, 66 PROC. OF THE 

AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 119, 120 (1957). 

//  //217//. See, e.g., //1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 34, 42–43. 

 218. 

//See, e.g.//, 5 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 231–34 (William T. Hutchinson et 

al. eds., 1962). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 99 

 

ity to contend the reverse was true—especially not a self-

respecting Anti-Federalist. 

//4.  The “Runaway Convention” theory was tested and rejected //

The Anti-Federalists’ claim that the delegates to the Conven-

tion exceeded their authority was put to a vote in New York 

and Massachusetts—the only two states that tracked the con-

gressional language in their delegates’ instructions. 

The New York legislature was decidedly anti-reform—it 

systematically rejected amendments to the Articles of Con-

federation and had done its best to derail the Philadelphia 

Convention by proposing a limited alternative in Con-

gress.219 It is unsurprising, therefore, that there was a motion 

in the New York legislature to condemn the work of the 

Constitutional Convention as an //ultra vires// proposal. On 

January 31st, 1788, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker and Samuel 

Jones proposed a resolution which recited that “the Senate 

and Assembly of this State” had “appointed Delegates” to 

the Philadelphia convention “for the sole and express pur-

pose of revising the articles of confederation.”220 To this 

point, the resolution was correct since it focused solely on 

the language employed by the New York legislature. How-

ever, the resolution then claimed that the “Delegates from 

several of the States” met in Philadelphia “for the purpose 

aforesaid.”221 Based on this inaccurate recitation of the cre-

dentials from the other states, the resolution claimed that 

“instead of revising and reporting alterations and provisions 

in the Articles of Confederation” the delegates “have report-

ed a new Constitution for the United States” which “will ma-

terially alter the Constitution and Government of this 

State.”222 A contentious debate ensued, but ultimately the 

legislature of this Anti-Federalist-leaning state defeated the 

motion by a vote of 27 to 25.223 

                                                                      

 219. 

//See// //supra// notes 81–84 and accompanying text; 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, 

//supra //note 70, at 72–73.   

  220. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

703, 703. 

//  //221//. Id.// 

//  //222//. Id.// at 704. 

//  //223//. Id. //

98 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

the sovereignty of particular states” was beyond the authority 

granted to any state legislature in their respective constitutions 

and beyond the power of Congress in the Articles of Confedera-

tion.214 To justify the kind of government created by the Constitu-

tion, Yates apparently believed that the people of every state 

would first need to amend their state constitutions to give their 

legislatures the power to enter into such a government. Then the 

states would be authorized to direct their delegates in Congress to 

propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation in accord 

with the new state constitutional provisions.  Finally, Congress 

would be required to approve the new measure followed by the 

unanimous consent of the legislatures of every state. This position 

was echoed in delegate instructions drafted by the town of Great 

Barrington, Massachusetts215—a community that was at the center 

of Shay’s Rebellion.216 

Yates does help us understand the true nature of the Anti-

Federalist argument. They were not contending that they ex-

pected a series of discrete amendments to the Articles of Con-

federation. The New Jersey Plan would have also required a 

wholesale revision of that document. Anti-Federalists contend-

ed that no one was authorized at any point to adopt a govern-

ment that was national rather than federal in character.217 The 

Convention was condemned not for creating a whole new doc-

ument, but for creating a government with a new nature. Anti-

Federalists conceded the key procedural points—the states 

called the convention and the states gave their delegates their 

instructions. To have contended otherwise would have turned 

Anti-Federalist doctrine on its head. Advocates for state su-

premacy simply could not argue that Congress had an implied 

power to call a convention and that the states’ delegates were 

bound to follow the will of Congress. Contemporary practice 

was exactly the opposite. State legislatures routinely instructed 

their delegations in Congress.218 No one would have the audac-

                                                                      

//  //214//. Id.// 

  215. Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //5 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 959. 

  216. Stephen T. Riley, //Dr. William Whiting and Shays’ Rebellion//, 66 PROC. OF THE 

AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOC’Y 119, 120 (1957). 

//  //217//. See, e.g., //1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 34, 42–43. 

 218. 

//See, e.g.//, 5 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 231–34 (William T. Hutchinson et 

al. eds., 1962). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 

 

ity to contend the reverse was true—especially not a self-

respecting Anti-Federalist. 

//4.  The “Runaway Convention” theory was tested and rejected //

The Anti-Federalists’ claim that the delegates to the Conven-

tion exceeded their authority was put to a vote in New York 

and Massachusetts—the only two states that tracked the con-

gressional language in their delegates’ instructions. 

The New York legislature was decidedly anti-reform—it

systematically rejected amendments to the Articles of Con-

federation and had done its best to derail the Philadelphia

Convention by proposing a limited alternative in Con-

gress.219 It is unsurprising, therefore, that there was a motion

in the New York legislature to condemn the work of the

Constitutional Convention as an //ultra vires// proposal. On 

January 31st, 1788, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker and Samu

Jones proposed a resolution which recited that “the Senat

and Assembly of this State” had “appointed Delegates” t

the Philadelphia convention “for the sole and express pur-

pose of revising the articles of confederation.”220 To th

point, the resolution was correct since it focused solely 

the language employed by the New York legislature. Ho

ever, the resolution then claimed that the “Delegates from

several of the States” met in Philadelphia “for the purpos

aforesaid.”221 Based on this inaccurate recitation of the cre-

dentials from the other states, the resolution claimed that 

“instead of revising and reporting alterations and provisio

in the Articles of Confederation” the delegates “have report-

ed a new Constitution for the United States” which “will ma-

terially alter the Constitution and Government of this 

State.”222 A contentious debate ensued, but ultimately th

legislature of this Anti-Federalist-leaning state defeated the 

motion by a vote of 27 to 25.223 

                                                                      

 219. 

//See// //supra// notes 81–84 and accompanying text; 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS

//supra //note 70, at 72–73.   

  220. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note

703, 703. 

//  //221//. Id.// 

//  //222//. Id.// at 704. 

//  //223//. Id. //



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**104**

100 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

A similar debate arose in the Massachusetts legislature. Dr. 

Kilham argued that the Convention had “assum[ed] powers not 

delegated to them by their commission.”224 Immediately thereaf-

ter the Massachusetts House voted to call the ratification con-

vention by a vote of 129 to 32.225 A more specific resolution was 

made in the Massachusetts ratification convention. “Mr. Bishop” 

from Rehoboth, moved to “strike out all that related to the Con-

stitution” and to “insert a clause” in which “the General Con-

vention was charged with exceeding their powers & recom-

mending measures which might involve the Country in 

blood.”226 The motion was defeated by a vote of “90 & od to 50 & 

od.”227 The final ratification by Massachusetts recites that the 

people of the United States had the opportunity to enter into “an 

explicit & solemn Compact” “without fraud or surprise.”228 

In addition to these formal defeats in the very states that had 

relied on the restrictive language from Congress, an Anti-

Federalist critic penned an article in the New York Daily Ad-

vertiser that demonstrated that the general public in that city 

rejected these claims. “Curtiopolis” claimed that the “Conven-

tion were delegated to //amend// our political Constitution, instead 

of which they //altered it//.”229 He accused the delegates of “detest-

able //hypocricy//” and claimed that “their deeds were //evil//.”230 Fo-

cusing in on Alexander Hamilton, Curtiopolis urged the read-

ers “to take good notice of that vile conspirator, //the author of //

//Publius//: I think he might be impeached for high treason: he 

continues to do infinite mischief //among readers: //this whole city, 

except about forty [or] fifty of us, are all bewitched with him, 

and he is a playing the very devil elsewhere.”231 This Anti-

Federalist writer openly admitted that only forty or fifty people 

in New York City agreed with his strident position—the rest of 

the population were “bewitched.” \\
                                                                      

  224. MASS.  CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 

135. 

//  //225//. Id.// at 138. 

  226. Letter from Nathaniel Gorham to Henry Knox (Mar. 9, 1788), //reprinted// //in //7 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1673, 1674. 

//  //227//. Id.// 

  228. 16 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at 68. 

 229. 

//Curtiopolis//, N.Y.  DAILY  ADVERTISER, Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 625, 625. 

//  //230//. Id.// at 625–26. 

//  //231//. Id.// at 628. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 101 

 

While it is clear that the allegation of //ultra vires //action was 

widely asserted, this view was decisively rejected in the two 

states that had the only plausible basis for raising the conten-

tion. It was a minority view, often accompanied by inflamma-

tory charges against the delegates to the Convention. 

II.  WAS THE CONSTITUTION PROPERLY RATIFIED? 

The most common modern attack against the legitimacy of 

the Constitution has been addressed—the delegates did not 

exceed the authority granted to them by their states. Neither 

Federalists nor Anti-Federalists contended that the calling of 

the Convention was premised on the language of Article XIII of 

the Articles of Confederation. But, when critics of the Constitu-

tion’s adoption turn to the ratification process, they suddenly 

shift gears. They claim the Constitution was not properly rati-

fied when it was adopted because the process found in Article 

XIII was not followed. This Article specified that amendments 

had to be ratified by all thirteen states—rather than being ap-

proved by specially called conventions in just nine states. 

Logically, if the Convention was not called under the authority 

of the Articles to begin with, as most concede, it makes little sense 

to argue that the Convention needed to follow the ratification 

process contained therein. This confusion is understandable be-

cause, prior to the Convention, the clear expectation was that the 

work product from Philadelphia would be first sent to Congress 

and then would be adopted only when ratified by all thirteen leg-

islatures. But, as we see below, the source of this rule was not Ar-

ticle XIII, but the resolutions from the states, which had called the 

Convention and given instructions to their delegates. 

However, we will also discover that most critics have over-

looked two important steps taken in the process of adopting 

the Constitution. The Convention enacted two formal 

measures. One was the Constitution itself. The second was a 

formal proposal concerning a change in the ratification process. 

Congress and all thirteen state legislatures approved this 

change in process. The expected process was used to approve a 

process designed to obtain the consent of the governed. This 

two-stage endeavor was aimed to satisfy both the legal re-

quirements from the old system and the moral claim that the 

Constitution should be approved by the people themselves. 

100 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

A similar debate arose in the Massachusetts legislature. Dr. 

Kilham argued that the Convention had “assum[ed] powers not 

delegated to them by their commission.”224 Immediately thereaf-

ter the Massachusetts House voted to call the ratification con-

vention by a vote of 129 to 32.225 A more specific resolution was 

made in the Massachusetts ratification convention. “Mr. Bishop” 

from Rehoboth, moved to “strike out all that related to the Con-

stitution” and to “insert a clause” in which “the General Con-

vention was charged with exceeding their powers & recom-

mending measures which might involve the Country in 

blood.”226 The motion was defeated by a vote of “90 & od to 50 & 

od.”227 The final ratification by Massachusetts recites that the 

people of the United States had the opportunity to enter into “an 

explicit & solemn Compact” “without fraud or surprise.”228 

In addition to these formal defeats in the very states that had 

relied on the restrictive language from Congress, an Anti-

Federalist critic penned an article in the New York Daily Ad-

vertiser that demonstrated that the general public in that city 

rejected these claims. “Curtiopolis” claimed that the “Conven-

tion were delegated to //amend// our political Constitution, instead 

of which they //altered it//.”229 He accused the delegates of “detest-

able //hypocricy//” and claimed that “their deeds were //evil//.”230 Fo-

cusing in on Alexander Hamilton, Curtiopolis urged the read-

ers “to take good notice of that vile conspirator, //the author of //

//Publius//: I think he might be impeached for high treason: he 

continues to do infinite mischief //among readers: //this whole city, 

except about forty [or] fifty of us, are all bewitched with him, 

and he is a playing the very devil elsewhere.”231 This Anti-

Federalist writer openly admitted that only forty or fifty people 

in New York City agreed with his strident position—the rest of 

the population were “bewitched.” \\
                                                                      

  224. MASS.  CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 

135. 

//  //225//. Id.// at 138. 

  226. Letter from Nathaniel Gorham to Henry Knox (Mar. 9, 1788), //reprinted// //in //7 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1673, 1674. 

//  //227//. Id.// 

  228. 16 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at 68. 

 229. 

//Curtiopolis//, N.Y.  DAILY  ADVERTISER, Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 625, 625. 

//  //230//. Id.// at 625–26. 

//  //231//. Id.// at 628. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 101

 

While it is clear that the allegation of //ultra vires //action was

widely asserted, this view was decisively rejected in the two 

states that had the only plausible basis for raising the conten-

tion. It was a minority view, often accompanied by inflamma-

tory charges against the delegates to the Convention. 

II.  WAS THE CONSTITUTION PROPERLY RATIFIED? 

The most common modern attack against the legitimacy of 

the Constitution has been addressed—the delegates did not

exceed the authority granted to them by their states. Neither 

Federalists nor Anti-Federalists contended that the calling

the Convention was premised on the language of Article XIII of 

the Articles of Confederation. But, when critics of the Constitu-

tion’s adoption turn to the ratification process, they suddenly 

shift gears. They claim the Constitution was not properly rati-

fied when it was adopted because the process found in Article

XIII was not followed. This Article specified that amendmen

had to be ratified by all thirteen states—rather than being ap-

proved by specially called conventions in just nine states. 

Logically, if the Convention was not called under the authori

of the Articles to begin with, as most concede, it makes little sense

to argue that the Convention needed to follow the ratificatio

process contained therein. This confusion is understandable be-

cause, prior to the Convention, the clear expectation was that t

work product from Philadelphia would be first sent to Congr

and then would be adopted only when ratified by all thirteen le

islatures. But, as we see below, the source of this rule was not Ar-

ticle XIII, but the resolutions from the states, which had called the 

Convention and given instructions to their delegates. 

However, we will also discover that most critics have over-

looked two important steps taken in the process of adopting

the Constitution. The Convention enacted two form

measures. One was the Constitution itself. The second was a 

formal proposal concerning a change in the ratification process. 

Congress and all thirteen state legislatures approved this 

change in process. The expected process was used to approve a 

process designed to obtain the consent of the governed. This

two-stage endeavor was aimed to satisfy both the legal re-

quirements from the old system and the moral claim that the

Constitution should be approved by the people themselves.



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**105**

100 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

A similar debate arose in the Massachusetts legislature. Dr. 

Kilham argued that the Convention had “assum[ed] powers not 

delegated to them by their commission.”224 Immediately thereaf-

ter the Massachusetts House voted to call the ratification con-

vention by a vote of 129 to 32.225 A more specific resolution was 

made in the Massachusetts ratification convention. “Mr. Bishop” 

from Rehoboth, moved to “strike out all that related to the Con-

stitution” and to “insert a clause” in which “the General Con-

vention was charged with exceeding their powers & recom-

mending measures which might involve the Country in 

blood.”226 The motion was defeated by a vote of “90 & od to 50 & 

od.”227 The final ratification by Massachusetts recites that the 

people of the United States had the opportunity to enter into “an 

explicit & solemn Compact” “without fraud or surprise.”228 

In addition to these formal defeats in the very states that had 

relied on the restrictive language from Congress, an Anti-

Federalist critic penned an article in the New York Daily Ad-

vertiser that demonstrated that the general public in that city 

rejected these claims. “Curtiopolis” claimed that the “Conven-

tion were delegated to //amend// our political Constitution, instead 

of which they //altered it//.”229 He accused the delegates of “detest-

able //hypocricy//” and claimed that “their deeds were //evil//.”230 Fo-

cusing in on Alexander Hamilton, Curtiopolis urged the read-

ers “to take good notice of that vile conspirator, //the author of //

//Publius//: I think he might be impeached for high treason: he 

continues to do infinite mischief //among readers: //this whole city, 

except about forty [or] fifty of us, are all bewitched with him, 

and he is a playing the very devil elsewhere.”231 This Anti-

Federalist writer openly admitted that only forty or fifty people 

in New York City agreed with his strident position—the rest of 

the population were “bewitched.” \\
                                                                      

  224. MASS.  CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 

135. 

//  //225//. Id.// at 138. 

  226. Letter from Nathaniel Gorham to Henry Knox (Mar. 9, 1788), //reprinted// //in //7 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1673, 1674. 

//  //227//. Id.// 

  228. 16 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at 68. 

 229. 

//Curtiopolis//, N.Y.  DAILY  ADVERTISER, Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 625, 625. 

//  //230//. Id.// at 625–26. 

//  //231//. Id.// at 628. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 101 

 

While it is clear that the allegation of //ultra vires //action was 

widely asserted, this view was decisively rejected in the two 

states that had the only plausible basis for raising the conten-

tion. It was a minority view, often accompanied by inflamma-

tory charges against the delegates to the Convention. 

II.  WAS THE CONSTITUTION PROPERLY RATIFIED? 

The most common modern attack against the legitimacy of 

the Constitution has been addressed—the delegates did not 

exceed the authority granted to them by their states. Neither 

Federalists nor Anti-Federalists contended that the calling of 

the Convention was premised on the language of Article XIII of 

the Articles of Confederation. But, when critics of the Constitu-

tion’s adoption turn to the ratification process, they suddenly 

shift gears. They claim the Constitution was not properly rati-

fied when it was adopted because the process found in Article 

XIII was not followed. This Article specified that amendments 

had to be ratified by all thirteen states—rather than being ap-

proved by specially called conventions in just nine states. 

Logically, if the Convention was not called under the authority 

of the Articles to begin with, as most concede, it makes little sense 

to argue that the Convention needed to follow the ratification 

process contained therein. This confusion is understandable be-

cause, prior to the Convention, the clear expectation was that the 

work product from Philadelphia would be first sent to Congress 

and then would be adopted only when ratified by all thirteen leg-

islatures. But, as we see below, the source of this rule was not Ar-

ticle XIII, but the resolutions from the states, which had called the 

Convention and given instructions to their delegates. 

However, we will also discover that most critics have over-

looked two important steps taken in the process of adopting 

the Constitution. The Convention enacted two formal 

measures. One was the Constitution itself. The second was a 

formal proposal concerning a change in the ratification process. 

Congress and all thirteen state legislatures approved this 

change in process. The expected process was used to approve a 

process designed to obtain the consent of the governed. This 

two-stage endeavor was aimed to satisfy both the legal re-

quirements from the old system and the moral claim that the 

Constitution should be approved by the people themselves. 

100 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

A similar debate arose in the Massachusetts legislature. Dr. 

Kilham argued that the Convention had “assum[ed] powers not 

delegated to them by their commission.”224 Immediately thereaf-

ter the Massachusetts House voted to call the ratification con-

vention by a vote of 129 to 32.225 A more specific resolution was 

made in the Massachusetts ratification convention. “Mr. Bishop” 

from Rehoboth, moved to “strike out all that related to the Con-

stitution” and to “insert a clause” in which “the General Con-

vention was charged with exceeding their powers & recom-

mending measures which might involve the Country in 

blood.”226 The motion was defeated by a vote of “90 & od to 50 & 

od.”227 The final ratification by Massachusetts recites that the 

people of the United States had the opportunity to enter into “an 

explicit & solemn Compact” “without fraud or surprise.”228 

In addition to these formal defeats in the very states that had 

relied on the restrictive language from Congress, an Anti-

Federalist critic penned an article in the New York Daily Ad-

vertiser that demonstrated that the general public in that city 

rejected these claims. “Curtiopolis” claimed that the “Conven-

tion were delegated to //amend// our political Constitution, instead 

of which they //altered it//.”229 He accused the delegates of “detest-

able //hypocricy//” and claimed that “their deeds were //evil//.”230 Fo-

cusing in on Alexander Hamilton, Curtiopolis urged the read-

ers “to take good notice of that vile conspirator, //the author of //

//Publius//: I think he might be impeached for high treason: he 

continues to do infinite mischief //among readers: //this whole city, 

except about forty [or] fifty of us, are all bewitched with him, 

and he is a playing the very devil elsewhere.”231 This Anti-

Federalist writer openly admitted that only forty or fifty people 

in New York City agreed with his strident position—the rest of 

the population were “bewitched.” \\
                                                                      

  224. MASS.  CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 

135. 

//  //225//. Id.// at 138. 

  226. Letter from Nathaniel Gorham to Henry Knox (Mar. 9, 1788), //reprinted// //in //7 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1673, 1674. 

//  //227//. Id.// 

  228. 16 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at 68. 

 229. 

//Curtiopolis//, N.Y.  DAILY  ADVERTISER, Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 625, 625. 

//  //230//. Id.// at 625–26. 

//  //231//. Id.// at 628. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 101

 

While it is clear that the allegation of //ultra vires //action was

widely asserted, this view was decisively rejected in the two 

states that had the only plausible basis for raising the conten-

tion. It was a minority view, often accompanied by inflamma-

tory charges against the delegates to the Convention. 

II.  WAS THE CONSTITUTION PROPERLY RATIFIED? 

The most common modern attack against the legitimacy of 

the Constitution has been addressed—the delegates did not

exceed the authority granted to them by their states. Neither 

Federalists nor Anti-Federalists contended that the calling

the Convention was premised on the language of Article XIII of 

the Articles of Confederation. But, when critics of the Constitu-

tion’s adoption turn to the ratification process, they suddenly 

shift gears. They claim the Constitution was not properly rati-

fied when it was adopted because the process found in Article

XIII was not followed. This Article specified that amendmen

had to be ratified by all thirteen states—rather than being ap-

proved by specially called conventions in just nine states. 

Logically, if the Convention was not called under the authori

of the Articles to begin with, as most concede, it makes little sense

to argue that the Convention needed to follow the ratificatio

process contained therein. This confusion is understandable be-

cause, prior to the Convention, the clear expectation was that t

work product from Philadelphia would be first sent to Congr

and then would be adopted only when ratified by all thirteen le

islatures. But, as we see below, the source of this rule was not Ar-

ticle XIII, but the resolutions from the states, which had called the 

Convention and given instructions to their delegates. 

However, we will also discover that most critics have over-

looked two important steps taken in the process of adopting

the Constitution. The Convention enacted two form

measures. One was the Constitution itself. The second was a 

formal proposal concerning a change in the ratification process. 

Congress and all thirteen state legislatures approved this 

change in process. The expected process was used to approve a 

process designed to obtain the consent of the governed. This

two-stage endeavor was aimed to satisfy both the legal re-

quirements from the old system and the moral claim that the

Constitution should be approved by the people themselves.



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102 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//A.  The Source of Law for Ratification //** **//Authority //

Although not formally binding, both the Annapolis Convention 

and the February 21st Congressional endorsement look to the 

same method for ratification of the Constitutional Convention’s 

work. The Annapolis report suggests that the Convention should 

send its proposal “to the United States in Congress Assembled, as 

when agreed to, by them, and afterwards confirmed by the Legis-

latures of every State, will effectually provide for the same.”232 

The controlling documents—the delegates’ appointments by their 

respective legislatures—were in general agreement as to the mode 

of ratification. Virginia’s legislature specified the following: “re-

porting such an Act for that purpose, to the United States in Con-

gress, as, when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the 

several States, will effectually provide for the same.”233 Georgia,234 

South Carolina,235 Maryland,236 and New Hampshire237 employed 

the exact same phrasing. Pennsylvania made only a minor change 

allowing for the submission of “such act or acts.”238 This two-

word variance was repeated precisely by Delaware.239 Thus seven 

states were in near unison on the point. New Jersey and North 

Carolina were silent on the issue of the method of ratification. 

Massachusetts quoted the ratification language of the February 

21st endorsement by Congress.240 New York copied the Congres-

sional language precisely in the formal directives to their dele-

                                                                      

  232. Proceedings and Report of the Commissioners at Annapolis, Maryland 

(Sept. 11–14, 1786), //reprinted//  //in// 1 DHRC, //supra  //note 4, at 181, 184–185.//  //The lan-

guage of the Congressional endorsement was nearly identical. //See// //supra// note 89 

and accompanying text. 

  233. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Nov. 23, 1786), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 196, 197. 

  234. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 204, 204. 

  235. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates, (Mar. 8, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 213, 214. 

  236. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 222, 223. 

  237. Resolution Electing and Empowering Delegates (Jan. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

  238. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 199, 199–200. 

  239. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 203, 203. 

  240. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 

1787), //reprinted// 1 //in //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 207. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 103 

 

gates.241 Connecticut used similar, but somewhat distinct lan-

guage: “[r]eport such Alterations and  Provisions . . . to  the  Con-

gress of the United States, and to the General Assembly of this 

State.”242 The variances are legally insignificant. Every state that 

addressed the method of ratification contemplated that the Con-

vention would send its report first for approval by Congress and 

then for final adoption by the legislatures of the several states. 

//B.  The Constitutional Convention’s Development of the Plan for //

//Ratification //

The very first mention of the plan for ratification was on May 

29th in a speech by Edmund Randolph during the first substan-

tive discussion in the Convention. Randolph laid out a fifteen-

point outline that became known as the Virginia Plan.243 The 

final item dealt with ratification: 

15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the 

Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or 

times, after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to 

an assembly or assemblies of Representatives, recommended 

by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the 

people, to consider & decide thereon.244 

This obviously differed from the language of the delegates’ in-

structions. Randolph’s proposal, like the instructions from the 

states, called for approval by Congress. But rather than ap-

proval by the legislatures themselves, Randolph called for rati-

fication conventions of specially elected delegates upon the 

recommendation of each legislature. 

What is clear, both from this language and from the ensuing 

debates, is that there were two competing ideas concerning ratifi-

cation of the Constitution. The first theory, driven by traditional, 

institutional, and legal concerns, was that Congress and all thir-

teen state legislatures should be the agencies that consent on be-

half of the people. Alternatively, others contended that the people 

themselves should consent to the Constitution. Randolph’s ratifi-

cation method took elements of both. Congress—which had rep-

                                                                      

  241. Assembly and Senate Elect Delegates (Mar. 6, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 211, 211. 

  242. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted//  //in  //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 215, 216. 

  243. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 18–22. 

//  //244//. Id. //at 22. 

102 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//A.  The Source of Law for Ratification //** **//Authority //

Although not formally binding, both the Annapolis Convention 

and the February 21st Congressional endorsement look to the 

same method for ratification of the Constitutional Convention’s 

work. The Annapolis report suggests that the Convention should 

send its proposal “to the United States in Congress Assembled, as 

when agreed to, by them, and afterwards confirmed by the Legis-

latures of every State, will effectually provide for the same.”232 

The controlling documents—the delegates’ appointments by their 

respective legislatures—were in general agreement as to the mode 

of ratification. Virginia’s legislature specified the following: “re-

porting such an Act for that purpose, to the United States in Con-

gress, as, when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the 

several States, will effectually provide for the same.”233 Georgia,234 

South Carolina,235 Maryland,236 and New Hampshire237 employed 

the exact same phrasing. Pennsylvania made only a minor change 

allowing for the submission of “such act or acts.”238 This two-

word variance was repeated precisely by Delaware.239 Thus seven 

states were in near unison on the point. New Jersey and North 

Carolina were silent on the issue of the method of ratification. 

Massachusetts quoted the ratification language of the February 

21st endorsement by Congress.240 New York copied the Congres-

sional language precisely in the formal directives to their dele-

                                                                      

  232. Proceedings and Report of the Commissioners at Annapolis, Maryland 

(Sept. 11–14, 1786), //reprinted//  //in// 1 DHRC, //supra  //note 4, at 181, 184–185.//  //The lan-

guage of the Congressional endorsement was nearly identical. //See// //supra// note 89 

and accompanying text. 

  233. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Nov. 23, 1786), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 196, 197. 

  234. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 204, 204. 

  235. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates, (Mar. 8, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 213, 214. 

  236. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 222, 223. 

  237. Resolution Electing and Empowering Delegates (Jan. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

  238. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 199, 199–200. 

  239. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 203, 203. 

  240. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 

1787), //reprinted// 1 //in //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 207. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 103

 

gates.241 Connecticut used similar, but somewhat distinct lan-

guage: “[r]eport such Alterations and  Provisions . . . to  the  Con

gress of the United States, and to the General Assembly of t

State.”242 The variances are legally insignificant. Every state th

addressed the method of ratification contemplated that the Con-

vention would send its report first for approval by Congress an

then for final adoption by the legislatures of the several states. 

//B.  The Constitutional Convention’s Development of the Plan for //

//Ratification //

The very first mention of the plan for ratification was on May

29th in a speech by Edmund Randolph during the first substan-

tive discussion in the Convention. Randolph laid out a fifteen-

point outline that became known as the Virginia Plan.243 The

final item dealt with ratification: 

15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the 

Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or 

times, after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to 

an assembly or assemblies of Representatives, recommended 

by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the 

people, to consider & decide thereon.244 

This obviously differed from the language of the delegates’ 

structions. Randolph’s proposal, like the instructions from the 

states, called for approval by Congress. But rather than ap-

proval by the legislatures themselves, Randolph called for ra

fication conventions of specially elected delegates upon t

recommendation of each legislature. 

What is clear, both from this language and from the ensui

debates, is that there were two competing ideas concerning ratifi-

cation of the Constitution. The first theory, driven by traditional

institutional, and legal concerns, was that Congress and all thir-

teen state legislatures should be the agencies that consent on be-

half of the people. Alternatively, others contended that the peo

themselves should consent to the Constitution. Randolph’s ratifi-

cation method took elements of both. Congress—which had rep-

                                                                      

  241. Assembly and Senate Elect Delegates (Mar. 6, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHR

//supra// note 4, at 211, 211. 

  242. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted//  //in //

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 215, 216. 

  243. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 18–22. 

//  //244//. Id. //at 22. 



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102 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//A.  The Source of Law for Ratification //** **//Authority //

Although not formally binding, both the Annapolis Convention 

and the February 21st Congressional endorsement look to the 

same method for ratification of the Constitutional Convention’s 

work. The Annapolis report suggests that the Convention should 

send its proposal “to the United States in Congress Assembled, as 

when agreed to, by them, and afterwards confirmed by the Legis-

latures of every State, will effectually provide for the same.”232 

The controlling documents—the delegates’ appointments by their 

respective legislatures—were in general agreement as to the mode 

of ratification. Virginia’s legislature specified the following: “re-

porting such an Act for that purpose, to the United States in Con-

gress, as, when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the 

several States, will effectually provide for the same.”233 Georgia,234 

South Carolina,235 Maryland,236 and New Hampshire237 employed 

the exact same phrasing. Pennsylvania made only a minor change 

allowing for the submission of “such act or acts.”238 This two-

word variance was repeated precisely by Delaware.239 Thus seven 

states were in near unison on the point. New Jersey and North 

Carolina were silent on the issue of the method of ratification. 

Massachusetts quoted the ratification language of the February 

21st endorsement by Congress.240 New York copied the Congres-

sional language precisely in the formal directives to their dele-

                                                                      

  232. Proceedings and Report of the Commissioners at Annapolis, Maryland 

(Sept. 11–14, 1786), //reprinted//  //in// 1 DHRC, //supra  //note 4, at 181, 184–185.//  //The lan-

guage of the Congressional endorsement was nearly identical. //See// //supra// note 89 

and accompanying text. 

  233. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Nov. 23, 1786), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 196, 197. 

  234. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 204, 204. 

  235. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates, (Mar. 8, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 213, 214. 

  236. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 222, 223. 

  237. Resolution Electing and Empowering Delegates (Jan. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

  238. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 199, 199–200. 

  239. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 203, 203. 

  240. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 

1787), //reprinted// 1 //in //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 207. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 103 

 

gates.241 Connecticut used similar, but somewhat distinct lan-

guage: “[r]eport such Alterations and  Provisions . . . to  the  Con-

gress of the United States, and to the General Assembly of this 

State.”242 The variances are legally insignificant. Every state that 

addressed the method of ratification contemplated that the Con-

vention would send its report first for approval by Congress and 

then for final adoption by the legislatures of the several states. 

//B.  The Constitutional Convention’s Development of the Plan for //

//Ratification //

The very first mention of the plan for ratification was on May 

29th in a speech by Edmund Randolph during the first substan-

tive discussion in the Convention. Randolph laid out a fifteen-

point outline that became known as the Virginia Plan.243 The 

final item dealt with ratification: 

15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the 

Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or 

times, after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to 

an assembly or assemblies of Representatives, recommended 

by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the 

people, to consider & decide thereon.244 

This obviously differed from the language of the delegates’ in-

structions. Randolph’s proposal, like the instructions from the 

states, called for approval by Congress. But rather than ap-

proval by the legislatures themselves, Randolph called for rati-

fication conventions of specially elected delegates upon the 

recommendation of each legislature. 

What is clear, both from this language and from the ensuing 

debates, is that there were two competing ideas concerning ratifi-

cation of the Constitution. The first theory, driven by traditional, 

institutional, and legal concerns, was that Congress and all thir-

teen state legislatures should be the agencies that consent on be-

half of the people. Alternatively, others contended that the people 

themselves should consent to the Constitution. Randolph’s ratifi-

cation method took elements of both. Congress—which had rep-

                                                                      

  241. Assembly and Senate Elect Delegates (Mar. 6, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 211, 211. 

  242. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted//  //in  //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 215, 216. 

  243. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 18–22. 

//  //244//. Id. //at 22. 

102 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//A.  The Source of Law for Ratification //** **//Authority //

Although not formally binding, both the Annapolis Convention 

and the February 21st Congressional endorsement look to the 

same method for ratification of the Constitutional Convention’s 

work. The Annapolis report suggests that the Convention should 

send its proposal “to the United States in Congress Assembled, as 

when agreed to, by them, and afterwards confirmed by the Legis-

latures of every State, will effectually provide for the same.”232 

The controlling documents—the delegates’ appointments by their 

respective legislatures—were in general agreement as to the mode 

of ratification. Virginia’s legislature specified the following: “re-

porting such an Act for that purpose, to the United States in Con-

gress, as, when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the 

several States, will effectually provide for the same.”233 Georgia,234 

South Carolina,235 Maryland,236 and New Hampshire237 employed 

the exact same phrasing. Pennsylvania made only a minor change 

allowing for the submission of “such act or acts.”238 This two-

word variance was repeated precisely by Delaware.239 Thus seven 

states were in near unison on the point. New Jersey and North 

Carolina were silent on the issue of the method of ratification. 

Massachusetts quoted the ratification language of the February 

21st endorsement by Congress.240 New York copied the Congres-

sional language precisely in the formal directives to their dele-

                                                                      

  232. Proceedings and Report of the Commissioners at Annapolis, Maryland 

(Sept. 11–14, 1786), //reprinted//  //in// 1 DHRC, //supra  //note 4, at 181, 184–185.//  //The lan-

guage of the Congressional endorsement was nearly identical. //See// //supra// note 89 

and accompanying text. 

  233. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates (Nov. 23, 1786), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 196, 197. 

  234. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 10, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 204, 204. 

  235. Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates, (Mar. 8, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 213, 214. 

  236. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 222, 223. 

  237. Resolution Electing and Empowering Delegates (Jan. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 223, 223. 

  238. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Dec. 30, 1786), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 199, 199–200. 

  239. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (Feb. 3, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 1 DHRC, 

//supra// note 4, at 203, 203. 

  240. House Substitute of 7 March for the Resolution of 22 February (Mar. 7, 

1787), //reprinted// 1 //in //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 207. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 103

 

gates.241 Connecticut used similar, but somewhat distinct lan-

guage: “[r]eport such Alterations and  Provisions . . . to  the  Con

gress of the United States, and to the General Assembly of t

State.”242 The variances are legally insignificant. Every state th

addressed the method of ratification contemplated that the Con-

vention would send its report first for approval by Congress an

then for final adoption by the legislatures of the several states. 

//B.  The Constitutional Convention’s Development of the Plan for //

//Ratification //

The very first mention of the plan for ratification was on May

29th in a speech by Edmund Randolph during the first substan-

tive discussion in the Convention. Randolph laid out a fifteen-

point outline that became known as the Virginia Plan.243 The

final item dealt with ratification: 

15. Resd. that the amendments which shall be offered to the 

Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or 

times, after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted to 

an assembly or assemblies of Representatives, recommended 

by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the 

people, to consider & decide thereon.244 

This obviously differed from the language of the delegates’ 

structions. Randolph’s proposal, like the instructions from the 

states, called for approval by Congress. But rather than ap-

proval by the legislatures themselves, Randolph called for ra

fication conventions of specially elected delegates upon t

recommendation of each legislature. 

What is clear, both from this language and from the ensui

debates, is that there were two competing ideas concerning ratifi-

cation of the Constitution. The first theory, driven by traditional

institutional, and legal concerns, was that Congress and all thir-

teen state legislatures should be the agencies that consent on be-

half of the people. Alternatively, others contended that the peo

themselves should consent to the Constitution. Randolph’s ratifi-

cation method took elements of both. Congress—which had rep-

                                                                      

  241. Assembly and Senate Elect Delegates (Mar. 6, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHR

//supra// note 4, at 211, 211. 

  242. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted//  //in //

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 215, 216. 

  243. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 18–22. 

//  //244//. Id. //at 22. 



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resentatives from every state and which voted as states—would 

approve first to satisfy the institutional and legal interest. The sec-

ond step of state ratification conventions was offered as the best 

method to obtain the direct consent of the people. It was believed 

that the consent of the governed was best obtained not by a vote 

by state legislators, who were chosen for multiple purposes, but 

by convention delegates elected solely for the purpose of ratifying 

or rejecting the Constitution. 

The first debate on Randolph’s fifteenth resolution was rec-

orded on June 5th. Madison’s notes list six delegates who 

spoke to the issue—Sherman, Madison, Gerry, King, Wilson, 

and Pinkney.245 Yates’ notes only mention comments by Madi-

son, King, and Wilson.246 Roger Sherman thought popular rati-

fication was unnecessary.247 He referred to the provision in the 

Articles of Confederation for changes and alterations.248 It is not 

clear from the context whether Sherman believed that such 

measures were legally binding or merely provided an appro-

priate example that should be followed.249 Madison argued that 

the new Constitution should be ratified in the “most unexcep-

tionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people 

themselves.”250 He also suggested that the Confederation had 

been defective in the method of ratification since it lacked any 

direct approbation by the people.251 Elbridge Gerry contended 

that the Articles had been sanctioned by the people in the east-

ern states.252 He also warned that the people of this quarter 

were too wild to be trusted with a vote on the issue.253 His fears 

undoubtedly arose from concerns about Shay’s Rebellion and 

associated populist movements, particularly in Rhode Island.254 

Rufus King argued that Article XIII legitimized the idea that 

legislatures were competent to ratify constitutional changes 

                                                                      

//  //245//. Id.// at 122–123. 

//  //246//. Id.// at 126–27. 

//  //247//. Id.// at 122. 

//  //248//. Id.// 

//  //249//. See id.// 

//  //250//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //251//. Id. //at 122–23, 126–127. 

//  //252//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //253//. Id.// 

  254. MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at xliii. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 105 

 

and that the people had impliedly consented.255 But, he contin-

ued, it might make good policy sense to change the mode.256 In 

the end, the people wouldn’t care which method of consent 

was employed so long as the substantive document was ap-

propriate.257 In Madison’s notes, James Wilson of Pennsylvania 

argued that whatever process was adopted, it should not end 

with the result that a few inconsiderate or selfish states should 

be able to prevent the others from “confederat[ing] anew on 

better principles” while allowing the others to accede later.258 

Yates’s notes focus on Wilson’s contention that “the people by 

a convention are the only power that can ratify the proposed 

system of the new government.”259 Charles Pinckney of South 

Carolina agreed with the essence of Wilson’s first point arguing 

that if nine states could agree on a new government, it should 

suffice.260 After these speakers, it became obvious that more 

work would be needed to reach consensus on the topic. And it 

was quickly agreed that the issue should be postponed.261 

The fifteenth resolution regarding the ratification process 

was raised for a vote in the Committee of the Whole on June 

12th. Yates records that no debate arose and that it passed five 

in favor, three opposed, and two states divided.262 Madison 

records the vote as six in favor, New York, New Jersey, and 

Connecticut opposed, while Delaware and New Jersey were 

divided.263 On July 23rd, the issue was again addressed. The 

provision was now numbered as the nineteenth resolution of 

the amended Virginia Plan. Ellsworth moved to refer the Con-

stitution to the legislatures of the States for ratification.264 Alt-

hough New Jersey temporarily lacked a quorum for voting 

purposes, Paterson seconded the motion.265 

                                                                      

  255. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 123. 

//  //256//. Id.// 

//  //257//. Id. //at 123, 127. 

//  //258//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //259//. Id. //at 127. 

//  //260//. Id. //at 123. 

//  //261//. Id.// at 123, 127. 

//  //262//. Id. //at 220. 

//  //263//. Id. //at 214. 

  264. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 88. 

//  //265//. Id.// 

104 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

resentatives from every state and which voted as states—would 

approve first to satisfy the institutional and legal interest. The sec-

ond step of state ratification conventions was offered as the best 

method to obtain the direct consent of the people. It was believed 

that the consent of the governed was best obtained not by a vote 

by state legislators, who were chosen for multiple purposes, but 

by convention delegates elected solely for the purpose of ratifying 

or rejecting the Constitution. 

The first debate on Randolph’s fifteenth resolution was rec-

orded on June 5th. Madison’s notes list six delegates who 

spoke to the issue—Sherman, Madison, Gerry, King, Wilson, 

and Pinkney.245 Yates’ notes only mention comments by Madi-

son, King, and Wilson.246 Roger Sherman thought popular rati-

fication was unnecessary.247 He referred to the provision in the 

Articles of Confederation for changes and alterations.248 It is not 

clear from the context whether Sherman believed that such 

measures were legally binding or merely provided an appro-

priate example that should be followed.249 Madison argued that 

the new Constitution should be ratified in the “most unexcep-

tionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people 

themselves.”250 He also suggested that the Confederation had 

been defective in the method of ratification since it lacked any 

direct approbation by the people.251 Elbridge Gerry contended 

that the Articles had been sanctioned by the people in the east-

ern states.252 He also warned that the people of this quarter 

were too wild to be trusted with a vote on the issue.253 His fears 

undoubtedly arose from concerns about Shay’s Rebellion and 

associated populist movements, particularly in Rhode Island.254 

Rufus King argued that Article XIII legitimized the idea that 

legislatures were competent to ratify constitutional changes 

                                                                      

//  //245//. Id.// at 122–123. 

//  //246//. Id.// at 126–27. 

//  //247//. Id.// at 122. 

//  //248//. Id.// 

//  //249//. See id.// 

//  //250//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //251//. Id. //at 122–23, 126–127. 

//  //252//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //253//. Id.// 

  254. MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at xliii. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 105

 

and that the people had impliedly consented.255 But, he conti

ued, it might make good policy sense to change the mode.256

the end, the people wouldn’t care which method of consent 

was employed so long as the substantive document was a

propriate.257 In Madison’s notes, James Wilson of Pennsylvani

argued that whatever process was adopted, it should not end 

with the result that a few inconsiderate or selfish states shou

be able to prevent the others from “confederat[ing] anew on 

better principles” while allowing the others to accede later.258

Yates’s notes focus on Wilson’s contention that “the people b

a convention are the only power that can ratify the proposed

system of the new government.”259 Charles Pinckney of South 

Carolina agreed with the essence of Wilson’s first point argui

that if nine states could agree on a new government, it should 

suffice.260 After these speakers, it became obvious that mor

work would be needed to reach consensus on the topic. And 

was quickly agreed that the issue should be postponed.261 

The fifteenth resolution regarding the ratification proce

was raised for a vote in the Committee of the Whole on June 

12th. Yates records that no debate arose and that it passed fi

in favor, three opposed, and two states divided.262 Madison 

records the vote as six in favor, New York, New Jersey, and 

Connecticut opposed, while Delaware and New Jersey were 

divided.263 On July 23rd, the issue was again addressed. The 

provision was now numbered as the nineteenth resolution of 

the amended Virginia Plan. Ellsworth moved to refer the Con-

stitution to the legislatures of the States for ratification.264 Alt-

hough New Jersey temporarily lacked a quorum for voting

purposes, Paterson seconded the motion.265 

                                                                      

  255. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 123. 

//  //256//. Id.// 

//  //257//. Id. //at 123, 127. 

//  //258//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //259//. Id. //at 127. 

//  //260//. Id. //at 123. 

//  //261//. Id.// at 123, 127. 

//  //262//. Id. //at 220. 

//  //263//. Id. //at 214. 

  264. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 88. 

//  //265//. Id.// 



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**109**

104 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

resentatives from every state and which voted as states—would 

approve first to satisfy the institutional and legal interest. The sec-

ond step of state ratification conventions was offered as the best 

method to obtain the direct consent of the people. It was believed 

that the consent of the governed was best obtained not by a vote 

by state legislators, who were chosen for multiple purposes, but 

by convention delegates elected solely for the purpose of ratifying 

or rejecting the Constitution. 

The first debate on Randolph’s fifteenth resolution was rec-

orded on June 5th. Madison’s notes list six delegates who 

spoke to the issue—Sherman, Madison, Gerry, King, Wilson, 

and Pinkney.245 Yates’ notes only mention comments by Madi-

son, King, and Wilson.246 Roger Sherman thought popular rati-

fication was unnecessary.247 He referred to the provision in the 

Articles of Confederation for changes and alterations.248 It is not 

clear from the context whether Sherman believed that such 

measures were legally binding or merely provided an appro-

priate example that should be followed.249 Madison argued that 

the new Constitution should be ratified in the “most unexcep-

tionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people 

themselves.”250 He also suggested that the Confederation had 

been defective in the method of ratification since it lacked any 

direct approbation by the people.251 Elbridge Gerry contended 

that the Articles had been sanctioned by the people in the east-

ern states.252 He also warned that the people of this quarter 

were too wild to be trusted with a vote on the issue.253 His fears 

undoubtedly arose from concerns about Shay’s Rebellion and 

associated populist movements, particularly in Rhode Island.254 

Rufus King argued that Article XIII legitimized the idea that 

legislatures were competent to ratify constitutional changes 

                                                                      

//  //245//. Id.// at 122–123. 

//  //246//. Id.// at 126–27. 

//  //247//. Id.// at 122. 

//  //248//. Id.// 

//  //249//. See id.// 

//  //250//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //251//. Id. //at 122–23, 126–127. 

//  //252//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //253//. Id.// 

  254. MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at xliii. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 105 

 

and that the people had impliedly consented.255 But, he contin-

ued, it might make good policy sense to change the mode.256 In 

the end, the people wouldn’t care which method of consent 

was employed so long as the substantive document was ap-

propriate.257 In Madison’s notes, James Wilson of Pennsylvania 

argued that whatever process was adopted, it should not end 

with the result that a few inconsiderate or selfish states should 

be able to prevent the others from “confederat[ing] anew on 

better principles” while allowing the others to accede later.258 

Yates’s notes focus on Wilson’s contention that “the people by 

a convention are the only power that can ratify the proposed 

system of the new government.”259 Charles Pinckney of South 

Carolina agreed with the essence of Wilson’s first point arguing 

that if nine states could agree on a new government, it should 

suffice.260 After these speakers, it became obvious that more 

work would be needed to reach consensus on the topic. And it 

was quickly agreed that the issue should be postponed.261 

The fifteenth resolution regarding the ratification process 

was raised for a vote in the Committee of the Whole on June 

12th. Yates records that no debate arose and that it passed five 

in favor, three opposed, and two states divided.262 Madison 

records the vote as six in favor, New York, New Jersey, and 

Connecticut opposed, while Delaware and New Jersey were 

divided.263 On July 23rd, the issue was again addressed. The 

provision was now numbered as the nineteenth resolution of 

the amended Virginia Plan. Ellsworth moved to refer the Con-

stitution to the legislatures of the States for ratification.264 Alt-

hough New Jersey temporarily lacked a quorum for voting 

purposes, Paterson seconded the motion.265 

                                                                      

  255. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 123. 

//  //256//. Id.// 

//  //257//. Id. //at 123, 127. 

//  //258//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //259//. Id. //at 127. 

//  //260//. Id. //at 123. 

//  //261//. Id.// at 123, 127. 

//  //262//. Id. //at 220. 

//  //263//. Id. //at 214. 

  264. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 88. 

//  //265//. Id.// 

104 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

resentatives from every state and which voted as states—would 

approve first to satisfy the institutional and legal interest. The sec-

ond step of state ratification conventions was offered as the best 

method to obtain the direct consent of the people. It was believed 

that the consent of the governed was best obtained not by a vote 

by state legislators, who were chosen for multiple purposes, but 

by convention delegates elected solely for the purpose of ratifying 

or rejecting the Constitution. 

The first debate on Randolph’s fifteenth resolution was rec-

orded on June 5th. Madison’s notes list six delegates who 

spoke to the issue—Sherman, Madison, Gerry, King, Wilson, 

and Pinkney.245 Yates’ notes only mention comments by Madi-

son, King, and Wilson.246 Roger Sherman thought popular rati-

fication was unnecessary.247 He referred to the provision in the 

Articles of Confederation for changes and alterations.248 It is not 

clear from the context whether Sherman believed that such 

measures were legally binding or merely provided an appro-

priate example that should be followed.249 Madison argued that 

the new Constitution should be ratified in the “most unexcep-

tionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people 

themselves.”250 He also suggested that the Confederation had 

been defective in the method of ratification since it lacked any 

direct approbation by the people.251 Elbridge Gerry contended 

that the Articles had been sanctioned by the people in the east-

ern states.252 He also warned that the people of this quarter 

were too wild to be trusted with a vote on the issue.253 His fears 

undoubtedly arose from concerns about Shay’s Rebellion and 

associated populist movements, particularly in Rhode Island.254 

Rufus King argued that Article XIII legitimized the idea that 

legislatures were competent to ratify constitutional changes 

                                                                      

//  //245//. Id.// at 122–123. 

//  //246//. Id.// at 126–27. 

//  //247//. Id.// at 122. 

//  //248//. Id.// 

//  //249//. See id.// 

//  //250//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //251//. Id. //at 122–23, 126–127. 

//  //252//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //253//. Id.// 

  254. MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787, //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at xliii. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 105

 

and that the people had impliedly consented.255 But, he conti

ued, it might make good policy sense to change the mode.256

the end, the people wouldn’t care which method of consent 

was employed so long as the substantive document was a

propriate.257 In Madison’s notes, James Wilson of Pennsylvani

argued that whatever process was adopted, it should not end 

with the result that a few inconsiderate or selfish states shou

be able to prevent the others from “confederat[ing] anew on 

better principles” while allowing the others to accede later.258

Yates’s notes focus on Wilson’s contention that “the people b

a convention are the only power that can ratify the proposed

system of the new government.”259 Charles Pinckney of South 

Carolina agreed with the essence of Wilson’s first point argui

that if nine states could agree on a new government, it should 

suffice.260 After these speakers, it became obvious that mor

work would be needed to reach consensus on the topic. And 

was quickly agreed that the issue should be postponed.261 

The fifteenth resolution regarding the ratification proce

was raised for a vote in the Committee of the Whole on June 

12th. Yates records that no debate arose and that it passed fi

in favor, three opposed, and two states divided.262 Madison 

records the vote as six in favor, New York, New Jersey, and 

Connecticut opposed, while Delaware and New Jersey were 

divided.263 On July 23rd, the issue was again addressed. The 

provision was now numbered as the nineteenth resolution of 

the amended Virginia Plan. Ellsworth moved to refer the Con-

stitution to the legislatures of the States for ratification.264 Alt-

hough New Jersey temporarily lacked a quorum for voting

purposes, Paterson seconded the motion.265 

                                                                      

  255. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 123. 

//  //256//. Id.// 

//  //257//. Id. //at 123, 127. 

//  //258//. Id.// at 123. 

//  //259//. Id. //at 127. 

//  //260//. Id. //at 123. 

//  //261//. Id.// at 123, 127. 

//  //262//. Id. //at 220. 

//  //263//. Id. //at 214. 

  264. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 88. 

//  //265//. Id.// 



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[Vol. 40 

 

Mason, Randolph, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, Hugh 

Williamson of North Carolina, Morris, King, and Madison spoke 

against the motion. It was supported only by Ellsworth and Ger-

ry.266 The vast majority of the debate was centered on the conten-

tion that the Constitution would be placed on the best footing if 

arising from the direct approval by the people. Though no one 

disputed this moral proposition, Gerry contended that the people 

had acquiesced in the ratification of the Articles of Confederation 

which was a sufficient expression of the consent of the gov-

erned.267 Moreover, he argued, the contention that the direct con-

sent of the governed was necessary proved too much since the 

argument would delegitimize the Articles of Confederation and 

many state constitutions.268 Neither Gerry nor Ellsworth expressly 

argued that the text of Article XIII was legally controlling. But, 

Ellsworth came close to implying this idea. This prompted the 

following response from Morris: 

The amendmt. moved by Mr. Elseworth [sic] erroneously sup-

poses that we are proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. 

This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.269 

No refutation of Morris was forthcoming from any of the pro-

ponents of legislative ratification. 

Ellsworth’s motion was defeated 7 to 3, with Connecticut, 

Delaware, and Maryland supporting the motion.270 Morris 

then moved for a new national ratification convention cho-

sen and authorized by the people.271 This idea was truly un-

popular and died for the lack of a second.272 Thus, as of July 

23rd, the plan was to submit the new Constitution to Con-

gress and then on to state ratification conventions.273 But, this 

was not the end of the matter. 

The Convention adjourned on July 26th until August 6th to 

allow a Committee of Detail to transform all of the resolutions 

into a single working draft.274 On the 6th, the Convention re-\\
                                                                      

//  //266//. Id. //at 88–94. 

//  //267//. Id.// at 89–90. 

//  //268//. Id.// 

//  //269//. Id. //at 92. 

//  //270//. Id.// at 93. 

 271. 

//Id.// 

//  //272//. Id. //

//  //273//. Id. //at 93–94. 

//  //274//. Id. //at 128. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 107 

 

convened, distributed the draft document and adjourned until 

the next day to allow the delegates a chance to read the whole 

document.275 There were now three provisions concerning rati-

fication and transition to the new government, Articles XXI, 

XXII and XXIII: 

ARTICLE XXI. \\
The ratification of the conventions of %%__%% States shall be suffi-

cient for organizing this Constitution. \\
ARTICLE XXII. \\
This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in 

Congress assembled, for their approbation; and it is the 

opinion of this Convention, that it should be afterwards 

submitted to a Convention chosen [in each State], under the 

recommendation of its legislature, in order to receive the rat-

ification of such Convention. \\
ARTICLE XXIII. \\
To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Con-

vention, that each assenting convention should notify its as-

sent and ratification to the United States in Congress assem-

bled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and 

ratification of the Conventions of %%__%% States, should appoint 

and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place, 

for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that 

after such publication, the Legislatures of the several States 

should elect members of the Senate, and direct the election 

of members of the House of Representatives; and that the 

members of the Legislature should meet at the time and 

place assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as may be, 

after their meeting, choose the President of the United 

States, and proceed to execute this Constitution.276 

Debate on these three articles began on August 30th.277 The 

initial focus was the matter of filling in the blank left in the 

draft—how many states would be required to ratify. Wilson 

proposed seven—a majority.278 Morris argued for two different 

numbers, a lower number if the ratifying states were contigu-

                                                                      

//  //275//. Id.// at 176. 

//  //276//. Id. //at 189. 

//  //277//. Id.// at 468. 

//  //278//. Id.// 

106 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Mason, Randolph, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, Hugh 

Williamson of North Carolina, Morris, King, and Madison spoke 

against the motion. It was supported only by Ellsworth and Ger-

ry.266 The vast majority of the debate was centered on the conten-

tion that the Constitution would be placed on the best footing if 

arising from the direct approval by the people. Though no one 

disputed this moral proposition, Gerry contended that the people 

had acquiesced in the ratification of the Articles of Confederation 

which was a sufficient expression of the consent of the gov-

erned.267 Moreover, he argued, the contention that the direct con-

sent of the governed was necessary proved too much since the 

argument would delegitimize the Articles of Confederation and 

many state constitutions.268 Neither Gerry nor Ellsworth expressly 

argued that the text of Article XIII was legally controlling. But, 

Ellsworth came close to implying this idea. This prompted the 

following response from Morris: 

The amendmt. moved by Mr. Elseworth [sic] erroneously sup-

poses that we are proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. 

This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.269 

No refutation of Morris was forthcoming from any of the pro-

ponents of legislative ratification. 

Ellsworth’s motion was defeated 7 to 3, with Connecticut, 

Delaware, and Maryland supporting the motion.270 Morris 

then moved for a new national ratification convention cho-

sen and authorized by the people.271 This idea was truly un-

popular and died for the lack of a second.272 Thus, as of July 

23rd, the plan was to submit the new Constitution to Con-

gress and then on to state ratification conventions.273 But, this 

was not the end of the matter. 

The Convention adjourned on July 26th until August 6th to 

allow a Committee of Detail to transform all of the resolutions 

into a single working draft.274 On the 6th, the Convention re-\\
                                                                      

//  //266//. Id. //at 88–94. 

//  //267//. Id.// at 89–90. 

//  //268//. Id.// 

//  //269//. Id. //at 92. 

//  //270//. Id.// at 93. 

 271. 

//Id.// 

//  //272//. Id. //

//  //273//. Id. //at 93–94. 

//  //274//. Id. //at 128. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 107

 

convened, distributed the draft document and adjourned un

the next day to allow the delegates a chance to read the whole 

document.275 There were now three provisions concerning rati-

fication and transition to the new government, Articles XXI, 

XXII and XXIII: 

ARTICLE XXI. \\
The ratification of the conventions of %%__%% States shall be suffi-

cient for organizing this Constitution. \\
ARTICLE XXII. \\
This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in 

Congress assembled, for their approbation; and it is the 

opinion of this Convention, that it should be afterwards 

submitted to a Convention chosen [in each State], under the 

recommendation of its legislature, in order to receive the rat-

ification of such Convention. \\
ARTICLE XXIII. \\
To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Con-

vention, that each assenting convention should notify its as-

sent and ratification to the United States in Congress assem-

bled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and 

ratification of the Conventions of %%__%% States, should appoint 

and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place, 

for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that 

after such publication, the Legislatures of the several States 

should elect members of the Senate, and direct the election 

of members of the House of Representatives; and that the 

members of the Legislature should meet at the time and 

place assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as may be, 

after their meeting, choose the President of the United 

States, and proceed to execute this Constitution.276 

Debate on these three articles began on August 30th.277 The

initial focus was the matter of filling in the blank left in the 

draft—how many states would be required to ratify. Wilson 

proposed seven—a majority.278 Morris argued for two different

numbers, a lower number if the ratifying states were contigu-

                                                                      

//  //275//. Id.// at 176. 

//  //276//. Id. //at 189. 

//  //277//. Id.// at 468. 

//  //278//. Id.// 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto111.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**111**

106 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Mason, Randolph, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, Hugh 

Williamson of North Carolina, Morris, King, and Madison spoke 

against the motion. It was supported only by Ellsworth and Ger-

ry.266 The vast majority of the debate was centered on the conten-

tion that the Constitution would be placed on the best footing if 

arising from the direct approval by the people. Though no one 

disputed this moral proposition, Gerry contended that the people 

had acquiesced in the ratification of the Articles of Confederation 

which was a sufficient expression of the consent of the gov-

erned.267 Moreover, he argued, the contention that the direct con-

sent of the governed was necessary proved too much since the 

argument would delegitimize the Articles of Confederation and 

many state constitutions.268 Neither Gerry nor Ellsworth expressly 

argued that the text of Article XIII was legally controlling. But, 

Ellsworth came close to implying this idea. This prompted the 

following response from Morris: 

The amendmt. moved by Mr. Elseworth [sic] erroneously sup-

poses that we are proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. 

This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.269 

No refutation of Morris was forthcoming from any of the pro-

ponents of legislative ratification. 

Ellsworth’s motion was defeated 7 to 3, with Connecticut, 

Delaware, and Maryland supporting the motion.270 Morris 

then moved for a new national ratification convention cho-

sen and authorized by the people.271 This idea was truly un-

popular and died for the lack of a second.272 Thus, as of July 

23rd, the plan was to submit the new Constitution to Con-

gress and then on to state ratification conventions.273 But, this 

was not the end of the matter. 

The Convention adjourned on July 26th until August 6th to 

allow a Committee of Detail to transform all of the resolutions 

into a single working draft.274 On the 6th, the Convention re-\\
                                                                      

//  //266//. Id. //at 88–94. 

//  //267//. Id.// at 89–90. 

//  //268//. Id.// 

//  //269//. Id. //at 92. 

//  //270//. Id.// at 93. 

 271. 

//Id.// 

//  //272//. Id. //

//  //273//. Id. //at 93–94. 

//  //274//. Id. //at 128. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 107 

 

convened, distributed the draft document and adjourned until 

the next day to allow the delegates a chance to read the whole 

document.275 There were now three provisions concerning rati-

fication and transition to the new government, Articles XXI, 

XXII and XXIII: 

ARTICLE XXI. \\
The ratification of the conventions of %%__%% States shall be suffi-

cient for organizing this Constitution. \\
ARTICLE XXII. \\
This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in 

Congress assembled, for their approbation; and it is the 

opinion of this Convention, that it should be afterwards 

submitted to a Convention chosen [in each State], under the 

recommendation of its legislature, in order to receive the rat-

ification of such Convention. \\
ARTICLE XXIII. \\
To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Con-

vention, that each assenting convention should notify its as-

sent and ratification to the United States in Congress assem-

bled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and 

ratification of the Conventions of %%__%% States, should appoint 

and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place, 

for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that 

after such publication, the Legislatures of the several States 

should elect members of the Senate, and direct the election 

of members of the House of Representatives; and that the 

members of the Legislature should meet at the time and 

place assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as may be, 

after their meeting, choose the President of the United 

States, and proceed to execute this Constitution.276 

Debate on these three articles began on August 30th.277 The 

initial focus was the matter of filling in the blank left in the 

draft—how many states would be required to ratify. Wilson 

proposed seven—a majority.278 Morris argued for two different 

numbers, a lower number if the ratifying states were contigu-

                                                                      

//  //275//. Id.// at 176. 

//  //276//. Id. //at 189. 

//  //277//. Id.// at 468. 

//  //278//. Id.// 

106 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Mason, Randolph, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, Hugh 

Williamson of North Carolina, Morris, King, and Madison spoke 

against the motion. It was supported only by Ellsworth and Ger-

ry.266 The vast majority of the debate was centered on the conten-

tion that the Constitution would be placed on the best footing if 

arising from the direct approval by the people. Though no one 

disputed this moral proposition, Gerry contended that the people 

had acquiesced in the ratification of the Articles of Confederation 

which was a sufficient expression of the consent of the gov-

erned.267 Moreover, he argued, the contention that the direct con-

sent of the governed was necessary proved too much since the 

argument would delegitimize the Articles of Confederation and 

many state constitutions.268 Neither Gerry nor Ellsworth expressly 

argued that the text of Article XIII was legally controlling. But, 

Ellsworth came close to implying this idea. This prompted the 

following response from Morris: 

The amendmt. moved by Mr. Elseworth [sic] erroneously sup-

poses that we are proceeding on the basis of the Confederation. 

This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.269 

No refutation of Morris was forthcoming from any of the pro-

ponents of legislative ratification. 

Ellsworth’s motion was defeated 7 to 3, with Connecticut, 

Delaware, and Maryland supporting the motion.270 Morris 

then moved for a new national ratification convention cho-

sen and authorized by the people.271 This idea was truly un-

popular and died for the lack of a second.272 Thus, as of July 

23rd, the plan was to submit the new Constitution to Con-

gress and then on to state ratification conventions.273 But, this 

was not the end of the matter. 

The Convention adjourned on July 26th until August 6th to 

allow a Committee of Detail to transform all of the resolutions 

into a single working draft.274 On the 6th, the Convention re-\\
                                                                      

//  //266//. Id. //at 88–94. 

//  //267//. Id.// at 89–90. 

//  //268//. Id.// 

//  //269//. Id. //at 92. 

//  //270//. Id.// at 93. 

 271. 

//Id.// 

//  //272//. Id. //

//  //273//. Id. //at 93–94. 

//  //274//. Id. //at 128. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 107

 

convened, distributed the draft document and adjourned un

the next day to allow the delegates a chance to read the whole 

document.275 There were now three provisions concerning rati-

fication and transition to the new government, Articles XXI, 

XXII and XXIII: 

ARTICLE XXI. \\
The ratification of the conventions of %%__%% States shall be suffi-

cient for organizing this Constitution. \\
ARTICLE XXII. \\
This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in 

Congress assembled, for their approbation; and it is the 

opinion of this Convention, that it should be afterwards 

submitted to a Convention chosen [in each State], under the 

recommendation of its legislature, in order to receive the rat-

ification of such Convention. \\
ARTICLE XXIII. \\
To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Con-

vention, that each assenting convention should notify its as-

sent and ratification to the United States in Congress assem-

bled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and 

ratification of the Conventions of %%__%% States, should appoint 

and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place, 

for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that 

after such publication, the Legislatures of the several States 

should elect members of the Senate, and direct the election 

of members of the House of Representatives; and that the 

members of the Legislature should meet at the time and 

place assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as may be, 

after their meeting, choose the President of the United 

States, and proceed to execute this Constitution.276 

Debate on these three articles began on August 30th.277 The

initial focus was the matter of filling in the blank left in the 

draft—how many states would be required to ratify. Wilson 

proposed seven—a majority.278 Morris argued for two different

numbers, a lower number if the ratifying states were contigu-

                                                                      

//  //275//. Id.// at 176. 

//  //276//. Id. //at 189. 

//  //277//. Id.// at 468. 

//  //278//. Id.// 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto112.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**112**

108 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ous, and a higher number if not.279 Sherman argued that since 

the present system required unanimous approval, ten seemed 

like the right number.280 Randolph argued for nine because it 

was a “respectable majority of the whole” and was a familiar 

number under the Articles.281 Wilson suggested eight.282 Carroll 

argued that the number should be thirteen since unanimity 

should be required to dissolve the existing confederation.283 

Madison, Wilson, and King debated the issue of whether 

non-consenting states could be bound by the action of a majori-

ty or super-majority.284 The whole debate spilled over to the 

next day.285 King immediately moved to add the words “be-

tween the said States” to “confine the operation of the Govt. to 

the States ratifying it.”286 Nine states voted favorably.287 Mary-

land was the lone dissent.288 Delaware was temporarily without 

a quorum. The moral principle of treaty law prevailed—no 

state could be bound by a treaty without its consent. 

During the debates, various formulas were proposed and re-

jected. Madison offered seven states.289 Morris moved to allow 

each state to choose its own method for ratification.290 Sherman, 

who argued for ten states on the prior day, now argued that all 

thirteen should be required.291 A motion to fill in the blank with 10 

states was rejected 7 to 4.292 Nine states (which was apparently 

moved by Mason) was approved by a vote of 8 to 3.293 Virginia 

                                                                      

//  //279//. Id. //

//  //280//. Id. //at 468–69. 

//  //281//. Id. //at 469. Nine states could declare war and take other military actions, for 

example. //See// ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 6. 

  282. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 469. 

//  //283//. Id.// 

//  //284//. Id. //

//  //285//. Id. //

//  //286//. Id.// at 475. 

//  //287//. Id.// 

//  //288//. Id.// 

//  //289//. Id. //

//  //290//. Id. //

//  //291//. Id. //

//  //292//. Id.// at 477. 

//  //293//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 109 

 

and both Carolinas voted no.294 Then final passage of the Article 

as amended was approved by all states save for Maryland.295 

The debate then turned to Article XXII which required the ap-

probation of Congress and then submission to the ratification 

conventions, with the state legislatures being responsible for the 

calling and associated rules.296 Morris moved to strike the phrase 

requiring the “approbation” of Congress.297 His motion passed 

eight states to three—with Massachusetts, Maryland, and Georgia 

voting no.298 Other skirmishes ensued, the most important of 

which was the suggestion of Randolph to allow the state ratifica-

tion conventions to be at liberty to propose amendments which 

would then be submitted to a second general convention.299 He 

generated no support for his idea.300 Final passage on Article XXII 

as drafted was 10 to 1, with Maryland again being the lone dis-

sent.301 Article XXIII, which provided a transition plan for moving 

from the Articles to the Constitution, was then approved with a 

minor amendment without dissent.302  

On September 5th, Gerry gave notice that he intended to 

move for reconsideration of Articles XIX, XX, XXI, and XXII.303 

His motions regarding Articles XXI and XXII were heard on 

September 10th.304 Gerry argued that failing to require the ap-

probation of Congress would give umbrage to that body.305 

Hamilton spoke strongly in support of Gerry’s motion: 

Mr. Hamilton concurred with Mr. Gerry as to the indeco-

rum of not requiring the approbation of Congress. He con-

sidered this as a necessary ingredient in the transaction. He 

thought it wrong also to allow nine States as provided by 

art. XXI. to institute a new Government on the ruins of the 

existing one. He [would] propose as a better modification 

of the two articles (XXI & XXII) that the plan should be sent 

                                                                      

//  //294//. Id. //

//  //295//. Id. //

//  //296//. Id. //at 478. 

//  //297//. Id. //

//  //298//. Id.// 

//  //299//. Id.// at 479. 

//  //300//. Id.// 

//  //301//. Id. //

//  //302//. Id. //at 479–80. 

//  //303//. Id. //at 511. 

//  //304//. Id. //at 559. 

//  //305//. Id.// at 559–60. 

108 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ous, and a higher number if not.279 Sherman argued that since 

the present system required unanimous approval, ten seemed 

like the right number.280 Randolph argued for nine because it 

was a “respectable majority of the whole” and was a familiar 

number under the Articles.281 Wilson suggested eight.282 Carroll 

argued that the number should be thirteen since unanimity 

should be required to dissolve the existing confederation.283 

Madison, Wilson, and King debated the issue of whether 

non-consenting states could be bound by the action of a majori-

ty or super-majority.284 The whole debate spilled over to the 

next day.285 King immediately moved to add the words “be-

tween the said States” to “confine the operation of the Govt. to 

the States ratifying it.”286 Nine states voted favorably.287 Mary-

land was the lone dissent.288 Delaware was temporarily without 

a quorum. The moral principle of treaty law prevailed—no 

state could be bound by a treaty without its consent. 

During the debates, various formulas were proposed and re-

jected. Madison offered seven states.289 Morris moved to allow 

each state to choose its own method for ratification.290 Sherman, 

who argued for ten states on the prior day, now argued that all 

thirteen should be required.291 A motion to fill in the blank with 10 

states was rejected 7 to 4.292 Nine states (which was apparently 

moved by Mason) was approved by a vote of 8 to 3.293 Virginia 

                                                                      

//  //279//. Id. //

//  //280//. Id. //at 468–69. 

//  //281//. Id. //at 469. Nine states could declare war and take other military actions, for 

example. //See// ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 6. 

  282. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 469. 

//  //283//. Id.// 

//  //284//. Id. //

//  //285//. Id. //

//  //286//. Id.// at 475. 

//  //287//. Id.// 

//  //288//. Id.// 

//  //289//. Id. //

//  //290//. Id. //

//  //291//. Id. //

//  //292//. Id.// at 477. 

//  //293//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 109

 

and both Carolinas voted no.294 Then final passage of the Arti

as amended was approved by all states save for Maryland.295 

The debate then turned to Article XXII which required the ap

probation of Congress and then submission to the ratificatio

conventions, with the state legislatures being responsible for 

calling and associated rules.296 Morris moved to strike the phra

requiring the “approbation” of Congress.297 His motion pass

eight states to three—with Massachusetts, Maryland, and Geor

voting no.298 Other skirmishes ensued, the most important of 

which was the suggestion of Randolph to allow the state ratifica

tion conventions to be at liberty to propose amendments which 

would then be submitted to a second general convention.299 He 

generated no support for his idea.300 Final passage on Article X

as drafted was 10 to 1, with Maryland again being the lone dis-

sent.301 Article XXIII, which provided a transition plan for moving 

from the Articles to the Constitution, was then approved with

minor amendment without dissent.302  

On September 5th, Gerry gave notice that he intended t

move for reconsideration of Articles XIX, XX, XXI, and XXII.303

His motions regarding Articles XXI and XXII were heard on 

September 10th.304 Gerry argued that failing to require the ap-

probation of Congress would give umbrage to that body 305

Hamilton spoke strongly in support of Gerry’s motion: 

Mr. Hamilton concurred with Mr. Gerry as to the indeco-

rum of not requiring the approbation of Congress. He con-

sidered this as a necessary ingredient in the transaction. He 

thought it wrong also to allow nine States as provided by 

art. XXI. to institute a new Government on the ruins of the 

existing one. He [would] propose as a better modification

of the two articles (XXI & XXII) that the plan should be sent 

                                                                      

//  //294//. Id. //

//  //295//. Id. //

//  //296//. Id. //at 478. 

//  //297//. Id. //

//  //298//. Id.// 

//  //299//. Id.// at 479. 

//  //300//. Id.// 

//  //301//. Id. //

//  //302//. Id. //at 479–80. 

//  //303//. Id. //at 511. 

//  //304//. Id. //at 559. 

//  //305//. Id.// at 559–60. 



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108 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ous, and a higher number if not.279 Sherman argued that since 

the present system required unanimous approval, ten seemed 

like the right number.280 Randolph argued for nine because it 

was a “respectable majority of the whole” and was a familiar 

number under the Articles.281 Wilson suggested eight.282 Carroll 

argued that the number should be thirteen since unanimity 

should be required to dissolve the existing confederation.283 

Madison, Wilson, and King debated the issue of whether 

non-consenting states could be bound by the action of a majori-

ty or super-majority.284 The whole debate spilled over to the 

next day.285 King immediately moved to add the words “be-

tween the said States” to “confine the operation of the Govt. to 

the States ratifying it.”286 Nine states voted favorably.287 Mary-

land was the lone dissent.288 Delaware was temporarily without 

a quorum. The moral principle of treaty law prevailed—no 

state could be bound by a treaty without its consent. 

During the debates, various formulas were proposed and re-

jected. Madison offered seven states.289 Morris moved to allow 

each state to choose its own method for ratification.290 Sherman, 

who argued for ten states on the prior day, now argued that all 

thirteen should be required.291 A motion to fill in the blank with 10 

states was rejected 7 to 4.292 Nine states (which was apparently 

moved by Mason) was approved by a vote of 8 to 3.293 Virginia 

                                                                      

//  //279//. Id. //

//  //280//. Id. //at 468–69. 

//  //281//. Id. //at 469. Nine states could declare war and take other military actions, for 

example. //See// ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 6. 

  282. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 469. 

//  //283//. Id.// 

//  //284//. Id. //

//  //285//. Id. //

//  //286//. Id.// at 475. 

//  //287//. Id.// 

//  //288//. Id.// 

//  //289//. Id. //

//  //290//. Id. //

//  //291//. Id. //

//  //292//. Id.// at 477. 

//  //293//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 109 

 

and both Carolinas voted no.294 Then final passage of the Article 

as amended was approved by all states save for Maryland.295 

The debate then turned to Article XXII which required the ap-

probation of Congress and then submission to the ratification 

conventions, with the state legislatures being responsible for the 

calling and associated rules.296 Morris moved to strike the phrase 

requiring the “approbation” of Congress.297 His motion passed 

eight states to three—with Massachusetts, Maryland, and Georgia 

voting no.298 Other skirmishes ensued, the most important of 

which was the suggestion of Randolph to allow the state ratifica-

tion conventions to be at liberty to propose amendments which 

would then be submitted to a second general convention.299 He 

generated no support for his idea.300 Final passage on Article XXII 

as drafted was 10 to 1, with Maryland again being the lone dis-

sent.301 Article XXIII, which provided a transition plan for moving 

from the Articles to the Constitution, was then approved with a 

minor amendment without dissent.302  

On September 5th, Gerry gave notice that he intended to 

move for reconsideration of Articles XIX, XX, XXI, and XXII.303 

His motions regarding Articles XXI and XXII were heard on 

September 10th.304 Gerry argued that failing to require the ap-

probation of Congress would give umbrage to that body.305 

Hamilton spoke strongly in support of Gerry’s motion: 

Mr. Hamilton concurred with Mr. Gerry as to the indeco-

rum of not requiring the approbation of Congress. He con-

sidered this as a necessary ingredient in the transaction. He 

thought it wrong also to allow nine States as provided by 

art. XXI. to institute a new Government on the ruins of the 

existing one. He [would] propose as a better modification 

of the two articles (XXI & XXII) that the plan should be sent 

                                                                      

//  //294//. Id. //

//  //295//. Id. //

//  //296//. Id. //at 478. 

//  //297//. Id. //

//  //298//. Id.// 

//  //299//. Id.// at 479. 

//  //300//. Id.// 

//  //301//. Id. //

//  //302//. Id. //at 479–80. 

//  //303//. Id. //at 511. 

//  //304//. Id. //at 559. 

//  //305//. Id.// at 559–60. 

108 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ous, and a higher number if not.279 Sherman argued that since 

the present system required unanimous approval, ten seemed 

like the right number.280 Randolph argued for nine because it 

was a “respectable majority of the whole” and was a familiar 

number under the Articles.281 Wilson suggested eight.282 Carroll 

argued that the number should be thirteen since unanimity 

should be required to dissolve the existing confederation.283 

Madison, Wilson, and King debated the issue of whether 

non-consenting states could be bound by the action of a majori-

ty or super-majority.284 The whole debate spilled over to the 

next day.285 King immediately moved to add the words “be-

tween the said States” to “confine the operation of the Govt. to 

the States ratifying it.”286 Nine states voted favorably.287 Mary-

land was the lone dissent.288 Delaware was temporarily without 

a quorum. The moral principle of treaty law prevailed—no 

state could be bound by a treaty without its consent. 

During the debates, various formulas were proposed and re-

jected. Madison offered seven states.289 Morris moved to allow 

each state to choose its own method for ratification.290 Sherman, 

who argued for ten states on the prior day, now argued that all 

thirteen should be required.291 A motion to fill in the blank with 10 

states was rejected 7 to 4.292 Nine states (which was apparently 

moved by Mason) was approved by a vote of 8 to 3.293 Virginia 

                                                                      

//  //279//. Id. //

//  //280//. Id. //at 468–69. 

//  //281//. Id. //at 469. Nine states could declare war and take other military actions, for 

example. //See// ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 6. 

  282. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 469. 

//  //283//. Id.// 

//  //284//. Id. //

//  //285//. Id. //

//  //286//. Id.// at 475. 

//  //287//. Id.// 

//  //288//. Id.// 

//  //289//. Id. //

//  //290//. Id. //

//  //291//. Id. //

//  //292//. Id.// at 477. 

//  //293//. Id.// 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 109

 

and both Carolinas voted no.294 Then final passage of the Arti

as amended was approved by all states save for Maryland.295 

The debate then turned to Article XXII which required the ap

probation of Congress and then submission to the ratificatio

conventions, with the state legislatures being responsible for 

calling and associated rules.296 Morris moved to strike the phra

requiring the “approbation” of Congress.297 His motion pass

eight states to three—with Massachusetts, Maryland, and Geor

voting no.298 Other skirmishes ensued, the most important of 

which was the suggestion of Randolph to allow the state ratifica

tion conventions to be at liberty to propose amendments which 

would then be submitted to a second general convention.299 He 

generated no support for his idea.300 Final passage on Article X

as drafted was 10 to 1, with Maryland again being the lone dis-

sent.301 Article XXIII, which provided a transition plan for moving 

from the Articles to the Constitution, was then approved with

minor amendment without dissent.302  

On September 5th, Gerry gave notice that he intended t

move for reconsideration of Articles XIX, XX, XXI, and XXII.303

His motions regarding Articles XXI and XXII were heard on 

September 10th.304 Gerry argued that failing to require the ap-

probation of Congress would give umbrage to that body 305

Hamilton spoke strongly in support of Gerry’s motion: 

Mr. Hamilton concurred with Mr. Gerry as to the indeco-

rum of not requiring the approbation of Congress. He con-

sidered this as a necessary ingredient in the transaction. He 

thought it wrong also to allow nine States as provided by 

art. XXI. to institute a new Government on the ruins of the 

existing one. He [would] propose as a better modification

of the two articles (XXI & XXII) that the plan should be sent 

                                                                      

//  //294//. Id. //

//  //295//. Id. //

//  //296//. Id. //at 478. 

//  //297//. Id. //

//  //298//. Id.// 

//  //299//. Id.// at 479. 

//  //300//. Id.// 

//  //301//. Id. //

//  //302//. Id. //at 479–80. 

//  //303//. Id. //at 511. 

//  //304//. Id. //at 559. 

//  //305//. Id.// at 559–60. 



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**114**

110 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

to Congress in order that the same if approved by them, 

may be communicated to the State Legislatures, to the end 

that they may refer it to State Conventions; each Legisla-

ture declaring that if the convention of the State should 

think the plan ought to take effect among nine ratifying 

States, the same [should] take effect accordingly.306 

  In other words, Hamilton argued that the plan for nine states to 

approve the new Constitution would in fact be appropriate if the 

new plan for ratification was first approved by the Congress and 

then by the thirteen state legislatures. Hamilton’s proposal would 

thread the needle, achieving both of the competing interests—the 

desire to follow the recognized procedures to achieve legal validi-

ty (approval of the new process both by Congress and the state 

legislatures) as well as the desire to ground the Constitution in the 

moral authority that flows from the approval of the people. Sher-

man made a second important suggestion in accord with Hamil-

ton. Rather than embodying the Hamilton plan in the text of the 

proposed Constitution, Sherman proposed that these ratification 

requirements should be made a “separate Act”—a formal pro-

posal having legal weight but distinct from the ultimate docu-

ment itself.307 The motion to reconsider was passed seven to 

three with New Hampshire divided. Massachusetts, Pennsyl-

vania, and South Carolina were the dissenting states.308 

A motion to take up Hamilton’s idea was defeated, on a pro-

cedural vote, 10 to 1.309 Article XXI as submitted was then ap-

proved unanimously.310 Hamilton withdrew his motion regard-

ing Article XXII since it was certain to meet with the same 

defeat.311 Hamilton’s motion would have provided a very clear 

argument for both legal and moral validity—but at this stage it 

was rejected.312 Immediately after this vote, the Constitution 

was committed to the final committee of style to prepare the 

final draft of the Constitution.313 

                                                                      

//  //306//. Id. //at 560. 

//  //307//. Id. //at 561. 

//  //308//. Id.// 

//  //309//. Id.// at 563. 

//  //310//. Id. //

//  //311//. Id//. 

//  //312//. Id.// 

//  //313//. Id.// at 564. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 111 

 

Surprisingly, on September 10th, the Committee of Style re-

turned with final language that essentially tracked the sugges-

tions of Hamilton and Sherman.314 The final version of Article 

VII regarding ratification followed the previously approved 

text of the draft Article XXI: “The ratification of the Conven-

tions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of 

this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.”315 

The contents of draft Articles XXII and XXIII were placed in-

to a separate formal act adopted unanimously as an official act 

of the Convention.316 The controlling paragraph of this second 

official enactment read as following: 

Resolved, That the preceding Constitution be laid before the 

United States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opin-

ion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submit-

ted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the 

People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legisla-

ture, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each Con-

vention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give 

Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.317 

This Act also contained the transition plan for elections for the 

new government that had been previously drafted as Article 

XXIII.318 In addition to the Constitution and the “Ratification and 

Transition” Resolution, a formal letter of transmission was also 

sent from the Convention to Congress.319 The letter was adopted 

by the “Unanimous Order of the Convention” and formally 

signed by George Washington, President of the Convention.320 

In the end, the Convention followed Hamilton’s suggestion 

as to content and Sherman’s suggestion as to bifurcation. They 

would lay the matter before Congress with the request that 

Congress send the matter to the state legislatures.321 The legisla-

tures were, in turn, requested to approve the new methodology 

for ratification.322 It is this final product that must be considered \\
                                                                      

//  //314//. Id.// at 579. 

//  //315//. Id. //at 603. 

//  //316//. Id. //at 604–05, 665–66. 

//  //317//. Id. //at 665. 

//  //318//. Id.// at 665–66. 

//  //319//. Id.// at 666–67. 

//  //320//. Id. //at 667. 

//  //321//. Id.// at 665. 

//  //322//. Id.// 

110 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

to Congress in order that the same if approved by them, 

may be communicated to the State Legislatures, to the end 

that they may refer it to State Conventions; each Legisla-

ture declaring that if the convention of the State should 

think the plan ought to take effect among nine ratifying 

States, the same [should] take effect accordingly.306 

  In other words, Hamilton argued that the plan for nine states to 

approve the new Constitution would in fact be appropriate if the 

new plan for ratification was first approved by the Congress and 

then by the thirteen state legislatures. Hamilton’s proposal would 

thread the needle, achieving both of the competing interests—the 

desire to follow the recognized procedures to achieve legal validi-

ty (approval of the new process both by Congress and the state 

legislatures) as well as the desire to ground the Constitution in the 

moral authority that flows from the approval of the people. Sher-

man made a second important suggestion in accord with Hamil-

ton. Rather than embodying the Hamilton plan in the text of the 

proposed Constitution, Sherman proposed that these ratification 

requirements should be made a “separate Act”—a formal pro-

posal having legal weight but distinct from the ultimate docu-

ment itself.307 The motion to reconsider was passed seven to 

three with New Hampshire divided. Massachusetts, Pennsyl-

vania, and South Carolina were the dissenting states.308 

A motion to take up Hamilton’s idea was defeated, on a pro-

cedural vote, 10 to 1.309 Article XXI as submitted was then ap-

proved unanimously.310 Hamilton withdrew his motion regard-

ing Article XXII since it was certain to meet with the same 

defeat.311 Hamilton’s motion would have provided a very clear 

argument for both legal and moral validity—but at this stage it 

was rejected.312 Immediately after this vote, the Constitution 

was committed to the final committee of style to prepare the 

final draft of the Constitution.313 

                                                                      

//  //306//. Id. //at 560. 

//  //307//. Id. //at 561. 

//  //308//. Id.// 

//  //309//. Id.// at 563. 

//  //310//. Id. //

//  //311//. Id//. 

//  //312//. Id.// 

//  //313//. Id.// at 564. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 111

 

Surprisingly, on September 10th, the Committee of Style re-

turned with final language that essentially tracked the sugg

tions of Hamilton and Sherman.314 The final version of Article 

VII regarding ratification followed the previously approved 

text of the draft Article XXI: “The ratification of the Conven-

tions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment

this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.”315

The contents of draft Articles XXII and XXIII were placed in

to a separate formal act adopted unanimously as an official 

of the Convention.316 The controlling paragraph of this second

official enactment read as following: 

Resolved, That the preceding Constitution be laid before the 

United States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opin-

ion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submit-

ted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the 

People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legisla-

ture, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each Con-

vention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give 

Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.317 

This Act also contained the transition plan for elections for the 

new government that had been previously drafted as Arti

XXIII.318 In addition to the Constitution and the “Ratification an

Transition” Resolution, a formal letter of transmission was a

sent from the Convention to Congress.319 The letter was adopte

by the “Unanimous Order of the Convention” and form

signed by George Washington, President of the Convention.320

In the end, the Convention followed Hamilton’s suggestion 

as to content and Sherman’s suggestion as to bifurcation. Th

would lay the matter before Congress with the request that 

Congress send the matter to the state legislatures.321 The legisl

tures were, in turn, requested to approve the new methodol

for ratification.322 It is this final product that must be considered \\
                                                                      

//  //314//. Id.// at 579. 

//  //315//. Id. //at 603. 

//  //316//. Id. //at 604–05, 665–66. 

//  //317//. Id. //at 665. 

//  //318//. Id.// at 665–66. 

//  //319//. Id.// at 666–67. 

//  //320//. Id. //at 667. 

//  //321//. Id.// at 665. 

//  //322//. Id.// 



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**115**

110 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

to Congress in order that the same if approved by them, 

may be communicated to the State Legislatures, to the end 

that they may refer it to State Conventions; each Legisla-

ture declaring that if the convention of the State should 

think the plan ought to take effect among nine ratifying 

States, the same [should] take effect accordingly.306 

  In other words, Hamilton argued that the plan for nine states to 

approve the new Constitution would in fact be appropriate if the 

new plan for ratification was first approved by the Congress and 

then by the thirteen state legislatures. Hamilton’s proposal would 

thread the needle, achieving both of the competing interests—the 

desire to follow the recognized procedures to achieve legal validi-

ty (approval of the new process both by Congress and the state 

legislatures) as well as the desire to ground the Constitution in the 

moral authority that flows from the approval of the people. Sher-

man made a second important suggestion in accord with Hamil-

ton. Rather than embodying the Hamilton plan in the text of the 

proposed Constitution, Sherman proposed that these ratification 

requirements should be made a “separate Act”—a formal pro-

posal having legal weight but distinct from the ultimate docu-

ment itself.307 The motion to reconsider was passed seven to 

three with New Hampshire divided. Massachusetts, Pennsyl-

vania, and South Carolina were the dissenting states.308 

A motion to take up Hamilton’s idea was defeated, on a pro-

cedural vote, 10 to 1.309 Article XXI as submitted was then ap-

proved unanimously.310 Hamilton withdrew his motion regard-

ing Article XXII since it was certain to meet with the same 

defeat.311 Hamilton’s motion would have provided a very clear 

argument for both legal and moral validity—but at this stage it 

was rejected.312 Immediately after this vote, the Constitution 

was committed to the final committee of style to prepare the 

final draft of the Constitution.313 

                                                                      

//  //306//. Id. //at 560. 

//  //307//. Id. //at 561. 

//  //308//. Id.// 

//  //309//. Id.// at 563. 

//  //310//. Id. //

//  //311//. Id//. 

//  //312//. Id.// 

//  //313//. Id.// at 564. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 111 

 

Surprisingly, on September 10th, the Committee of Style re-

turned with final language that essentially tracked the sugges-

tions of Hamilton and Sherman.314 The final version of Article 

VII regarding ratification followed the previously approved 

text of the draft Article XXI: “The ratification of the Conven-

tions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of 

this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.”315 

The contents of draft Articles XXII and XXIII were placed in-

to a separate formal act adopted unanimously as an official act 

of the Convention.316 The controlling paragraph of this second 

official enactment read as following: 

Resolved, That the preceding Constitution be laid before the 

United States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opin-

ion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submit-

ted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the 

People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legisla-

ture, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each Con-

vention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give 

Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.317 

This Act also contained the transition plan for elections for the 

new government that had been previously drafted as Article 

XXIII.318 In addition to the Constitution and the “Ratification and 

Transition” Resolution, a formal letter of transmission was also 

sent from the Convention to Congress.319 The letter was adopted 

by the “Unanimous Order of the Convention” and formally 

signed by George Washington, President of the Convention.320 

In the end, the Convention followed Hamilton’s suggestion 

as to content and Sherman’s suggestion as to bifurcation. They 

would lay the matter before Congress with the request that 

Congress send the matter to the state legislatures.321 The legisla-

tures were, in turn, requested to approve the new methodology 

for ratification.322 It is this final product that must be considered \\
                                                                      

//  //314//. Id.// at 579. 

//  //315//. Id. //at 603. 

//  //316//. Id. //at 604–05, 665–66. 

//  //317//. Id. //at 665. 

//  //318//. Id.// at 665–66. 

//  //319//. Id.// at 666–67. 

//  //320//. Id. //at 667. 

//  //321//. Id.// at 665. 

//  //322//. Id.// 

110 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

to Congress in order that the same if approved by them, 

may be communicated to the State Legislatures, to the end 

that they may refer it to State Conventions; each Legisla-

ture declaring that if the convention of the State should 

think the plan ought to take effect among nine ratifying 

States, the same [should] take effect accordingly.306 

  In other words, Hamilton argued that the plan for nine states to 

approve the new Constitution would in fact be appropriate if the 

new plan for ratification was first approved by the Congress and 

then by the thirteen state legislatures. Hamilton’s proposal would 

thread the needle, achieving both of the competing interests—the 

desire to follow the recognized procedures to achieve legal validi-

ty (approval of the new process both by Congress and the state 

legislatures) as well as the desire to ground the Constitution in the 

moral authority that flows from the approval of the people. Sher-

man made a second important suggestion in accord with Hamil-

ton. Rather than embodying the Hamilton plan in the text of the 

proposed Constitution, Sherman proposed that these ratification 

requirements should be made a “separate Act”—a formal pro-

posal having legal weight but distinct from the ultimate docu-

ment itself.307 The motion to reconsider was passed seven to 

three with New Hampshire divided. Massachusetts, Pennsyl-

vania, and South Carolina were the dissenting states.308 

A motion to take up Hamilton’s idea was defeated, on a pro-

cedural vote, 10 to 1.309 Article XXI as submitted was then ap-

proved unanimously.310 Hamilton withdrew his motion regard-

ing Article XXII since it was certain to meet with the same 

defeat.311 Hamilton’s motion would have provided a very clear 

argument for both legal and moral validity—but at this stage it 

was rejected.312 Immediately after this vote, the Constitution 

was committed to the final committee of style to prepare the 

final draft of the Constitution.313 

                                                                      

//  //306//. Id. //at 560. 

//  //307//. Id. //at 561. 

//  //308//. Id.// 

//  //309//. Id.// at 563. 

//  //310//. Id. //

//  //311//. Id//. 

//  //312//. Id.// 

//  //313//. Id.// at 564. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 111

 

Surprisingly, on September 10th, the Committee of Style re-

turned with final language that essentially tracked the sugg

tions of Hamilton and Sherman.314 The final version of Article 

VII regarding ratification followed the previously approved 

text of the draft Article XXI: “The ratification of the Conven-

tions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment

this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.”315

The contents of draft Articles XXII and XXIII were placed in

to a separate formal act adopted unanimously as an official 

of the Convention.316 The controlling paragraph of this second

official enactment read as following: 

Resolved, That the preceding Constitution be laid before the 

United States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opin-

ion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submit-

ted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the 

People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legisla-

ture, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each Con-

vention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give 

Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.317 

This Act also contained the transition plan for elections for the 

new government that had been previously drafted as Arti

XXIII.318 In addition to the Constitution and the “Ratification an

Transition” Resolution, a formal letter of transmission was a

sent from the Convention to Congress.319 The letter was adopte

by the “Unanimous Order of the Convention” and form

signed by George Washington, President of the Convention.320

In the end, the Convention followed Hamilton’s suggestion 

as to content and Sherman’s suggestion as to bifurcation. Th

would lay the matter before Congress with the request that 

Congress send the matter to the state legislatures.321 The legisl

tures were, in turn, requested to approve the new methodol

for ratification.322 It is this final product that must be considered \\
                                                                      

//  //314//. Id.// at 579. 

//  //315//. Id. //at 603. 

//  //316//. Id. //at 604–05, 665–66. 

//  //317//. Id. //at 665. 

//  //318//. Id.// at 665–66. 

//  //319//. Id.// at 666–67. 

//  //320//. Id. //at 667. 

//  //321//. Id.// at 665. 

//  //322//. Id.// 



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112 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

in assessing the legality of the process employed for ratifica-

tion—not any of the prior suggestions or drafts that were con-

sidered by the Convention. 

There appears to be no scholarly work that assesses the va-

lidity of the ratification process taking into account the full 

process sanctioned by the Convention, followed by Congress, 

and approved by the thirteen state legislatures. No one would 

doubt the need to consider the legal ramifications of this lan-

guage had it remained in the text of the Constitution. The deci-

sion of the Convention to separate the transitional articles into 

a separate act was not done so as to deny their efficacy. It was 

an apparent decision to not clutter the Constitution of the Unit-

ed States with language that was temporary in nature. This 

language was just as formal as the Constitution itself and actu-

ally was employed by the sanction of Congress and the state 

legislatures for both the ratification process and in planning for 

an orderly transition. 

//C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress //

On September 19th, the Secretary of the Constitutional Con-

vention, William Jackson, delivered the Constitution, the “Rati-

fication and Transition” Resolution, and the letter to the Secre-

tary of the Confederation Congress, Charles Thompson.323 It 

was read to Congress on September 20th and the date of Sep-

tember 26th was assigned for its consideration.324 The debate 

lasted for two days.325 

Every speaker in Congress ultimately argued that the Consti-

tution should be laid before the people via the convention pro-

cess outlined in Article VII and the “Ratification and Transi-

tion” Resolution.326 However, there was a strong clash over the 

approach in so doing. Nathan Dane wanted Congress to adopt 

language that explained that since the “constitution appears to 

be intended as an entire system in itself, and not as any part of, 

or alteration in the Articles of Confederation” Congress—

which was a creature of the Articles—was powerless to take 

                                                                      

  323. 13 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 229. 

//  //324//. Id.// 

//  //325//. Id.// 

//  //326//. See //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 327–340. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 113 

 

any action thereon.327 Richard Henry Lee proposed a resolution 

stating that the Articles of Confederation did not authorize 

Congress to create a new confederacy of nine states, but, out of 

respect, sending the Convention’s plan to the states anyway.328 

He further recommended that Congress amend the Constitu-

tion.329 Madison wanted Congress to formally approve the 

Constitution.330 He agreed with Lee that Congress had the 

power to amend the document, but if it did so, then it would be 

subject to the procedural requirements of Article XIII which 

would require the assent of thirteen legislatures rather than 

nine state conventions.331 Dane and R.H. Lee repeatedly point-

ed out that approving the new process “brings into view so 

materially [the] question of 9 States //should be adopted//.”332 

Those arguing against the Constitution wanted Congress to re-

view it article by article. Those arguing for the Constitution 

sought to avoid a repetition of the work of the Convention. In the 

end, Congress adopted essentially the same approach as was ad-

vocated by Hamilton at the end of the Constitutional Convention: 

  Congress having received the report of the Convention 

lately assembled in Philadelphia. \\
  Resolved unanimously, That the said report with the reso-

lutions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to 

the several legislatures in order to be submitted to a conven-

tion of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof 

in conformity to the resolves of the Convention made and 

provided in that case.333 

Specifically referencing the accompanying resolutions (“Ratifi-

cation and Transition”), Congress limited its approval to the 

process itself, rather than the Constitution on its substance.334 

The editors of the encyclopedic Documentary History of the 

                                                                      

  327. Nathan Dane’s Motion (Sept. 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 

327, 328. 

  328. Richard Henry Lee’s Motion (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //

note 4, at 329, 329. 

  329. Melancton Smith’s Notes (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 335, 336. 

//  //330//. See id.// at 335. 

//  //331//. Id. //at 336. 

  332. Debates (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 234, 234–35. 

  333. Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

340, 340. 

//  //334//. See id.// 

112 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

in assessing the legality of the process employed for ratifica-

tion—not any of the prior suggestions or drafts that were con-

sidered by the Convention. 

There appears to be no scholarly work that assesses the va-

lidity of the ratification process taking into account the full 

process sanctioned by the Convention, followed by Congress, 

and approved by the thirteen state legislatures. No one would 

doubt the need to consider the legal ramifications of this lan-

guage had it remained in the text of the Constitution. The deci-

sion of the Convention to separate the transitional articles into 

a separate act was not done so as to deny their efficacy. It was 

an apparent decision to not clutter the Constitution of the Unit-

ed States with language that was temporary in nature. This 

language was just as formal as the Constitution itself and actu-

ally was employed by the sanction of Congress and the state 

legislatures for both the ratification process and in planning for 

an orderly transition. 

//C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress //

On September 19th, the Secretary of the Constitutional Con-

vention, William Jackson, delivered the Constitution, the “Rati-

fication and Transition” Resolution, and the letter to the Secre-

tary of the Confederation Congress, Charles Thompson.323 It 

was read to Congress on September 20th and the date of Sep-

tember 26th was assigned for its consideration.324 The debate 

lasted for two days.325 

Every speaker in Congress ultimately argued that the Consti-

tution should be laid before the people via the convention pro-

cess outlined in Article VII and the “Ratification and Transi-

tion” Resolution.326 However, there was a strong clash over the 

approach in so doing. Nathan Dane wanted Congress to adopt 

language that explained that since the “constitution appears to 

be intended as an entire system in itself, and not as any part of, 

or alteration in the Articles of Confederation” Congress—

which was a creature of the Articles—was powerless to take 

                                                                      

  323. 13 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 229. 

//  //324//. Id.// 

//  //325//. Id.// 

//  //326//. See //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 327–340. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 113

 

any action thereon.327 Richard Henry Lee proposed a resolution

stating that the Articles of Confederation did not authorize 

Congress to create a new confederacy of nine states, but, out

respect, sending the Convention’s plan to the states anyway 328

He further recommended that Congress amend the Consti

tion.329 Madison wanted Congress to formally approve the 

Constitution.330 He agreed with Lee that Congress had th

power to amend the document, but if it did so, then it would be

subject to the procedural requirements of Article XIII which

would require the assent of thirteen legislatures rather than 

nine state conventions.331 Dane and R.H. Lee repeatedly point-

ed out that approving the new process “brings into view so

materially [the] question of 9 States //should be adopted//.”332 

Those arguing against the Constitution wanted Congress to re-

view it article by article. Those arguing for the Constitution 

sought to avoid a repetition of the work of the Convention. In the 

end, Congress adopted essentially the same approach as was ad-

vocated by Hamilton at the end of the Constitutional Convention:

  Congress having received the report of the Convention 

lately assembled in Philadelphia. \\
  Resolved unanimously, That the said report with the reso-

lutions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to 

the several legislatures in order to be submitted to a conven-

tion of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof 

in conformity to the resolves of the Convention made and 

provided in that case.333 

Specifically referencing the accompanying resolutions (“Ratifi-

cation and Transition”), Congress limited its approval to the

process itself, rather than the Constitution on its substance.334

The editors of the encyclopedic Documentary History of t

                                                                      

  327. Nathan Dane’s Motion (Sept. 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4

327, 328. 

  328. Richard Henry Lee’s Motion (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //sup//

note 4, at 329, 329. 

  329. Melancton Smith’s Notes (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note

at 335, 336. 

//  //330//. See id.// at 335. 

//  //331//. Id. //at 336. 

  332. Debates (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 234, 234–35. 

  333. Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4,

340, 340. 

//  //334//. See id.// 



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**117**

112 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

in assessing the legality of the process employed for ratifica-

tion—not any of the prior suggestions or drafts that were con-

sidered by the Convention. 

There appears to be no scholarly work that assesses the va-

lidity of the ratification process taking into account the full 

process sanctioned by the Convention, followed by Congress, 

and approved by the thirteen state legislatures. No one would 

doubt the need to consider the legal ramifications of this lan-

guage had it remained in the text of the Constitution. The deci-

sion of the Convention to separate the transitional articles into 

a separate act was not done so as to deny their efficacy. It was 

an apparent decision to not clutter the Constitution of the Unit-

ed States with language that was temporary in nature. This 

language was just as formal as the Constitution itself and actu-

ally was employed by the sanction of Congress and the state 

legislatures for both the ratification process and in planning for 

an orderly transition. 

//C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress //

On September 19th, the Secretary of the Constitutional Con-

vention, William Jackson, delivered the Constitution, the “Rati-

fication and Transition” Resolution, and the letter to the Secre-

tary of the Confederation Congress, Charles Thompson.323 It 

was read to Congress on September 20th and the date of Sep-

tember 26th was assigned for its consideration.324 The debate 

lasted for two days.325 

Every speaker in Congress ultimately argued that the Consti-

tution should be laid before the people via the convention pro-

cess outlined in Article VII and the “Ratification and Transi-

tion” Resolution.326 However, there was a strong clash over the 

approach in so doing. Nathan Dane wanted Congress to adopt 

language that explained that since the “constitution appears to 

be intended as an entire system in itself, and not as any part of, 

or alteration in the Articles of Confederation” Congress—

which was a creature of the Articles—was powerless to take 

                                                                      

  323. 13 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 229. 

//  //324//. Id.// 

//  //325//. Id.// 

//  //326//. See //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 327–340. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 113 

 

any action thereon.327 Richard Henry Lee proposed a resolution 

stating that the Articles of Confederation did not authorize 

Congress to create a new confederacy of nine states, but, out of 

respect, sending the Convention’s plan to the states anyway.328 

He further recommended that Congress amend the Constitu-

tion.329 Madison wanted Congress to formally approve the 

Constitution.330 He agreed with Lee that Congress had the 

power to amend the document, but if it did so, then it would be 

subject to the procedural requirements of Article XIII which 

would require the assent of thirteen legislatures rather than 

nine state conventions.331 Dane and R.H. Lee repeatedly point-

ed out that approving the new process “brings into view so 

materially [the] question of 9 States //should be adopted//.”332 

Those arguing against the Constitution wanted Congress to re-

view it article by article. Those arguing for the Constitution 

sought to avoid a repetition of the work of the Convention. In the 

end, Congress adopted essentially the same approach as was ad-

vocated by Hamilton at the end of the Constitutional Convention: 

  Congress having received the report of the Convention 

lately assembled in Philadelphia. \\
  Resolved unanimously, That the said report with the reso-

lutions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to 

the several legislatures in order to be submitted to a conven-

tion of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof 

in conformity to the resolves of the Convention made and 

provided in that case.333 

Specifically referencing the accompanying resolutions (“Ratifi-

cation and Transition”), Congress limited its approval to the 

process itself, rather than the Constitution on its substance.334 

The editors of the encyclopedic Documentary History of the 

                                                                      

  327. Nathan Dane’s Motion (Sept. 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 

327, 328. 

  328. Richard Henry Lee’s Motion (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //

note 4, at 329, 329. 

  329. Melancton Smith’s Notes (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 335, 336. 

//  //330//. See id.// at 335. 

//  //331//. Id. //at 336. 

  332. Debates (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 234, 234–35. 

  333. Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

340, 340. 

//  //334//. See id.// 

112 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

in assessing the legality of the process employed for ratifica-

tion—not any of the prior suggestions or drafts that were con-

sidered by the Convention. 

There appears to be no scholarly work that assesses the va-

lidity of the ratification process taking into account the full 

process sanctioned by the Convention, followed by Congress, 

and approved by the thirteen state legislatures. No one would 

doubt the need to consider the legal ramifications of this lan-

guage had it remained in the text of the Constitution. The deci-

sion of the Convention to separate the transitional articles into 

a separate act was not done so as to deny their efficacy. It was 

an apparent decision to not clutter the Constitution of the Unit-

ed States with language that was temporary in nature. This 

language was just as formal as the Constitution itself and actu-

ally was employed by the sanction of Congress and the state 

legislatures for both the ratification process and in planning for 

an orderly transition. 

//C.  Debates in the Confederation Congress //

On September 19th, the Secretary of the Constitutional Con-

vention, William Jackson, delivered the Constitution, the “Rati-

fication and Transition” Resolution, and the letter to the Secre-

tary of the Confederation Congress, Charles Thompson.323 It 

was read to Congress on September 20th and the date of Sep-

tember 26th was assigned for its consideration.324 The debate 

lasted for two days.325 

Every speaker in Congress ultimately argued that the Consti-

tution should be laid before the people via the convention pro-

cess outlined in Article VII and the “Ratification and Transi-

tion” Resolution.326 However, there was a strong clash over the 

approach in so doing. Nathan Dane wanted Congress to adopt 

language that explained that since the “constitution appears to 

be intended as an entire system in itself, and not as any part of, 

or alteration in the Articles of Confederation” Congress—

which was a creature of the Articles—was powerless to take 

                                                                      

  323. 13 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 229. 

//  //324//. Id.// 

//  //325//. Id.// 

//  //326//. See //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 327–340. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 113

 

any action thereon.327 Richard Henry Lee proposed a resolution

stating that the Articles of Confederation did not authorize 

Congress to create a new confederacy of nine states, but, out

respect, sending the Convention’s plan to the states anyway 328

He further recommended that Congress amend the Consti

tion.329 Madison wanted Congress to formally approve the 

Constitution.330 He agreed with Lee that Congress had th

power to amend the document, but if it did so, then it would be

subject to the procedural requirements of Article XIII which

would require the assent of thirteen legislatures rather than 

nine state conventions.331 Dane and R.H. Lee repeatedly point-

ed out that approving the new process “brings into view so

materially [the] question of 9 States //should be adopted//.”332 

Those arguing against the Constitution wanted Congress to re-

view it article by article. Those arguing for the Constitution 

sought to avoid a repetition of the work of the Convention. In the 

end, Congress adopted essentially the same approach as was ad-

vocated by Hamilton at the end of the Constitutional Convention:

  Congress having received the report of the Convention 

lately assembled in Philadelphia. \\
  Resolved unanimously, That the said report with the reso-

lutions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to 

the several legislatures in order to be submitted to a conven-

tion of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof 

in conformity to the resolves of the Convention made and 

provided in that case.333 

Specifically referencing the accompanying resolutions (“Ratifi-

cation and Transition”), Congress limited its approval to the

process itself, rather than the Constitution on its substance.334

The editors of the encyclopedic Documentary History of t

                                                                      

  327. Nathan Dane’s Motion (Sept. 26, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //supra //note 4

327, 328. 

  328. Richard Henry Lee’s Motion (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in //1 DHRC, //sup//

note 4, at 329, 329. 

  329. Melancton Smith’s Notes (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note

at 335, 336. 

//  //330//. See id.// at 335. 

//  //331//. Id. //at 336. 

  332. Debates (Sept. 27, 1787), //reprinted in //13 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 234, 234–35. 

  333. Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4,

340, 340. 

//  //334//. See id.// 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto118.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**118**

114 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Ratification of the Constitution summarize the approach taken 

by Congress thusly: 

On 28 September Congress reached a compromise. It re-

solved “unanimously” that the Constitution and the resolu-

tions and the letter of the Convention be sent to the states 

with only a suggestion that the states call conventions to 

consider the Constitution. This compromise followed the 

recommendation of the Convention.335 

Congress only approved the new process and sent the matter to 

the state legislatures with recommendation that they do the same. 

//D.  Thirteen Legislatures Approve the New Process //

Given the fact that the Convention had been held in Philadel-

phia, the first state legislature to receive the new Constitution 

and the accompanying resolutions was Pennsylvania.336 There 

was an effort to call a ratification convention very quickly with 

the goal of making the Keystone state the first to ratify the Con-

stitution.337 However, this desire was thwarted by the quorum 

rules for the legislature found in the state constitution.338 Rather 

than the typical majority requirement, two-thirds of the mem-

bers of the Assembly were necessary to constitute a quorum.339 

And even though there was a clear pro-Constitution majority in 

the legislature, slightly more than a third of the members delib-

erately absented themselves from the chambers to defeat the 

ability of the legislature to transact any business—not only the 

calling of the ratification convention, but the ability to complete 

the state’s legislative calendar before the end of the session on 

September 29th.340 The Anti-Federalists hoped that the forthcom-

ing elections after the end of session would result in a greater 

number of anti-Constitution representatives.341 

Apparently, this was not the first time that members went 

missing for such purposes.342 The Assembly directed the Ser-

geant-at-Arms to find the missing members and to direct them \\
                                                                      

  335. 13 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at// //230. 

//  //336//. See //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 54. 

//  //337//. See id.// 

 338. 

//Id.// at 55. 

//  //339//. Id.// 

//  //340//. Id.// 

//  //341//. See id//. at 54. 

//  //342//. Id.// at 55. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 115 

 

back to their seats—which was their duty under law.343 Finally, 

two members were located and were escorted by the Assem-

bly’s messengers—with the enthusiastic support of a threaten-

ing mob—back to their seats.344 These two members were a suf-

ficient addition to constitute a quorum.345 On September 29th, 

the Pennsylvania legislature was the first to approve the new 

process by calling a convention.346 

In October, five state legislatures followed suit: Connecticut 

on October 16th,347 Massachusetts on October 25th,348 Georgia 

October 26th,349 New Jersey on October 29th,350 and Virginia on 

October 31st.351 Georgia is noteworthy because its delegates 

were permitted to “adopt or reject any part of the whole.”352 On 

November 9th and 10th, Delaware’s legislature approved the 

new process by calling a convention.353 Maryland’s Assembly 

approved the call of the ratification convention on November 

27th and the Senate followed on December 1st.354 In December, 

two more state legislatures sanctioned the use of the new pro-

cess: North Carolina on December 6th355 and New Hampshire 

on December 14th.356 

North Carolina is worthy of special mention. Pauline Maier 

notes that despite the fact that “critics of the Constitution con-\\
                                                                      

//  //343//. Id.// 

//  //344//. Id.// 

//  //345//. Id.// 

  346. Assembly Proceedings (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

99, 99–103. 

  347. House Proceedings, A.M. (Oct. 16, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 364, 364–66. 

  348. Report of the Joint Committee with Senate and House Amendments (Oct. 

19–25, 1787), //reprinted// //in //4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 130, 130–33. 

  349. Assembly Proceedings (Oct. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

227, 227–28. 

  350. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Oct. 29, 1787), //reprinted//  //in  //3 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 167, 167–68. 

  351. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Oct. 31, 1787), //reprinted in //8// //

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 118, 118. 

  352. Assembly Proceedings (Oct. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3// //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

227, 228. 

  353. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Nov. 9–10, 1787), //reprinted in //3 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 90, 90. 

  354. JOHN FRANKLIN JAMESON, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL CON-

VENTION OF 

1787, at// //163 (1903). 

//  //355//. Id. //

//  //356//. Id. //at 161. 

114 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Ratification of the Constitution summarize the approach taken 

by Congress thusly: 

On 28 September Congress reached a compromise. It re-

solved “unanimously” that the Constitution and the resolu-

tions and the letter of the Convention be sent to the states 

with only a suggestion that the states call conventions to 

consider the Constitution. This compromise followed the 

recommendation of the Convention.335 

Congress only approved the new process and sent the matter to 

the state legislatures with recommendation that they do the same. 

//D.  Thirteen Legislatures Approve the New Process //

Given the fact that the Convention had been held in Philadel-

phia, the first state legislature to receive the new Constitution 

and the accompanying resolutions was Pennsylvania.336 There 

was an effort to call a ratification convention very quickly with 

the goal of making the Keystone state the first to ratify the Con-

stitution.337 However, this desire was thwarted by the quorum 

rules for the legislature found in the state constitution.338 Rather 

than the typical majority requirement, two-thirds of the mem-

bers of the Assembly were necessary to constitute a quorum.339 

And even though there was a clear pro-Constitution majority in 

the legislature, slightly more than a third of the members delib-

erately absented themselves from the chambers to defeat the 

ability of the legislature to transact any business—not only the 

calling of the ratification convention, but the ability to complete 

the state’s legislative calendar before the end of the session on 

September 29th.340 The Anti-Federalists hoped that the forthcom-

ing elections after the end of session would result in a greater 

number of anti-Constitution representatives.341 

Apparently, this was not the first time that members went 

missing for such purposes.342 The Assembly directed the Ser-

geant-at-Arms to find the missing members and to direct them \\
                                                                      

  335. 13 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at// //230. 

//  //336//. See //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 54. 

//  //337//. See id.// 

 338. 

//Id.// at 55. 

//  //339//. Id.// 

//  //340//. Id.// 

//  //341//. See id//. at 54. 

//  //342//. Id.// at 55. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 115

 

back to their seats—which was their duty under law.343 Finally, 

two members were located and were escorted by the Asse

bly’s messengers—with the enthusiastic support of a threaten-

ing mob—back to their seats.344 These two members were a s

ficient addition to constitute a quorum.345 On September 29th

the Pennsylvania legislature was the first to approve the new

process by calling a convention.346 

In October, five state legislatures followed suit: Connectic

on October 16th,347 Massachusetts on October 25th,348 Georgia

October 26th,349 New Jersey on October 29th,350 and Virginia on

October 31st.351 Georgia is noteworthy because its delegates 

were permitted to “adopt or reject any part of the whole.”352 On 

November 9th and 10th, Delaware’s legislature approved the 

new process by calling a convention.353 Maryland’s Assembly 

approved the call of the ratification convention on November 

27th and the Senate followed on December 1st.354 In Decembe

two more state legislatures sanctioned the use of the new p

cess: North Carolina on December 6th355 and New Hampshire 

on December 14th.356 

North Carolina is worthy of special mention. Pauline Maie

notes that despite the fact that “critics of the Constitution con-\\
                                                                      

//  //343//. Id.// 

//  //344//. Id.// 

//  //345//. Id.// 

  346. Assembly Proceedings (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4,

99, 99–103. 

  347. House Proceedings, A.M. (Oct. 16, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3 DHRC, //supra// note 

at 364, 364–66. 

  348. Report of the Joint Committee with Senate and House Amendments (O

19–25, 1787), //reprinted// //in //4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 130, 130–33. 

  349. Assembly Proceedings (Oct. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at

227, 227–28. 

  350. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Oct. 29, 1787), //reprinted//  //in //

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 167, 167–68. 

  351. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Oct. 31, 1787), //reprinted in //

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 118, 118. 

  352. Assembly Proceedings (Oct. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3// //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at

227, 228. 

  353. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Nov. 9–10, 1787), //reprinted in //

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 90, 90. 

  354. JOHN FRANKLIN JAMESON, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL 

VENTION OF 

1787, at// //163 (1903). 

//  //355//. Id. //

//  //356//. Id. //at 161. 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto119.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**119**

114 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Ratification of the Constitution summarize the approach taken 

by Congress thusly: 

On 28 September Congress reached a compromise. It re-

solved “unanimously” that the Constitution and the resolu-

tions and the letter of the Convention be sent to the states 

with only a suggestion that the states call conventions to 

consider the Constitution. This compromise followed the 

recommendation of the Convention.335 

Congress only approved the new process and sent the matter to 

the state legislatures with recommendation that they do the same. 

//D.  Thirteen Legislatures Approve the New Process //

Given the fact that the Convention had been held in Philadel-

phia, the first state legislature to receive the new Constitution 

and the accompanying resolutions was Pennsylvania.336 There 

was an effort to call a ratification convention very quickly with 

the goal of making the Keystone state the first to ratify the Con-

stitution.337 However, this desire was thwarted by the quorum 

rules for the legislature found in the state constitution.338 Rather 

than the typical majority requirement, two-thirds of the mem-

bers of the Assembly were necessary to constitute a quorum.339 

And even though there was a clear pro-Constitution majority in 

the legislature, slightly more than a third of the members delib-

erately absented themselves from the chambers to defeat the 

ability of the legislature to transact any business—not only the 

calling of the ratification convention, but the ability to complete 

the state’s legislative calendar before the end of the session on 

September 29th.340 The Anti-Federalists hoped that the forthcom-

ing elections after the end of session would result in a greater 

number of anti-Constitution representatives.341 

Apparently, this was not the first time that members went 

missing for such purposes.342 The Assembly directed the Ser-

geant-at-Arms to find the missing members and to direct them \\
                                                                      

  335. 13 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at// //230. 

//  //336//. See //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 54. 

//  //337//. See id.// 

 338. 

//Id.// at 55. 

//  //339//. Id.// 

//  //340//. Id.// 

//  //341//. See id//. at 54. 

//  //342//. Id.// at 55. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 115 

 

back to their seats—which was their duty under law.343 Finally, 

two members were located and were escorted by the Assem-

bly’s messengers—with the enthusiastic support of a threaten-

ing mob—back to their seats.344 These two members were a suf-

ficient addition to constitute a quorum.345 On September 29th, 

the Pennsylvania legislature was the first to approve the new 

process by calling a convention.346 

In October, five state legislatures followed suit: Connecticut 

on October 16th,347 Massachusetts on October 25th,348 Georgia 

October 26th,349 New Jersey on October 29th,350 and Virginia on 

October 31st.351 Georgia is noteworthy because its delegates 

were permitted to “adopt or reject any part of the whole.”352 On 

November 9th and 10th, Delaware’s legislature approved the 

new process by calling a convention.353 Maryland’s Assembly 

approved the call of the ratification convention on November 

27th and the Senate followed on December 1st.354 In December, 

two more state legislatures sanctioned the use of the new pro-

cess: North Carolina on December 6th355 and New Hampshire 

on December 14th.356 

North Carolina is worthy of special mention. Pauline Maier 

notes that despite the fact that “critics of the Constitution con-\\
                                                                      

//  //343//. Id.// 

//  //344//. Id.// 

//  //345//. Id.// 

  346. Assembly Proceedings (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

99, 99–103. 

  347. House Proceedings, A.M. (Oct. 16, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 364, 364–66. 

  348. Report of the Joint Committee with Senate and House Amendments (Oct. 

19–25, 1787), //reprinted// //in //4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 130, 130–33. 

  349. Assembly Proceedings (Oct. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

227, 227–28. 

  350. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Oct. 29, 1787), //reprinted//  //in  //3 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 167, 167–68. 

  351. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Oct. 31, 1787), //reprinted in //8// //

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 118, 118. 

  352. Assembly Proceedings (Oct. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3// //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

227, 228. 

  353. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Nov. 9–10, 1787), //reprinted in //3 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 90, 90. 

  354. JOHN FRANKLIN JAMESON, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL CON-

VENTION OF 

1787, at// //163 (1903). 

//  //355//. Id. //

//  //356//. Id. //at 161. 

114 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Ratification of the Constitution summarize the approach taken 

by Congress thusly: 

On 28 September Congress reached a compromise. It re-

solved “unanimously” that the Constitution and the resolu-

tions and the letter of the Convention be sent to the states 

with only a suggestion that the states call conventions to 

consider the Constitution. This compromise followed the 

recommendation of the Convention.335 

Congress only approved the new process and sent the matter to 

the state legislatures with recommendation that they do the same. 

//D.  Thirteen Legislatures Approve the New Process //

Given the fact that the Convention had been held in Philadel-

phia, the first state legislature to receive the new Constitution 

and the accompanying resolutions was Pennsylvania.336 There 

was an effort to call a ratification convention very quickly with 

the goal of making the Keystone state the first to ratify the Con-

stitution.337 However, this desire was thwarted by the quorum 

rules for the legislature found in the state constitution.338 Rather 

than the typical majority requirement, two-thirds of the mem-

bers of the Assembly were necessary to constitute a quorum.339 

And even though there was a clear pro-Constitution majority in 

the legislature, slightly more than a third of the members delib-

erately absented themselves from the chambers to defeat the 

ability of the legislature to transact any business—not only the 

calling of the ratification convention, but the ability to complete 

the state’s legislative calendar before the end of the session on 

September 29th.340 The Anti-Federalists hoped that the forthcom-

ing elections after the end of session would result in a greater 

number of anti-Constitution representatives.341 

Apparently, this was not the first time that members went 

missing for such purposes.342 The Assembly directed the Ser-

geant-at-Arms to find the missing members and to direct them \\
                                                                      

  335. 13 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at// //230. 

//  //336//. See //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 54. 

//  //337//. See id.// 

 338. 

//Id.// at 55. 

//  //339//. Id.// 

//  //340//. Id.// 

//  //341//. See id//. at 54. 

//  //342//. Id.// at 55. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 115

 

back to their seats—which was their duty under law.343 Finally, 

two members were located and were escorted by the Asse

bly’s messengers—with the enthusiastic support of a threaten-

ing mob—back to their seats.344 These two members were a s

ficient addition to constitute a quorum.345 On September 29th

the Pennsylvania legislature was the first to approve the new

process by calling a convention.346 

In October, five state legislatures followed suit: Connectic

on October 16th,347 Massachusetts on October 25th,348 Georgia

October 26th,349 New Jersey on October 29th,350 and Virginia on

October 31st.351 Georgia is noteworthy because its delegates 

were permitted to “adopt or reject any part of the whole.”352 On 

November 9th and 10th, Delaware’s legislature approved the 

new process by calling a convention.353 Maryland’s Assembly 

approved the call of the ratification convention on November 

27th and the Senate followed on December 1st.354 In Decembe

two more state legislatures sanctioned the use of the new p

cess: North Carolina on December 6th355 and New Hampshire 

on December 14th.356 

North Carolina is worthy of special mention. Pauline Maie

notes that despite the fact that “critics of the Constitution con-\\
                                                                      

//  //343//. Id.// 

//  //344//. Id.// 

//  //345//. Id.// 

  346. Assembly Proceedings (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //2 DHRC, //supra// note 4,

99, 99–103. 

  347. House Proceedings, A.M. (Oct. 16, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3 DHRC, //supra// note 

at 364, 364–66. 

  348. Report of the Joint Committee with Senate and House Amendments (O

19–25, 1787), //reprinted// //in //4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 130, 130–33. 

  349. Assembly Proceedings (Oct. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at

227, 227–28. 

  350. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Oct. 29, 1787), //reprinted//  //in //

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 167, 167–68. 

  351. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Oct. 31, 1787), //reprinted in//

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 118, 118. 

  352. Assembly Proceedings (Oct. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in //3// //DHRC, //supra// note 4, at

227, 228. 

  353. Resolutions Calling the State Convention (Nov. 9–10, 1787), //reprinted i//

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 90, 90. 

  354. JOHN FRANKLIN JAMESON, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL 

VENTION OF 

1787, at// //163 (1903). 

//  //355//. Id. //

//  //356//. Id. //at 161. 



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**120**

116 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

trolled both houses,” “[t]hey had . . . no intention of departing 

from the prescribed way of considering the Constitution.”357 

Like the others, the North Carolina legislature approved the 

new method of ratification and held a ratification convention 

for the Constitution.358 

On January 19th, 1788, South Carolina approved the new 

methodology,359 followed by New York on February 1st.360 Final-

ly, on March 1st the Rhode Island legislature took action.361 

Rhode Island was by far the most antagonistic state toward the 

Constitution. Many different approaches were considered. 

Rhode Island had previously explained that its failure to partici-

pate in the Constitutional Convention was based on the fact that 

the legislature had never been authorized by the people to send 

delegates to a convention for such a purpose.362 Many critics of 

Rhode Island, including the representatives from the more pop-

ulous cities in the state, contended that this argument was spe-

cious and was nothing more than a tactic to express opposition 

to any move toward a stronger central government.363 

In the end, the language adopted by the Rhode Island legisla-

ture was remarkably neutral in submitting the matter to the peo-

ple. After reciting the procedural history of the Constitutional 

Convention, the legislature approved the following: 

And whereas this Legislative Body, in General Assembly 

convened, conceiving themselves Representatives of the 

great Body of People at large, and that they cannot make any 

Innovations in a Constitution which has been agreed upon, 

and the Compact settled between the Governors and Gov-

erned, without the express Consent of the Freemen at large, 

by their own Voices individually taken in Town-Meetings 

assembled: Wherefore, for the Purpose aforesaid, and for 

                                                                      

  357. PAULINE  MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE  PEOPLE  DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 

1787–1788, at 403 (2010). 

  358. JAMESON, //supra// note 354//,// at 163. 

//  //359//. Id.// at 164. 

  360. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31, 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

703, 703–07. 

  361. Rhode Island Act Calling a Referendum on the Constitution (Mar. 1, 1788), 

//reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 133, 133–35. 

  362. Letter from the Rhode Island General Assembly to the President of Con-

gress, Newport (Sept. 15, 1787), //reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 19, 19–21. 

  363. Newport and Providence’s Protest of Rhode Island General Assembly’s 

Letter to Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), //reprinted// //in //24 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 21, 21–23. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 117 

 

submitting the said Constitution for the United States to the 

Consideration of the Freemen of this State.364 

The Freemen were tasked with the duty to “deliberate upon, 

and  determine . . . . whether  the  said  Constitution  shall  be 

adopted or negatived.”365 In effect, the Rhode Island legislature 

made every voter a delegate to a dispersed ratification conven-

tion and handed them the authority to determine whether the 

Constitution should be adopted or rejected. 

As predicted, the Rhode Island voters overwhelmingly re-

jected the Constitution by a vote of 238 to 2,714.366 But the rejec-

tion by the people of Rhode Island was procedurally no differ-

ent from the rejection by North Carolina’s delegates in its 1788 

convention. The ratification may have failed, but in each state 

the legislature sanctioned the use of the new methodology de-

signed to obtain the consent of the people. Not one state re-

fused to participate in the new process on the premise that the 

methodology set forth in Article XIII of the Articles of Confed-

eration should be employed. 

It is beyond legitimate debate that Congress approved and 

the state legislatures voted to implement the process outlined 

in Article VII and the “Ratification and Transition” Resolution. 

All thirteen state legislatures approved the implementation of 

the new process by March 1st, 1788. The legal argument that all 

thirteen legislatures approved the new process could not have 

been raised until after this step had been approved by the thir-

teenth state. Before this date, arguments bolstered by political 

philosophy and practical necessity were raised—and were all 

that could be raised. 

The chief example of such an argument is //Federalist No. 40//, 

which was published on January 18th, 1788.367 As of this date, 

only ten legislatures had approved the use of the new ratifica-

tion process. South Carolina approved the following day.368 But 

                                                                      

  364. Rhode Island Act Calling a Referendum on the Constitution (Mar. 1, 1788), 

//reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 133, 133–34. 

//  //365//. Id.// at 133–34. 

  366. Report of Committee Counting Yeas and Nays Upon the New Constitution 

(Apr. 3, 1788), //reprinted in //24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 232, 233. 

 367. 

//See// Publius, //On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government //

//Examined and Sustained//, N.Y.  PACKET,  Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 629, 629 (THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison)).  

  368. JAMESON, //supra// note 354//,// at 164. 

116 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

trolled both houses,” “[t]hey had . . . no intention of departing 

from the prescribed way of considering the Constitution.”357 

Like the others, the North Carolina legislature approved the 

new method of ratification and held a ratification convention 

for the Constitution.358 

On January 19th, 1788, South Carolina approved the new 

methodology,359 followed by New York on February 1st.360 Final-

ly, on March 1st the Rhode Island legislature took action.361 

Rhode Island was by far the most antagonistic state toward the 

Constitution. Many different approaches were considered. 

Rhode Island had previously explained that its failure to partici-

pate in the Constitutional Convention was based on the fact that 

the legislature had never been authorized by the people to send 

delegates to a convention for such a purpose.362 Many critics of 

Rhode Island, including the representatives from the more pop-

ulous cities in the state, contended that this argument was spe-

cious and was nothing more than a tactic to express opposition 

to any move toward a stronger central government.363 

In the end, the language adopted by the Rhode Island legisla-

ture was remarkably neutral in submitting the matter to the peo-

ple. After reciting the procedural history of the Constitutional 

Convention, the legislature approved the following: 

And whereas this Legislative Body, in General Assembly 

convened, conceiving themselves Representatives of the 

great Body of People at large, and that they cannot make any 

Innovations in a Constitution which has been agreed upon, 

and the Compact settled between the Governors and Gov-

erned, without the express Consent of the Freemen at large, 

by their own Voices individually taken in Town-Meetings 

assembled: Wherefore, for the Purpose aforesaid, and for 

                                                                      

  357. PAULINE  MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE  PEOPLE  DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 

1787–1788, at 403 (2010). 

  358. JAMESON, //supra// note 354//,// at 163. 

//  //359//. Id.// at 164. 

  360. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31, 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

703, 703–07. 

  361. Rhode Island Act Calling a Referendum on the Constitution (Mar. 1, 1788), 

//reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 133, 133–35. 

  362. Letter from the Rhode Island General Assembly to the President of Con-

gress, Newport (Sept. 15, 1787), //reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 19, 19–21. 

  363. Newport and Providence’s Protest of Rhode Island General Assembly’s 

Letter to Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), //reprinted// //in //24 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 21, 21–23. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 117

 

submitting the said Constitution for the United States to the 

Consideration of the Freemen of this State.364 

The Freemen were tasked with the duty to “deliberate upon, 

and  determine . . . . whether  the  said  Constitution  shall 

adopted or negatived.”365 In effect, the Rhode Island legislature

made every voter a delegate to a dispersed ratification conven-

tion and handed them the authority to determine whether the

Constitution should be adopted or rejected. 

As predicted, the Rhode Island voters overwhelmingly re

jected the Constitution by a vote of 238 to 2,714.366 But the rej

tion by the people of Rhode Island was procedurally no differ-

ent from the rejection by North Carolina’s delegates in its 1788 

convention. The ratification may have failed, but in each state 

the legislature sanctioned the use of the new methodology de-

signed to obtain the consent of the people. Not one state 

fused to participate in the new process on the premise that the

methodology set forth in Article XIII of the Articles of Confed-

eration should be employed. 

It is beyond legitimate debate that Congress approved and 

the state legislatures voted to implement the process outlined

in Article VII and the “Ratification and Transition” Resolution.

All thirteen state legislatures approved the implementation 

the new process by March 1st, 1788. The legal argument that a

thirteen legislatures approved the new process could not have 

been raised until after this step had been approved by the th

teenth state. Before this date, arguments bolstered by political 

philosophy and practical necessity were raised—and were all 

that could be raised. 

The chief example of such an argument is //Federalist No. 40//

which was published on January 18th, 1788.367 As of this dat

only ten legislatures had approved the use of the new ratifi

tion process. South Carolina approved the following day.368 But

                                                                      

  364. Rhode Island Act Calling a Referendum on the Constitution (Mar. 1, 1788)

//reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 133, 133–34. 

//  //365//. Id.// at 133–34. 

  366. Report of Committee Counting Yeas and Nays Upon the New Constitution 

(Apr. 3, 1788), //reprinted in //24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 232, 233. 

 367. 

//See// Publius, //On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government//

//Examined and Sustained//, N.Y.  PACKET,  Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, //su//

note 4, at 629, 629 (THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison)).  

  368. JAMESON, //supra// note 354//,// at 164. 



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**121**

116 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

trolled both houses,” “[t]hey had . . . no intention of departing 

from the prescribed way of considering the Constitution.”357 

Like the others, the North Carolina legislature approved the 

new method of ratification and held a ratification convention 

for the Constitution.358 

On January 19th, 1788, South Carolina approved the new 

methodology,359 followed by New York on February 1st.360 Final-

ly, on March 1st the Rhode Island legislature took action.361 

Rhode Island was by far the most antagonistic state toward the 

Constitution. Many different approaches were considered. 

Rhode Island had previously explained that its failure to partici-

pate in the Constitutional Convention was based on the fact that 

the legislature had never been authorized by the people to send 

delegates to a convention for such a purpose.362 Many critics of 

Rhode Island, including the representatives from the more pop-

ulous cities in the state, contended that this argument was spe-

cious and was nothing more than a tactic to express opposition 

to any move toward a stronger central government.363 

In the end, the language adopted by the Rhode Island legisla-

ture was remarkably neutral in submitting the matter to the peo-

ple. After reciting the procedural history of the Constitutional 

Convention, the legislature approved the following: 

And whereas this Legislative Body, in General Assembly 

convened, conceiving themselves Representatives of the 

great Body of People at large, and that they cannot make any 

Innovations in a Constitution which has been agreed upon, 

and the Compact settled between the Governors and Gov-

erned, without the express Consent of the Freemen at large, 

by their own Voices individually taken in Town-Meetings 

assembled: Wherefore, for the Purpose aforesaid, and for 

                                                                      

  357. PAULINE  MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE  PEOPLE  DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 

1787–1788, at 403 (2010). 

  358. JAMESON, //supra// note 354//,// at 163. 

//  //359//. Id.// at 164. 

  360. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31, 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

703, 703–07. 

  361. Rhode Island Act Calling a Referendum on the Constitution (Mar. 1, 1788), 

//reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 133, 133–35. 

  362. Letter from the Rhode Island General Assembly to the President of Con-

gress, Newport (Sept. 15, 1787), //reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 19, 19–21. 

  363. Newport and Providence’s Protest of Rhode Island General Assembly’s 

Letter to Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), //reprinted// //in //24 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 21, 21–23. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 117 

 

submitting the said Constitution for the United States to the 

Consideration of the Freemen of this State.364 

The Freemen were tasked with the duty to “deliberate upon, 

and  determine . . . . whether  the  said  Constitution  shall  be 

adopted or negatived.”365 In effect, the Rhode Island legislature 

made every voter a delegate to a dispersed ratification conven-

tion and handed them the authority to determine whether the 

Constitution should be adopted or rejected. 

As predicted, the Rhode Island voters overwhelmingly re-

jected the Constitution by a vote of 238 to 2,714.366 But the rejec-

tion by the people of Rhode Island was procedurally no differ-

ent from the rejection by North Carolina’s delegates in its 1788 

convention. The ratification may have failed, but in each state 

the legislature sanctioned the use of the new methodology de-

signed to obtain the consent of the people. Not one state re-

fused to participate in the new process on the premise that the 

methodology set forth in Article XIII of the Articles of Confed-

eration should be employed. 

It is beyond legitimate debate that Congress approved and 

the state legislatures voted to implement the process outlined 

in Article VII and the “Ratification and Transition” Resolution. 

All thirteen state legislatures approved the implementation of 

the new process by March 1st, 1788. The legal argument that all 

thirteen legislatures approved the new process could not have 

been raised until after this step had been approved by the thir-

teenth state. Before this date, arguments bolstered by political 

philosophy and practical necessity were raised—and were all 

that could be raised. 

The chief example of such an argument is //Federalist No. 40//, 

which was published on January 18th, 1788.367 As of this date, 

only ten legislatures had approved the use of the new ratifica-

tion process. South Carolina approved the following day.368 But 

                                                                      

  364. Rhode Island Act Calling a Referendum on the Constitution (Mar. 1, 1788), 

//reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 133, 133–34. 

//  //365//. Id.// at 133–34. 

  366. Report of Committee Counting Yeas and Nays Upon the New Constitution 

(Apr. 3, 1788), //reprinted in //24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 232, 233. 

 367. 

//See// Publius, //On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government //

//Examined and Sustained//, N.Y.  PACKET,  Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 629, 629 (THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison)).  

  368. JAMESON, //supra// note 354//,// at 164. 

116 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

trolled both houses,” “[t]hey had . . . no intention of departing 

from the prescribed way of considering the Constitution.”357 

Like the others, the North Carolina legislature approved the 

new method of ratification and held a ratification convention 

for the Constitution.358 

On January 19th, 1788, South Carolina approved the new 

methodology,359 followed by New York on February 1st.360 Final-

ly, on March 1st the Rhode Island legislature took action.361 

Rhode Island was by far the most antagonistic state toward the 

Constitution. Many different approaches were considered. 

Rhode Island had previously explained that its failure to partici-

pate in the Constitutional Convention was based on the fact that 

the legislature had never been authorized by the people to send 

delegates to a convention for such a purpose.362 Many critics of 

Rhode Island, including the representatives from the more pop-

ulous cities in the state, contended that this argument was spe-

cious and was nothing more than a tactic to express opposition 

to any move toward a stronger central government.363 

In the end, the language adopted by the Rhode Island legisla-

ture was remarkably neutral in submitting the matter to the peo-

ple. After reciting the procedural history of the Constitutional 

Convention, the legislature approved the following: 

And whereas this Legislative Body, in General Assembly 

convened, conceiving themselves Representatives of the 

great Body of People at large, and that they cannot make any 

Innovations in a Constitution which has been agreed upon, 

and the Compact settled between the Governors and Gov-

erned, without the express Consent of the Freemen at large, 

by their own Voices individually taken in Town-Meetings 

assembled: Wherefore, for the Purpose aforesaid, and for 

                                                                      

  357. PAULINE  MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE  PEOPLE  DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 

1787–1788, at 403 (2010). 

  358. JAMESON, //supra// note 354//,// at 163. 

//  //359//. Id.// at 164. 

  360. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31, 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

703, 703–07. 

  361. Rhode Island Act Calling a Referendum on the Constitution (Mar. 1, 1788), 

//reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 133, 133–35. 

  362. Letter from the Rhode Island General Assembly to the President of Con-

gress, Newport (Sept. 15, 1787), //reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 19, 19–21. 

  363. Newport and Providence’s Protest of Rhode Island General Assembly’s 

Letter to Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), //reprinted// //in //24 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 21, 21–23. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 117

 

submitting the said Constitution for the United States to the 

Consideration of the Freemen of this State.364 

The Freemen were tasked with the duty to “deliberate upon, 

and  determine . . . . whether  the  said  Constitution  shall 

adopted or negatived.”365 In effect, the Rhode Island legislature

made every voter a delegate to a dispersed ratification conven-

tion and handed them the authority to determine whether the

Constitution should be adopted or rejected. 

As predicted, the Rhode Island voters overwhelmingly re

jected the Constitution by a vote of 238 to 2,714.366 But the rej

tion by the people of Rhode Island was procedurally no differ-

ent from the rejection by North Carolina’s delegates in its 1788 

convention. The ratification may have failed, but in each state 

the legislature sanctioned the use of the new methodology de-

signed to obtain the consent of the people. Not one state 

fused to participate in the new process on the premise that the

methodology set forth in Article XIII of the Articles of Confed-

eration should be employed. 

It is beyond legitimate debate that Congress approved and 

the state legislatures voted to implement the process outlined

in Article VII and the “Ratification and Transition” Resolution.

All thirteen state legislatures approved the implementation 

the new process by March 1st, 1788. The legal argument that a

thirteen legislatures approved the new process could not have 

been raised until after this step had been approved by the th

teenth state. Before this date, arguments bolstered by political 

philosophy and practical necessity were raised—and were all 

that could be raised. 

The chief example of such an argument is //Federalist No. 40//

which was published on January 18th, 1788.367 As of this dat

only ten legislatures had approved the use of the new ratifi

tion process. South Carolina approved the following day.368 But

                                                                      

  364. Rhode Island Act Calling a Referendum on the Constitution (Mar. 1, 1788)

//reprinted in// 24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 133, 133–34. 

//  //365//. Id.// at 133–34. 

  366. Report of Committee Counting Yeas and Nays Upon the New Constitution 

(Apr. 3, 1788), //reprinted in //24 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 232, 233. 

 367. 

//See// Publius, //On the Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government//

//Examined and Sustained//, N.Y.  PACKET,  Jan. 18, 1788, //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, //su//

note 4, at 629, 629 (THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison)).  

  368. JAMESON, //supra// note 354//,// at 164. 



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118 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

the big prize was New York, where it was far from certain as to 

whether the legislature would approve the process and call a 

convention. On February 1st, by a vote of 27 to 25, the New 

York legislature rejected a motion to condemn the Convention 

for violating its instructions.369 Immediately thereafter, the New 

York legislature approved the new process and called for the 

convening of its ratification convention.370 

Madison made the defense that was available to him as of 

January 18th—a political and moral justification for ratifying 

the Constitution by the authority of the people.371 The legal ar-

gument based on the approval of the new process by all thir-

teen legislatures was simply not available to Madison because 

he wrote in the midst of the fray before all steps were complet-

ed. But in hindsight we have the benefit of knowing how 

events unfolded and are entitled to reconsider the legal ques-

tions in light of the totality of the record. Forty-one days after 

Madison published //Federalist No. 40//, all thirteen state legisla-

tures had approved the new process. 

Well prior to the date when the Constitution came into force 

(June 21st, 1788, upon New Hampshire’s ratification), Congress 

and all thirteen state legislatures had approved the methodolo-

gy for ratification of the new form of government. Whatever 

legal questions would have arisen if only twelve legislatures 

had approved or if the approval was subsequent to Constitu-

tion entering into force are speculative and moot. It did not 

happen that way. It is probable that the Founders would have 

adopted the Constitution even if the legal processes had not 

fallen neatly into place. But we do not judge the legality of the 

process on the basis of what might have happened, but on the 

basis of the complete record of what actually transpired. 

                                                                      

  369. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31, 1788), //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

703, 704. 

 370. 

//Id.// at 704–07. 

 371. 

//See// THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison).  

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 119 

 

III.  MOST MODERN SCHOLARSHIP FAILS TO CONSIDER THE 

ACTUAL PROCESS EMPLOYED IN ADOPTING THE 

CONSTITUTION 

//A.  Most Scholarly References to the Legality of the Adoption of the //

//Constitution are Superficial and Conclusory //

No legal scholar should conclude that the Constitution 

was drafted by an illegal runaway convention without at 

least asking themselves a few questions: What is the evi-

dence for this conclusion? Did the Framers of the Constitu-

tion defend the propriety of their action? What is revealed 

by the relevant documents? 

If one simply asks the second question, any reasonable scholar 

should think to consider the //Federalist Papers// to see if there is any 

defense of the legitimacy of the Constitutional Convention. //Feder-//

//alist No. 40//’s first sentence alerts the reader to its central subject: 

“THE  //second// point to be examined is, whether the convention 

were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitu-

tion.”372 Madison clearly defended the legitimacy of the delegates’ 

actions. This defense puts every scholar on notice that one cannot 

simply assume that the delegates knowingly violated their in-

structions without some examination of the historical evidence. 

There are dozens of “scholarly” references to the origins and 

legitimacy of the Constitutional Convention that fail even this 

rudimentary “standard of care” for scholarship. Law review 

authors and editors alike bear responsibility for the naked as-

sertions and plain errors that have marked numerous refer-

ences to the Philadelphia Convention. Even if a scholar ulti-

mately determines that the Anti-Federalist attacks on the 

legitimacy of the Convention were accurate, there is a clear du-

ty to point to the fact that James Madison, John Marshall, and 

many others, who are normally considered authorities with 

substantial credibility, took the opposite view. Academic integ-

rity demands at least this much. 

Law reviews are littered with the naked assertion that Con-

gress called the Convention for the “sole and express purpose of 

amending the Articles of Confederation” and that the Conven-

tion went beyond its authority by creating a whole new docu-

                                                                      

 372. 

//Id.// at 247 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  

118 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

the big prize was New York, where it was far from certain as to 

whether the legislature would approve the process and call a 

convention. On February 1st, by a vote of 27 to 25, the New 

York legislature rejected a motion to condemn the Convention 

for violating its instructions.369 Immediately thereafter, the New 

York legislature approved the new process and called for the 

convening of its ratification convention.370 

Madison made the defense that was available to him as of 

January 18th—a political and moral justification for ratifying 

the Constitution by the authority of the people.371 The legal ar-

gument based on the approval of the new process by all thir-

teen legislatures was simply not available to Madison because 

he wrote in the midst of the fray before all steps were complet-

ed. But in hindsight we have the benefit of knowing how 

events unfolded and are entitled to reconsider the legal ques-

tions in light of the totality of the record. Forty-one days after 

Madison published //Federalist No. 40//, all thirteen state legisla-

tures had approved the new process. 

Well prior to the date when the Constitution came into force 

(June 21st, 1788, upon New Hampshire’s ratification), Congress 

and all thirteen state legislatures had approved the methodolo-

gy for ratification of the new form of government. Whatever 

legal questions would have arisen if only twelve legislatures 

had approved or if the approval was subsequent to Constitu-

tion entering into force are speculative and moot. It did not 

happen that way. It is probable that the Founders would have 

adopted the Constitution even if the legal processes had not 

fallen neatly into place. But we do not judge the legality of the 

process on the basis of what might have happened, but on the 

basis of the complete record of what actually transpired. 

                                                                      

  369. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31, 1788), //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

703, 704. 

 370. 

//Id.// at 704–07. 

 371. 

//See// THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison).  

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 119

 

III.  MOST MODERN SCHOLARSHIP FAILS TO CONSIDER THE 

ACTUAL PROCESS EMPLOYED IN ADOPTING THE 

CONSTITUTION 

//A.  Most Scholarly References to the Legality of the Adoption of the //

//Constitution are Superficial and Conclusory //

No legal scholar should conclude that the Constituti

was drafted by an illegal runaway convention without at 

least asking themselves a few questions: What is the evi-

dence for this conclusion? Did the Framers of the Constit

tion defend the propriety of their action? What is reveal

by the relevant documents? 

If one simply asks the second question, any reasonable schol

should think to consider the //Federalist Papers// to see if there is any

defense of the legitimacy of the Constitutional Convention. //Fede//

//alist No. 40//’s first sentence alerts the reader to its central subje

“THE  //second// point to be examined is, whether the conventi

were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitu-

tion.”372 Madison clearly defended the legitimacy of the delegates’ 

actions. This defense puts every scholar on notice that one canno

simply assume that the delegates knowingly violated their 

structions without some examination of the historical evidence.

There are dozens of “scholarly” references to the origins and 

legitimacy of the Constitutional Convention that fail even this 

rudimentary “standard of care” for scholarship. Law review

authors and editors alike bear responsibility for the naked as-

sertions and plain errors that have marked numerous refer-

ences to the Philadelphia Convention. Even if a scholar ulti-

mately determines that the Anti-Federalist attacks on the

legitimacy of the Convention were accurate, there is a clear du-

ty to point to the fact that James Madison, John Marshall, and 

many others, who are normally considered authorities with

substantial credibility, took the opposite view. Academic integ-

rity demands at least this much. 

Law reviews are littered with the naked assertion that C

gress called the Convention for the “sole and express purpose

amending the Articles of Confederation” and that the Conven-

tion went beyond its authority by creating a whole new doc

                                                                      

 372. 

//Id.// at 247 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  



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**123**

118 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

the big prize was New York, where it was far from certain as to 

whether the legislature would approve the process and call a 

convention. On February 1st, by a vote of 27 to 25, the New 

York legislature rejected a motion to condemn the Convention 

for violating its instructions.369 Immediately thereafter, the New 

York legislature approved the new process and called for the 

convening of its ratification convention.370 

Madison made the defense that was available to him as of 

January 18th—a political and moral justification for ratifying 

the Constitution by the authority of the people.371 The legal ar-

gument based on the approval of the new process by all thir-

teen legislatures was simply not available to Madison because 

he wrote in the midst of the fray before all steps were complet-

ed. But in hindsight we have the benefit of knowing how 

events unfolded and are entitled to reconsider the legal ques-

tions in light of the totality of the record. Forty-one days after 

Madison published //Federalist No. 40//, all thirteen state legisla-

tures had approved the new process. 

Well prior to the date when the Constitution came into force 

(June 21st, 1788, upon New Hampshire’s ratification), Congress 

and all thirteen state legislatures had approved the methodolo-

gy for ratification of the new form of government. Whatever 

legal questions would have arisen if only twelve legislatures 

had approved or if the approval was subsequent to Constitu-

tion entering into force are speculative and moot. It did not 

happen that way. It is probable that the Founders would have 

adopted the Constitution even if the legal processes had not 

fallen neatly into place. But we do not judge the legality of the 

process on the basis of what might have happened, but on the 

basis of the complete record of what actually transpired. 

                                                                      

  369. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31, 1788), //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

703, 704. 

 370. 

//Id.// at 704–07. 

 371. 

//See// THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison).  

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 119 

 

III.  MOST MODERN SCHOLARSHIP FAILS TO CONSIDER THE 

ACTUAL PROCESS EMPLOYED IN ADOPTING THE 

CONSTITUTION 

//A.  Most Scholarly References to the Legality of the Adoption of the //

//Constitution are Superficial and Conclusory //

No legal scholar should conclude that the Constitution 

was drafted by an illegal runaway convention without at 

least asking themselves a few questions: What is the evi-

dence for this conclusion? Did the Framers of the Constitu-

tion defend the propriety of their action? What is revealed 

by the relevant documents? 

If one simply asks the second question, any reasonable scholar 

should think to consider the //Federalist Papers// to see if there is any 

defense of the legitimacy of the Constitutional Convention. //Feder-//

//alist No. 40//’s first sentence alerts the reader to its central subject: 

“THE  //second// point to be examined is, whether the convention 

were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitu-

tion.”372 Madison clearly defended the legitimacy of the delegates’ 

actions. This defense puts every scholar on notice that one cannot 

simply assume that the delegates knowingly violated their in-

structions without some examination of the historical evidence. 

There are dozens of “scholarly” references to the origins and 

legitimacy of the Constitutional Convention that fail even this 

rudimentary “standard of care” for scholarship. Law review 

authors and editors alike bear responsibility for the naked as-

sertions and plain errors that have marked numerous refer-

ences to the Philadelphia Convention. Even if a scholar ulti-

mately determines that the Anti-Federalist attacks on the 

legitimacy of the Convention were accurate, there is a clear du-

ty to point to the fact that James Madison, John Marshall, and 

many others, who are normally considered authorities with 

substantial credibility, took the opposite view. Academic integ-

rity demands at least this much. 

Law reviews are littered with the naked assertion that Con-

gress called the Convention for the “sole and express purpose of 

amending the Articles of Confederation” and that the Conven-

tion went beyond its authority by creating a whole new docu-

                                                                      

 372. 

//Id.// at 247 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  

118 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

the big prize was New York, where it was far from certain as to 

whether the legislature would approve the process and call a 

convention. On February 1st, by a vote of 27 to 25, the New 

York legislature rejected a motion to condemn the Convention 

for violating its instructions.369 Immediately thereafter, the New 

York legislature approved the new process and called for the 

convening of its ratification convention.370 

Madison made the defense that was available to him as of 

January 18th—a political and moral justification for ratifying 

the Constitution by the authority of the people.371 The legal ar-

gument based on the approval of the new process by all thir-

teen legislatures was simply not available to Madison because 

he wrote in the midst of the fray before all steps were complet-

ed. But in hindsight we have the benefit of knowing how 

events unfolded and are entitled to reconsider the legal ques-

tions in light of the totality of the record. Forty-one days after 

Madison published //Federalist No. 40//, all thirteen state legisla-

tures had approved the new process. 

Well prior to the date when the Constitution came into force 

(June 21st, 1788, upon New Hampshire’s ratification), Congress 

and all thirteen state legislatures had approved the methodolo-

gy for ratification of the new form of government. Whatever 

legal questions would have arisen if only twelve legislatures 

had approved or if the approval was subsequent to Constitu-

tion entering into force are speculative and moot. It did not 

happen that way. It is probable that the Founders would have 

adopted the Constitution even if the legal processes had not 

fallen neatly into place. But we do not judge the legality of the 

process on the basis of what might have happened, but on the 

basis of the complete record of what actually transpired. 

                                                                      

  369. Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31, 1788), //reprinted in// 20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 

703, 704. 

 370. 

//Id.// at 704–07. 

 371. 

//See// THE FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison).  

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 119

 

III.  MOST MODERN SCHOLARSHIP FAILS TO CONSIDER THE 

ACTUAL PROCESS EMPLOYED IN ADOPTING THE 

CONSTITUTION 

//A.  Most Scholarly References to the Legality of the Adoption of the //

//Constitution are Superficial and Conclusory //

No legal scholar should conclude that the Constituti

was drafted by an illegal runaway convention without at 

least asking themselves a few questions: What is the evi-

dence for this conclusion? Did the Framers of the Constit

tion defend the propriety of their action? What is reveal

by the relevant documents? 

If one simply asks the second question, any reasonable schol

should think to consider the //Federalist Papers// to see if there is any

defense of the legitimacy of the Constitutional Convention. //Fede//

//alist No. 40//’s first sentence alerts the reader to its central subje

“THE  //second// point to be examined is, whether the conventi

were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitu-

tion.”372 Madison clearly defended the legitimacy of the delegates’ 

actions. This defense puts every scholar on notice that one canno

simply assume that the delegates knowingly violated their 

structions without some examination of the historical evidence.

There are dozens of “scholarly” references to the origins and 

legitimacy of the Constitutional Convention that fail even this 

rudimentary “standard of care” for scholarship. Law review

authors and editors alike bear responsibility for the naked as-

sertions and plain errors that have marked numerous refer-

ences to the Philadelphia Convention. Even if a scholar ulti-

mately determines that the Anti-Federalist attacks on the

legitimacy of the Convention were accurate, there is a clear du-

ty to point to the fact that James Madison, John Marshall, and 

many others, who are normally considered authorities with

substantial credibility, took the opposite view. Academic integ-

rity demands at least this much. 

Law reviews are littered with the naked assertion that C

gress called the Convention for the “sole and express purpose

amending the Articles of Confederation” and that the Conven-

tion went beyond its authority by creating a whole new doc

                                                                      

 372. 

//Id.// at 247 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  



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[Vol. 40 

 

ment.373 Scholarly writers have not been satisfied with merely 

repeating this perfunctory canard and many have made asser-

tions concerning the Constitutional Convention that are objec-

tively false by any measure.374 Two articles state that the Annap-

                                                                      

//  //373//. See, e.g.//, Warren E. Burger, //Foreword//, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1987); Robert 

C. Byrd, //Remarks by U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd: The Constitution in Peril//, 101 W. VA. 

L. REV. 385, 388 (1998) (reciting that “the Framers went beyond the purposes for 

which Congress had called the convention”); Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, //Is the //

//Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?//, 62 GEO.  WASH.  L.  REV. 501, 545 

(1994); Charles Fried, //Foreword: Revolutions?//, 109 HARV.  L.  REV. 13, 20–25, n.45 

(1995) (“The Continental Congress’s charge to the Convention was far narrower 

than the work the Convention undertook from the beginning”); Richard S. Kay, 

//Constituent Authority//, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 728 (2011) (claiming that the Conven-

tion “grossly exceeded” the charge given to it by the “Continental Congress”); 

Lash, //supra// note 15, at 523 (“The Philadelphia Convention ignored that mandate 

and drafted an entirely new Constitution.”); Misha Tseytlin, Note, //The United //

//States Senate and the Problem of Equal State Suffrage//, 94 GEO. L.J. 859, 869–70 (2006) 

(“[T]he delegates decided to deviate from these instructions . . . .”); Benjamin A. 

Geslison,  //What Were They Thinking? Examining the Intellectual Inspirations of the //

//Framers and Opponents of the United States Constitution//,// //17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 185, 

193 (2012)// //(reviewing FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTEL-

LECTUAL 

ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION  (1985) and HERBERT  J.  STORING,  WHAT 

THE 

ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF 

THE 

CONSTITUTION  (1981)) (The Anti-Federalists “argued persuasively that the 

Constitution was an illegal act completely unauthorized by the Convention”); //see //

//also// Robert F. Blomquist, //Response to Geoffrey R. Stone and Seth Barrett Tillman//, //Be-//

//yond Historical Blushing: A Plea for Constitutional Intelligence//, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. 

DE NOVO

 244, 245; Jason A. Crook, //Toward A More “Perfect” Union: The Untimely //

//Decline of Federalism and the Rise of the Homogenous Political Culture//, 34 U. DAYTON 

L. REV. 47, 50 (2008); Godbold//,// //supra// note 15, at 314; Kane, //supra// note 12, at 160; 

Maggs, //supra// note 5, at 1710–12; Denys P. Myers, //History of the Printed Archetype of //

//the Constitution of the United States of America//, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 217, 219–20 (2008); 

Smith, //supra// note 15, at 539–41; Edward C. Walterscheid, //The Nature of the Intellec-//

//tual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Part 1)//, 83 J. PAT. & TRADE-

MARK 

OFF. SOC’Y 763, 790 (2001); Susan Henderson-Utis, Comment, //What Would //

//the Founding Fathers Do? The Rise of Religious Programs in the United States Prison //

//System//, 52 HOW. L.J. 459, 506 (2009); Jonker, //supra// note 15, at 453–54; David Kow-

alski, Comment, //Red State, Blue State, No State?: Examining the Existence of A Con-//

//gressional Power to Remove A State//, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 335, 343–45 (2007). 

//  //374//. See, e.g.//, Dennis M. Cariello, //Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting //

//for the Values of Federalism//, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1528 (1999); John Cornyn, 

//The Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to Statehood//, 26 TEX.  TECH  L.  REV. 

1089, 1094–95 (1995); Robert L. Jones, //Lessons from a Lost Constitution: The Council of //

//Revision, the Bill of Rights, and the Role of the Judiciary in Democratic Governance//, 27 

J.L. & POL. 459, 555 (2012); James Leonard, //Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s a //

//Remedy, There’s a Right: A Skeptic’s Critique of Ex Parte Young//, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 

215, 367 (2004); Michael B. Rappaport, //The Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: //

//An Originalist Analysis//, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 53, 67–68 (2012); Richard D. Rosen, 

//Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of A Presidential //

//Power of the Purse//, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 152 (1998); Louis Michael Seidman, //The Secret //

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 121 

 

olis Convention “asked Congress to call a convention.”375 The 

Annapolis delegates did no such thing. A copy was submitted to 

Congress out of mere respect with no request for action.376 The 

Maine article reproduced a speech by a federal judge that 

claimed that the five-month gap between the “request” from 

Annapolis and the “call” from Congress arose because Congress 

could not convene a quorum377—a claim that is belied by hun-

dreds of pages of congressional records in this time frame.378 

Another writer, a bankruptcy judge, claimed: “The Federalists 

did not really refute the charge that the delegates to the Conven-

tion had exceeded the authority given them by their states.”379 His 

only citation for this proposition is the text of Article VII of the 

Constitution.380 Ironically, this author’s next paragraph cites John 

Marshall on the legitimacy of the ratification process.381 However, 

he ignores Marshall’s statement in defense of the Convention that 

“the Convention did not exceed their powers.”382 

Colonel Richard D. Rosen claims that “[t]he Convention also 

did not bother, as the Continental Congress had directed, to 

return to Congress for its approval upon completing its 

work.”383 We have already reviewed in detail the debates in the 

Confederation Congress after it received the Constitution from 

Philadelphia. Even Chief Justice Burger, who asserted that the \\
                                                                      

//History of American Constitutional Skepticism: A Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation//, 

17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 12–14 (2014); Lynn D. Wardle, //The Proposed Federal Mar-//

//riage Amendment and the Risks to Federalism in Family Law//, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137, 

198 (2004); Lynn D. Wardle, //“Time Enough”: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services //

//and the Prudent Pace of Justice//, 41 FLA. L. REV. 881, 938 n.308 (1989); Bruce Stein, 

Note, //The Framers’ Intent and the Early Years of the Republic//, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 413, 

428–29 (1982). 

  375. George  Anastaplo,  //The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations,// 22 TEX. 

TECH  L.  REV. 967, 969–70 (1991); Daniel Wathen & Barbara Riegelhaupt, //The //

//Speeches of Frank M. Coffin: A Sideline to Judging//, 63 ME.  L.  REV. 467, 472 (2011) 

(quoting speech of Judge Frank M. Coffin). 

  376. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

  377. Wathen & Riegelhaupt, //supra// note 375, at 472 (quoting speech of Judge 

Frank M. Coffin). 

  378. 24 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra// note 70, at 261–62. 

  379. Randolph J. Haines, //The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different//, 77 

AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 147 (2003). 

//  //380//. Id.// 

//  //381//. Id.// 

  382. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

  383. Rosen, //supra// note 374, at 66 n.367. 

120 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ment.373 Scholarly writers have not been satisfied with merely 

repeating this perfunctory canard and many have made asser-

tions concerning the Constitutional Convention that are objec-

tively false by any measure.374 Two articles state that the Annap-

                                                                      

//  //373//. See, e.g.//, Warren E. Burger, //Foreword//, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1987); Robert 

C. Byrd, //Remarks by U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd: The Constitution in Peril//, 101 W. VA. 

L. REV. 385, 388 (1998) (reciting that “the Framers went beyond the purposes for 

which Congress had called the convention”); Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, //Is the //

//Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?//, 62 GEO.  WASH.  L.  REV. 501, 545 

(1994); Charles Fried, //Foreword: Revolutions?//, 109 HARV.  L.  REV. 13, 20–25, n.45 

(1995) (“The Continental Congress’s charge to the Convention was far narrower 

than the work the Convention undertook from the beginning”); Richard S. Kay, 

//Constituent Authority//, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 728 (2011) (claiming that the Conven-

tion “grossly exceeded” the charge given to it by the “Continental Congress”); 

Lash, //supra// note 15, at 523 (“The Philadelphia Convention ignored that mandate 

and drafted an entirely new Constitution.”); Misha Tseytlin, Note, //The United //

//States Senate and the Problem of Equal State Suffrage//, 94 GEO. L.J. 859, 869–70 (2006) 

(“[T]he delegates decided to deviate from these instructions . . . .”); Benjamin A. 

Geslison,  //What Were They Thinking? Examining the Intellectual Inspirations of the //

//Framers and Opponents of the United States Constitution//,// //17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 185, 

193 (2012)// //(reviewing FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTEL-

LECTUAL 

ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION  (1985) and HERBERT  J.  STORING,  WHAT 

THE 

ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF 

THE 

CONSTITUTION  (1981)) (The Anti-Federalists “argued persuasively that the 

Constitution was an illegal act completely unauthorized by the Convention”); //see //

//also// Robert F. Blomquist, //Response to Geoffrey R. Stone and Seth Barrett Tillman//, //Be-//

//yond Historical Blushing: A Plea for Constitutional Intelligence//, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. 

DE NOVO

 244, 245; Jason A. Crook, //Toward A More “Perfect” Union: The Untimely //

//Decline of Federalism and the Rise of the Homogenous Political Culture//, 34 U. DAYTON 

L. REV. 47, 50 (2008); Godbold//,// //supra// note 15, at 314; Kane, //supra// note 12, at 160; 

Maggs, //supra// note 5, at 1710–12; Denys P. Myers, //History of the Printed Archetype of //

//the Constitution of the United States of America//, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 217, 219–20 (2008); 

Smith, //supra// note 15, at 539–41; Edward C. Walterscheid, //The Nature of the Intellec-//

//tual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Part 1)//, 83 J. PAT. & TRADE-

MARK 

OFF. SOC’Y 763, 790 (2001); Susan Henderson-Utis, Comment, //What Would //

//the Founding Fathers Do? The Rise of Religious Programs in the United States Prison //

//System//, 52 HOW. L.J. 459, 506 (2009); Jonker, //supra// note 15, at 453–54; David Kow-

alski, Comment, //Red State, Blue State, No State?: Examining the Existence of A Con-//

//gressional Power to Remove A State//, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 335, 343–45 (2007). 

//  //374//. See, e.g.//, Dennis M. Cariello, //Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting //

//for the Values of Federalism//, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1528 (1999); John Cornyn, 

//The Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to Statehood//, 26 TEX.  TECH  L.  REV. 

1089, 1094–95 (1995); Robert L. Jones, //Lessons from a Lost Constitution: The Council of //

//Revision, the Bill of Rights, and the Role of the Judiciary in Democratic Governance//, 27 

J.L. & POL. 459, 555 (2012); James Leonard, //Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s a //

//Remedy, There’s a Right: A Skeptic’s Critique of Ex Parte Young//, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 

215, 367 (2004); Michael B. Rappaport, //The Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: //

//An Originalist Analysis//, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 53, 67–68 (2012); Richard D. Rosen, 

//Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of A Presidential //

//Power of the Purse//, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 152 (1998); Louis Michael Seidman, //The Secret //

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 121

 

olis Convention “asked Congress to call a convention.”375 The 

Annapolis delegates did no such thing. A copy was submitted

Congress out of mere respect with no request for action.376 T

Maine article reproduced a speech by a federal judge th

claimed that the five-month gap between the “request” fro

Annapolis and the “call” from Congress arose because Congr

could not convene a quorum377—a claim that is belied by hu

dreds of pages of congressional records in this time frame.378 

Another writer, a bankruptcy judge, claimed: “The Federalis

did not really refute the charge that the delegates to the Conven-

tion had exceeded the authority given them by their states.”379 H

only citation for this proposition is the text of Article VII of the

Constitution.380 Ironically, this author’s next paragraph cites Jo

Marshall on the legitimacy of the ratification process.381 However, 

he ignores Marshall’s statement in defense of the Convention th

“the Convention did not exceed their powers.”382 

Colonel Richard D. Rosen claims that “[t]he Convention also 

did not bother, as the Continental Congress had directed, to 

return to Congress for its approval upon completing its 

work.”383 We have already reviewed in detail the debates in t

Confederation Congress after it received the Constitution from 

Philadelphia. Even Chief Justice Burger, who asserted that the \\
                                                                      

//History of American Constitutional Skepticism: A Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation//

17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 12–14 (2014); Lynn D. Wardle, //The Proposed Federal M//

//riage Amendment and the Risks to Federalism in Family Law//, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1

198 (2004); Lynn D. Wardle, //“Time Enough”: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services //

//and the Prudent Pace of Justice//, 41 FLA. L. REV. 881, 938 n.308 (1989); Bruce Ste

Note, //The Framers’ Intent and the Early Years of the Republic//, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 413, 

428–29 (1982). 

  375. George  Anastaplo,  //The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations,// 22 TEX

TECH  L.  REV. 967, 969–70 (1991); Daniel Wathen & Barbara Riegelhaupt, //The //

//Speeches of Frank M. Coffin: A Sideline to Judging//, 63 ME.  L.  REV. 467, 472 (20

(quoting speech of Judge Frank M. Coffin). 

  376. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

  377. Wathen & Riegelhaupt, //supra// note 375, at 472 (quoting speech of Judge

Frank M. Coffin). 

  378. 24 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra// note 70, at 261–62. 

  379. Randolph J. Haines, //The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different//, 77 

AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 147 (2003). 

//  //380//. Id.// 

//  //381//. Id.// 

  382. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra//

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

  383. Rosen, //supra// note 374, at 66 n.367. 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto125.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**125**

120 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ment.373 Scholarly writers have not been satisfied with merely 

repeating this perfunctory canard and many have made asser-

tions concerning the Constitutional Convention that are objec-

tively false by any measure.374 Two articles state that the Annap-

                                                                      

//  //373//. See, e.g.//, Warren E. Burger, //Foreword//, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1987); Robert 

C. Byrd, //Remarks by U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd: The Constitution in Peril//, 101 W. VA. 

L. REV. 385, 388 (1998) (reciting that “the Framers went beyond the purposes for 

which Congress had called the convention”); Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, //Is the //

//Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?//, 62 GEO.  WASH.  L.  REV. 501, 545 

(1994); Charles Fried, //Foreword: Revolutions?//, 109 HARV.  L.  REV. 13, 20–25, n.45 

(1995) (“The Continental Congress’s charge to the Convention was far narrower 

than the work the Convention undertook from the beginning”); Richard S. Kay, 

//Constituent Authority//, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 728 (2011) (claiming that the Conven-

tion “grossly exceeded” the charge given to it by the “Continental Congress”); 

Lash, //supra// note 15, at 523 (“The Philadelphia Convention ignored that mandate 

and drafted an entirely new Constitution.”); Misha Tseytlin, Note, //The United //

//States Senate and the Problem of Equal State Suffrage//, 94 GEO. L.J. 859, 869–70 (2006) 

(“[T]he delegates decided to deviate from these instructions . . . .”); Benjamin A. 

Geslison,  //What Were They Thinking? Examining the Intellectual Inspirations of the //

//Framers and Opponents of the United States Constitution//,// //17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 185, 

193 (2012)// //(reviewing FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTEL-

LECTUAL 

ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION  (1985) and HERBERT  J.  STORING,  WHAT 

THE 

ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF 

THE 

CONSTITUTION  (1981)) (The Anti-Federalists “argued persuasively that the 

Constitution was an illegal act completely unauthorized by the Convention”); //see //

//also// Robert F. Blomquist, //Response to Geoffrey R. Stone and Seth Barrett Tillman//, //Be-//

//yond Historical Blushing: A Plea for Constitutional Intelligence//, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. 

DE NOVO

 244, 245; Jason A. Crook, //Toward A More “Perfect” Union: The Untimely //

//Decline of Federalism and the Rise of the Homogenous Political Culture//, 34 U. DAYTON 

L. REV. 47, 50 (2008); Godbold//,// //supra// note 15, at 314; Kane, //supra// note 12, at 160; 

Maggs, //supra// note 5, at 1710–12; Denys P. Myers, //History of the Printed Archetype of //

//the Constitution of the United States of America//, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 217, 219–20 (2008); 

Smith, //supra// note 15, at 539–41; Edward C. Walterscheid, //The Nature of the Intellec-//

//tual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Part 1)//, 83 J. PAT. & TRADE-

MARK 

OFF. SOC’Y 763, 790 (2001); Susan Henderson-Utis, Comment, //What Would //

//the Founding Fathers Do? The Rise of Religious Programs in the United States Prison //

//System//, 52 HOW. L.J. 459, 506 (2009); Jonker, //supra// note 15, at 453–54; David Kow-

alski, Comment, //Red State, Blue State, No State?: Examining the Existence of A Con-//

//gressional Power to Remove A State//, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 335, 343–45 (2007). 

//  //374//. See, e.g.//, Dennis M. Cariello, //Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting //

//for the Values of Federalism//, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1528 (1999); John Cornyn, 

//The Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to Statehood//, 26 TEX.  TECH  L.  REV. 

1089, 1094–95 (1995); Robert L. Jones, //Lessons from a Lost Constitution: The Council of //

//Revision, the Bill of Rights, and the Role of the Judiciary in Democratic Governance//, 27 

J.L. & POL. 459, 555 (2012); James Leonard, //Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s a //

//Remedy, There’s a Right: A Skeptic’s Critique of Ex Parte Young//, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 

215, 367 (2004); Michael B. Rappaport, //The Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: //

//An Originalist Analysis//, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 53, 67–68 (2012); Richard D. Rosen, 

//Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of A Presidential //

//Power of the Purse//, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 152 (1998); Louis Michael Seidman, //The Secret //

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 121 

 

olis Convention “asked Congress to call a convention.”375 The 

Annapolis delegates did no such thing. A copy was submitted to 

Congress out of mere respect with no request for action.376 The 

Maine article reproduced a speech by a federal judge that 

claimed that the five-month gap between the “request” from 

Annapolis and the “call” from Congress arose because Congress 

could not convene a quorum377—a claim that is belied by hun-

dreds of pages of congressional records in this time frame.378 

Another writer, a bankruptcy judge, claimed: “The Federalists 

did not really refute the charge that the delegates to the Conven-

tion had exceeded the authority given them by their states.”379 His 

only citation for this proposition is the text of Article VII of the 

Constitution.380 Ironically, this author’s next paragraph cites John 

Marshall on the legitimacy of the ratification process.381 However, 

he ignores Marshall’s statement in defense of the Convention that 

“the Convention did not exceed their powers.”382 

Colonel Richard D. Rosen claims that “[t]he Convention also 

did not bother, as the Continental Congress had directed, to 

return to Congress for its approval upon completing its 

work.”383 We have already reviewed in detail the debates in the 

Confederation Congress after it received the Constitution from 

Philadelphia. Even Chief Justice Burger, who asserted that the \\
                                                                      

//History of American Constitutional Skepticism: A Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation//, 

17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 12–14 (2014); Lynn D. Wardle, //The Proposed Federal Mar-//

//riage Amendment and the Risks to Federalism in Family Law//, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137, 

198 (2004); Lynn D. Wardle, //“Time Enough”: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services //

//and the Prudent Pace of Justice//, 41 FLA. L. REV. 881, 938 n.308 (1989); Bruce Stein, 

Note, //The Framers’ Intent and the Early Years of the Republic//, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 413, 

428–29 (1982). 

  375. George  Anastaplo,  //The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations,// 22 TEX. 

TECH  L.  REV. 967, 969–70 (1991); Daniel Wathen & Barbara Riegelhaupt, //The //

//Speeches of Frank M. Coffin: A Sideline to Judging//, 63 ME.  L.  REV. 467, 472 (2011) 

(quoting speech of Judge Frank M. Coffin). 

  376. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

  377. Wathen & Riegelhaupt, //supra// note 375, at 472 (quoting speech of Judge 

Frank M. Coffin). 

  378. 24 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra// note 70, at 261–62. 

  379. Randolph J. Haines, //The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different//, 77 

AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 147 (2003). 

//  //380//. Id.// 

//  //381//. Id.// 

  382. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra// 

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

  383. Rosen, //supra// note 374, at 66 n.367. 

120 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

ment.373 Scholarly writers have not been satisfied with merely 

repeating this perfunctory canard and many have made asser-

tions concerning the Constitutional Convention that are objec-

tively false by any measure.374 Two articles state that the Annap-

                                                                      

//  //373//. See, e.g.//, Warren E. Burger, //Foreword//, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1987); Robert 

C. Byrd, //Remarks by U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd: The Constitution in Peril//, 101 W. VA. 

L. REV. 385, 388 (1998) (reciting that “the Framers went beyond the purposes for 

which Congress had called the convention”); Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, //Is the //

//Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late?//, 62 GEO.  WASH.  L.  REV. 501, 545 

(1994); Charles Fried, //Foreword: Revolutions?//, 109 HARV.  L.  REV. 13, 20–25, n.45 

(1995) (“The Continental Congress’s charge to the Convention was far narrower 

than the work the Convention undertook from the beginning”); Richard S. Kay, 

//Constituent Authority//, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 728 (2011) (claiming that the Conven-

tion “grossly exceeded” the charge given to it by the “Continental Congress”); 

Lash, //supra// note 15, at 523 (“The Philadelphia Convention ignored that mandate 

and drafted an entirely new Constitution.”); Misha Tseytlin, Note, //The United //

//States Senate and the Problem of Equal State Suffrage//, 94 GEO. L.J. 859, 869–70 (2006) 

(“[T]he delegates decided to deviate from these instructions . . . .”); Benjamin A. 

Geslison,  //What Were They Thinking? Examining the Intellectual Inspirations of the //

//Framers and Opponents of the United States Constitution//,// //17 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 185, 

193 (2012)// //(reviewing FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTEL-

LECTUAL 

ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION  (1985) and HERBERT  J.  STORING,  WHAT 

THE 

ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF 

THE 

CONSTITUTION  (1981)) (The Anti-Federalists “argued persuasively that the 

Constitution was an illegal act completely unauthorized by the Convention”); //see //

//also// Robert F. Blomquist, //Response to Geoffrey R. Stone and Seth Barrett Tillman//, //Be-//

//yond Historical Blushing: A Plea for Constitutional Intelligence//, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. 

DE NOVO

 244, 245; Jason A. Crook, //Toward A More “Perfect” Union: The Untimely //

//Decline of Federalism and the Rise of the Homogenous Political Culture//, 34 U. DAYTON 

L. REV. 47, 50 (2008); Godbold//,// //supra// note 15, at 314; Kane, //supra// note 12, at 160; 

Maggs, //supra// note 5, at 1710–12; Denys P. Myers, //History of the Printed Archetype of //

//the Constitution of the United States of America//, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 217, 219–20 (2008); 

Smith, //supra// note 15, at 539–41; Edward C. Walterscheid, //The Nature of the Intellec-//

//tual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Part 1)//, 83 J. PAT. & TRADE-

MARK 

OFF. SOC’Y 763, 790 (2001); Susan Henderson-Utis, Comment, //What Would //

//the Founding Fathers Do? The Rise of Religious Programs in the United States Prison //

//System//, 52 HOW. L.J. 459, 506 (2009); Jonker, //supra// note 15, at 453–54; David Kow-

alski, Comment, //Red State, Blue State, No State?: Examining the Existence of A Con-//

//gressional Power to Remove A State//, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 335, 343–45 (2007). 

//  //374//. See, e.g.//, Dennis M. Cariello, //Federalism for the New Millennium: Accounting //

//for the Values of Federalism//, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1493, 1528 (1999); John Cornyn, 

//The Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to Statehood//, 26 TEX.  TECH  L.  REV. 

1089, 1094–95 (1995); Robert L. Jones, //Lessons from a Lost Constitution: The Council of //

//Revision, the Bill of Rights, and the Role of the Judiciary in Democratic Governance//, 27 

J.L. & POL. 459, 555 (2012); James Leonard, //Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s a //

//Remedy, There’s a Right: A Skeptic’s Critique of Ex Parte Young//, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 

215, 367 (2004); Michael B. Rappaport, //The Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: //

//An Originalist Analysis//, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 53, 67–68 (2012); Richard D. Rosen, 

//Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of A Presidential //

//Power of the Purse//, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 152 (1998); Louis Michael Seidman, //The Secret //

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 121

 

olis Convention “asked Congress to call a convention.”375 The 

Annapolis delegates did no such thing. A copy was submitted

Congress out of mere respect with no request for action.376 T

Maine article reproduced a speech by a federal judge th

claimed that the five-month gap between the “request” fro

Annapolis and the “call” from Congress arose because Congr

could not convene a quorum377—a claim that is belied by hu

dreds of pages of congressional records in this time frame.378 

Another writer, a bankruptcy judge, claimed: “The Federalis

did not really refute the charge that the delegates to the Conven-

tion had exceeded the authority given them by their states.”379 H

only citation for this proposition is the text of Article VII of the

Constitution.380 Ironically, this author’s next paragraph cites Jo

Marshall on the legitimacy of the ratification process.381 However, 

he ignores Marshall’s statement in defense of the Convention th

“the Convention did not exceed their powers.”382 

Colonel Richard D. Rosen claims that “[t]he Convention also 

did not bother, as the Continental Congress had directed, to 

return to Congress for its approval upon completing its 

work.”383 We have already reviewed in detail the debates in t

Confederation Congress after it received the Constitution from 

Philadelphia. Even Chief Justice Burger, who asserted that the \\
                                                                      

//History of American Constitutional Skepticism: A Recovery and Preliminary Evaluation//

17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 12–14 (2014); Lynn D. Wardle, //The Proposed Federal M//

//riage Amendment and the Risks to Federalism in Family Law//, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1

198 (2004); Lynn D. Wardle, //“Time Enough”: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services //

//and the Prudent Pace of Justice//, 41 FLA. L. REV. 881, 938 n.308 (1989); Bruce Ste

Note, //The Framers’ Intent and the Early Years of the Republic//, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 413, 

428–29 (1982). 

  375. George  Anastaplo,  //The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations,// 22 TEX

TECH  L.  REV. 967, 969–70 (1991); Daniel Wathen & Barbara Riegelhaupt, //The //

//Speeches of Frank M. Coffin: A Sideline to Judging//, 63 ME.  L.  REV. 467, 472 (20

(quoting speech of Judge Frank M. Coffin). 

  376. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

  377. Wathen & Riegelhaupt, //supra// note 375, at 472 (quoting speech of Judge

Frank M. Coffin). 

  378. 24 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra// note 70, at 261–62. 

  379. Randolph J. Haines, //The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different//, 77 

AM. BANKR. L.J. 129, 147 (2003). 

//  //380//. Id.// 

//  //381//. Id.// 

  382. Virginia Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) //reprinted in //9 DHRC, //supra//

note 4, at 1092, 1118. 

  383. Rosen, //supra// note 374, at 66 n.367. 



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122 

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[Vol. 40 

 

Constitution was illegally adopted, recognized that “the Con-

stitution was sent back to the Continental Congress.”384 

A few scholars have chronicled a more complete version of 

the events surrounding the call of the Philadelphia Conven-

tion.385 However, completeness does not always equate with his-

torical accuracy. Shawn Gunnarson makes the forgivable error 

of saying that only four states “responded” to Virginia’s call for 

the Annapolis Convention.386 Nine states (counting Virginia) ap-

pointed delegates, but only four others joined Virginia in a time-

ly manner. However, Gunnarson makes the far more egregious 

error of claiming that Virginia’s subsequent call for the Philadel-

phia Convention “languished until New York presented a mo-

tion in Congress.”387 This assertion ignores the fact that five other 

states joined the Virginia call for the Philadelphia Convention 

before New York’s motion was ever presented in Congress. 

Moreover, New York’s motion did not even launch the discus-

sion of the Annapolis Convention in Congress. A congressional 

committee had already recommended that Congress endorse the 

Philadelphia Convention prior to New York’s motion.388  

Gunnarson follows with the standard, but inaccurate, claim 

that Congress authorized the Convention, which he follows with 

the utterly unsupportable assertion that “the delegates decided 

to exceed the express terms of their congressional mandate.”389 

He offers no evidence to support the notion that the Convention 

believed that it had been called pursuant to a mandate by Con-

gress or that the delegates agreed that they had violated their 

actual mandates from their respective states. As we have seen, 

the record of the Convention shows that all sides of the debate 

appealed to the authority of their state appointments as the issue 

of the scope of their authority; moreover, the Federalists vigor-

ously defended the legitimacy of their actions. 

Other scholars who have written more extensive critiques of 

the legitimacy of the Convention generally base their core ar-

guments and conclusions on the faulty premise that Congress \\
                                                                      

  384. Burger, Remarks, //supra// note 3, at 79. 

//  //385//. See, e.g.//,// //Shawn Gunnarson, //Using History to Reshape the Discussion of Judicial //

//Review//, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 151, 160–62 (1994). 

//  //386//. Id.// 

//  //387//. Id. //at 161. 

 388. 

//See// //supra //notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 

  389. Gunnarson, //supra //note 385, at 162. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 123 

 

called the Convention for the sole purpose for amending the 

Articles of Confederation.390 Such conclusions would be far 

more academically palatable if there was some level of 

acknowledgement that this premise of infidelity is disputed.391 

Brian C. Murchison’s article bears mentioning because of his 

selective editing of the historical record. He casts doubt on fi-

delity of the actions of the delegates at the Convention by first 

suggesting that the Convention “arguably went beyond ‘revis-

ing’ the Articles” and that it “proposed an entirely new gov-

ernment.”392 He ends by proclaiming that the “Convention’s 

product was ‘bold and radical’ not only for its extraordinary 

content but for the independent character of its creation.”393 

Murchison posits the view the Convention acted without legal 

authority. His central thesis is that Madison justified this know-

ingly revolutionary action with language that paralleled Jeffer-

son’s Declaration of Independence.394 

Murchison’s entire argument is premised on the contention 

that the delegates’ formal authority came from a combination 

of the Annapolis Convention report and the February 21st reso-

lution of Congress. As we have seen earlier, the overwhelming 

evidence from the historical record supports Madison’s conten-

tion in //Federalist No. 40// that “[t]he powers of the convention 

ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the 

commissions given to the members by their respective constit-

uents.”395 Murchison actually quotes the first part of this sen-

tence—putting a period after the word “determined.”396 By \\
                                                                      

//  //390//. See e.g.//, Finkelman, //supra //note 11, at 1174. 

//  //391//. Compare// //id.//, //with //Eric M. Freedman, //Why Constitutional Lawyers and Histori-//

//ans Should Take// //A Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the Confedera-//

//tion Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation//, 60 TENN. L. REV. 

783, 839 (1993) (noting, in passing, that Bruce Ackerman contends that the dele-

gates were unfaithful to their call while James Madison in //Federalist No. 40// takes 

the opposite position) (citing Bruce Ackerman, //Constitutional Politics/Constitutional //

//Law//, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 456 (1989)). 

  392. Brian C. Murchison, //The Concept of Independence in Public Law//, 41 EMORY L.J. 

961, 976 (1992). 

//  //393//. Id. // 

//  //394//. Id. //at 975–81. 

  395. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 

//  //396//. Id. //at 975 (“He devotes //Federalist No. 40// to answering this objection, posing 

the question as ‘whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose 

this mixed Constitution,’ and conceding, ‘The powers of the convention ought, in 

strictness, to be determined.’”). 

122 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Constitution was illegally adopted, recognized that “the Con-

stitution was sent back to the Continental Congress.”384 

A few scholars have chronicled a more complete version of 

the events surrounding the call of the Philadelphia Conven-

tion.385 However, completeness does not always equate with his-

torical accuracy. Shawn Gunnarson makes the forgivable error 

of saying that only four states “responded” to Virginia’s call for 

the Annapolis Convention.386 Nine states (counting Virginia) ap-

pointed delegates, but only four others joined Virginia in a time-

ly manner. However, Gunnarson makes the far more egregious 

error of claiming that Virginia’s subsequent call for the Philadel-

phia Convention “languished until New York presented a mo-

tion in Congress.”387 This assertion ignores the fact that five other 

states joined the Virginia call for the Philadelphia Convention 

before New York’s motion was ever presented in Congress. 

Moreover, New York’s motion did not even launch the discus-

sion of the Annapolis Convention in Congress. A congressional 

committee had already recommended that Congress endorse the 

Philadelphia Convention prior to New York’s motion.388  

Gunnarson follows with the standard, but inaccurate, claim 

that Congress authorized the Convention, which he follows with 

the utterly unsupportable assertion that “the delegates decided 

to exceed the express terms of their congressional mandate.”389 

He offers no evidence to support the notion that the Convention 

believed that it had been called pursuant to a mandate by Con-

gress or that the delegates agreed that they had violated their 

actual mandates from their respective states. As we have seen, 

the record of the Convention shows that all sides of the debate 

appealed to the authority of their state appointments as the issue 

of the scope of their authority; moreover, the Federalists vigor-

ously defended the legitimacy of their actions. 

Other scholars who have written more extensive critiques of 

the legitimacy of the Convention generally base their core ar-

guments and conclusions on the faulty premise that Congress \\
                                                                      

  384. Burger, Remarks, //supra// note 3, at 79. 

//  //385//. See, e.g.//,// //Shawn Gunnarson, //Using History to Reshape the Discussion of Judicial //

//Review//, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 151, 160–62 (1994). 

//  //386//. Id.// 

//  //387//. Id. //at 161. 

 388. 

//See// //supra //notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 

  389. Gunnarson, //supra //note 385, at 162. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 123

 

called the Convention for the sole purpose for amending the 

Articles of Confederation.390 Such conclusions would be f

more academically palatable if there was some level o

acknowledgement that this premise of infidelity is disputed.391

Brian C. Murchison’s article bears mentioning because of his

selective editing of the historical record. He casts doubt on fi-

delity of the actions of the delegates at the Convention by first 

suggesting that the Convention “arguably went beyond ‘revis-

ing’ the Articles” and that it “proposed an entirely new gov-

ernment.”392 He ends by proclaiming that the “Convention’s 

product was ‘bold and radical’ not only for its extraordinary 

content but for the independent character of its creation.”393

Murchison posits the view the Convention acted without legal 

authority. His central thesis is that Madison justified this know-

ingly revolutionary action with language that paralleled Jeffer-

son’s Declaration of Independence.394 

Murchison’s entire argument is premised on the contention 

that the delegates’ formal authority came from a combination 

of the Annapolis Convention report and the February 21st re

lution of Congress. As we have seen earlier, the overwhelming 

evidence from the historical record supports Madison’s conten-

tion in //Federalist No. 40// that “[t]he powers of the conventi

ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the

commissions given to the members by their respective constit-

uents.”395 Murchison actually quotes the first part of this sen-

tence—putting a period after the word “determined.”396 By\\
                                                                      

//  //390//. See e.g.//, Finkelman, //supra //note 11, at 1174. 

//  //391//. Compare// //id.//, //with //Eric M. Freedman, //Why Constitutional Lawyers and Histori-//

//ans Should Take// //A Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the Confede//

//tion Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation//, 60 TENN. L. REV

783, 839 (1993) (noting, in passing, that Bruce Ackerman contends that the dele-

gates were unfaithful to their call while James Madison in //Federalist No. 40// takes 

the opposite position) (citing Bruce Ackerman, //Constitutional Politics/Constitutio//

//Law//, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 456 (1989)). 

  392. Brian C. Murchison, //The Concept of Independence in Public Law//, 41 EMORY L.

961, 976 (1992). 

//  //393//. Id. // 

//  //394//. Id. //at 975–81. 

  395. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 

//  //396//. Id. //at 975 (“He devotes //Federalist No. 40// to answering this objection, posi

the question as ‘whether the convention were authorized to frame and propos

this mixed Constitution,’ and conceding, ‘The powers of the convention ought,

strictness, to be determined.’”). 



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**127**

122 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Constitution was illegally adopted, recognized that “the Con-

stitution was sent back to the Continental Congress.”384 

A few scholars have chronicled a more complete version of 

the events surrounding the call of the Philadelphia Conven-

tion.385 However, completeness does not always equate with his-

torical accuracy. Shawn Gunnarson makes the forgivable error 

of saying that only four states “responded” to Virginia’s call for 

the Annapolis Convention.386 Nine states (counting Virginia) ap-

pointed delegates, but only four others joined Virginia in a time-

ly manner. However, Gunnarson makes the far more egregious 

error of claiming that Virginia’s subsequent call for the Philadel-

phia Convention “languished until New York presented a mo-

tion in Congress.”387 This assertion ignores the fact that five other 

states joined the Virginia call for the Philadelphia Convention 

before New York’s motion was ever presented in Congress. 

Moreover, New York’s motion did not even launch the discus-

sion of the Annapolis Convention in Congress. A congressional 

committee had already recommended that Congress endorse the 

Philadelphia Convention prior to New York’s motion.388  

Gunnarson follows with the standard, but inaccurate, claim 

that Congress authorized the Convention, which he follows with 

the utterly unsupportable assertion that “the delegates decided 

to exceed the express terms of their congressional mandate.”389 

He offers no evidence to support the notion that the Convention 

believed that it had been called pursuant to a mandate by Con-

gress or that the delegates agreed that they had violated their 

actual mandates from their respective states. As we have seen, 

the record of the Convention shows that all sides of the debate 

appealed to the authority of their state appointments as the issue 

of the scope of their authority; moreover, the Federalists vigor-

ously defended the legitimacy of their actions. 

Other scholars who have written more extensive critiques of 

the legitimacy of the Convention generally base their core ar-

guments and conclusions on the faulty premise that Congress \\
                                                                      

  384. Burger, Remarks, //supra// note 3, at 79. 

//  //385//. See, e.g.//,// //Shawn Gunnarson, //Using History to Reshape the Discussion of Judicial //

//Review//, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 151, 160–62 (1994). 

//  //386//. Id.// 

//  //387//. Id. //at 161. 

 388. 

//See// //supra //notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 

  389. Gunnarson, //supra //note 385, at 162. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 123 

 

called the Convention for the sole purpose for amending the 

Articles of Confederation.390 Such conclusions would be far 

more academically palatable if there was some level of 

acknowledgement that this premise of infidelity is disputed.391 

Brian C. Murchison’s article bears mentioning because of his 

selective editing of the historical record. He casts doubt on fi-

delity of the actions of the delegates at the Convention by first 

suggesting that the Convention “arguably went beyond ‘revis-

ing’ the Articles” and that it “proposed an entirely new gov-

ernment.”392 He ends by proclaiming that the “Convention’s 

product was ‘bold and radical’ not only for its extraordinary 

content but for the independent character of its creation.”393 

Murchison posits the view the Convention acted without legal 

authority. His central thesis is that Madison justified this know-

ingly revolutionary action with language that paralleled Jeffer-

son’s Declaration of Independence.394 

Murchison’s entire argument is premised on the contention 

that the delegates’ formal authority came from a combination 

of the Annapolis Convention report and the February 21st reso-

lution of Congress. As we have seen earlier, the overwhelming 

evidence from the historical record supports Madison’s conten-

tion in //Federalist No. 40// that “[t]he powers of the convention 

ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the 

commissions given to the members by their respective constit-

uents.”395 Murchison actually quotes the first part of this sen-

tence—putting a period after the word “determined.”396 By \\
                                                                      

//  //390//. See e.g.//, Finkelman, //supra //note 11, at 1174. 

//  //391//. Compare// //id.//, //with //Eric M. Freedman, //Why Constitutional Lawyers and Histori-//

//ans Should Take// //A Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the Confedera-//

//tion Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation//, 60 TENN. L. REV. 

783, 839 (1993) (noting, in passing, that Bruce Ackerman contends that the dele-

gates were unfaithful to their call while James Madison in //Federalist No. 40// takes 

the opposite position) (citing Bruce Ackerman, //Constitutional Politics/Constitutional //

//Law//, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 456 (1989)). 

  392. Brian C. Murchison, //The Concept of Independence in Public Law//, 41 EMORY L.J. 

961, 976 (1992). 

//  //393//. Id. // 

//  //394//. Id. //at 975–81. 

  395. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 

//  //396//. Id. //at 975 (“He devotes //Federalist No. 40// to answering this objection, posing 

the question as ‘whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose 

this mixed Constitution,’ and conceding, ‘The powers of the convention ought, in 

strictness, to be determined.’”). 

122 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Constitution was illegally adopted, recognized that “the Con-

stitution was sent back to the Continental Congress.”384 

A few scholars have chronicled a more complete version of 

the events surrounding the call of the Philadelphia Conven-

tion.385 However, completeness does not always equate with his-

torical accuracy. Shawn Gunnarson makes the forgivable error 

of saying that only four states “responded” to Virginia’s call for 

the Annapolis Convention.386 Nine states (counting Virginia) ap-

pointed delegates, but only four others joined Virginia in a time-

ly manner. However, Gunnarson makes the far more egregious 

error of claiming that Virginia’s subsequent call for the Philadel-

phia Convention “languished until New York presented a mo-

tion in Congress.”387 This assertion ignores the fact that five other 

states joined the Virginia call for the Philadelphia Convention 

before New York’s motion was ever presented in Congress. 

Moreover, New York’s motion did not even launch the discus-

sion of the Annapolis Convention in Congress. A congressional 

committee had already recommended that Congress endorse the 

Philadelphia Convention prior to New York’s motion.388  

Gunnarson follows with the standard, but inaccurate, claim 

that Congress authorized the Convention, which he follows with 

the utterly unsupportable assertion that “the delegates decided 

to exceed the express terms of their congressional mandate.”389 

He offers no evidence to support the notion that the Convention 

believed that it had been called pursuant to a mandate by Con-

gress or that the delegates agreed that they had violated their 

actual mandates from their respective states. As we have seen, 

the record of the Convention shows that all sides of the debate 

appealed to the authority of their state appointments as the issue 

of the scope of their authority; moreover, the Federalists vigor-

ously defended the legitimacy of their actions. 

Other scholars who have written more extensive critiques of 

the legitimacy of the Convention generally base their core ar-

guments and conclusions on the faulty premise that Congress \\
                                                                      

  384. Burger, Remarks, //supra// note 3, at 79. 

//  //385//. See, e.g.//,// //Shawn Gunnarson, //Using History to Reshape the Discussion of Judicial //

//Review//, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 151, 160–62 (1994). 

//  //386//. Id.// 

//  //387//. Id. //at 161. 

 388. 

//See// //supra //notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 

  389. Gunnarson, //supra //note 385, at 162. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 123

 

called the Convention for the sole purpose for amending the 

Articles of Confederation.390 Such conclusions would be f

more academically palatable if there was some level o

acknowledgement that this premise of infidelity is disputed.391

Brian C. Murchison’s article bears mentioning because of his

selective editing of the historical record. He casts doubt on fi-

delity of the actions of the delegates at the Convention by first 

suggesting that the Convention “arguably went beyond ‘revis-

ing’ the Articles” and that it “proposed an entirely new gov-

ernment.”392 He ends by proclaiming that the “Convention’s 

product was ‘bold and radical’ not only for its extraordinary 

content but for the independent character of its creation.”393

Murchison posits the view the Convention acted without legal 

authority. His central thesis is that Madison justified this know-

ingly revolutionary action with language that paralleled Jeffer-

son’s Declaration of Independence.394 

Murchison’s entire argument is premised on the contention 

that the delegates’ formal authority came from a combination 

of the Annapolis Convention report and the February 21st re

lution of Congress. As we have seen earlier, the overwhelming 

evidence from the historical record supports Madison’s conten-

tion in //Federalist No. 40// that “[t]he powers of the conventi

ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the

commissions given to the members by their respective constit-

uents.”395 Murchison actually quotes the first part of this sen-

tence—putting a period after the word “determined.”396 By\\
                                                                      

//  //390//. See e.g.//, Finkelman, //supra //note 11, at 1174. 

//  //391//. Compare// //id.//, //with //Eric M. Freedman, //Why Constitutional Lawyers and Histori-//

//ans Should Take// //A Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the Confede//

//tion Period: The Case of the Drafting of the Articles of Confederation//, 60 TENN. L. REV

783, 839 (1993) (noting, in passing, that Bruce Ackerman contends that the dele-

gates were unfaithful to their call while James Madison in //Federalist No. 40// takes 

the opposite position) (citing Bruce Ackerman, //Constitutional Politics/Constitutio//

//Law//, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 456 (1989)). 

  392. Brian C. Murchison, //The Concept of Independence in Public Law//, 41 EMORY L.

961, 976 (1992). 

//  //393//. Id. // 

//  //394//. Id. //at 975–81. 

  395. THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 

//  //396//. Id. //at 975 (“He devotes //Federalist No. 40// to answering this objection, posi

the question as ‘whether the convention were authorized to frame and propos

this mixed Constitution,’ and conceding, ‘The powers of the convention ought,

strictness, to be determined.’”). 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto128.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**128**

124 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

omitting the second half of the sentence, Murchison turns Mad-

ison’s defense of the Convention’s action into a concession of 

questionable behavior. Murchison’s pedantic analysis seeks to 

fit Madison’s arguments into a Procrustean Bed—lopping off 

key words on the one hand, while stretching superficial com-

parisons with the Declaration of Independence into a full-

blown claim that //Federalist No. 40// was a clever ruse attempting 

to justify a revolutionary convention. The superstructure of his 

theory is built on the discredited foundation that the delegates 

knowingly exceeded the limits flowing from their congression-

al appointment—facts he asserts without discussion or proof. 

Two scholars have looked at the question of the call of the Con-

vention and reached the conclusion that it did not come from 

Congress.397 Unsurprisingly, both of these scholars reach this con-

clusion by an actual examination of the relevant documents.  

Julius Goebel, Jr., recites the history that “some of the 

states . . . had authorized the appointment of delegates to a 

convention long before Congress was stirred to action . . . .”398 

Moreover, “Congress when it finally did recommend a conven-

tion” did so “by resolve, a form to which no statutory force 

may be attributed.”399 “Congress on February 21, 1787, had en-

dorsed the holding of a convention.”400 

Robert Natelson devotes six pages of a 2013 law review article 

to the defense of the fidelity of the delegates to their commis-

sions.401 By examining the texts of the credentials from each 

state, he concludes that “the delegates all were empowered 

through commissions issued by their respective states, and were 

subject to additional state instructions. All but a handful of dele-

gates remained within the scope of their authority or, if that was 

no longer possible, returned home.”402 However, he concludes 

that it is reasonable to question the fidelity of New York’s Alex-

ander Hamilton and Massachusetts’ Rufus King and Nathaniel 

Gorham—all of whom signed the Constitution.403 \\
                                                                      

//  //397//. See //Julius Goebel, Jr., //Melancton Smith’s Minutes of Debates on the New Consti-//

//tution//, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 26, 30 (1964); Natelson, //supra //note 91, at 674–79. 

  398. Goebel, //supra //note 397, at 30. 

//  //399//. Id.// 

//  //400//. Id.// 

  401. Natelson, //supra// note 91, at 674–79. 

//  //402//. Id. //at 679. 

//  //403//. See id. //at 678. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 125 

 

While Natelson correctly analyzes the historical facts and the 

legal conclusions on the whole, I take issue with his use of the 

signing of the Constitution as the test for fidelity of these dele-

gates. Signing was largely symbolic and was, at most, a per-

sonal pledge of support. This was at the end of a convention 

where every vote was made by states as states. The vote to ap-

prove the Constitution at the very end was counted by states, 

not by delegates. No delegate ever took official action as an in-

dividual. The Massachusetts delegates were either faithful or 

unfaithful to their commissions by casting dozens of votes in 

the process—especially the ultimate vote to approve the Con-

stitution. As acknowledged by Natelson,404 the charge is less 

credible against Hamilton because he never voted after Lansing 

and Yates left in July.405 Hamilton’s personal endorsement of 

the Constitution by signing it was not an act for the state of 

New York. Moreover, both the legislature of New York and the 

ratification convention in Massachusetts rejected the contention 

that the Convention had violated the directions given by the 

states.406 Despite these relatively minor disputes with Natelson 

regarding these specific delegates, his article is singularly 

noteworthy for looking at the correct documents and reasoning 

to sound conclusions therefrom. 

//B.  Answering Ackerman and Katyal //

Professors Bruce Ackerman and Neal Katyal407 stand near-

ly alone408 among legal scholars for having undertaken a 

                                                                      

//  //404//. See id. //at 678 n.414. 

  405. Natelson, however, questions whether Hamilton should have continued as 

a commissioner after the departure of his two New York colleagues. //Id.// at 722.  

//  //406//. See// Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 703, 704; 16 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at 68. 

  407. Katyal was a third-year student at Yale Law School at the time of publica-

tion. He is now a professor at Georgetown University Law Center. 

  408. Professor Akhil Amar has responded twice to the arguments of Ackerman 

and Katyal. //See  //Akhil Reed Amar, //The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional //

//Amendment Outside Article V//, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) [hereinafter //Consent//]; 

Akhil Reed Amar//, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article //

//V//, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1047–60 (1988) [hereinafter //Philadelphia//]. As the titles of 

both articles suggest, his discussions of the legality of the adoption of the Consti-

tution are made in service of his argument that there are paths to amend the Con-

stitution that are outside of Article V. //See// Amar, //Consent//, //supra//, at 494–508; Amar, 

//Philadelphia//, //supra//, at 1072–76. Moreover, his defense of the legality of the Consti-

tution is much more like an affirmative defense in a criminal case than a true de-

124 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

omitting the second half of the sentence, Murchison turns Mad-

ison’s defense of the Convention’s action into a concession of 

questionable behavior. Murchison’s pedantic analysis seeks to 

fit Madison’s arguments into a Procrustean Bed—lopping off 

key words on the one hand, while stretching superficial com-

parisons with the Declaration of Independence into a full-

blown claim that //Federalist No. 40// was a clever ruse attempting 

to justify a revolutionary convention. The superstructure of his 

theory is built on the discredited foundation that the delegates 

knowingly exceeded the limits flowing from their congression-

al appointment—facts he asserts without discussion or proof. 

Two scholars have looked at the question of the call of the Con-

vention and reached the conclusion that it did not come from 

Congress.397 Unsurprisingly, both of these scholars reach this con-

clusion by an actual examination of the relevant documents.  

Julius Goebel, Jr., recites the history that “some of the 

states . . . had authorized the appointment of delegates to a 

convention long before Congress was stirred to action . . . .”398 

Moreover, “Congress when it finally did recommend a conven-

tion” did so “by resolve, a form to which no statutory force 

may be attributed.”399 “Congress on February 21, 1787, had en-

dorsed the holding of a convention.”400 

Robert Natelson devotes six pages of a 2013 law review article 

to the defense of the fidelity of the delegates to their commis-

sions.401 By examining the texts of the credentials from each 

state, he concludes that “the delegates all were empowered 

through commissions issued by their respective states, and were 

subject to additional state instructions. All but a handful of dele-

gates remained within the scope of their authority or, if that was 

no longer possible, returned home.”402 However, he concludes 

that it is reasonable to question the fidelity of New York’s Alex-

ander Hamilton and Massachusetts’ Rufus King and Nathaniel 

Gorham—all of whom signed the Constitution.403 \\
                                                                      

//  //397//. See //Julius Goebel, Jr., //Melancton Smith’s Minutes of Debates on the New Consti-//

//tution//, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 26, 30 (1964); Natelson, //supra //note 91, at 674–79. 

  398. Goebel, //supra //note 397, at 30. 

//  //399//. Id.// 

//  //400//. Id.// 

  401. Natelson, //supra// note 91, at 674–79. 

//  //402//. Id. //at 679. 

//  //403//. See id. //at 678. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 125

 

While Natelson correctly analyzes the historical facts and th

legal conclusions on the whole, I take issue with his use of the

signing of the Constitution as the test for fidelity of these de

gates. Signing was largely symbolic and was, at most, a per-

sonal pledge of support. This was at the end of a convention 

where every vote was made by states as states. The vote to ap-

prove the Constitution at the very end was counted by states,

not by delegates. No delegate ever took official action as an in-

dividual. The Massachusetts delegates were either faithful or 

unfaithful to their commissions by casting dozens of votes in

the process—especially the ultimate vote to approve the Co

stitution. As acknowledged by Natelson,404 the charge is less 

credible against Hamilton because he never voted after Lansing 

and Yates left in July.405 Hamilton’s personal endorsement 

the Constitution by signing it was not an act for the state

New York. Moreover, both the legislature of New York and the 

ratification convention in Massachusetts rejected the contention 

that the Convention had violated the directions given by the

states.406 Despite these relatively minor disputes with Natelson 

regarding these specific delegates, his article is singularly

noteworthy for looking at the correct documents and reasoni

to sound conclusions therefrom. 

//B.  Answering Ackerman and Katyal //

Professors Bruce Ackerman and Neal Katyal407 stand nea

ly alone408 among legal scholars for having undertaken

                                                                      

//  //404//. See id. //at 678 n.414. 

  405. Natelson, however, questions whether Hamilton should have continued as

a commissioner after the departure of his two New York colleagues. //Id.// at 722.  

//  //406//. See// Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note

at 703, 704; 16 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at 68. 

  407. Katyal was a third-year student at Yale Law School at the time of publica-

tion. He is now a professor at Georgetown University Law Center. 

  408. Professor Akhil Amar has responded twice to the arguments of Ackerma

and Katyal. //See  //Akhil Reed Amar, //The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional//

//Amendment Outside Article V//, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) [hereinafter //Consent//

Akhil Reed Amar//, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Articl//

//V//, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1047–60 (1988) [hereinafter //Philadelphia//]. As the titles o

both articles suggest, his discussions of the legality of the adoption of the Consti-

tution are made in service of his argument that there are paths to amend the C

stitution that are outside of Article V. //See// Amar, //Consent//, //supra//, at 494–508; Am

//Philadelphia//, //supra//, at 1072–76. Moreover, his defense of the legality of the Con

tution is much more like an affirmative defense in a criminal case than a true 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto129.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**129**

124 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

omitting the second half of the sentence, Murchison turns Mad-

ison’s defense of the Convention’s action into a concession of 

questionable behavior. Murchison’s pedantic analysis seeks to 

fit Madison’s arguments into a Procrustean Bed—lopping off 

key words on the one hand, while stretching superficial com-

parisons with the Declaration of Independence into a full-

blown claim that //Federalist No. 40// was a clever ruse attempting 

to justify a revolutionary convention. The superstructure of his 

theory is built on the discredited foundation that the delegates 

knowingly exceeded the limits flowing from their congression-

al appointment—facts he asserts without discussion or proof. 

Two scholars have looked at the question of the call of the Con-

vention and reached the conclusion that it did not come from 

Congress.397 Unsurprisingly, both of these scholars reach this con-

clusion by an actual examination of the relevant documents.  

Julius Goebel, Jr., recites the history that “some of the 

states . . . had authorized the appointment of delegates to a 

convention long before Congress was stirred to action . . . .”398 

Moreover, “Congress when it finally did recommend a conven-

tion” did so “by resolve, a form to which no statutory force 

may be attributed.”399 “Congress on February 21, 1787, had en-

dorsed the holding of a convention.”400 

Robert Natelson devotes six pages of a 2013 law review article 

to the defense of the fidelity of the delegates to their commis-

sions.401 By examining the texts of the credentials from each 

state, he concludes that “the delegates all were empowered 

through commissions issued by their respective states, and were 

subject to additional state instructions. All but a handful of dele-

gates remained within the scope of their authority or, if that was 

no longer possible, returned home.”402 However, he concludes 

that it is reasonable to question the fidelity of New York’s Alex-

ander Hamilton and Massachusetts’ Rufus King and Nathaniel 

Gorham—all of whom signed the Constitution.403 \\
                                                                      

//  //397//. See //Julius Goebel, Jr., //Melancton Smith’s Minutes of Debates on the New Consti-//

//tution//, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 26, 30 (1964); Natelson, //supra //note 91, at 674–79. 

  398. Goebel, //supra //note 397, at 30. 

//  //399//. Id.// 

//  //400//. Id.// 

  401. Natelson, //supra// note 91, at 674–79. 

//  //402//. Id. //at 679. 

//  //403//. See id. //at 678. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 125 

 

While Natelson correctly analyzes the historical facts and the 

legal conclusions on the whole, I take issue with his use of the 

signing of the Constitution as the test for fidelity of these dele-

gates. Signing was largely symbolic and was, at most, a per-

sonal pledge of support. This was at the end of a convention 

where every vote was made by states as states. The vote to ap-

prove the Constitution at the very end was counted by states, 

not by delegates. No delegate ever took official action as an in-

dividual. The Massachusetts delegates were either faithful or 

unfaithful to their commissions by casting dozens of votes in 

the process—especially the ultimate vote to approve the Con-

stitution. As acknowledged by Natelson,404 the charge is less 

credible against Hamilton because he never voted after Lansing 

and Yates left in July.405 Hamilton’s personal endorsement of 

the Constitution by signing it was not an act for the state of 

New York. Moreover, both the legislature of New York and the 

ratification convention in Massachusetts rejected the contention 

that the Convention had violated the directions given by the 

states.406 Despite these relatively minor disputes with Natelson 

regarding these specific delegates, his article is singularly 

noteworthy for looking at the correct documents and reasoning 

to sound conclusions therefrom. 

//B.  Answering Ackerman and Katyal //

Professors Bruce Ackerman and Neal Katyal407 stand near-

ly alone408 among legal scholars for having undertaken a 

                                                                      

//  //404//. See id. //at 678 n.414. 

  405. Natelson, however, questions whether Hamilton should have continued as 

a commissioner after the departure of his two New York colleagues. //Id.// at 722.  

//  //406//. See// Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 703, 704; 16 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at 68. 

  407. Katyal was a third-year student at Yale Law School at the time of publica-

tion. He is now a professor at Georgetown University Law Center. 

  408. Professor Akhil Amar has responded twice to the arguments of Ackerman 

and Katyal. //See  //Akhil Reed Amar, //The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional //

//Amendment Outside Article V//, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) [hereinafter //Consent//]; 

Akhil Reed Amar//, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article //

//V//, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1047–60 (1988) [hereinafter //Philadelphia//]. As the titles of 

both articles suggest, his discussions of the legality of the adoption of the Consti-

tution are made in service of his argument that there are paths to amend the Con-

stitution that are outside of Article V. //See// Amar, //Consent//, //supra//, at 494–508; Amar, 

//Philadelphia//, //supra//, at 1072–76. Moreover, his defense of the legality of the Consti-

tution is much more like an affirmative defense in a criminal case than a true de-

124 

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[Vol. 40 

 

omitting the second half of the sentence, Murchison turns Mad-

ison’s defense of the Convention’s action into a concession of 

questionable behavior. Murchison’s pedantic analysis seeks to 

fit Madison’s arguments into a Procrustean Bed—lopping off 

key words on the one hand, while stretching superficial com-

parisons with the Declaration of Independence into a full-

blown claim that //Federalist No. 40// was a clever ruse attempting 

to justify a revolutionary convention. The superstructure of his 

theory is built on the discredited foundation that the delegates 

knowingly exceeded the limits flowing from their congression-

al appointment—facts he asserts without discussion or proof. 

Two scholars have looked at the question of the call of the Con-

vention and reached the conclusion that it did not come from 

Congress.397 Unsurprisingly, both of these scholars reach this con-

clusion by an actual examination of the relevant documents.  

Julius Goebel, Jr., recites the history that “some of the 

states . . . had authorized the appointment of delegates to a 

convention long before Congress was stirred to action . . . .”398 

Moreover, “Congress when it finally did recommend a conven-

tion” did so “by resolve, a form to which no statutory force 

may be attributed.”399 “Congress on February 21, 1787, had en-

dorsed the holding of a convention.”400 

Robert Natelson devotes six pages of a 2013 law review article 

to the defense of the fidelity of the delegates to their commis-

sions.401 By examining the texts of the credentials from each 

state, he concludes that “the delegates all were empowered 

through commissions issued by their respective states, and were 

subject to additional state instructions. All but a handful of dele-

gates remained within the scope of their authority or, if that was 

no longer possible, returned home.”402 However, he concludes 

that it is reasonable to question the fidelity of New York’s Alex-

ander Hamilton and Massachusetts’ Rufus King and Nathaniel 

Gorham—all of whom signed the Constitution.403 \\
                                                                      

//  //397//. See //Julius Goebel, Jr., //Melancton Smith’s Minutes of Debates on the New Consti-//

//tution//, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 26, 30 (1964); Natelson, //supra //note 91, at 674–79. 

  398. Goebel, //supra //note 397, at 30. 

//  //399//. Id.// 

//  //400//. Id.// 

  401. Natelson, //supra// note 91, at 674–79. 

//  //402//. Id. //at 679. 

//  //403//. See id. //at 678. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 125

 

While Natelson correctly analyzes the historical facts and th

legal conclusions on the whole, I take issue with his use of the

signing of the Constitution as the test for fidelity of these de

gates. Signing was largely symbolic and was, at most, a per-

sonal pledge of support. This was at the end of a convention 

where every vote was made by states as states. The vote to ap-

prove the Constitution at the very end was counted by states,

not by delegates. No delegate ever took official action as an in-

dividual. The Massachusetts delegates were either faithful or 

unfaithful to their commissions by casting dozens of votes in

the process—especially the ultimate vote to approve the Co

stitution. As acknowledged by Natelson,404 the charge is less 

credible against Hamilton because he never voted after Lansing 

and Yates left in July.405 Hamilton’s personal endorsement 

the Constitution by signing it was not an act for the state

New York. Moreover, both the legislature of New York and the 

ratification convention in Massachusetts rejected the contention 

that the Convention had violated the directions given by the

states.406 Despite these relatively minor disputes with Natelson 

regarding these specific delegates, his article is singularly

noteworthy for looking at the correct documents and reasoni

to sound conclusions therefrom. 

//B.  Answering Ackerman and Katyal //

Professors Bruce Ackerman and Neal Katyal407 stand nea

ly alone408 among legal scholars for having undertaken

                                                                      

//  //404//. See id. //at 678 n.414. 

  405. Natelson, however, questions whether Hamilton should have continued as

a commissioner after the departure of his two New York colleagues. //Id.// at 722.  

//  //406//. See// Assembly Proceedings (Jan. 31 1788), //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note

at 703, 704; 16 DHRC//, supra// note 4, at 68. 

  407. Katyal was a third-year student at Yale Law School at the time of publica-

tion. He is now a professor at Georgetown University Law Center. 

  408. Professor Akhil Amar has responded twice to the arguments of Ackerma

and Katyal. //See  //Akhil Reed Amar, //The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional//

//Amendment Outside Article V//, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) [hereinafter //Consent//

Akhil Reed Amar//, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Articl//

//V//, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1047–60 (1988) [hereinafter //Philadelphia//]. As the titles o

both articles suggest, his discussions of the legality of the adoption of the Consti-

tution are made in service of his argument that there are paths to amend the C

stitution that are outside of Article V. //See// Amar, //Consent//, //supra//, at 494–508; Am

//Philadelphia//, //supra//, at 1072–76. Moreover, his defense of the legality of the Con

tution is much more like an affirmative defense in a criminal case than a true 



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comprehensive review of the legality of the adoption of the 

Constitution.409 An earlier article, not cited by Ackerman and 

Katyal, makes very similar arguments.410 Ackerman and 

Katyal’s premises and conclusions are concisely described in 

their fourth paragraph: 

Our main task, however, is to confront the problem raised by 

the //Federalists’ flagrant illegalities//. Movements that //indulge in sys-//

//tematic contempt for the law// risk a violent backlash. Rather than 

establish a new and stable regime, //revolutionary acts of illegality //

can catalyze an escalating cycle of incivility, violence, and civil 

war. How did the Federalists avoid this dismal cycle? More 

positively: How did the Founders manage to win acceptance of 

their claim to speak for the People at the same moment that 

//they were breaking the rules of the game//?411 

This excerpt is typical of the highly charged language that per-

vades their work. The illegality of the adoption of the Constitu-

tion is not treated as a close question—the process of adopting 

                                                                      

fense. He essentially argues that while there is a facial inconsistency with Article 

XIII of the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution was lawfully adopted be-

cause the Articles were a treaty that had been breached by the states. Amar, //Con-//

//sent//,  //supra//, at 465–69. Thus, having been breached, the states were at liberty to 

write a new document that would otherwise be illegal. While we certainly find 

elements of international law parallels in the arguments of the Federalists, his 

concession that there is a facial violation is a much different defense than is ar-

gued here. His thesis that there is an extra-constitutional method of amending the 

Constitution takes the contention outside of anything that would amount to an 

originalist or textualist defense of the Constitution. It is a creative argument, but 

Ackerman and Katyal’s critiques of it are powerful. //See //Ackerman & Kaytal, //supra// 

note 14, at 476–487. This article is the first comprehensive direct defense (as op-

posed to Amar’s affirmative defense) of the legality of the Constitution. 

//  //409//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14. 

  410. Kay, //supra// note 14. Kay bases his argument on the familiar and erroneous 

assertion that the Annapolis Convention “proposed that Congress call another 

convention to be held in Philadelphia.” //Id.// at 63. He fails to cite or quote the actual 

language of the report from the Annapolis Convention which clearly addressed 

its recommendations to the state legislatures to call a convention. The conven-

tion’s stated reasons for sending a copy to Congress was to demonstrate courtesy. 

He then asserts the common claim that Congress called the Convention and lim-

ited their authority to the revision of the Articles. //Id. //at 63–64. Kay embellishes on 

this claim by stating “the Congressional resolution calling the convention, as well 

as the instructions to a number of state delegations, restricted the convention’s 

mission to ‘revising the Articles . . . .’” //Id. //at 64. He fails to examine the actual lan-

guage of any state’s delegation, nor does he consider the argument made by Mad-

ison in //Federalist No. 40// that the actual call of the Convention came from the states. 

//  //411//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14,// //at 476–77 (emphasis added). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 127 

 

the Constitution was “flagrant[ly]” illegal.412 The Founders 

demonstrated “systematic contempt for the law.”413 They 

committed “revolutionary acts of illegality.”414 They were not 

merely “breaking the rules of the game”—Madison, Hamilton, 

and Washington were doing so with deliberate disdain.415 

Ackerman and Katyal purport to paraphrase the Founders’ 

justification for this unscrupulous maneuvering: 

Granted, we did not play by the old rules. But we did some-

thing just as good. We have beaten our opponents time after 

time in an arduous series of electoral struggles within a large 

number of familiar lawmaking institutions. True, our repeated 

victories don’t add up to a formal constitutional amendment 

under the existing rules. But we never would have emerged 

victorious in election after election without the considered sup-

port of a mobilized majority of the American People. Moreover, 

the premises underlying the old rules for constitutional 

amendment are deeply defective, inconsistent with a better un-

derstanding of the nature of democratic popular rule. We there-

fore claim that our repeated legislative and electoral victories 

have already provided us with a legitimate //mandate from the //

//People// to make new constitutional law. Forcing us to play by 

the old rules would only allow a minority to stifle the living 

voice of the People by manipulating legalisms that have lost 

their underlying functions.416 

This paraphrase was unsupported by any citation to the actual 

words of the Federalists. Statements can be found from Madi-

son and other Federalists that support the claim that they be-

lieved their actions were morally justified,417 but nothing at all 

can be found to support the overall tone and thesis of this effort 

at historical ventriloquism. The Federalists defended both the 

legal and moral basis of their actions. They would at times ar-

gue these defenses in the alternative. But absolutely nothing 

can be found from the Framers that demonstrates that they be-

lieved their actions were clearly illegal and revolutionary and 

were nonetheless justified. \\
                                                                      

//  //412//. Id.// at 476. 

//  //413//. Id.// 

//  //414//. Id. //

//  //415//. See id.// at 476–77. 

//  //416//. Id. //at 478. 

//  //417//. See, e.g.//, THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 252–54 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossi-

er ed., 1961).  

126 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

comprehensive review of the legality of the adoption of the 

Constitution.409 An earlier article, not cited by Ackerman and 

Katyal, makes very similar arguments.410 Ackerman and 

Katyal’s premises and conclusions are concisely described in 

their fourth paragraph: 

Our main task, however, is to confront the problem raised by 

the //Federalists’ flagrant illegalities//. Movements that //indulge in sys-//

//tematic contempt for the law// risk a violent backlash. Rather than 

establish a new and stable regime, //revolutionary acts of illegality //

can catalyze an escalating cycle of incivility, violence, and civil 

war. How did the Federalists avoid this dismal cycle? More 

positively: How did the Founders manage to win acceptance of 

their claim to speak for the People at the same moment that 

//they were breaking the rules of the game//?411 

This excerpt is typical of the highly charged language that per-

vades their work. The illegality of the adoption of the Constitu-

tion is not treated as a close question—the process of adopting 

                                                                      

fense. He essentially argues that while there is a facial inconsistency with Article 

XIII of the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution was lawfully adopted be-

cause the Articles were a treaty that had been breached by the states. Amar, //Con-//

//sent//,  //supra//, at 465–69. Thus, having been breached, the states were at liberty to 

write a new document that would otherwise be illegal. While we certainly find 

elements of international law parallels in the arguments of the Federalists, his 

concession that there is a facial violation is a much different defense than is ar-

gued here. His thesis that there is an extra-constitutional method of amending the 

Constitution takes the contention outside of anything that would amount to an 

originalist or textualist defense of the Constitution. It is a creative argument, but 

Ackerman and Katyal’s critiques of it are powerful. //See //Ackerman & Kaytal, //supra// 

note 14, at 476–487. This article is the first comprehensive direct defense (as op-

posed to Amar’s affirmative defense) of the legality of the Constitution. 

//  //409//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14. 

  410. Kay, //supra// note 14. Kay bases his argument on the familiar and erroneous 

assertion that the Annapolis Convention “proposed that Congress call another 

convention to be held in Philadelphia.” //Id.// at 63. He fails to cite or quote the actual 

language of the report from the Annapolis Convention which clearly addressed 

its recommendations to the state legislatures to call a convention. The conven-

tion’s stated reasons for sending a copy to Congress was to demonstrate courtesy. 

He then asserts the common claim that Congress called the Convention and lim-

ited their authority to the revision of the Articles. //Id. //at 63–64. Kay embellishes on 

this claim by stating “the Congressional resolution calling the convention, as well 

as the instructions to a number of state delegations, restricted the convention’s 

mission to ‘revising the Articles . . . .’” //Id. //at 64. He fails to examine the actual lan-

guage of any state’s delegation, nor does he consider the argument made by Mad-

ison in //Federalist No. 40// that the actual call of the Convention came from the states. 

//  //411//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14,// //at 476–77 (emphasis added). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 127

 

the Constitution was “flagrant[ly]” illegal.412 The Found

demonstrated “systematic contempt for the law.”413 They

committed “revolutionary acts of illegality.”414 They were n

merely “breaking the rules of the game”—Madison, Hamilton, 

and Washington were doing so with deliberate disdain.415 

Ackerman and Katyal purport to paraphrase the Founde

justification for this unscrupulous maneuvering: 

Granted, we did not play by the old rules. But we did some-

thing just as good. We have beaten our opponents time after 

time in an arduous series of electoral struggles within a large 

number of familiar lawmaking institutions. True, our repeated 

victories don’t add up to a formal constitutional amendment 

under the existing rules. But we never would have emerged 

victorious in election after election without the considered sup-

port of a mobilized majority of the American People. Moreover, 

the premises underlying the old rules for constitutional 

amendment are deeply defective, inconsistent with a better un-

derstanding of the nature of democratic popular rule. We there-

fore claim that our repeated legislative and electoral victories 

have already provided us with a legitimate //mandate from the //

//People// to make new constitutional law. Forcing us to play by 

the old rules would only allow a minority to stifle the living 

voice of the People by manipulating legalisms that have lost 

their underlying functions.416 

This paraphrase was unsupported by any citation to the act

words of the Federalists. Statements can be found from Madi-

son and other Federalists that support the claim that they

lieved their actions were morally justified,417 but nothing at all 

can be found to support the overall tone and thesis of this effort 

at historical ventriloquism. The Federalists defended both 

legal and moral basis of their actions. They would at times

gue these defenses in the alternative. But absolutely nothing 

can be found from the Framers that demonstrates that they

lieved their actions were clearly illegal and revolutionary a

were nonetheless justified. \\
                                                                      

//  //412//. Id.// at 476. 

//  //413//. Id.// 

//  //414//. Id. //

//  //415//. See id.// at 476–77. 

//  //416//. Id. //at 478. 

//  //417//. See, e.g.//, THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 252–54 (James Madison) (Clinton 

er ed., 1961).  



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126 

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[Vol. 40 

 

comprehensive review of the legality of the adoption of the 

Constitution.409 An earlier article, not cited by Ackerman and 

Katyal, makes very similar arguments.410 Ackerman and 

Katyal’s premises and conclusions are concisely described in 

their fourth paragraph: 

Our main task, however, is to confront the problem raised by 

the //Federalists’ flagrant illegalities//. Movements that //indulge in sys-//

//tematic contempt for the law// risk a violent backlash. Rather than 

establish a new and stable regime, //revolutionary acts of illegality //

can catalyze an escalating cycle of incivility, violence, and civil 

war. How did the Federalists avoid this dismal cycle? More 

positively: How did the Founders manage to win acceptance of 

their claim to speak for the People at the same moment that 

//they were breaking the rules of the game//?411 

This excerpt is typical of the highly charged language that per-

vades their work. The illegality of the adoption of the Constitu-

tion is not treated as a close question—the process of adopting 

                                                                      

fense. He essentially argues that while there is a facial inconsistency with Article 

XIII of the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution was lawfully adopted be-

cause the Articles were a treaty that had been breached by the states. Amar, //Con-//

//sent//,  //supra//, at 465–69. Thus, having been breached, the states were at liberty to 

write a new document that would otherwise be illegal. While we certainly find 

elements of international law parallels in the arguments of the Federalists, his 

concession that there is a facial violation is a much different defense than is ar-

gued here. His thesis that there is an extra-constitutional method of amending the 

Constitution takes the contention outside of anything that would amount to an 

originalist or textualist defense of the Constitution. It is a creative argument, but 

Ackerman and Katyal’s critiques of it are powerful. //See //Ackerman & Kaytal, //supra// 

note 14, at 476–487. This article is the first comprehensive direct defense (as op-

posed to Amar’s affirmative defense) of the legality of the Constitution. 

//  //409//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14. 

  410. Kay, //supra// note 14. Kay bases his argument on the familiar and erroneous 

assertion that the Annapolis Convention “proposed that Congress call another 

convention to be held in Philadelphia.” //Id.// at 63. He fails to cite or quote the actual 

language of the report from the Annapolis Convention which clearly addressed 

its recommendations to the state legislatures to call a convention. The conven-

tion’s stated reasons for sending a copy to Congress was to demonstrate courtesy. 

He then asserts the common claim that Congress called the Convention and lim-

ited their authority to the revision of the Articles. //Id. //at 63–64. Kay embellishes on 

this claim by stating “the Congressional resolution calling the convention, as well 

as the instructions to a number of state delegations, restricted the convention’s 

mission to ‘revising the Articles . . . .’” //Id. //at 64. He fails to examine the actual lan-

guage of any state’s delegation, nor does he consider the argument made by Mad-

ison in //Federalist No. 40// that the actual call of the Convention came from the states. 

//  //411//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14,// //at 476–77 (emphasis added). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 127 

 

the Constitution was “flagrant[ly]” illegal.412 The Founders 

demonstrated “systematic contempt for the law.”413 They 

committed “revolutionary acts of illegality.”414 They were not 

merely “breaking the rules of the game”—Madison, Hamilton, 

and Washington were doing so with deliberate disdain.415 

Ackerman and Katyal purport to paraphrase the Founders’ 

justification for this unscrupulous maneuvering: 

Granted, we did not play by the old rules. But we did some-

thing just as good. We have beaten our opponents time after 

time in an arduous series of electoral struggles within a large 

number of familiar lawmaking institutions. True, our repeated 

victories don’t add up to a formal constitutional amendment 

under the existing rules. But we never would have emerged 

victorious in election after election without the considered sup-

port of a mobilized majority of the American People. Moreover, 

the premises underlying the old rules for constitutional 

amendment are deeply defective, inconsistent with a better un-

derstanding of the nature of democratic popular rule. We there-

fore claim that our repeated legislative and electoral victories 

have already provided us with a legitimate //mandate from the //

//People// to make new constitutional law. Forcing us to play by 

the old rules would only allow a minority to stifle the living 

voice of the People by manipulating legalisms that have lost 

their underlying functions.416 

This paraphrase was unsupported by any citation to the actual 

words of the Federalists. Statements can be found from Madi-

son and other Federalists that support the claim that they be-

lieved their actions were morally justified,417 but nothing at all 

can be found to support the overall tone and thesis of this effort 

at historical ventriloquism. The Federalists defended both the 

legal and moral basis of their actions. They would at times ar-

gue these defenses in the alternative. But absolutely nothing 

can be found from the Framers that demonstrates that they be-

lieved their actions were clearly illegal and revolutionary and 

were nonetheless justified. \\
                                                                      

//  //412//. Id.// at 476. 

//  //413//. Id.// 

//  //414//. Id. //

//  //415//. See id.// at 476–77. 

//  //416//. Id. //at 478. 

//  //417//. See, e.g.//, THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 252–54 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossi-

er ed., 1961).  

126 

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[Vol. 40 

 

comprehensive review of the legality of the adoption of the 

Constitution.409 An earlier article, not cited by Ackerman and 

Katyal, makes very similar arguments.410 Ackerman and 

Katyal’s premises and conclusions are concisely described in 

their fourth paragraph: 

Our main task, however, is to confront the problem raised by 

the //Federalists’ flagrant illegalities//. Movements that //indulge in sys-//

//tematic contempt for the law// risk a violent backlash. Rather than 

establish a new and stable regime, //revolutionary acts of illegality //

can catalyze an escalating cycle of incivility, violence, and civil 

war. How did the Federalists avoid this dismal cycle? More 

positively: How did the Founders manage to win acceptance of 

their claim to speak for the People at the same moment that 

//they were breaking the rules of the game//?411 

This excerpt is typical of the highly charged language that per-

vades their work. The illegality of the adoption of the Constitu-

tion is not treated as a close question—the process of adopting 

                                                                      

fense. He essentially argues that while there is a facial inconsistency with Article 

XIII of the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution was lawfully adopted be-

cause the Articles were a treaty that had been breached by the states. Amar, //Con-//

//sent//,  //supra//, at 465–69. Thus, having been breached, the states were at liberty to 

write a new document that would otherwise be illegal. While we certainly find 

elements of international law parallels in the arguments of the Federalists, his 

concession that there is a facial violation is a much different defense than is ar-

gued here. His thesis that there is an extra-constitutional method of amending the 

Constitution takes the contention outside of anything that would amount to an 

originalist or textualist defense of the Constitution. It is a creative argument, but 

Ackerman and Katyal’s critiques of it are powerful. //See //Ackerman & Kaytal, //supra// 

note 14, at 476–487. This article is the first comprehensive direct defense (as op-

posed to Amar’s affirmative defense) of the legality of the Constitution. 

//  //409//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14. 

  410. Kay, //supra// note 14. Kay bases his argument on the familiar and erroneous 

assertion that the Annapolis Convention “proposed that Congress call another 

convention to be held in Philadelphia.” //Id.// at 63. He fails to cite or quote the actual 

language of the report from the Annapolis Convention which clearly addressed 

its recommendations to the state legislatures to call a convention. The conven-

tion’s stated reasons for sending a copy to Congress was to demonstrate courtesy. 

He then asserts the common claim that Congress called the Convention and lim-

ited their authority to the revision of the Articles. //Id. //at 63–64. Kay embellishes on 

this claim by stating “the Congressional resolution calling the convention, as well 

as the instructions to a number of state delegations, restricted the convention’s 

mission to ‘revising the Articles . . . .’” //Id. //at 64. He fails to examine the actual lan-

guage of any state’s delegation, nor does he consider the argument made by Mad-

ison in //Federalist No. 40// that the actual call of the Convention came from the states. 

//  //411//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14,// //at 476–77 (emphasis added). 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 127

 

the Constitution was “flagrant[ly]” illegal.412 The Found

demonstrated “systematic contempt for the law.”413 They

committed “revolutionary acts of illegality.”414 They were n

merely “breaking the rules of the game”—Madison, Hamilton, 

and Washington were doing so with deliberate disdain.415 

Ackerman and Katyal purport to paraphrase the Founde

justification for this unscrupulous maneuvering: 

Granted, we did not play by the old rules. But we did some-

thing just as good. We have beaten our opponents time after 

time in an arduous series of electoral struggles within a large 

number of familiar lawmaking institutions. True, our repeated 

victories don’t add up to a formal constitutional amendment 

under the existing rules. But we never would have emerged 

victorious in election after election without the considered sup-

port of a mobilized majority of the American People. Moreover, 

the premises underlying the old rules for constitutional 

amendment are deeply defective, inconsistent with a better un-

derstanding of the nature of democratic popular rule. We there-

fore claim that our repeated legislative and electoral victories 

have already provided us with a legitimate //mandate from the //

//People// to make new constitutional law. Forcing us to play by 

the old rules would only allow a minority to stifle the living 

voice of the People by manipulating legalisms that have lost 

their underlying functions.416 

This paraphrase was unsupported by any citation to the act

words of the Federalists. Statements can be found from Madi-

son and other Federalists that support the claim that they

lieved their actions were morally justified,417 but nothing at all 

can be found to support the overall tone and thesis of this effort 

at historical ventriloquism. The Federalists defended both 

legal and moral basis of their actions. They would at times

gue these defenses in the alternative. But absolutely nothing 

can be found from the Framers that demonstrates that they

lieved their actions were clearly illegal and revolutionary a

were nonetheless justified. \\
                                                                      

//  //412//. Id.// at 476. 

//  //413//. Id.// 

//  //414//. Id. //

//  //415//. See id.// at 476–77. 

//  //416//. Id. //at 478. 

//  //417//. See, e.g.//, THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 252–54 (James Madison) (Clinton 

er ed., 1961).  



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[Vol. 40 

 

Ackerman and Katyal allege “three legal obstacles” that pur-

portedly demonstrate the illegality of the Founders’ conduct: 



  Problems with the Articles of Confederation 



  Problems with the Convention 



  Problems with State Constitutions418 

The professors allege ten distinct violations under these three 

categories.419 However, their “three legal obstacles” and ten 

specific allegations are not well-organized. A more logical or-

ganization of the professors’ legal arguments would be: 



  The process was illegal from beginning to end be-

cause Article XIII provided the exclusive method for 

amending the form of governance of the United 

States. 



  The delegates went beyond the call of the convention 

containing their controlling instructions. 



  The method of ratification chosen violated both Arti-

cle XIII and several state constitutions.420 

                                                                      

  418. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14,// //at 475–487. 

//  //419//. See id. //at 478–486. The violations are as follows: (1) the Constitution invited 

secession; (2) the Constitutional Convention ignored the role the Articles “ex-

pressly assigned to the Continental Congress” for approving subsequent amend-

ments; (3) the Founders cut the state legislatures out of the ratifying process; (4) 

the entire process was done “in the face of the Articles’ express claim to specify 

the exclusive means for its revision;” (5) the Convention was a secessionist body; 

(6) Delaware’s delegation “recognized that it was acting in contempt of its com-

mission;” (7) the delegates had been “charged” by the “Continental Congress” to 

meet “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles” and the delegates 

went “beyond their legal authority when they ripped up the Articles and pro-

posed an entirely new text;” (8) the delegations from New York, Connecticut, and 

Massachusetts clearly violated their commissions; (9) all states that gave instruc-

tions as to the mode of ratification specified approval by Congress followed by 

approval of the state legislatures—which was not followed; and (10) the Suprem-

acy Clause of the Constitution created an implied conflict with and de facto 

change in several state constitutional amendments. Thus, the process for obtain-

ing amendments to state constitutions was applicable and was not followed. //Id.// 

  420. One of their arguments does not fit this outline but can be easily dismissed. 

The contention that the Convention was secessionist is nothing more than a politi-

cal criticism and does not rise to the level of a serious legal argument. Moreover, it 

is a stretch to contend that it is a secessionist act to invite all states to a convention 

to discuss possible changes to the form of government. The fact that one state 

chose not to attend does not alter the nature of the Convention. If Rhode Island 

had been excluded by the others from the drafting convention it would plausibly 

raise the specter of secessionism. Describing Rhode Island’s refusal to attend the 

Convention as an act of secession by the other twelve states is facially without 

merit. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 129 

 

//1.  The Contention that the Whole Process Was Illegal under the //

//Articles of Confederation May Be Summarily Dismissed //

Although the professors’ argument that the entire process 

was done “in the face of the Articles’ express claim to specify 

the //exclusive// means for its revision”421 made the list of their ten 

specific illegalities, a reader must hunt diligently through the 

remainder of their article for any supporting argumentation. 

Random statements in support of this argument are sprinkled 

throughout the article, but if this theory is to be considered se-

riously, it demands robust development and careful considera-

tion rather than scattered and disjointed assertions.422 

The longest single presentation of this theory is a mere two 

sentences that refer to the Annapolis Convention: 

The commissioners had taken upon themselves the right 

to propose a fundamental change in constitutional law. 

While Article XIII had confided exclusive authority in 

Congress to propose amendments, Annapolis was making 

an end run around the existing institution by calling for a 

second body, the convention, unknown to the Confedera-

cy’s higher lawmaking system.423 

Ackerman and Katyal critique their rival Akhil Amar for making 

claims unsupported by evidence from the contemporaneous de-

bates.424 Amar’s theory (alleging a breach of treaty obligations) 

should be rejected, they say, because there wasn’t “any evidence 

that Americans took Amar’s argument seriously.”425 However, 

in their own article, despite their self-described exhaustive re-

search,426 they cite very slender evidence that anyone at the time 

                                                                      

  421. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 480. 

  422. If this theory was advanced in this manner in an appellate brief, it is clear 

that it would be dismissed under the familiar standard for undeveloped claims. 

//See// Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 59 

F.3d 284, 293–94 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, 

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. 

It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal 

way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”); United States v. Hayter Oil 

Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1269 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that defendants waived issue by 

making conclusory statements and failing to develop their theory). 

  423. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 497. 

//  //424//. See, e.g.//,// id. //at 488 n.35. 

//  //425//. Id.// at 539–540. 

 426. 

//Id. //at 540 (”[W]e have amassed an enormous body of evidence expressing 

legalistic objections to the Federalists’ unconventional activities.”). 

128 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Ackerman and Katyal allege “three legal obstacles” that pur-

portedly demonstrate the illegality of the Founders’ conduct: 



  Problems with the Articles of Confederation 



  Problems with the Convention 



  Problems with State Constitutions418 

The professors allege ten distinct violations under these three 

categories.419 However, their “three legal obstacles” and ten 

specific allegations are not well-organized. A more logical or-

ganization of the professors’ legal arguments would be: 



  The process was illegal from beginning to end be-

cause Article XIII provided the exclusive method for 

amending the form of governance of the United 

States. 



  The delegates went beyond the call of the convention 

containing their controlling instructions. 



  The method of ratification chosen violated both Arti-

cle XIII and several state constitutions.420 

                                                                      

  418. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14,// //at 475–487. 

//  //419//. See id. //at 478–486. The violations are as follows: (1) the Constitution invited 

secession; (2) the Constitutional Convention ignored the role the Articles “ex-

pressly assigned to the Continental Congress” for approving subsequent amend-

ments; (3) the Founders cut the state legislatures out of the ratifying process; (4) 

the entire process was done “in the face of the Articles’ express claim to specify 

the exclusive means for its revision;” (5) the Convention was a secessionist body; 

(6) Delaware’s delegation “recognized that it was acting in contempt of its com-

mission;” (7) the delegates had been “charged” by the “Continental Congress” to 

meet “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles” and the delegates 

went “beyond their legal authority when they ripped up the Articles and pro-

posed an entirely new text;” (8) the delegations from New York, Connecticut, and 

Massachusetts clearly violated their commissions; (9) all states that gave instruc-

tions as to the mode of ratification specified approval by Congress followed by 

approval of the state legislatures—which was not followed; and (10) the Suprem-

acy Clause of the Constitution created an implied conflict with and de facto 

change in several state constitutional amendments. Thus, the process for obtain-

ing amendments to state constitutions was applicable and was not followed. //Id.// 

  420. One of their arguments does not fit this outline but can be easily dismissed. 

The contention that the Convention was secessionist is nothing more than a politi-

cal criticism and does not rise to the level of a serious legal argument. Moreover, it 

is a stretch to contend that it is a secessionist act to invite all states to a convention 

to discuss possible changes to the form of government. The fact that one state 

chose not to attend does not alter the nature of the Convention. If Rhode Island 

had been excluded by the others from the drafting convention it would plausibly 

raise the specter of secessionism. Describing Rhode Island’s refusal to attend the 

Convention as an act of secession by the other twelve states is facially without 

merit. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 129

 

//1.  The Contention that the Whole Process Was Illegal under the //

//Articles of Confederation May Be Summarily Dismissed //

Although the professors’ argument that the entire proces

was done “in the face of the Articles’ express claim to specify 

the //exclusive// means for its revision”421 made the list of their te

specific illegalities, a reader must hunt diligently through the 

remainder of their article for any supporting argumentation.

Random statements in support of this argument are sprinkled 

throughout the article, but if this theory is to be considered 

riously, it demands robust development and careful considera-

tion rather than scattered and disjointed assertions.422 

The longest single presentation of this theory is a mere tw

sentences that refer to the Annapolis Convention: 

The commissioners had taken upon themselves the right 

to propose a fundamental change in constitutional law. 

While Article XIII had confided exclusive authority in 

Congress to propose amendments, Annapolis was making 

an end run around the existing institution by calling for a 

second body, the convention, unknown to the Confedera-

cy’s higher lawmaking system.423 

Ackerman and Katyal critique their rival Akhil Amar for maki

claims unsupported by evidence from the contemporaneous de-

bates.424 Amar’s theory (alleging a breach of treaty obligatio

should be rejected, they say, because there wasn’t “any eviden

that Americans took Amar’s argument seriously.”425 Howeve

in their own article, despite their self-described exhaustive r

search,426 they cite very slender evidence that anyone at the tim

                                                                      

  421. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 480. 

  422. If this theory was advanced in this manner in an appellate brief, it is clear 

that it would be dismissed under the familiar standard for undeveloped claims. 

//See// Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 59 

F.3d 284, 293–94 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, 

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. 

It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal 

way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”); United States v. Hayter Oil

Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1269 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that defendants waived issue by

making conclusory statements and failing to develop their theory). 

  423. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 497. 

//  //424//. See, e.g.//,// id. //at 488 n.35. 

//  //425//. Id.// at 539–540. 

 426. 

//Id. //at 540 (”[W]e have amassed an enormous body of evidence expressing

legalistic objections to the Federalists’ unconventional activities.”). 



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//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Ackerman and Katyal allege “three legal obstacles” that pur-

portedly demonstrate the illegality of the Founders’ conduct: 



  Problems with the Articles of Confederation 



  Problems with the Convention 



  Problems with State Constitutions418 

The professors allege ten distinct violations under these three 

categories.419 However, their “three legal obstacles” and ten 

specific allegations are not well-organized. A more logical or-

ganization of the professors’ legal arguments would be: 



  The process was illegal from beginning to end be-

cause Article XIII provided the exclusive method for 

amending the form of governance of the United 

States. 



  The delegates went beyond the call of the convention 

containing their controlling instructions. 



  The method of ratification chosen violated both Arti-

cle XIII and several state constitutions.420 

                                                                      

  418. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14,// //at 475–487. 

//  //419//. See id. //at 478–486. The violations are as follows: (1) the Constitution invited 

secession; (2) the Constitutional Convention ignored the role the Articles “ex-

pressly assigned to the Continental Congress” for approving subsequent amend-

ments; (3) the Founders cut the state legislatures out of the ratifying process; (4) 

the entire process was done “in the face of the Articles’ express claim to specify 

the exclusive means for its revision;” (5) the Convention was a secessionist body; 

(6) Delaware’s delegation “recognized that it was acting in contempt of its com-

mission;” (7) the delegates had been “charged” by the “Continental Congress” to 

meet “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles” and the delegates 

went “beyond their legal authority when they ripped up the Articles and pro-

posed an entirely new text;” (8) the delegations from New York, Connecticut, and 

Massachusetts clearly violated their commissions; (9) all states that gave instruc-

tions as to the mode of ratification specified approval by Congress followed by 

approval of the state legislatures—which was not followed; and (10) the Suprem-

acy Clause of the Constitution created an implied conflict with and de facto 

change in several state constitutional amendments. Thus, the process for obtain-

ing amendments to state constitutions was applicable and was not followed. //Id.// 

  420. One of their arguments does not fit this outline but can be easily dismissed. 

The contention that the Convention was secessionist is nothing more than a politi-

cal criticism and does not rise to the level of a serious legal argument. Moreover, it 

is a stretch to contend that it is a secessionist act to invite all states to a convention 

to discuss possible changes to the form of government. The fact that one state 

chose not to attend does not alter the nature of the Convention. If Rhode Island 

had been excluded by the others from the drafting convention it would plausibly 

raise the specter of secessionism. Describing Rhode Island’s refusal to attend the 

Convention as an act of secession by the other twelve states is facially without 

merit. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 129 

 

//1.  The Contention that the Whole Process Was Illegal under the //

//Articles of Confederation May Be Summarily Dismissed //

Although the professors’ argument that the entire process 

was done “in the face of the Articles’ express claim to specify 

the //exclusive// means for its revision”421 made the list of their ten 

specific illegalities, a reader must hunt diligently through the 

remainder of their article for any supporting argumentation. 

Random statements in support of this argument are sprinkled 

throughout the article, but if this theory is to be considered se-

riously, it demands robust development and careful considera-

tion rather than scattered and disjointed assertions.422 

The longest single presentation of this theory is a mere two 

sentences that refer to the Annapolis Convention: 

The commissioners had taken upon themselves the right 

to propose a fundamental change in constitutional law. 

While Article XIII had confided exclusive authority in 

Congress to propose amendments, Annapolis was making 

an end run around the existing institution by calling for a 

second body, the convention, unknown to the Confedera-

cy’s higher lawmaking system.423 

Ackerman and Katyal critique their rival Akhil Amar for making 

claims unsupported by evidence from the contemporaneous de-

bates.424 Amar’s theory (alleging a breach of treaty obligations) 

should be rejected, they say, because there wasn’t “any evidence 

that Americans took Amar’s argument seriously.”425 However, 

in their own article, despite their self-described exhaustive re-

search,426 they cite very slender evidence that anyone at the time 

                                                                      

  421. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 480. 

  422. If this theory was advanced in this manner in an appellate brief, it is clear 

that it would be dismissed under the familiar standard for undeveloped claims. 

//See// Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 59 

F.3d 284, 293–94 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, 

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. 

It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal 

way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”); United States v. Hayter Oil 

Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1269 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that defendants waived issue by 

making conclusory statements and failing to develop their theory). 

  423. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 497. 

//  //424//. See, e.g.//,// id. //at 488 n.35. 

//  //425//. Id.// at 539–540. 

 426. 

//Id. //at 540 (”[W]e have amassed an enormous body of evidence expressing 

legalistic objections to the Federalists’ unconventional activities.”). 

128 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Ackerman and Katyal allege “three legal obstacles” that pur-

portedly demonstrate the illegality of the Founders’ conduct: 



  Problems with the Articles of Confederation 



  Problems with the Convention 



  Problems with State Constitutions418 

The professors allege ten distinct violations under these three 

categories.419 However, their “three legal obstacles” and ten 

specific allegations are not well-organized. A more logical or-

ganization of the professors’ legal arguments would be: 



  The process was illegal from beginning to end be-

cause Article XIII provided the exclusive method for 

amending the form of governance of the United 

States. 



  The delegates went beyond the call of the convention 

containing their controlling instructions. 



  The method of ratification chosen violated both Arti-

cle XIII and several state constitutions.420 

                                                                      

  418. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14,// //at 475–487. 

//  //419//. See id. //at 478–486. The violations are as follows: (1) the Constitution invited 

secession; (2) the Constitutional Convention ignored the role the Articles “ex-

pressly assigned to the Continental Congress” for approving subsequent amend-

ments; (3) the Founders cut the state legislatures out of the ratifying process; (4) 

the entire process was done “in the face of the Articles’ express claim to specify 

the exclusive means for its revision;” (5) the Convention was a secessionist body; 

(6) Delaware’s delegation “recognized that it was acting in contempt of its com-

mission;” (7) the delegates had been “charged” by the “Continental Congress” to 

meet “for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles” and the delegates 

went “beyond their legal authority when they ripped up the Articles and pro-

posed an entirely new text;” (8) the delegations from New York, Connecticut, and 

Massachusetts clearly violated their commissions; (9) all states that gave instruc-

tions as to the mode of ratification specified approval by Congress followed by 

approval of the state legislatures—which was not followed; and (10) the Suprem-

acy Clause of the Constitution created an implied conflict with and de facto 

change in several state constitutional amendments. Thus, the process for obtain-

ing amendments to state constitutions was applicable and was not followed. //Id.// 

  420. One of their arguments does not fit this outline but can be easily dismissed. 

The contention that the Convention was secessionist is nothing more than a politi-

cal criticism and does not rise to the level of a serious legal argument. Moreover, it 

is a stretch to contend that it is a secessionist act to invite all states to a convention 

to discuss possible changes to the form of government. The fact that one state 

chose not to attend does not alter the nature of the Convention. If Rhode Island 

had been excluded by the others from the drafting convention it would plausibly 

raise the specter of secessionism. Describing Rhode Island’s refusal to attend the 

Convention as an act of secession by the other twelve states is facially without 

merit. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 129

 

//1.  The Contention that the Whole Process Was Illegal under the //

//Articles of Confederation May Be Summarily Dismissed //

Although the professors’ argument that the entire proces

was done “in the face of the Articles’ express claim to specify 

the //exclusive// means for its revision”421 made the list of their te

specific illegalities, a reader must hunt diligently through the 

remainder of their article for any supporting argumentation.

Random statements in support of this argument are sprinkled 

throughout the article, but if this theory is to be considered 

riously, it demands robust development and careful considera-

tion rather than scattered and disjointed assertions.422 

The longest single presentation of this theory is a mere tw

sentences that refer to the Annapolis Convention: 

The commissioners had taken upon themselves the right 

to propose a fundamental change in constitutional law. 

While Article XIII had confided exclusive authority in 

Congress to propose amendments, Annapolis was making 

an end run around the existing institution by calling for a 

second body, the convention, unknown to the Confedera-

cy’s higher lawmaking system.423 

Ackerman and Katyal critique their rival Akhil Amar for maki

claims unsupported by evidence from the contemporaneous de-

bates.424 Amar’s theory (alleging a breach of treaty obligatio

should be rejected, they say, because there wasn’t “any eviden

that Americans took Amar’s argument seriously.”425 Howeve

in their own article, despite their self-described exhaustive r

search,426 they cite very slender evidence that anyone at the tim

                                                                      

  421. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 480. 

  422. If this theory was advanced in this manner in an appellate brief, it is clear 

that it would be dismissed under the familiar standard for undeveloped claims. 

//See// Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 59 

F.3d 284, 293–94 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, 

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. 

It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal 

way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.”); United States v. Hayter Oil

Co., 51 F.3d 1265, 1269 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that defendants waived issue by

making conclusory statements and failing to develop their theory). 

  423. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 497. 

//  //424//. See, e.g.//,// id. //at 488 n.35. 

//  //425//. Id.// at 539–540. 

 426. 

//Id. //at 540 (”[W]e have amassed an enormous body of evidence expressing

legalistic objections to the Federalists’ unconventional activities.”). 



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130 

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[Vol. 40 

 

even raised the argument that the entire Convention was illegal 

from the beginning. And they offer no evidence at all that Amer-

icans at the time took the argument seriously. 

The professors’ meager suggestion of contemporary support 

comes from a statement on the floor of the Massachusetts legis-

lature by Rufus King: 

The Confederation was the act of the people. No part could 

be altered but by consent of Congress and confirmation of 

the several Legislatures. Congress therefore ought to make 

the examination first, because, if it was done by a conven-

tion, no Legislature could have a right to confirm it . . . . Be-

sides, if Congress should not agree upon a report of a con-

vention, the most fatal consequences might follow. Congress 

therefore were the proper body to propose alterations . . . .427 

But King stopped well short of the argument advanced by 

Ackerman and Katyal. He did not say that it was illegal to call 

a convention of states to draft amendments. Rather he began 

with the premise that nothing could be finally altered except by 

the consent of Congress and all of the states. In light of the legal 

requirement for ratification, King makes a political argument 

that it is wiser to have Congress make the proposed alterations 

in the first place. 

This explanation of King’s argument makes much more 

sense in light of the fact that he was the co-author the success-

ful motion in Congress to endorse the Constitutional Conven-

tion on February 21st, 1787.428 The professors acknowledge 

King’s role in the congressional resolution429 but shrug it off 

without explanation—as if King had somehow been swept into 

the vortex of Madison and Hamilton’s grand revolutionary 

conspiracy. If King believed it was illegal for a convention to be 

called, he was a hypocrite of the first order by making the mo-

tion. But a wise politician can change his views on the practi-

cality of a particular approach without duplicity. The better 

reading of King’s words and actions leads to the conclusion 

that he believed it was illegal to adopt changes without ap-

proval of Congress and the states. 

                                                                      

//  //427//. Id. //at 501 (quoting //Proceedings of Government, Boston, October 12//, WORCESTER 

MAGAZINE, 3rd week of Oct. 1786, at 353). 

  428. Ackerman & Kaytal, //supra //note 14, at 503.  

//  //429//. See id.// at 501. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 131 

 

Moreover, in the footnote citing the original source of 

King’s speech in the Massachusetts legislature, the profes-

sors quote Nathan Dane on this topic.430 Dane, also speaking 

in the state legislature, said: 

[A] question arises as to the best mode of obtaining these altera-

tions, whether by the means of a convention, or by the constitu-

tional mode pointed out in the 13th article of the confederation. 

In favour of a convention, it is said, that the States will probably 

place more confidence in their doings, and that the alterations 

there may be better adjusted, than in Congress.431 

Far from arguing that Article XIII was the exclusive path for 

changes, Dane clearly posits a convention as a legitimate alter-

native. The criteria for choosing one or the other, Dane sug-

gests, is simply political expediency. 

I have found two contemporary critics of the Constitution 

who did in fact make the argument advanced by Ackerman 

and Katyal. In the New York ratification convention, Abraham 

Yates unleashed a scattershot attack on the legality of the entire 

process. He argued that on February 19th, 1787, the New York 

legislature violated the state constitution when it instructed its 

delegates in Congress to move an act recommending the con-

vention.432 Moreover, Congress violated Article XIII when it 

passed its resolution of approval on February 21st.433 Congress 

again violated Article XIII, on September 28th, when it sent the 

Constitution to the state legislatures.434 And the New York leg-

islature violated its Constitution when it approved the calling 

of the ratification convention in February 1788.435 The best read-

ing of Yates is that he was an ardent Anti-Federalist and that he 

was willing to make shotgun attacks that were a mix of politi-

cal and legal rhetoric designed to serve his political viewpoint. 

Treating Yates as a legal purist—or even as someone who mer-

its consideration as a serious legal critic—overstates both his 

arguments and his importance. \\
                                                                      

//  //430//. See id. //at 501 n.72. 

//  //431//. Id//. (quoting Nathan Dane, Speech to Massachusetts House of Representa-

tives, //in// //Proceedings of Government//, NEWPORT MERCURY, Nov. 17, 1786). 

 432. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153, 

1156. 

//  //433//. Id.// 

//  //434//. Id.// at 1157. 

//  //435//. Id//. 

130 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

even raised the argument that the entire Convention was illegal 

from the beginning. And they offer no evidence at all that Amer-

icans at the time took the argument seriously. 

The professors’ meager suggestion of contemporary support 

comes from a statement on the floor of the Massachusetts legis-

lature by Rufus King: 

The Confederation was the act of the people. No part could 

be altered but by consent of Congress and confirmation of 

the several Legislatures. Congress therefore ought to make 

the examination first, because, if it was done by a conven-

tion, no Legislature could have a right to confirm it . . . . Be-

sides, if Congress should not agree upon a report of a con-

vention, the most fatal consequences might follow. Congress 

therefore were the proper body to propose alterations . . . .427 

But King stopped well short of the argument advanced by 

Ackerman and Katyal. He did not say that it was illegal to call 

a convention of states to draft amendments. Rather he began 

with the premise that nothing could be finally altered except by 

the consent of Congress and all of the states. In light of the legal 

requirement for ratification, King makes a political argument 

that it is wiser to have Congress make the proposed alterations 

in the first place. 

This explanation of King’s argument makes much more 

sense in light of the fact that he was the co-author the success-

ful motion in Congress to endorse the Constitutional Conven-

tion on February 21st, 1787.428 The professors acknowledge 

King’s role in the congressional resolution429 but shrug it off 

without explanation—as if King had somehow been swept into 

the vortex of Madison and Hamilton’s grand revolutionary 

conspiracy. If King believed it was illegal for a convention to be 

called, he was a hypocrite of the first order by making the mo-

tion. But a wise politician can change his views on the practi-

cality of a particular approach without duplicity. The better 

reading of King’s words and actions leads to the conclusion 

that he believed it was illegal to adopt changes without ap-

proval of Congress and the states. 

                                                                      

//  //427//. Id. //at 501 (quoting //Proceedings of Government, Boston, October 12//, WORCESTER 

MAGAZINE, 3rd week of Oct. 1786, at 353). 

  428. Ackerman & Kaytal, //supra //note 14, at 503.  

//  //429//. See id.// at 501. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 131

 

Moreover, in the footnote citing the original source o

King’s speech in the Massachusetts legislature, the profes-

sors quote Nathan Dane on this topic.430 Dane, also speaking 

in the state legislature, said: 

[A] question arises as to the best mode of obtaining these altera-

tions, whether by the means of a convention, or by the constitu-

tional mode pointed out in the 13th article of the confederation. 

In favour of a convention, it is said, that the States will probably 

place more confidence in their doings, and that the alterations 

there may be better adjusted, than in Congress.431 

Far from arguing that Article XIII was the exclusive path 

changes, Dane clearly posits a convention as a legitimate alt

native. The criteria for choosing one or the other, Dane sug-

gests, is simply political expediency. 

I have found two contemporary critics of the Constitution

who did in fact make the argument advanced by Ackerman

and Katyal. In the New York ratification convention, Abraham

Yates unleashed a scattershot attack on the legality of the ent

process. He argued that on February 19th, 1787, the New York 

legislature violated the state constitution when it instructed i

delegates in Congress to move an act recommending the con-

vention.432 Moreover, Congress violated Article XIII when

passed its resolution of approval on February 21st.433 Congress 

again violated Article XIII, on September 28th, when it sent the

Constitution to the state legislatures.434 And the New York leg

islature violated its Constitution when it approved the calling 

of the ratification convention in February 1788.435 The best read-

ing of Yates is that he was an ardent Anti-Federalist and that he 

was willing to make shotgun attacks that were a mix of pol

cal and legal rhetoric designed to serve his political viewpoi

Treating Yates as a legal purist—or even as someone who mer-

its consideration as a serious legal critic—overstates both his 

arguments and his importance. \\
                                                                      

//  //430//. See id. //at 501 n.72. 

//  //431//. Id//. (quoting Nathan Dane, Speech to Massachusetts House of Representa-

tives, //in// //Proceedings of Government//, NEWPORT MERCURY, Nov. 17, 1786). 

 432. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153

1156. 

//  //433//. Id.// 

//  //434//. Id.// at 1157. 

//  //435//. Id//. 



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**135**

130 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

even raised the argument that the entire Convention was illegal 

from the beginning. And they offer no evidence at all that Amer-

icans at the time took the argument seriously. 

The professors’ meager suggestion of contemporary support 

comes from a statement on the floor of the Massachusetts legis-

lature by Rufus King: 

The Confederation was the act of the people. No part could 

be altered but by consent of Congress and confirmation of 

the several Legislatures. Congress therefore ought to make 

the examination first, because, if it was done by a conven-

tion, no Legislature could have a right to confirm it . . . . Be-

sides, if Congress should not agree upon a report of a con-

vention, the most fatal consequences might follow. Congress 

therefore were the proper body to propose alterations . . . .427 

But King stopped well short of the argument advanced by 

Ackerman and Katyal. He did not say that it was illegal to call 

a convention of states to draft amendments. Rather he began 

with the premise that nothing could be finally altered except by 

the consent of Congress and all of the states. In light of the legal 

requirement for ratification, King makes a political argument 

that it is wiser to have Congress make the proposed alterations 

in the first place. 

This explanation of King’s argument makes much more 

sense in light of the fact that he was the co-author the success-

ful motion in Congress to endorse the Constitutional Conven-

tion on February 21st, 1787.428 The professors acknowledge 

King’s role in the congressional resolution429 but shrug it off 

without explanation—as if King had somehow been swept into 

the vortex of Madison and Hamilton’s grand revolutionary 

conspiracy. If King believed it was illegal for a convention to be 

called, he was a hypocrite of the first order by making the mo-

tion. But a wise politician can change his views on the practi-

cality of a particular approach without duplicity. The better 

reading of King’s words and actions leads to the conclusion 

that he believed it was illegal to adopt changes without ap-

proval of Congress and the states. 

                                                                      

//  //427//. Id. //at 501 (quoting //Proceedings of Government, Boston, October 12//, WORCESTER 

MAGAZINE, 3rd week of Oct. 1786, at 353). 

  428. Ackerman & Kaytal, //supra //note 14, at 503.  

//  //429//. See id.// at 501. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 131 

 

Moreover, in the footnote citing the original source of 

King’s speech in the Massachusetts legislature, the profes-

sors quote Nathan Dane on this topic.430 Dane, also speaking 

in the state legislature, said: 

[A] question arises as to the best mode of obtaining these altera-

tions, whether by the means of a convention, or by the constitu-

tional mode pointed out in the 13th article of the confederation. 

In favour of a convention, it is said, that the States will probably 

place more confidence in their doings, and that the alterations 

there may be better adjusted, than in Congress.431 

Far from arguing that Article XIII was the exclusive path for 

changes, Dane clearly posits a convention as a legitimate alter-

native. The criteria for choosing one or the other, Dane sug-

gests, is simply political expediency. 

I have found two contemporary critics of the Constitution 

who did in fact make the argument advanced by Ackerman 

and Katyal. In the New York ratification convention, Abraham 

Yates unleashed a scattershot attack on the legality of the entire 

process. He argued that on February 19th, 1787, the New York 

legislature violated the state constitution when it instructed its 

delegates in Congress to move an act recommending the con-

vention.432 Moreover, Congress violated Article XIII when it 

passed its resolution of approval on February 21st.433 Congress 

again violated Article XIII, on September 28th, when it sent the 

Constitution to the state legislatures.434 And the New York leg-

islature violated its Constitution when it approved the calling 

of the ratification convention in February 1788.435 The best read-

ing of Yates is that he was an ardent Anti-Federalist and that he 

was willing to make shotgun attacks that were a mix of politi-

cal and legal rhetoric designed to serve his political viewpoint. 

Treating Yates as a legal purist—or even as someone who mer-

its consideration as a serious legal critic—overstates both his 

arguments and his importance. \\
                                                                      

//  //430//. See id. //at 501 n.72. 

//  //431//. Id//. (quoting Nathan Dane, Speech to Massachusetts House of Representa-

tives, //in// //Proceedings of Government//, NEWPORT MERCURY, Nov. 17, 1786). 

 432. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153, 

1156. 

//  //433//. Id.// 

//  //434//. Id.// at 1157. 

//  //435//. Id//. 

130 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

even raised the argument that the entire Convention was illegal 

from the beginning. And they offer no evidence at all that Amer-

icans at the time took the argument seriously. 

The professors’ meager suggestion of contemporary support 

comes from a statement on the floor of the Massachusetts legis-

lature by Rufus King: 

The Confederation was the act of the people. No part could 

be altered but by consent of Congress and confirmation of 

the several Legislatures. Congress therefore ought to make 

the examination first, because, if it was done by a conven-

tion, no Legislature could have a right to confirm it . . . . Be-

sides, if Congress should not agree upon a report of a con-

vention, the most fatal consequences might follow. Congress 

therefore were the proper body to propose alterations . . . .427 

But King stopped well short of the argument advanced by 

Ackerman and Katyal. He did not say that it was illegal to call 

a convention of states to draft amendments. Rather he began 

with the premise that nothing could be finally altered except by 

the consent of Congress and all of the states. In light of the legal 

requirement for ratification, King makes a political argument 

that it is wiser to have Congress make the proposed alterations 

in the first place. 

This explanation of King’s argument makes much more 

sense in light of the fact that he was the co-author the success-

ful motion in Congress to endorse the Constitutional Conven-

tion on February 21st, 1787.428 The professors acknowledge 

King’s role in the congressional resolution429 but shrug it off 

without explanation—as if King had somehow been swept into 

the vortex of Madison and Hamilton’s grand revolutionary 

conspiracy. If King believed it was illegal for a convention to be 

called, he was a hypocrite of the first order by making the mo-

tion. But a wise politician can change his views on the practi-

cality of a particular approach without duplicity. The better 

reading of King’s words and actions leads to the conclusion 

that he believed it was illegal to adopt changes without ap-

proval of Congress and the states. 

                                                                      

//  //427//. Id. //at 501 (quoting //Proceedings of Government, Boston, October 12//, WORCESTER 

MAGAZINE, 3rd week of Oct. 1786, at 353). 

  428. Ackerman & Kaytal, //supra //note 14, at 503.  

//  //429//. See id.// at 501. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 131

 

Moreover, in the footnote citing the original source o

King’s speech in the Massachusetts legislature, the profes-

sors quote Nathan Dane on this topic.430 Dane, also speaking 

in the state legislature, said: 

[A] question arises as to the best mode of obtaining these altera-

tions, whether by the means of a convention, or by the constitu-

tional mode pointed out in the 13th article of the confederation. 

In favour of a convention, it is said, that the States will probably 

place more confidence in their doings, and that the alterations 

there may be better adjusted, than in Congress.431 

Far from arguing that Article XIII was the exclusive path 

changes, Dane clearly posits a convention as a legitimate alt

native. The criteria for choosing one or the other, Dane sug-

gests, is simply political expediency. 

I have found two contemporary critics of the Constitution

who did in fact make the argument advanced by Ackerman

and Katyal. In the New York ratification convention, Abraham

Yates unleashed a scattershot attack on the legality of the ent

process. He argued that on February 19th, 1787, the New York 

legislature violated the state constitution when it instructed i

delegates in Congress to move an act recommending the con-

vention.432 Moreover, Congress violated Article XIII when

passed its resolution of approval on February 21st.433 Congress 

again violated Article XIII, on September 28th, when it sent the

Constitution to the state legislatures.434 And the New York leg

islature violated its Constitution when it approved the calling 

of the ratification convention in February 1788.435 The best read-

ing of Yates is that he was an ardent Anti-Federalist and that he 

was willing to make shotgun attacks that were a mix of pol

cal and legal rhetoric designed to serve his political viewpoi

Treating Yates as a legal purist—or even as someone who mer-

its consideration as a serious legal critic—overstates both his 

arguments and his importance. \\
                                                                      

//  //430//. See id. //at 501 n.72. 

//  //431//. Id//. (quoting Nathan Dane, Speech to Massachusetts House of Representa-

tives, //in// //Proceedings of Government//, NEWPORT MERCURY, Nov. 17, 1786). 

 432. 

//Sydney,// N.Y.J., June 13–14, 1788, //reprinted in //20 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1153

1156. 

//  //433//. Id.// 

//  //434//. Id.// at 1157. 

//  //435//. Id//. 



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**136**

132 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Moreover, the standard that Ackerman and Katyal raise 

against Amar is truly appropriate: did Americans at the time 

pay any serious attention to these arguments? Yates’ position 

was never confirmed by the vote of any convention or legisla-

tive body. Not Congress, not the Constitutional Convention, 

not any ratification convention, and not any state legislature. 

New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina 

all had problems with the adoption of the Constitution at one 

time or another. Not even in any of these states was there ever 

a successful resolution that condemned the very calling of a 

Convention from its inception. 

The void-from-the-beginning position did have one other 

contemporary source of support not mentioned by the profes-

sors. The Town Meeting of Great Barrington, Massachusetts 

approved the following resolution as an instruction to their 

delegate to the state ratification convention: 

First as the Constitution of this Commonwealth Invests the 

Legslature [sic] with no such Power as sending Delligates 

[sic] To a Convention for the purpose of framing a New Sys-

tem of Fedderal [sic] Government—we conceive that the 

Constitution now offered us is Destituce [sic] of any Con-

stituenal [sic] authority either states or fodderal [sic].436 

The small town in Massachusetts, relying primarily on its state 

constitution, took the position that the legislature had no pow-

er to appoint delegates to the Constitutional Convention. The 

additional contention that the proposed Constitution was 

“Destituce” of any federal “Constituenal” authority was sum-

marily made. This paragraph represents the pinnacle of con-

temporary acceptance of the Ackerman/Katyal theory. Such 

scant evidence fails to meet their own standard requiring evi-

dence that “Americans took [their] argument seriously.”437 

There was nearly universal acceptance of the idea that a 

Convention was a proper alternative to Congress for drafting 

proposed changes, as Dane’s state legislative speech demon-

strates. Moreover, no one believed that the Convention had any 

power to make law. They merely had the power to make a rec-

ommendation. As James Wilson said: 

                                                                      

  436. Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 5// //DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 959. 

  437. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 539. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 133 

 

I think the late Convention have done nothing beyond 

their powers. The fact is, they have exercised no power at 

all. And in point of validity, this Constitution, proposed 

by them for the government of the United States, claims 

no more than a production of the same nature would 

claim, flowing from a private pen.438 

Second, the overwhelming understanding was that the 

states—which were clearly in possession of ultimate political 

power—had the power to convene a convention if they wished. 

In fact, the clear supremacy of the states was the very reason a 

new Constitution was needed. The States created the Union. 

The States created the Articles of Confederation. The States ap-

pointed the members of Congress. The state legislatures could 

and did issue binding directions to their members in Congress. 

Indeed, the February 21st, 1787, resolution by Congress ap-

proving the Convention was the result of a process started by 

the New York congressional delegation who were acting in 

obedience to directions received from their legislature.439 

The States called the Convention. The States appointed dele-

gates to the convention and gave them instructions on the 

scope of their authority and quorum rules for casting the single 

vote of their state. Natelson records that from “1774 until 1787, 

there were at least a dozen inter-colonial or interstate conven-

tions.”440 Convening conventions of the states to recommend 

solutions for problems was common political practice. The ar-

gument that it was a violation of Article XIII for the states to 

convene a convention to propose changes in the Constitution 

was made by a scant few at the time and accepted only by the 

single town of Great Barrington. Ackerman and Katyal’s con-

tention that the convention was //void ab initio// cannot bear up 

under focused scrutiny. 

                                                                      

  438. Convention Debates, A.M. (Dec. 4, 1787), //reprinted// //in //2 DHRC, //supra //note 4, 

at 483. 

//  //439//. See// 19 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at xl; 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70//,// 

at 72. 

  440. Robert Natelson, //James Madison and the Constitution’s “Convention for Propos-//

//ing Amendments”//, 45 AKRON L. REV. 431, 434 (2012). 

132 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Moreover, the standard that Ackerman and Katyal raise 

against Amar is truly appropriate: did Americans at the time 

pay any serious attention to these arguments? Yates’ position 

was never confirmed by the vote of any convention or legisla-

tive body. Not Congress, not the Constitutional Convention, 

not any ratification convention, and not any state legislature. 

New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina 

all had problems with the adoption of the Constitution at one 

time or another. Not even in any of these states was there ever 

a successful resolution that condemned the very calling of a 

Convention from its inception. 

The void-from-the-beginning position did have one other 

contemporary source of support not mentioned by the profes-

sors. The Town Meeting of Great Barrington, Massachusetts 

approved the following resolution as an instruction to their 

delegate to the state ratification convention: 

First as the Constitution of this Commonwealth Invests the 

Legslature [sic] with no such Power as sending Delligates 

[sic] To a Convention for the purpose of framing a New Sys-

tem of Fedderal [sic] Government—we conceive that the 

Constitution now offered us is Destituce [sic] of any Con-

stituenal [sic] authority either states or fodderal [sic].436 

The small town in Massachusetts, relying primarily on its state 

constitution, took the position that the legislature had no pow-

er to appoint delegates to the Constitutional Convention. The 

additional contention that the proposed Constitution was 

“Destituce” of any federal “Constituenal” authority was sum-

marily made. This paragraph represents the pinnacle of con-

temporary acceptance of the Ackerman/Katyal theory. Such 

scant evidence fails to meet their own standard requiring evi-

dence that “Americans took [their] argument seriously.”437 

There was nearly universal acceptance of the idea that a 

Convention was a proper alternative to Congress for drafting 

proposed changes, as Dane’s state legislative speech demon-

strates. Moreover, no one believed that the Convention had any 

power to make law. They merely had the power to make a rec-

ommendation. As James Wilson said: 

                                                                      

  436. Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 5// //DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 959. 

  437. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 539. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 133

 

I think the late Convention have done nothing beyond 

their powers. The fact is, they have exercised no power at 

all. And in point of validity, this Constitution, proposed 

by them for the government of the United States, claims 

no more than a production of the same nature would 

claim, flowing from a private pen.438 

Second, the overwhelming understanding was that t

states—which were clearly in possession of ultimate political 

power—had the power to convene a convention if they wished.

In fact, the clear supremacy of the states was the very reason a 

new Constitution was needed. The States created the Union. 

The States created the Articles of Confederation. The States a

pointed the members of Congress. The state legislatures could 

and did issue binding directions to their members in Congre

Indeed, the February 21st, 1787, resolution by Congress ap-

proving the Convention was the result of a process started 

the New York congressional delegation who were acting in 

obedience to directions received from their legislature.439 

The States called the Convention. The States appointed dele-

gates to the convention and gave them instructions on the

scope of their authority and quorum rules for casting the sin

vote of their state. Natelson records that from “1774 until 1787, 

there were at least a dozen inter-colonial or interstate conven-

tions.”440 Convening conventions of the states to recommend 

solutions for problems was common political practice. The 

gument that it was a violation of Article XIII for the states 

convene a convention to propose changes in the Constituti

was made by a scant few at the time and accepted only by the 

single town of Great Barrington. Ackerman and Katyal’s co

tention that the convention was //void ab initio// cannot bear 

under focused scrutiny. 

                                                                      

  438. Convention Debates, A.M. (Dec. 4, 1787), //reprinted// //in //2 DHRC, //supra //note 4, 

at 483. 

//  //439//. See// 19 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at xl; 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70

at 72. 

  440. Robert Natelson, //James Madison and the Constitution’s “Convention for Propos-//

//ing Amendments”//, 45 AKRON L. REV. 431, 434 (2012). 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto137.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**137**

132 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Moreover, the standard that Ackerman and Katyal raise 

against Amar is truly appropriate: did Americans at the time 

pay any serious attention to these arguments? Yates’ position 

was never confirmed by the vote of any convention or legisla-

tive body. Not Congress, not the Constitutional Convention, 

not any ratification convention, and not any state legislature. 

New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina 

all had problems with the adoption of the Constitution at one 

time or another. Not even in any of these states was there ever 

a successful resolution that condemned the very calling of a 

Convention from its inception. 

The void-from-the-beginning position did have one other 

contemporary source of support not mentioned by the profes-

sors. The Town Meeting of Great Barrington, Massachusetts 

approved the following resolution as an instruction to their 

delegate to the state ratification convention: 

First as the Constitution of this Commonwealth Invests the 

Legslature [sic] with no such Power as sending Delligates 

[sic] To a Convention for the purpose of framing a New Sys-

tem of Fedderal [sic] Government—we conceive that the 

Constitution now offered us is Destituce [sic] of any Con-

stituenal [sic] authority either states or fodderal [sic].436 

The small town in Massachusetts, relying primarily on its state 

constitution, took the position that the legislature had no pow-

er to appoint delegates to the Constitutional Convention. The 

additional contention that the proposed Constitution was 

“Destituce” of any federal “Constituenal” authority was sum-

marily made. This paragraph represents the pinnacle of con-

temporary acceptance of the Ackerman/Katyal theory. Such 

scant evidence fails to meet their own standard requiring evi-

dence that “Americans took [their] argument seriously.”437 

There was nearly universal acceptance of the idea that a 

Convention was a proper alternative to Congress for drafting 

proposed changes, as Dane’s state legislative speech demon-

strates. Moreover, no one believed that the Convention had any 

power to make law. They merely had the power to make a rec-

ommendation. As James Wilson said: 

                                                                      

  436. Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 5// //DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 959. 

  437. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 539. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 133 

 

I think the late Convention have done nothing beyond 

their powers. The fact is, they have exercised no power at 

all. And in point of validity, this Constitution, proposed 

by them for the government of the United States, claims 

no more than a production of the same nature would 

claim, flowing from a private pen.438 

Second, the overwhelming understanding was that the 

states—which were clearly in possession of ultimate political 

power—had the power to convene a convention if they wished. 

In fact, the clear supremacy of the states was the very reason a 

new Constitution was needed. The States created the Union. 

The States created the Articles of Confederation. The States ap-

pointed the members of Congress. The state legislatures could 

and did issue binding directions to their members in Congress. 

Indeed, the February 21st, 1787, resolution by Congress ap-

proving the Convention was the result of a process started by 

the New York congressional delegation who were acting in 

obedience to directions received from their legislature.439 

The States called the Convention. The States appointed dele-

gates to the convention and gave them instructions on the 

scope of their authority and quorum rules for casting the single 

vote of their state. Natelson records that from “1774 until 1787, 

there were at least a dozen inter-colonial or interstate conven-

tions.”440 Convening conventions of the states to recommend 

solutions for problems was common political practice. The ar-

gument that it was a violation of Article XIII for the states to 

convene a convention to propose changes in the Constitution 

was made by a scant few at the time and accepted only by the 

single town of Great Barrington. Ackerman and Katyal’s con-

tention that the convention was //void ab initio// cannot bear up 

under focused scrutiny. 

                                                                      

  438. Convention Debates, A.M. (Dec. 4, 1787), //reprinted// //in //2 DHRC, //supra //note 4, 

at 483. 

//  //439//. See// 19 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at xl; 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70//,// 

at 72. 

  440. Robert Natelson, //James Madison and the Constitution’s “Convention for Propos-//

//ing Amendments”//, 45 AKRON L. REV. 431, 434 (2012). 

132 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

Moreover, the standard that Ackerman and Katyal raise 

against Amar is truly appropriate: did Americans at the time 

pay any serious attention to these arguments? Yates’ position 

was never confirmed by the vote of any convention or legisla-

tive body. Not Congress, not the Constitutional Convention, 

not any ratification convention, and not any state legislature. 

New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina 

all had problems with the adoption of the Constitution at one 

time or another. Not even in any of these states was there ever 

a successful resolution that condemned the very calling of a 

Convention from its inception. 

The void-from-the-beginning position did have one other 

contemporary source of support not mentioned by the profes-

sors. The Town Meeting of Great Barrington, Massachusetts 

approved the following resolution as an instruction to their 

delegate to the state ratification convention: 

First as the Constitution of this Commonwealth Invests the 

Legslature [sic] with no such Power as sending Delligates 

[sic] To a Convention for the purpose of framing a New Sys-

tem of Fedderal [sic] Government—we conceive that the 

Constitution now offered us is Destituce [sic] of any Con-

stituenal [sic] authority either states or fodderal [sic].436 

The small town in Massachusetts, relying primarily on its state 

constitution, took the position that the legislature had no pow-

er to appoint delegates to the Constitutional Convention. The 

additional contention that the proposed Constitution was 

“Destituce” of any federal “Constituenal” authority was sum-

marily made. This paragraph represents the pinnacle of con-

temporary acceptance of the Ackerman/Katyal theory. Such 

scant evidence fails to meet their own standard requiring evi-

dence that “Americans took [their] argument seriously.”437 

There was nearly universal acceptance of the idea that a 

Convention was a proper alternative to Congress for drafting 

proposed changes, as Dane’s state legislative speech demon-

strates. Moreover, no one believed that the Convention had any 

power to make law. They merely had the power to make a rec-

ommendation. As James Wilson said: 

                                                                      

  436. Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted// //in// 5// //DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 959. 

  437. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 539. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 133

 

I think the late Convention have done nothing beyond 

their powers. The fact is, they have exercised no power at 

all. And in point of validity, this Constitution, proposed 

by them for the government of the United States, claims 

no more than a production of the same nature would 

claim, flowing from a private pen.438 

Second, the overwhelming understanding was that t

states—which were clearly in possession of ultimate political 

power—had the power to convene a convention if they wished.

In fact, the clear supremacy of the states was the very reason a 

new Constitution was needed. The States created the Union. 

The States created the Articles of Confederation. The States a

pointed the members of Congress. The state legislatures could 

and did issue binding directions to their members in Congre

Indeed, the February 21st, 1787, resolution by Congress ap-

proving the Convention was the result of a process started 

the New York congressional delegation who were acting in 

obedience to directions received from their legislature.439 

The States called the Convention. The States appointed dele-

gates to the convention and gave them instructions on the

scope of their authority and quorum rules for casting the sin

vote of their state. Natelson records that from “1774 until 1787, 

there were at least a dozen inter-colonial or interstate conven-

tions.”440 Convening conventions of the states to recommend 

solutions for problems was common political practice. The 

gument that it was a violation of Article XIII for the states 

convene a convention to propose changes in the Constituti

was made by a scant few at the time and accepted only by the 

single town of Great Barrington. Ackerman and Katyal’s co

tention that the convention was //void ab initio// cannot bear 

under focused scrutiny. 

                                                                      

  438. Convention Debates, A.M. (Dec. 4, 1787), //reprinted// //in //2 DHRC, //supra //note 4, 

at 483. 

//  //439//. See// 19 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at xl; 32 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS, //supra //note 70

at 72. 

  440. Robert Natelson, //James Madison and the Constitution’s “Convention for Propos-//

//ing Amendments”//, 45 AKRON L. REV. 431, 434 (2012). 



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134 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//2.  Conspiracy Theories and Character Attacks: Exploring the //

//Legality of the Delegates’ Conduct //

Ackerman and Katyal paint a picture of the Federalists as 

“dangerous revolutionaries”441 who “lacked the legal authori-

ty . . . to make such an end run”442 around the existing legal re-

quirements. Yet, here again, the professors make a scattershot 

attack, failing to ever engage in a focused analysis of the ques-

tions of: (a) who called the convention; and (b) what were the 

instructions given to the delegates. Some of their analytical dif-

ficulty seems to arise from the professors’ failure to make any 

distinction between informal measures that suggest, support, 

or endorse a convention and formal “calls” for a convention.443 

//a.  The Call //

The professors claim that in “calling for the Philadelphia 

Convention, the Continental Congress had charged the dele-

gates to meet ‘for the //sole and express// purpose of revising the 

Articles.’”444 Later, they say that the Continental Congress 

“join[ed] the call for the convention.”445 In other places, they 

say that the “commercial commissioners” at the Annapolis 

Convention called the Convention.446 Then later, they describe 

the Annapolis Convention with a bit more nuance: “[T]he 

commissioners did not take decisive action unilaterally. They 

merely called upon Congress and the thirteen state legislatures 

to issue such calls.”447 The report language from Annapolis 

clearly contradicts even this version of their assertion. The An-

napolis delegates asked their state legislatures to appoint 

commissioners with broader powers and to use their good of-

fices to get other states to do the same.448 They sent copies of 

                                                                      

  441. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 495. 

//  //442//. Id. //at 487. 

//  //443//. See//,// e.g.//, //id.// at 486 (describing the Federalists’ general plan for ratification as 

the “Federalists’ call for ratifying conventions”); //id.// at 498 (describing Hamilton’s 

recommendation at Annapolis as a “dramatic call”). 

//  //444//. Id. a//t 481; //see also// //id.// at 501 (“[King and Dane] would be the authors of the 

congressional resolution calling upon the states to send delegates to Philadelph-

ia.”). 

//  //445//. Id. //at 483. 

//  //446//. Id. //at 496. 

//  //447//. Id. //at 497. 

  448. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 135 

 

their report both to Congress and to the Governors “from mo-

tives of respect.”449 By Ackerman and Katyal’s logic, it would 

be equally valid to suggest that the Annapolis delegates asked 

the thirteen governors to call a convention. 

The professors review the historical sequence leading up to the 

Convention without ever trying to conclusively answer the ques-

tion: Who formally called the convention? In their sequential nar-

rative, Ackerman and Katyal begin with efforts to amend the Ar-

ticles in 1781, move on to the Mount Vernon Conference between 

Virginia and Maryland, then to the Annapolis Convention, then 

to a discussion of the impact of Shay’s Rebellion, onto the Febru-

ary, 1787 resolution by Congress, a protest from Rhode Island, 

and finally to the Constitutional Convention itself.450 

There is a significant gap in this sequence. Ackerman and 

Katyal do not give any consideration to the actions of the legis-

latures in actually calling for the Philadelphia Convention. This 

failure is no mere oversight, since //Federalist No. 40// expressly 

contended that the delegates’ authority did not come from ei-

ther the Annapolis Convention or the resolution from the Con-

federation Congress—but from the several states.451 Moreover, 

the professors themselves noted that the Annapolis Convention 

had “called upon” both Congress and the thirteen state legisla-

tures to call the Convention.452 They duly discuss the role of 

Congress but inexplicably fail to discuss the role of the state 

legislatures. Avoiding this inconvenient set of facts relieves 

them of the difficulty of explaining how Congress could issue 

the official call for a convention when in fact, before Congress 

acted, six states had already named the time and place, chosen 

delegates, set the agenda, and had issued instructions to con-

trol their delegates’ actions in Philadelphia. 

While this is the professors’ principal failure in describing the 

sequence of events, their reference to “Rhode Island’s Protest” is 

                                                                      

//  //449//. Id.// 

  450. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14,// //at 489–514. 

//  //451//. See //THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 

1961) (“[B]y the assent . . . of the legislatures of the several states . . . a convention 

of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several states . . . .”); //see also id.// 

at 249 (“The States would never have appointed a convention with so much so-

lemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some //substantial// reform 

had not been in contemplation.”). 

  452. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14,// //at 497. 

134 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//2.  Conspiracy Theories and Character Attacks: Exploring the //

//Legality of the Delegates’ Conduct //

Ackerman and Katyal paint a picture of the Federalists as 

“dangerous revolutionaries”441 who “lacked the legal authori-

ty . . . to make such an end run”442 around the existing legal re-

quirements. Yet, here again, the professors make a scattershot 

attack, failing to ever engage in a focused analysis of the ques-

tions of: (a) who called the convention; and (b) what were the 

instructions given to the delegates. Some of their analytical dif-

ficulty seems to arise from the professors’ failure to make any 

distinction between informal measures that suggest, support, 

or endorse a convention and formal “calls” for a convention.443 

//a.  The Call //

The professors claim that in “calling for the Philadelphia 

Convention, the Continental Congress had charged the dele-

gates to meet ‘for the //sole and express// purpose of revising the 

Articles.’”444 Later, they say that the Continental Congress 

“join[ed] the call for the convention.”445 In other places, they 

say that the “commercial commissioners” at the Annapolis 

Convention called the Convention.446 Then later, they describe 

the Annapolis Convention with a bit more nuance: “[T]he 

commissioners did not take decisive action unilaterally. They 

merely called upon Congress and the thirteen state legislatures 

to issue such calls.”447 The report language from Annapolis 

clearly contradicts even this version of their assertion. The An-

napolis delegates asked their state legislatures to appoint 

commissioners with broader powers and to use their good of-

fices to get other states to do the same.448 They sent copies of 

                                                                      

  441. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 495. 

//  //442//. Id. //at 487. 

//  //443//. See//,// e.g.//, //id.// at 486 (describing the Federalists’ general plan for ratification as 

the “Federalists’ call for ratifying conventions”); //id.// at 498 (describing Hamilton’s 

recommendation at Annapolis as a “dramatic call”). 

//  //444//. Id. a//t 481; //see also// //id.// at 501 (“[King and Dane] would be the authors of the 

congressional resolution calling upon the states to send delegates to Philadelph-

ia.”). 

//  //445//. Id. //at 483. 

//  //446//. Id. //at 496. 

//  //447//. Id. //at 497. 

  448. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 135

 

their report both to Congress and to the Governors “from mo-

tives of respect.”449 By Ackerman and Katyal’s logic, it would

be equally valid to suggest that the Annapolis delegates ask

the thirteen governors to call a convention. 

The professors review the historical sequence leading up to t

Convention without ever trying to conclusively answer the qu

tion: Who formally called the convention? In their sequential na

rative, Ackerman and Katyal begin with efforts to amend the Ar

ticles in 1781, move on to the Mount Vernon Conference betwee

Virginia and Maryland, then to the Annapolis Convention, th

to a discussion of the impact of Shay’s Rebellion, onto the Feb

ary, 1787 resolution by Congress, a protest from Rhode Island,

and finally to the Constitutional Convention itself.450 

There is a significant gap in this sequence. Ackerman and

Katyal do not give any consideration to the actions of the legis-

latures in actually calling for the Philadelphia Convention. This

failure is no mere oversight, since //Federalist No. 40// expressly 

contended that the delegates’ authority did not come from ei-

ther the Annapolis Convention or the resolution from the Con-

federation Congress—but from the several states.451 Moreover,

the professors themselves noted that the Annapolis Convention 

had “called upon” both Congress and the thirteen state legisla-

tures to call the Convention.452 They duly discuss the role of 

Congress but inexplicably fail to discuss the role of the state 

legislatures. Avoiding this inconvenient set of facts relieves 

them of the difficulty of explaining how Congress could issue 

the official call for a convention when in fact, before Congress 

acted, six states had already named the time and place, chosen

delegates, set the agenda, and had issued instructions to con-

trol their delegates’ actions in Philadelphia. 

While this is the professors’ principal failure in describing the 

sequence of events, their reference to “Rhode Island’s Protest”

                                                                      

//  //449//. Id.// 

  450. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14,// //at 489–514. 

//  //451//. See //THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter e

1961) (“[B]y the assent . . . of the legislatures of the several states . . . a conventi

of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several states . . . .”); //see also id//

at 249 (“The States would never have appointed a convention with so muc

lemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some //substantial// ref

had not been in contemplation.”). 

  452. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14,// //at 497. 



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**139**

134 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//2.  Conspiracy Theories and Character Attacks: Exploring the //

//Legality of the Delegates’ Conduct //

Ackerman and Katyal paint a picture of the Federalists as 

“dangerous revolutionaries”441 who “lacked the legal authori-

ty . . . to make such an end run”442 around the existing legal re-

quirements. Yet, here again, the professors make a scattershot 

attack, failing to ever engage in a focused analysis of the ques-

tions of: (a) who called the convention; and (b) what were the 

instructions given to the delegates. Some of their analytical dif-

ficulty seems to arise from the professors’ failure to make any 

distinction between informal measures that suggest, support, 

or endorse a convention and formal “calls” for a convention.443 

//a.  The Call //

The professors claim that in “calling for the Philadelphia 

Convention, the Continental Congress had charged the dele-

gates to meet ‘for the //sole and express// purpose of revising the 

Articles.’”444 Later, they say that the Continental Congress 

“join[ed] the call for the convention.”445 In other places, they 

say that the “commercial commissioners” at the Annapolis 

Convention called the Convention.446 Then later, they describe 

the Annapolis Convention with a bit more nuance: “[T]he 

commissioners did not take decisive action unilaterally. They 

merely called upon Congress and the thirteen state legislatures 

to issue such calls.”447 The report language from Annapolis 

clearly contradicts even this version of their assertion. The An-

napolis delegates asked their state legislatures to appoint 

commissioners with broader powers and to use their good of-

fices to get other states to do the same.448 They sent copies of 

                                                                      

  441. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 495. 

//  //442//. Id. //at 487. 

//  //443//. See//,// e.g.//, //id.// at 486 (describing the Federalists’ general plan for ratification as 

the “Federalists’ call for ratifying conventions”); //id.// at 498 (describing Hamilton’s 

recommendation at Annapolis as a “dramatic call”). 

//  //444//. Id. a//t 481; //see also// //id.// at 501 (“[King and Dane] would be the authors of the 

congressional resolution calling upon the states to send delegates to Philadelph-

ia.”). 

//  //445//. Id. //at 483. 

//  //446//. Id. //at 496. 

//  //447//. Id. //at 497. 

  448. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 135 

 

their report both to Congress and to the Governors “from mo-

tives of respect.”449 By Ackerman and Katyal’s logic, it would 

be equally valid to suggest that the Annapolis delegates asked 

the thirteen governors to call a convention. 

The professors review the historical sequence leading up to the 

Convention without ever trying to conclusively answer the ques-

tion: Who formally called the convention? In their sequential nar-

rative, Ackerman and Katyal begin with efforts to amend the Ar-

ticles in 1781, move on to the Mount Vernon Conference between 

Virginia and Maryland, then to the Annapolis Convention, then 

to a discussion of the impact of Shay’s Rebellion, onto the Febru-

ary, 1787 resolution by Congress, a protest from Rhode Island, 

and finally to the Constitutional Convention itself.450 

There is a significant gap in this sequence. Ackerman and 

Katyal do not give any consideration to the actions of the legis-

latures in actually calling for the Philadelphia Convention. This 

failure is no mere oversight, since //Federalist No. 40// expressly 

contended that the delegates’ authority did not come from ei-

ther the Annapolis Convention or the resolution from the Con-

federation Congress—but from the several states.451 Moreover, 

the professors themselves noted that the Annapolis Convention 

had “called upon” both Congress and the thirteen state legisla-

tures to call the Convention.452 They duly discuss the role of 

Congress but inexplicably fail to discuss the role of the state 

legislatures. Avoiding this inconvenient set of facts relieves 

them of the difficulty of explaining how Congress could issue 

the official call for a convention when in fact, before Congress 

acted, six states had already named the time and place, chosen 

delegates, set the agenda, and had issued instructions to con-

trol their delegates’ actions in Philadelphia. 

While this is the professors’ principal failure in describing the 

sequence of events, their reference to “Rhode Island’s Protest” is 

                                                                      

//  //449//. Id.// 

  450. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14,// //at 489–514. 

//  //451//. See //THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 

1961) (“[B]y the assent . . . of the legislatures of the several states . . . a convention 

of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several states . . . .”); //see also id.// 

at 249 (“The States would never have appointed a convention with so much so-

lemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some //substantial// reform 

had not been in contemplation.”). 

  452. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14,// //at 497. 

134 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

//2.  Conspiracy Theories and Character Attacks: Exploring the //

//Legality of the Delegates’ Conduct //

Ackerman and Katyal paint a picture of the Federalists as 

“dangerous revolutionaries”441 who “lacked the legal authori-

ty . . . to make such an end run”442 around the existing legal re-

quirements. Yet, here again, the professors make a scattershot 

attack, failing to ever engage in a focused analysis of the ques-

tions of: (a) who called the convention; and (b) what were the 

instructions given to the delegates. Some of their analytical dif-

ficulty seems to arise from the professors’ failure to make any 

distinction between informal measures that suggest, support, 

or endorse a convention and formal “calls” for a convention.443 

//a.  The Call //

The professors claim that in “calling for the Philadelphia 

Convention, the Continental Congress had charged the dele-

gates to meet ‘for the //sole and express// purpose of revising the 

Articles.’”444 Later, they say that the Continental Congress 

“join[ed] the call for the convention.”445 In other places, they 

say that the “commercial commissioners” at the Annapolis 

Convention called the Convention.446 Then later, they describe 

the Annapolis Convention with a bit more nuance: “[T]he 

commissioners did not take decisive action unilaterally. They 

merely called upon Congress and the thirteen state legislatures 

to issue such calls.”447 The report language from Annapolis 

clearly contradicts even this version of their assertion. The An-

napolis delegates asked their state legislatures to appoint 

commissioners with broader powers and to use their good of-

fices to get other states to do the same.448 They sent copies of 

                                                                      

  441. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 495. 

//  //442//. Id. //at 487. 

//  //443//. See//,// e.g.//, //id.// at 486 (describing the Federalists’ general plan for ratification as 

the “Federalists’ call for ratifying conventions”); //id.// at 498 (describing Hamilton’s 

recommendation at Annapolis as a “dramatic call”). 

//  //444//. Id. a//t 481; //see also// //id.// at 501 (“[King and Dane] would be the authors of the 

congressional resolution calling upon the states to send delegates to Philadelph-

ia.”). 

//  //445//. Id. //at 483. 

//  //446//. Id. //at 496. 

//  //447//. Id. //at 497. 

  448. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, //supra //note 23,// //at 118. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 135

 

their report both to Congress and to the Governors “from mo-

tives of respect.”449 By Ackerman and Katyal’s logic, it would

be equally valid to suggest that the Annapolis delegates ask

the thirteen governors to call a convention. 

The professors review the historical sequence leading up to t

Convention without ever trying to conclusively answer the qu

tion: Who formally called the convention? In their sequential na

rative, Ackerman and Katyal begin with efforts to amend the Ar

ticles in 1781, move on to the Mount Vernon Conference betwee

Virginia and Maryland, then to the Annapolis Convention, th

to a discussion of the impact of Shay’s Rebellion, onto the Feb

ary, 1787 resolution by Congress, a protest from Rhode Island,

and finally to the Constitutional Convention itself.450 

There is a significant gap in this sequence. Ackerman and

Katyal do not give any consideration to the actions of the legis-

latures in actually calling for the Philadelphia Convention. This

failure is no mere oversight, since //Federalist No. 40// expressly 

contended that the delegates’ authority did not come from ei-

ther the Annapolis Convention or the resolution from the Con-

federation Congress—but from the several states.451 Moreover,

the professors themselves noted that the Annapolis Convention 

had “called upon” both Congress and the thirteen state legisla-

tures to call the Convention.452 They duly discuss the role of 

Congress but inexplicably fail to discuss the role of the state 

legislatures. Avoiding this inconvenient set of facts relieves 

them of the difficulty of explaining how Congress could issue 

the official call for a convention when in fact, before Congress 

acted, six states had already named the time and place, chosen

delegates, set the agenda, and had issued instructions to con-

trol their delegates’ actions in Philadelphia. 

While this is the professors’ principal failure in describing the 

sequence of events, their reference to “Rhode Island’s Protest”

                                                                      

//  //449//. Id.// 

  450. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14,// //at 489–514. 

//  //451//. See //THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter e

1961) (“[B]y the assent . . . of the legislatures of the several states . . . a conventi

of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several states . . . .”); //see also id//

at 249 (“The States would never have appointed a convention with so muc

lemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some //substantial// ref

had not been in contemplation.”). 

  452. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra// note 14,// //at 497. 



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[Vol. 40 

 

simply odd. It is the only state action that is reviewed in this se-

quence of events. And this discussion is placed prior to the dis-

cussion of the Convention itself. Rhode Island’s “protest” was is-

sued September 15th, 1787, just two days before the conclusion of 

the Convention.453 Moreover, Ackerman and Katyal fail to note 

that Rhode Island’s protest was itself protested by the towns of 

Newport and Providence.454 Yet, in their discussion of Rhode Is-

land’s protest, the professors give yet another explanation for the 

call of the Convention. They note that “the Philadelphia Conven-

tion was a creature of state legislatures.”455 However, three pages 

later Ackerman and Katyal return to their claim that Congress 

called the convention and gave the delegates their instructions—a 

claim repeated at least twice thereafter.456 

The best explanation for this shifting cloud of confusion is that 

the professors simply did not think through the difference be-

tween a formal call and various informal suggestions, endorse-

ments, and encouragements. The full historical record and docu-

ments give us the correct answer: Virginia called the Convention 

and this formal call was joined by eleven other states. 

//b.  The Delegates’ Authority //

Ackerman and Katyal continue their inconsistent analysis 

with respect to the source of the delegates’ instructions and au-

thority. At times they argue that “Congress had charged the 

delegates” to only amend the Articles.457 They favorably recite 

Anti-Federalist claims that the federalist proposals “were simp-

ly beyond the convention’s authority.”458 And yet, they be-

                                                                      

  453. Nearly every mention of Rhode Island in the debates of the Philadelphia 

Convention and the subsequent ratification conventions was pejorative in nature. 

//See//, //e.g.//, The Virginia Convention Debates (Jun. 25, 1788), //reprinted in// 10 DHRC, 

//supra //note 4, at 1515, 1516 (Benjamin Harrison V stated that “Rhode-Island is not 

worthy of the attention of this House—She is of no weight or importance to influ-

ence any general subject of consequence.” Harrison was a signer of the Declara-

tion of Independence and former Governor of Virginia). 

  454. Newport and Providence’s Protest of Rhode Island General Assembly’s 

Letter to Congress, (Sept. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //24 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 21, 21–

23. 

  455. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 505. 

//  //456//. Id. //at 508–509, 514. 

//  //457//. Id. //at 481. 

//  //458//. Id. //at 508. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 137 

 

grudgingly admit, often in footnotes, that the instructions from 

the states actually mattered.459 The following passage is crucial: 

  In calling for the Philadelphia Convention, the Continen-

tal Congress had charged the delegates to meet “for the //sole// 

//and express// purpose of revising the Articles.” Given this ex-

plicit language, did the delegates go beyond their legal au-

thority when they ripped the Articles up and proposed an 

entirely new text? \\
  This charge was raised repeatedly—and justifiably in the 

cases of Massachussetts [sic], New York, and Connecticut, 

where legislatures had expressly incorporated Congress’s 

restrictive language in their own instructions to delegates. 

Other state delegations, however, came with a broader 

mandate, allowing them to make any constitutional pro-

posal they thought appropriate. Thus, while some key dele-

gates may well have acted beyond their commission, this 

was not true of all.460 

While the strong inference is raised that all delegates were 

bound by the “explicit language” from Congress, Ackerman 

and Katyal make the curious claim that the delegates from 

Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut were justifiably 

accused of violating their instructions //from their own state legis-//

//latures. //The professors do not explain how New York’s delega-

tion could be accused of violating their instructions by voting 

for the Constitution since New York cast no vote one way or 

the other. Yet, they inexplicably contend that New York’s dele-

gates are “justifiably” charged of going “beyond their commis-

sion” when they “ripped the Articles up and proposed an en-

tirely new text.”461// //

As to Connecticut, the professors fail to quote or consider 

the actual legislative language appointing the delegates. As 

we have already seen, while the Connecticut resolution re-

fers to the congressional resolution, its delegates were ulti-

mately given much broader authority.462 Connecticut more 

properly belongs in the category of states essentially follow-

ing the Virginia model, granting broad authority to their \\
                                                                      

//  //459//. See, e.g.//, //id. //at 482 n.18, 483 n.20. 

//  //460//. Id. //at 481–83 (footnotes omitted). 

//  //461//. Id.// at 482–83. 

  462. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 216. 

136 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

simply odd. It is the only state action that is reviewed in this se-

quence of events. And this discussion is placed prior to the dis-

cussion of the Convention itself. Rhode Island’s “protest” was is-

sued September 15th, 1787, just two days before the conclusion of 

the Convention.453 Moreover, Ackerman and Katyal fail to note 

that Rhode Island’s protest was itself protested by the towns of 

Newport and Providence.454 Yet, in their discussion of Rhode Is-

land’s protest, the professors give yet another explanation for the 

call of the Convention. They note that “the Philadelphia Conven-

tion was a creature of state legislatures.”455 However, three pages 

later Ackerman and Katyal return to their claim that Congress 

called the convention and gave the delegates their instructions—a 

claim repeated at least twice thereafter.456 

The best explanation for this shifting cloud of confusion is that 

the professors simply did not think through the difference be-

tween a formal call and various informal suggestions, endorse-

ments, and encouragements. The full historical record and docu-

ments give us the correct answer: Virginia called the Convention 

and this formal call was joined by eleven other states. 

//b.  The Delegates’ Authority //

Ackerman and Katyal continue their inconsistent analysis 

with respect to the source of the delegates’ instructions and au-

thority. At times they argue that “Congress had charged the 

delegates” to only amend the Articles.457 They favorably recite 

Anti-Federalist claims that the federalist proposals “were simp-

ly beyond the convention’s authority.”458 And yet, they be-

                                                                      

  453. Nearly every mention of Rhode Island in the debates of the Philadelphia 

Convention and the subsequent ratification conventions was pejorative in nature. 

//See//, //e.g.//, The Virginia Convention Debates (Jun. 25, 1788), //reprinted in// 10 DHRC, 

//supra //note 4, at 1515, 1516 (Benjamin Harrison V stated that “Rhode-Island is not 

worthy of the attention of this House—She is of no weight or importance to influ-

ence any general subject of consequence.” Harrison was a signer of the Declara-

tion of Independence and former Governor of Virginia). 

  454. Newport and Providence’s Protest of Rhode Island General Assembly’s 

Letter to Congress, (Sept. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //24 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 21, 21–

23. 

  455. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 505. 

//  //456//. Id. //at 508–509, 514. 

//  //457//. Id. //at 481. 

//  //458//. Id. //at 508. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 137

 

grudgingly admit, often in footnotes, that the instructions from

the states actually mattered.459 The following passage is crucia

  In calling for the Philadelphia Convention, the Continen-

tal Congress had charged the delegates to meet “for the //sole// 

//and express// purpose of revising the Articles.” Given this ex-

plicit language, did the delegates go beyond their legal au-

thority when they ripped the Articles up and proposed an 

entirely new text? \\
  This charge was raised repeatedly—and justifiably in the 

cases of Massachussetts [sic], New York, and Connecticut, 

where legislatures had expressly incorporated Congress’s 

restrictive language in their own instructions to delegates. 

Other state delegations, however, came with a broader 

mandate, allowing them to make any constitutional pro-

posal they thought appropriate. Thus, while some key dele-

gates may well have acted beyond their commission, this 

was not true of all.460 

While the strong inference is raised that all delegates were 

bound by the “explicit language” from Congress, Ackerman

and Katyal make the curious claim that the delegates fro

Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut were justifiably 

accused of violating their instructions //from their own state legis-//

//latures. //The professors do not explain how New York’s delega-

tion could be accused of violating their instructions by voti

for the Constitution since New York cast no vote one way 

the other. Yet, they inexplicably contend that New York’s dele-

gates are “justifiably” charged of going “beyond their commis-

sion” when they “ripped the Articles up and proposed an e

tirely new text.”461// //

As to Connecticut, the professors fail to quote or conside

the actual legislative language appointing the delegates. As

we have already seen, while the Connecticut resolution r

fers to the congressional resolution, its delegates were ulti

mately given much broader authority.462 Connecticut mo

properly belongs in the category of states essentially follo

ing the Virginia model, granting broad authority to th\\
                                                                      

//  //459//. See, e.g.//, //id. //at 482 n.18, 483 n.20. 

//  //460//. Id. //at 481–83 (footnotes omitted). 

//  //461//. Id.// at 482–83. 

  462. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 216. 



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//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

simply odd. It is the only state action that is reviewed in this se-

quence of events. And this discussion is placed prior to the dis-

cussion of the Convention itself. Rhode Island’s “protest” was is-

sued September 15th, 1787, just two days before the conclusion of 

the Convention.453 Moreover, Ackerman and Katyal fail to note 

that Rhode Island’s protest was itself protested by the towns of 

Newport and Providence.454 Yet, in their discussion of Rhode Is-

land’s protest, the professors give yet another explanation for the 

call of the Convention. They note that “the Philadelphia Conven-

tion was a creature of state legislatures.”455 However, three pages 

later Ackerman and Katyal return to their claim that Congress 

called the convention and gave the delegates their instructions—a 

claim repeated at least twice thereafter.456 

The best explanation for this shifting cloud of confusion is that 

the professors simply did not think through the difference be-

tween a formal call and various informal suggestions, endorse-

ments, and encouragements. The full historical record and docu-

ments give us the correct answer: Virginia called the Convention 

and this formal call was joined by eleven other states. 

//b.  The Delegates’ Authority //

Ackerman and Katyal continue their inconsistent analysis 

with respect to the source of the delegates’ instructions and au-

thority. At times they argue that “Congress had charged the 

delegates” to only amend the Articles.457 They favorably recite 

Anti-Federalist claims that the federalist proposals “were simp-

ly beyond the convention’s authority.”458 And yet, they be-

                                                                      

  453. Nearly every mention of Rhode Island in the debates of the Philadelphia 

Convention and the subsequent ratification conventions was pejorative in nature. 

//See//, //e.g.//, The Virginia Convention Debates (Jun. 25, 1788), //reprinted in// 10 DHRC, 

//supra //note 4, at 1515, 1516 (Benjamin Harrison V stated that “Rhode-Island is not 

worthy of the attention of this House—She is of no weight or importance to influ-

ence any general subject of consequence.” Harrison was a signer of the Declara-

tion of Independence and former Governor of Virginia). 

  454. Newport and Providence’s Protest of Rhode Island General Assembly’s 

Letter to Congress, (Sept. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //24 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 21, 21–

23. 

  455. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 505. 

//  //456//. Id. //at 508–509, 514. 

//  //457//. Id. //at 481. 

//  //458//. Id. //at 508. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 137 

 

grudgingly admit, often in footnotes, that the instructions from 

the states actually mattered.459 The following passage is crucial: 

  In calling for the Philadelphia Convention, the Continen-

tal Congress had charged the delegates to meet “for the //sole// 

//and express// purpose of revising the Articles.” Given this ex-

plicit language, did the delegates go beyond their legal au-

thority when they ripped the Articles up and proposed an 

entirely new text? \\
  This charge was raised repeatedly—and justifiably in the 

cases of Massachussetts [sic], New York, and Connecticut, 

where legislatures had expressly incorporated Congress’s 

restrictive language in their own instructions to delegates. 

Other state delegations, however, came with a broader 

mandate, allowing them to make any constitutional pro-

posal they thought appropriate. Thus, while some key dele-

gates may well have acted beyond their commission, this 

was not true of all.460 

While the strong inference is raised that all delegates were 

bound by the “explicit language” from Congress, Ackerman 

and Katyal make the curious claim that the delegates from 

Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut were justifiably 

accused of violating their instructions //from their own state legis-//

//latures. //The professors do not explain how New York’s delega-

tion could be accused of violating their instructions by voting 

for the Constitution since New York cast no vote one way or 

the other. Yet, they inexplicably contend that New York’s dele-

gates are “justifiably” charged of going “beyond their commis-

sion” when they “ripped the Articles up and proposed an en-

tirely new text.”461// //

As to Connecticut, the professors fail to quote or consider 

the actual legislative language appointing the delegates. As 

we have already seen, while the Connecticut resolution re-

fers to the congressional resolution, its delegates were ulti-

mately given much broader authority.462 Connecticut more 

properly belongs in the category of states essentially follow-

ing the Virginia model, granting broad authority to their \\
                                                                      

//  //459//. See, e.g.//, //id. //at 482 n.18, 483 n.20. 

//  //460//. Id. //at 481–83 (footnotes omitted). 

//  //461//. Id.// at 482–83. 

  462. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //1 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 216. 

136 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

simply odd. It is the only state action that is reviewed in this se-

quence of events. And this discussion is placed prior to the dis-

cussion of the Convention itself. Rhode Island’s “protest” was is-

sued September 15th, 1787, just two days before the conclusion of 

the Convention.453 Moreover, Ackerman and Katyal fail to note 

that Rhode Island’s protest was itself protested by the towns of 

Newport and Providence.454 Yet, in their discussion of Rhode Is-

land’s protest, the professors give yet another explanation for the 

call of the Convention. They note that “the Philadelphia Conven-

tion was a creature of state legislatures.”455 However, three pages 

later Ackerman and Katyal return to their claim that Congress 

called the convention and gave the delegates their instructions—a 

claim repeated at least twice thereafter.456 

The best explanation for this shifting cloud of confusion is that 

the professors simply did not think through the difference be-

tween a formal call and various informal suggestions, endorse-

ments, and encouragements. The full historical record and docu-

ments give us the correct answer: Virginia called the Convention 

and this formal call was joined by eleven other states. 

//b.  The Delegates’ Authority //

Ackerman and Katyal continue their inconsistent analysis 

with respect to the source of the delegates’ instructions and au-

thority. At times they argue that “Congress had charged the 

delegates” to only amend the Articles.457 They favorably recite 

Anti-Federalist claims that the federalist proposals “were simp-

ly beyond the convention’s authority.”458 And yet, they be-

                                                                      

  453. Nearly every mention of Rhode Island in the debates of the Philadelphia 

Convention and the subsequent ratification conventions was pejorative in nature. 

//See//, //e.g.//, The Virginia Convention Debates (Jun. 25, 1788), //reprinted in// 10 DHRC, 

//supra //note 4, at 1515, 1516 (Benjamin Harrison V stated that “Rhode-Island is not 

worthy of the attention of this House—She is of no weight or importance to influ-

ence any general subject of consequence.” Harrison was a signer of the Declara-

tion of Independence and former Governor of Virginia). 

  454. Newport and Providence’s Protest of Rhode Island General Assembly’s 

Letter to Congress, (Sept. 17, 1787), //reprinted in //24 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 21, 21–

23. 

  455. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 505. 

//  //456//. Id. //at 508–509, 514. 

//  //457//. Id. //at 481. 

//  //458//. Id. //at 508. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 137

 

grudgingly admit, often in footnotes, that the instructions from

the states actually mattered.459 The following passage is crucia

  In calling for the Philadelphia Convention, the Continen-

tal Congress had charged the delegates to meet “for the //sole// 

//and express// purpose of revising the Articles.” Given this ex-

plicit language, did the delegates go beyond their legal au-

thority when they ripped the Articles up and proposed an 

entirely new text? \\
  This charge was raised repeatedly—and justifiably in the 

cases of Massachussetts [sic], New York, and Connecticut, 

where legislatures had expressly incorporated Congress’s 

restrictive language in their own instructions to delegates. 

Other state delegations, however, came with a broader 

mandate, allowing them to make any constitutional pro-

posal they thought appropriate. Thus, while some key dele-

gates may well have acted beyond their commission, this 

was not true of all.460 

While the strong inference is raised that all delegates were 

bound by the “explicit language” from Congress, Ackerman

and Katyal make the curious claim that the delegates fro

Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut were justifiably 

accused of violating their instructions //from their own state legis-//

//latures. //The professors do not explain how New York’s delega-

tion could be accused of violating their instructions by voti

for the Constitution since New York cast no vote one way 

the other. Yet, they inexplicably contend that New York’s dele-

gates are “justifiably” charged of going “beyond their commis-

sion” when they “ripped the Articles up and proposed an e

tirely new text.”461// //

As to Connecticut, the professors fail to quote or conside

the actual legislative language appointing the delegates. As

we have already seen, while the Connecticut resolution r

fers to the congressional resolution, its delegates were ulti

mately given much broader authority.462 Connecticut mo

properly belongs in the category of states essentially follo

ing the Virginia model, granting broad authority to th\\
                                                                      

//  //459//. See, e.g.//, //id. //at 482 n.18, 483 n.20. 

//  //460//. Id. //at 481–83 (footnotes omitted). 

//  //461//. Id.// at 482–83. 

  462. Act Electing and Empowering Delegates (May 17, 1787), //reprinted in //

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 215, 216. 



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delegates. The charge against the Massachusetts delegation 

is facially more plausible. However, there are two significant 

factors, previously reviewed, that place this claim in a differ-

ent light.463 The professors fail to mention that the Massachu-

setts legislature debated the question of whether the Con-

vention had “assum[ed] powers not delegated to them by 

their commissions.”464 Despite this contention, that legisla-

ture agreed to call the state ratification convention by a vote 

of 129 to 32.465 Moreover, the Massachusetts convention, by a 

vote of “90 & od to 50 & od,” expressly rejected the argu-

ment that their delegates had violated their instructions.466 

Moreover, James Madison strongly defended the legality of 

the actions of the delegates from those states that adopted 

the congressional language in their instructions.467 In their 

review of //Federalist No. 40//, the professors summarily pro-

nounce Madison’s legal analysis of the instructions as 

“strained” without the benefit of further discussion.468 Thus, 

we are left with the choice of accepting the conclusions of 

the Massachusetts legislature, ratifying convention, and 

James Madison or the undeveloped assertions of two leading 

modern scholars in pursuit of a grand theory that the Feder-

alists were unconventional revolutionaries. 

But we should not lose sight of the fact that Ackerman and 

Katyal make an important admission regarding the other nine 

states. As to the charge that the delegates from these states violat-

ed their commissions, the professors pronounce judgment: “this 

was not true.”469 Notwithstanding this begrudging exoneration of 

the actions of delegates from nine states, the balance of the article 

proceeds on the basis of a cloud of assumed impropriety by all 

delegates. “Illegality was a leitmotif at the convention from its 

                                                                      

//  //463//. See supra// notes 229–33 and accompanying text. 

 464. 

//Speech of Dr. Kilham//, MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787,// in //4 DHRC, //supra //note 

4, at 135. 

  465. MASS. CENTINEL (Oct. 27, 1787) //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 

138. 

  466. Letter from Nathaniel Gorham to Henry Knox (Mar. 9, 1788), //reprinted// //in //7 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1673, 1674. 

//  //467//. See// THE  FEDERALIST  NO.  40, at 248–55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 

ed., 1961).  

  468. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 544. 

//  //469//. Id. //at 483. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 139 

 

first days to its last.”470 Musical imagery is no substitute for actual 

evidence nor does it resolve the professors’ numerous internal 

inconsistencies on this issue. We have previously reviewed the 

full historical record on this subject. The claim that recognized 

and deliberate illegality was the overriding theme of the Conven-

tion is without merit. 

//c.  The Delaware Claim //

The professors make the particular claim that Delaware’s 

delegation “recognized that it was acting in contempt of its 

commission.”471 This assertion is supported by a footnote with 

a variety of citations—not one of which supports the claim that 

the Delaware delegates recognized that they were violating 

their commissions.472 The first citation is nothing more than 

Merrill Jensen’s reproduction of the commission by the Dela-

ware legislature.473 Ackerman and Katyal then say that the 

“Delaware problem was broadly recognized by the delegates to 

Philadelphia.”474 For this assertion, they cite the minutes of 

Convention when the Delaware credentials were first read.475 

This was a mere notation that Delaware’s delegates had been 

directed by their legislature to not support a form of voting in 

Congress that failed to recognize the equality of states. They 

offer no explanation of the specific actions taken by the Dela-

ware delegates that were in violation of their commissions. The 

professors do not quote a single statement by any source from 

Delaware. Such a citation should be the bare minimum when 

asserting that the Delaware delegates “recognized” their “con-

tempt” for their instructions. The final citation in this footnote 

is a comment by Luther Martin, an Anti-Federalist who 

claimed in his own Maryland ratifying convention that Dela-

ware’s delegates had violated their instructions.476 Not one 

piece of evidence is offered which demonstrates that the Dela-

ware delegates themselves knew or believed they were violat-

ing their instructions. \\
                                                                      

//  //470//. Id. //at 506. 

//  //471//. Id. //at 481. 

//  //472//. See id. //at 481 n.16. 

//  //473//. Id//. 

//  //474//. Id.// 

//  //475//. Id//. 

//  //476//. Id.// 

138 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

delegates. The charge against the Massachusetts delegation 

is facially more plausible. However, there are two significant 

factors, previously reviewed, that place this claim in a differ-

ent light.463 The professors fail to mention that the Massachu-

setts legislature debated the question of whether the Con-

vention had “assum[ed] powers not delegated to them by 

their commissions.”464 Despite this contention, that legisla-

ture agreed to call the state ratification convention by a vote 

of 129 to 32.465 Moreover, the Massachusetts convention, by a 

vote of “90 & od to 50 & od,” expressly rejected the argu-

ment that their delegates had violated their instructions.466 

Moreover, James Madison strongly defended the legality of 

the actions of the delegates from those states that adopted 

the congressional language in their instructions.467 In their 

review of //Federalist No. 40//, the professors summarily pro-

nounce Madison’s legal analysis of the instructions as 

“strained” without the benefit of further discussion.468 Thus, 

we are left with the choice of accepting the conclusions of 

the Massachusetts legislature, ratifying convention, and 

James Madison or the undeveloped assertions of two leading 

modern scholars in pursuit of a grand theory that the Feder-

alists were unconventional revolutionaries. 

But we should not lose sight of the fact that Ackerman and 

Katyal make an important admission regarding the other nine 

states. As to the charge that the delegates from these states violat-

ed their commissions, the professors pronounce judgment: “this 

was not true.”469 Notwithstanding this begrudging exoneration of 

the actions of delegates from nine states, the balance of the article 

proceeds on the basis of a cloud of assumed impropriety by all 

delegates. “Illegality was a leitmotif at the convention from its 

                                                                      

//  //463//. See supra// notes 229–33 and accompanying text. 

 464. 

//Speech of Dr. Kilham//, MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787,// in //4 DHRC, //supra //note 

4, at 135. 

  465. MASS. CENTINEL (Oct. 27, 1787) //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 

138. 

  466. Letter from Nathaniel Gorham to Henry Knox (Mar. 9, 1788), //reprinted// //in //7 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1673, 1674. 

//  //467//. See// THE  FEDERALIST  NO.  40, at 248–55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 

ed., 1961).  

  468. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 544. 

//  //469//. Id. //at 483. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 139

 

first days to its last.”470 Musical imagery is no substitute for actu

evidence nor does it resolve the professors’ numerous internal

inconsistencies on this issue. We have previously reviewed t

full historical record on this subject. The claim that recognized

and deliberate illegality was the overriding theme of the Conven-

tion is without merit. 

//c.  The Delaware Claim //

The professors make the particular claim that Delaware’

delegation “recognized that it was acting in contempt of 

commission.”471 This assertion is supported by a footnote wit

a variety of citations—not one of which supports the claim that

the Delaware delegates recognized that they were violating 

their commissions.472 The first citation is nothing more than

Merrill Jensen’s reproduction of the commission by the Dela-

ware legislature.473 Ackerman and Katyal then say that t

“Delaware problem was broadly recognized by the delegates to 

Philadelphia.”474 For this assertion, they cite the minutes 

Convention when the Delaware credentials were first read 475

This was a mere notation that Delaware’s delegates had been 

directed by their legislature to not support a form of voting in 

Congress that failed to recognize the equality of states. Th

offer no explanation of the specific actions taken by the De

ware delegates that were in violation of their commissions. The 

professors do not quote a single statement by any source from

Delaware. Such a citation should be the bare minimum when

asserting that the Delaware delegates “recognized” their “con-

tempt” for their instructions. The final citation in this footnote 

is a comment by Luther Martin, an Anti-Federalist who 

claimed in his own Maryland ratifying convention that Dela-

ware’s delegates had violated their instructions.476 Not one 

piece of evidence is offered which demonstrates that the D

ware delegates themselves knew or believed they were violat-

ing their instructions. \\
                                                                      

//  //470//. Id. //at 506. 

//  //471//. Id. //at 481. 

//  //472//. See id. //at 481 n.16. 

//  //473//. Id//. 

//  //474//. Id.// 

//  //475//. Id//. 

//  //476//. Id.// 



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delegates. The charge against the Massachusetts delegation 

is facially more plausible. However, there are two significant 

factors, previously reviewed, that place this claim in a differ-

ent light.463 The professors fail to mention that the Massachu-

setts legislature debated the question of whether the Con-

vention had “assum[ed] powers not delegated to them by 

their commissions.”464 Despite this contention, that legisla-

ture agreed to call the state ratification convention by a vote 

of 129 to 32.465 Moreover, the Massachusetts convention, by a 

vote of “90 & od to 50 & od,” expressly rejected the argu-

ment that their delegates had violated their instructions.466 

Moreover, James Madison strongly defended the legality of 

the actions of the delegates from those states that adopted 

the congressional language in their instructions.467 In their 

review of //Federalist No. 40//, the professors summarily pro-

nounce Madison’s legal analysis of the instructions as 

“strained” without the benefit of further discussion.468 Thus, 

we are left with the choice of accepting the conclusions of 

the Massachusetts legislature, ratifying convention, and 

James Madison or the undeveloped assertions of two leading 

modern scholars in pursuit of a grand theory that the Feder-

alists were unconventional revolutionaries. 

But we should not lose sight of the fact that Ackerman and 

Katyal make an important admission regarding the other nine 

states. As to the charge that the delegates from these states violat-

ed their commissions, the professors pronounce judgment: “this 

was not true.”469 Notwithstanding this begrudging exoneration of 

the actions of delegates from nine states, the balance of the article 

proceeds on the basis of a cloud of assumed impropriety by all 

delegates. “Illegality was a leitmotif at the convention from its 

                                                                      

//  //463//. See supra// notes 229–33 and accompanying text. 

 464. 

//Speech of Dr. Kilham//, MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787,// in //4 DHRC, //supra //note 

4, at 135. 

  465. MASS. CENTINEL (Oct. 27, 1787) //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 

138. 

  466. Letter from Nathaniel Gorham to Henry Knox (Mar. 9, 1788), //reprinted// //in //7 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1673, 1674. 

//  //467//. See// THE  FEDERALIST  NO.  40, at 248–55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 

ed., 1961).  

  468. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 544. 

//  //469//. Id. //at 483. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 139 

 

first days to its last.”470 Musical imagery is no substitute for actual 

evidence nor does it resolve the professors’ numerous internal 

inconsistencies on this issue. We have previously reviewed the 

full historical record on this subject. The claim that recognized 

and deliberate illegality was the overriding theme of the Conven-

tion is without merit. 

//c.  The Delaware Claim //

The professors make the particular claim that Delaware’s 

delegation “recognized that it was acting in contempt of its 

commission.”471 This assertion is supported by a footnote with 

a variety of citations—not one of which supports the claim that 

the Delaware delegates recognized that they were violating 

their commissions.472 The first citation is nothing more than 

Merrill Jensen’s reproduction of the commission by the Dela-

ware legislature.473 Ackerman and Katyal then say that the 

“Delaware problem was broadly recognized by the delegates to 

Philadelphia.”474 For this assertion, they cite the minutes of 

Convention when the Delaware credentials were first read.475 

This was a mere notation that Delaware’s delegates had been 

directed by their legislature to not support a form of voting in 

Congress that failed to recognize the equality of states. They 

offer no explanation of the specific actions taken by the Dela-

ware delegates that were in violation of their commissions. The 

professors do not quote a single statement by any source from 

Delaware. Such a citation should be the bare minimum when 

asserting that the Delaware delegates “recognized” their “con-

tempt” for their instructions. The final citation in this footnote 

is a comment by Luther Martin, an Anti-Federalist who 

claimed in his own Maryland ratifying convention that Dela-

ware’s delegates had violated their instructions.476 Not one 

piece of evidence is offered which demonstrates that the Dela-

ware delegates themselves knew or believed they were violat-

ing their instructions. \\
                                                                      

//  //470//. Id. //at 506. 

//  //471//. Id. //at 481. 

//  //472//. See id. //at 481 n.16. 

//  //473//. Id//. 

//  //474//. Id.// 

//  //475//. Id//. 

//  //476//. Id.// 

138 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

delegates. The charge against the Massachusetts delegation 

is facially more plausible. However, there are two significant 

factors, previously reviewed, that place this claim in a differ-

ent light.463 The professors fail to mention that the Massachu-

setts legislature debated the question of whether the Con-

vention had “assum[ed] powers not delegated to them by 

their commissions.”464 Despite this contention, that legisla-

ture agreed to call the state ratification convention by a vote 

of 129 to 32.465 Moreover, the Massachusetts convention, by a 

vote of “90 & od to 50 & od,” expressly rejected the argu-

ment that their delegates had violated their instructions.466 

Moreover, James Madison strongly defended the legality of 

the actions of the delegates from those states that adopted 

the congressional language in their instructions.467 In their 

review of //Federalist No. 40//, the professors summarily pro-

nounce Madison’s legal analysis of the instructions as 

“strained” without the benefit of further discussion.468 Thus, 

we are left with the choice of accepting the conclusions of 

the Massachusetts legislature, ratifying convention, and 

James Madison or the undeveloped assertions of two leading 

modern scholars in pursuit of a grand theory that the Feder-

alists were unconventional revolutionaries. 

But we should not lose sight of the fact that Ackerman and 

Katyal make an important admission regarding the other nine 

states. As to the charge that the delegates from these states violat-

ed their commissions, the professors pronounce judgment: “this 

was not true.”469 Notwithstanding this begrudging exoneration of 

the actions of delegates from nine states, the balance of the article 

proceeds on the basis of a cloud of assumed impropriety by all 

delegates. “Illegality was a leitmotif at the convention from its 

                                                                      

//  //463//. See supra// notes 229–33 and accompanying text. 

 464. 

//Speech of Dr. Kilham//, MASS. CENTINEL, Oct. 27, 1787,// in //4 DHRC, //supra //note 

4, at 135. 

  465. MASS. CENTINEL (Oct. 27, 1787) //reprinted in// 4 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 135, 

138. 

  466. Letter from Nathaniel Gorham to Henry Knox (Mar. 9, 1788), //reprinted// //in //7 

DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 1673, 1674. 

//  //467//. See// THE  FEDERALIST  NO.  40, at 248–55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 

ed., 1961).  

  468. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 544. 

//  //469//. Id. //at 483. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 139

 

first days to its last.”470 Musical imagery is no substitute for actu

evidence nor does it resolve the professors’ numerous internal

inconsistencies on this issue. We have previously reviewed t

full historical record on this subject. The claim that recognized

and deliberate illegality was the overriding theme of the Conven-

tion is without merit. 

//c.  The Delaware Claim //

The professors make the particular claim that Delaware’

delegation “recognized that it was acting in contempt of 

commission.”471 This assertion is supported by a footnote wit

a variety of citations—not one of which supports the claim that

the Delaware delegates recognized that they were violating 

their commissions.472 The first citation is nothing more than

Merrill Jensen’s reproduction of the commission by the Dela-

ware legislature.473 Ackerman and Katyal then say that t

“Delaware problem was broadly recognized by the delegates to 

Philadelphia.”474 For this assertion, they cite the minutes 

Convention when the Delaware credentials were first read 475

This was a mere notation that Delaware’s delegates had been 

directed by their legislature to not support a form of voting in 

Congress that failed to recognize the equality of states. Th

offer no explanation of the specific actions taken by the De

ware delegates that were in violation of their commissions. The 

professors do not quote a single statement by any source from

Delaware. Such a citation should be the bare minimum when

asserting that the Delaware delegates “recognized” their “con-

tempt” for their instructions. The final citation in this footnote 

is a comment by Luther Martin, an Anti-Federalist who 

claimed in his own Maryland ratifying convention that Dela-

ware’s delegates had violated their instructions.476 Not one 

piece of evidence is offered which demonstrates that the D

ware delegates themselves knew or believed they were violat-

ing their instructions. \\
                                                                      

//  //470//. Id. //at 506. 

//  //471//. Id. //at 481. 

//  //472//. See id. //at 481 n.16. 

//  //473//. Id//. 

//  //474//. Id.// 

//  //475//. Id//. 

//  //476//. Id.// 



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The preservation of the equality of the states was indeed a ma-

jor topic at the Constitutional Convention. Delaware’s delegates 

supported the Great Compromise which created our bicameral 

system with the House based on equality of population and the 

Senate based on the equality of States.477 This compromise was 

consistent with the tenor of Delaware’s instructions to preserve 

the equality of the states in Congress. The opinion of a single An-

ti-Federalist from Maryland does not prove Ackerman and 

Katyal’s assertion that Delaware’s delegates knowingly violated 

their instructions. And the ultimate proof of the delegates’ fidelity 

is found in the fact that Delaware was the first state to ratify the 

Constitution.478 Its vote was unanimous.479 

//3.  The Legality of the Ratification Process //

//a.  Article XIII //

Ackerman and Katyal’s principal attack on the legality of the 

adoption of the Constitution rests on the alleged improprieties 

of the ratification process. This is logical given that, at least oc-

casionally, they admit that the vast majority of delegates were 

faithful to their instructions. Thus, they focus the majority of 

their article on the more complex and plausible issue that the 

ratification process was improper. 

The professors make a straightforward legal argument.480 Ar-

ticle XIII required all amendments to be first proposed by Con-

gress and then ratified by all thirteen state legislatures. The 

new Constitution itself was not approved by Congress, nor by 

the state legislatures—thus the ratification process was illegal. 

Ackerman and Katyal make three fundamental errors in their 

ratification argument. First, they fail to identify the correct 

source for the rule that ratification was to proceed first to Con-

gress and then to the state legislatures. Second, they fail to con-

sider the legal implications arising from the “Ratification and 

Transition” Resolution of the Philadelphia Convention.481 \\
                                                                      

//  //477//. See //1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 664. 

  478. 3 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 41. 

//  //479//. Id.// 

  480. Kay’s arguments on this point are essentially parallel to those of Ackerman 

and Katyal. //See// Kay, //supra //note 14//, //at 67–70. 

  481. Kay does reference this second act of the Convention in his arguments on 

ratification. However, he inaccurately classifies this act as a letter. //See id. //at 68. Kay 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 141 

 

Third, they fail to acknowledge that the new process itself was, 

in fact, approved by Congress unanimously and then by all 

thirteen state legislatures. 

It is only by ignoring the full documentary and historical 

record that Ackerman and Katyal so easily reach their conclu-

sion that the change in the ratification process was unsanc-

tioned. But the plain facts are that the states set the expectation 

for the ratification process in their appointments of delegates, 

and the states were free to lawfully change this process provid-

ed that Congress and all thirteen legislatures agreed. And this 

is what actually happened.482 

The professors make much ado about the political and mor-

al arguments raised by Madison to justify for the new process. 

From such statements by Madison, they contend that he ar-

gued that the end of obtaining the Constitution was so im-

portant that it justified illegal and revolutionary means to 

achieve this end.483 Two things are abundantly clear from the 

historical record about these contentions. First, the supporters 

of the Constitution genuinely believed that a government 

based on the consent of the governed was morally superior to 

a government assented to only by elected legislators. All polit-

ical legitimacy rested on this standard. Second, it is beyond 

legitimate debate that the Founders would have proceeded 

with the new process and entered into the government under 

the new Constitution even if one or more state legislatures 

refused to endorse the new process for ratification. The Fram-

ers clearly believed that the nation was on the verge of col-

lapse and that moral and political legitimacy, based on the 

direct consent of the governed, was more important than le-

galistic correctness.484 However, proof that the Founders were 

willing, if it had become necessary, to take such steps is not 

proof that they acted illegally. We judge the legality of their 

                                                                      

gives no consideration to the legal effects of the approval of the process set forth 

in these resolutions by both the Confederation Congress and all thirteen state 

legislatures. 

//  //482//. See// Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 340, 340. 

  483. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 488. 

//  //484//. See// THE  FEDERALIST  NO.  40, at 252–55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 

ed., 1961).  

140 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

The preservation of the equality of the states was indeed a ma-

jor topic at the Constitutional Convention. Delaware’s delegates 

supported the Great Compromise which created our bicameral 

system with the House based on equality of population and the 

Senate based on the equality of States.477 This compromise was 

consistent with the tenor of Delaware’s instructions to preserve 

the equality of the states in Congress. The opinion of a single An-

ti-Federalist from Maryland does not prove Ackerman and 

Katyal’s assertion that Delaware’s delegates knowingly violated 

their instructions. And the ultimate proof of the delegates’ fidelity 

is found in the fact that Delaware was the first state to ratify the 

Constitution.478 Its vote was unanimous.479 

//3.  The Legality of the Ratification Process //

//a.  Article XIII //

Ackerman and Katyal’s principal attack on the legality of the 

adoption of the Constitution rests on the alleged improprieties 

of the ratification process. This is logical given that, at least oc-

casionally, they admit that the vast majority of delegates were 

faithful to their instructions. Thus, they focus the majority of 

their article on the more complex and plausible issue that the 

ratification process was improper. 

The professors make a straightforward legal argument.480 Ar-

ticle XIII required all amendments to be first proposed by Con-

gress and then ratified by all thirteen state legislatures. The 

new Constitution itself was not approved by Congress, nor by 

the state legislatures—thus the ratification process was illegal. 

Ackerman and Katyal make three fundamental errors in their 

ratification argument. First, they fail to identify the correct 

source for the rule that ratification was to proceed first to Con-

gress and then to the state legislatures. Second, they fail to con-

sider the legal implications arising from the “Ratification and 

Transition” Resolution of the Philadelphia Convention.481 \\
                                                                      

//  //477//. See //1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 664. 

  478. 3 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 41. 

//  //479//. Id.// 

  480. Kay’s arguments on this point are essentially parallel to those of Ackerman 

and Katyal. //See// Kay, //supra //note 14//, //at 67–70. 

  481. Kay does reference this second act of the Convention in his arguments on 

ratification. However, he inaccurately classifies this act as a letter. //See id. //at 68. Kay 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 141

 

Third, they fail to acknowledge that the new process itself w

in fact, approved by Congress unanimously and then by 

thirteen state legislatures. 

It is only by ignoring the full documentary and historical 

record that Ackerman and Katyal so easily reach their conc

sion that the change in the ratification process was unsan

tioned. But the plain facts are that the states set the expectation 

for the ratification process in their appointments of delegates, 

and the states were free to lawfully change this process provid-

ed that Congress and all thirteen legislatures agreed. And this 

is what actually happened.482 

The professors make much ado about the political and m

al arguments raised by Madison to justify for the new proces

From such statements by Madison, they contend that he ar-

gued that the end of obtaining the Constitution was so im-

portant that it justified illegal and revolutionary means to 

achieve this end.483 Two things are abundantly clear from the 

historical record about these contentions. First, the support

of the Constitution genuinely believed that a government

based on the consent of the governed was morally superior t

a government assented to only by elected legislators. All polit-

ical legitimacy rested on this standard. Second, it is beyond

legitimate debate that the Founders would have proceeded 

with the new process and entered into the government under 

the new Constitution even if one or more state legislatur

refused to endorse the new process for ratification. The Fram-

ers clearly believed that the nation was on the verge of col-

lapse and that moral and political legitimacy, based on the 

direct consent of the governed, was more important than 

galistic correctness.484 However, proof that the Founders we

willing, if it had become necessary, to take such steps is not 

proof that they acted illegally. We judge the legality of the

                                                                      

gives no consideration to the legal effects of the approval of the process set fo

in these resolutions by both the Confederation Congress and all thirteen st

legislatures. 

//  //482//. See// Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4

at 340, 340. 

  483. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 488. 

//  //484//. See// THE  FEDERALIST  NO.  40, at 252–55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossi

ed., 1961).  



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140 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

The preservation of the equality of the states was indeed a ma-

jor topic at the Constitutional Convention. Delaware’s delegates 

supported the Great Compromise which created our bicameral 

system with the House based on equality of population and the 

Senate based on the equality of States.477 This compromise was 

consistent with the tenor of Delaware’s instructions to preserve 

the equality of the states in Congress. The opinion of a single An-

ti-Federalist from Maryland does not prove Ackerman and 

Katyal’s assertion that Delaware’s delegates knowingly violated 

their instructions. And the ultimate proof of the delegates’ fidelity 

is found in the fact that Delaware was the first state to ratify the 

Constitution.478 Its vote was unanimous.479 

//3.  The Legality of the Ratification Process //

//a.  Article XIII //

Ackerman and Katyal’s principal attack on the legality of the 

adoption of the Constitution rests on the alleged improprieties 

of the ratification process. This is logical given that, at least oc-

casionally, they admit that the vast majority of delegates were 

faithful to their instructions. Thus, they focus the majority of 

their article on the more complex and plausible issue that the 

ratification process was improper. 

The professors make a straightforward legal argument.480 Ar-

ticle XIII required all amendments to be first proposed by Con-

gress and then ratified by all thirteen state legislatures. The 

new Constitution itself was not approved by Congress, nor by 

the state legislatures—thus the ratification process was illegal. 

Ackerman and Katyal make three fundamental errors in their 

ratification argument. First, they fail to identify the correct 

source for the rule that ratification was to proceed first to Con-

gress and then to the state legislatures. Second, they fail to con-

sider the legal implications arising from the “Ratification and 

Transition” Resolution of the Philadelphia Convention.481 \\
                                                                      

//  //477//. See //1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 664. 

  478. 3 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 41. 

//  //479//. Id.// 

  480. Kay’s arguments on this point are essentially parallel to those of Ackerman 

and Katyal. //See// Kay, //supra //note 14//, //at 67–70. 

  481. Kay does reference this second act of the Convention in his arguments on 

ratification. However, he inaccurately classifies this act as a letter. //See id. //at 68. Kay 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 141 

 

Third, they fail to acknowledge that the new process itself was, 

in fact, approved by Congress unanimously and then by all 

thirteen state legislatures. 

It is only by ignoring the full documentary and historical 

record that Ackerman and Katyal so easily reach their conclu-

sion that the change in the ratification process was unsanc-

tioned. But the plain facts are that the states set the expectation 

for the ratification process in their appointments of delegates, 

and the states were free to lawfully change this process provid-

ed that Congress and all thirteen legislatures agreed. And this 

is what actually happened.482 

The professors make much ado about the political and mor-

al arguments raised by Madison to justify for the new process. 

From such statements by Madison, they contend that he ar-

gued that the end of obtaining the Constitution was so im-

portant that it justified illegal and revolutionary means to 

achieve this end.483 Two things are abundantly clear from the 

historical record about these contentions. First, the supporters 

of the Constitution genuinely believed that a government 

based on the consent of the governed was morally superior to 

a government assented to only by elected legislators. All polit-

ical legitimacy rested on this standard. Second, it is beyond 

legitimate debate that the Founders would have proceeded 

with the new process and entered into the government under 

the new Constitution even if one or more state legislatures 

refused to endorse the new process for ratification. The Fram-

ers clearly believed that the nation was on the verge of col-

lapse and that moral and political legitimacy, based on the 

direct consent of the governed, was more important than le-

galistic correctness.484 However, proof that the Founders were 

willing, if it had become necessary, to take such steps is not 

proof that they acted illegally. We judge the legality of their 

                                                                      

gives no consideration to the legal effects of the approval of the process set forth 

in these resolutions by both the Confederation Congress and all thirteen state 

legislatures. 

//  //482//. See// Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 340, 340. 

  483. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 488. 

//  //484//. See// THE  FEDERALIST  NO.  40, at 252–55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 

ed., 1961).  

140 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

The preservation of the equality of the states was indeed a ma-

jor topic at the Constitutional Convention. Delaware’s delegates 

supported the Great Compromise which created our bicameral 

system with the House based on equality of population and the 

Senate based on the equality of States.477 This compromise was 

consistent with the tenor of Delaware’s instructions to preserve 

the equality of the states in Congress. The opinion of a single An-

ti-Federalist from Maryland does not prove Ackerman and 

Katyal’s assertion that Delaware’s delegates knowingly violated 

their instructions. And the ultimate proof of the delegates’ fidelity 

is found in the fact that Delaware was the first state to ratify the 

Constitution.478 Its vote was unanimous.479 

//3.  The Legality of the Ratification Process //

//a.  Article XIII //

Ackerman and Katyal’s principal attack on the legality of the 

adoption of the Constitution rests on the alleged improprieties 

of the ratification process. This is logical given that, at least oc-

casionally, they admit that the vast majority of delegates were 

faithful to their instructions. Thus, they focus the majority of 

their article on the more complex and plausible issue that the 

ratification process was improper. 

The professors make a straightforward legal argument.480 Ar-

ticle XIII required all amendments to be first proposed by Con-

gress and then ratified by all thirteen state legislatures. The 

new Constitution itself was not approved by Congress, nor by 

the state legislatures—thus the ratification process was illegal. 

Ackerman and Katyal make three fundamental errors in their 

ratification argument. First, they fail to identify the correct 

source for the rule that ratification was to proceed first to Con-

gress and then to the state legislatures. Second, they fail to con-

sider the legal implications arising from the “Ratification and 

Transition” Resolution of the Philadelphia Convention.481 \\
                                                                      

//  //477//. See //1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, //supra// note 107, at 664. 

  478. 3 DHRC, //supra// note 4, at 41. 

//  //479//. Id.// 

  480. Kay’s arguments on this point are essentially parallel to those of Ackerman 

and Katyal. //See// Kay, //supra //note 14//, //at 67–70. 

  481. Kay does reference this second act of the Convention in his arguments on 

ratification. However, he inaccurately classifies this act as a letter. //See id. //at 68. Kay 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 141

 

Third, they fail to acknowledge that the new process itself w

in fact, approved by Congress unanimously and then by 

thirteen state legislatures. 

It is only by ignoring the full documentary and historical 

record that Ackerman and Katyal so easily reach their conc

sion that the change in the ratification process was unsan

tioned. But the plain facts are that the states set the expectation 

for the ratification process in their appointments of delegates, 

and the states were free to lawfully change this process provid-

ed that Congress and all thirteen legislatures agreed. And this 

is what actually happened.482 

The professors make much ado about the political and m

al arguments raised by Madison to justify for the new proces

From such statements by Madison, they contend that he ar-

gued that the end of obtaining the Constitution was so im-

portant that it justified illegal and revolutionary means to 

achieve this end.483 Two things are abundantly clear from the 

historical record about these contentions. First, the support

of the Constitution genuinely believed that a government

based on the consent of the governed was morally superior t

a government assented to only by elected legislators. All polit-

ical legitimacy rested on this standard. Second, it is beyond

legitimate debate that the Founders would have proceeded 

with the new process and entered into the government under 

the new Constitution even if one or more state legislatur

refused to endorse the new process for ratification. The Fram-

ers clearly believed that the nation was on the verge of col-

lapse and that moral and political legitimacy, based on the 

direct consent of the governed, was more important than 

galistic correctness.484 However, proof that the Founders we

willing, if it had become necessary, to take such steps is not 

proof that they acted illegally. We judge the legality of the

                                                                      

gives no consideration to the legal effects of the approval of the process set fo

in these resolutions by both the Confederation Congress and all thirteen st

legislatures. 

//  //482//. See// Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted in// 1 DHRC, //supra// note 4

at 340, 340. 

  483. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 488. 

//  //484//. See// THE  FEDERALIST  NO.  40, at 252–55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossi

ed., 1961).  



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//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

actual actions, not what they probably (or even certainly) 

would have done if the legally proper method failed. 

Thus, Ackerman and Katyal’s recitation of the Federalists’ 

moral arguments and appeals to popular sovereignty are his-

torically interesting and demonstrate that our country came 

very close to making a quasi-revolutionary decision in the rati-

fication process. But, in the end they found a path that was not 

revolutionary. They asked Congress and all thirteen state legis-

latures to approve the new ratification process and they did. 

Thus, there is no need for either an apology or a moral justifica-

tion from the Framers nor forgiveness from their political de-

scendants. Congress and all thirteen legislatures gave legal 

sanction to the new process. 

//b.  State Constitutions //

Ackerman and Katyal make a second argument as to the ille-

gality of the ratification process. They contend that several 

state constitutions contained a required process for amend-

ments thereto.485 And since the Supremacy Clause in Article VI 

represented a //de facto// amendment to these state constitutions, 

these states were required to follow that process first.486 Each 

state constitution would have to be amended to authorize the 

legislature to call a ratification convention for a Constitution 

that proclaimed itself to be supreme over the states in matters 

delegated to the new central government.487 

This argument borders on frivolousness, ignoring, as it does, 

the text of Article XIII. The first sentence of that Article con-

tained a supremacy clause: “Every State shall abide by the de-

termination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all 

questions which by this confederation are submitted to 

them.”488 Nothing in Article VI of the Constitution says any-

thing materially different.489 The Constitution and all laws 

made in furtherance of the Constitution are supreme over in-

consistent state laws and state constitutions. The provisions of 

the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution on the ques-

                                                                      

  485. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 484. 

//  //486//. See id.// 

//  //487//. See id.// at 484–87. 

  488. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII. 

//  //489//. See// U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 143 

 

tion of supremacy are functionally identical. Moreover, if the 

state constitutions of these select states required the use of the 

state amending process to adopt a supremacy clause, then that 

requirement was equally applicable to the adoption of the Arti-

cles of Confederation. No state did this, of course, which un-

derscores the absurdity of this argument. 

Although Ackerman and Katyal never mention it, this argu-

ment was made and answered during the ratification debates. 

The Republican Federalist argued that the Massachusetts con-

stitution would be effectively amended by the new federal con-

stitution.490 Accordingly, prior to ratification, permission would 

have to be obtained by first following the provisions of the 

Massachusetts state constitution.491 This suggestion was never 

given serious consideration in either the Massachusetts legisla-

ture or its ratification convention. 

This theory was also argued by the town of Great Barrington, 

Massachusetts in proposed instructions to their original delegate 

to the state ratification convention, William Whiting.492 He was 

one of the Common Pleas judges from Great Barrington, Massa-

chusetts who was convicted of sedition for his role in Shay’s Re-

bellion.493 A Federalist writer answered such arguments by point-

ing out that, if true, they would equally demonstrate that the 

Articles of Confederation had been illegally adopted: 

[I]f we put the credentials of our rulers in 1781 to the test; if 

we dare to try the extent of their authority by the criterion of 

//first principles//; if in our researches after truth on this point 

we follow //these// whithersoever they will guide us, may it not 

be safely and fairly asserted that the States of South Carolina 

Virginia, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode-Island and New 

Hampshire even from the date of Independence to that of 

the confederation to which we are objecting, never invested 

their respective Legislatures with sufficient powers perma-

nently to form and ratify such a compact.494 

                                                                      

 490. 

//The Republican Federalist III//, MASS.  CENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1787, //reprinted in// 5 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 661–65.  

//  //491//. See id.// 

//  //492//. See// Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted in //5 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 

959. 

//  //493//. See id.// at 958. 

  494. Letter from John Brown Cutting to William Short London (Jan. 9, 1788), 

//reprinted in //14 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 493–94. 

142 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

actual actions, not what they probably (or even certainly) 

would have done if the legally proper method failed. 

Thus, Ackerman and Katyal’s recitation of the Federalists’ 

moral arguments and appeals to popular sovereignty are his-

torically interesting and demonstrate that our country came 

very close to making a quasi-revolutionary decision in the rati-

fication process. But, in the end they found a path that was not 

revolutionary. They asked Congress and all thirteen state legis-

latures to approve the new ratification process and they did. 

Thus, there is no need for either an apology or a moral justifica-

tion from the Framers nor forgiveness from their political de-

scendants. Congress and all thirteen legislatures gave legal 

sanction to the new process. 

//b.  State Constitutions //

Ackerman and Katyal make a second argument as to the ille-

gality of the ratification process. They contend that several 

state constitutions contained a required process for amend-

ments thereto.485 And since the Supremacy Clause in Article VI 

represented a //de facto// amendment to these state constitutions, 

these states were required to follow that process first.486 Each 

state constitution would have to be amended to authorize the 

legislature to call a ratification convention for a Constitution 

that proclaimed itself to be supreme over the states in matters 

delegated to the new central government.487 

This argument borders on frivolousness, ignoring, as it does, 

the text of Article XIII. The first sentence of that Article con-

tained a supremacy clause: “Every State shall abide by the de-

termination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all 

questions which by this confederation are submitted to 

them.”488 Nothing in Article VI of the Constitution says any-

thing materially different.489 The Constitution and all laws 

made in furtherance of the Constitution are supreme over in-

consistent state laws and state constitutions. The provisions of 

the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution on the ques-

                                                                      

  485. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 484. 

//  //486//. See id.// 

//  //487//. See id.// at 484–87. 

  488. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII. 

//  //489//. See// U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 143

 

tion of supremacy are functionally identical. Moreover, if t

state constitutions of these select states required the use of the 

state amending process to adopt a supremacy clause, then th

requirement was equally applicable to the adoption of the Arti-

cles of Confederation. No state did this, of course, which un-

derscores the absurdity of this argument. 

Although Ackerman and Katyal never mention it, this argu-

ment was made and answered during the ratification debates.

The Republican Federalist argued that the Massachusetts con-

stitution would be effectively amended by the new federal con-

stitution.490 Accordingly, prior to ratification, permission woul

have to be obtained by first following the provisions of t

Massachusetts state constitution.491 This suggestion was neve

given serious consideration in either the Massachusetts legisla-

ture or its ratification convention. 

This theory was also argued by the town of Great Barrington, 

Massachusetts in proposed instructions to their original delegate 

to the state ratification convention, William Whiting.492 He was 

one of the Common Pleas judges from Great Barrington, Massa-

chusetts who was convicted of sedition for his role in Shay’s R

bellion.493 A Federalist writer answered such arguments by poi

ing out that, if true, they would equally demonstrate that 

Articles of Confederation had been illegally adopted: 

[I]f we put the credentials of our rulers in 1781 to the test; if 

we dare to try the extent of their authority by the criterion of 

//first principles//; if in our researches after truth on this point 

we follow //these// whithersoever they will guide us, may it not 

be safely and fairly asserted that the States of South Carolina 

Virginia, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode-Island and New 

Hampshire even from the date of Independence to that of 

the confederation to which we are objecting, never invested 

their respective Legislatures with sufficient powers perma-

nently to form and ratify such a compact.494 

                                                                      

 490. 

//The Republican Federalist III//, MASS.  CENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1787, //reprinted in//

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 661–65.  

//  //491//. See id.// 

//  //492//. See// Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted in //5 DHRC, //supra //note 4,

959. 

//  //493//. See id.// at 958. 

  494. Letter from John Brown Cutting to William Short London (Jan. 9, 1788)

//reprinted in //14 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 493–94. 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto147.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**147**

142 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

actual actions, not what they probably (or even certainly) 

would have done if the legally proper method failed. 

Thus, Ackerman and Katyal’s recitation of the Federalists’ 

moral arguments and appeals to popular sovereignty are his-

torically interesting and demonstrate that our country came 

very close to making a quasi-revolutionary decision in the rati-

fication process. But, in the end they found a path that was not 

revolutionary. They asked Congress and all thirteen state legis-

latures to approve the new ratification process and they did. 

Thus, there is no need for either an apology or a moral justifica-

tion from the Framers nor forgiveness from their political de-

scendants. Congress and all thirteen legislatures gave legal 

sanction to the new process. 

//b.  State Constitutions //

Ackerman and Katyal make a second argument as to the ille-

gality of the ratification process. They contend that several 

state constitutions contained a required process for amend-

ments thereto.485 And since the Supremacy Clause in Article VI 

represented a //de facto// amendment to these state constitutions, 

these states were required to follow that process first.486 Each 

state constitution would have to be amended to authorize the 

legislature to call a ratification convention for a Constitution 

that proclaimed itself to be supreme over the states in matters 

delegated to the new central government.487 

This argument borders on frivolousness, ignoring, as it does, 

the text of Article XIII. The first sentence of that Article con-

tained a supremacy clause: “Every State shall abide by the de-

termination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all 

questions which by this confederation are submitted to 

them.”488 Nothing in Article VI of the Constitution says any-

thing materially different.489 The Constitution and all laws 

made in furtherance of the Constitution are supreme over in-

consistent state laws and state constitutions. The provisions of 

the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution on the ques-

                                                                      

  485. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 484. 

//  //486//. See id.// 

//  //487//. See id.// at 484–87. 

  488. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII. 

//  //489//. See// U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 143 

 

tion of supremacy are functionally identical. Moreover, if the 

state constitutions of these select states required the use of the 

state amending process to adopt a supremacy clause, then that 

requirement was equally applicable to the adoption of the Arti-

cles of Confederation. No state did this, of course, which un-

derscores the absurdity of this argument. 

Although Ackerman and Katyal never mention it, this argu-

ment was made and answered during the ratification debates. 

The Republican Federalist argued that the Massachusetts con-

stitution would be effectively amended by the new federal con-

stitution.490 Accordingly, prior to ratification, permission would 

have to be obtained by first following the provisions of the 

Massachusetts state constitution.491 This suggestion was never 

given serious consideration in either the Massachusetts legisla-

ture or its ratification convention. 

This theory was also argued by the town of Great Barrington, 

Massachusetts in proposed instructions to their original delegate 

to the state ratification convention, William Whiting.492 He was 

one of the Common Pleas judges from Great Barrington, Massa-

chusetts who was convicted of sedition for his role in Shay’s Re-

bellion.493 A Federalist writer answered such arguments by point-

ing out that, if true, they would equally demonstrate that the 

Articles of Confederation had been illegally adopted: 

[I]f we put the credentials of our rulers in 1781 to the test; if 

we dare to try the extent of their authority by the criterion of 

//first principles//; if in our researches after truth on this point 

we follow //these// whithersoever they will guide us, may it not 

be safely and fairly asserted that the States of South Carolina 

Virginia, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode-Island and New 

Hampshire even from the date of Independence to that of 

the confederation to which we are objecting, never invested 

their respective Legislatures with sufficient powers perma-

nently to form and ratify such a compact.494 

                                                                      

 490. 

//The Republican Federalist III//, MASS.  CENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1787, //reprinted in// 5 

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 661–65.  

//  //491//. See id.// 

//  //492//. See// Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted in //5 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 

959. 

//  //493//. See id.// at 958. 

  494. Letter from John Brown Cutting to William Short London (Jan. 9, 1788), 

//reprinted in //14 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 493–94. 

142 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

actual actions, not what they probably (or even certainly) 

would have done if the legally proper method failed. 

Thus, Ackerman and Katyal’s recitation of the Federalists’ 

moral arguments and appeals to popular sovereignty are his-

torically interesting and demonstrate that our country came 

very close to making a quasi-revolutionary decision in the rati-

fication process. But, in the end they found a path that was not 

revolutionary. They asked Congress and all thirteen state legis-

latures to approve the new ratification process and they did. 

Thus, there is no need for either an apology or a moral justifica-

tion from the Framers nor forgiveness from their political de-

scendants. Congress and all thirteen legislatures gave legal 

sanction to the new process. 

//b.  State Constitutions //

Ackerman and Katyal make a second argument as to the ille-

gality of the ratification process. They contend that several 

state constitutions contained a required process for amend-

ments thereto.485 And since the Supremacy Clause in Article VI 

represented a //de facto// amendment to these state constitutions, 

these states were required to follow that process first.486 Each 

state constitution would have to be amended to authorize the 

legislature to call a ratification convention for a Constitution 

that proclaimed itself to be supreme over the states in matters 

delegated to the new central government.487 

This argument borders on frivolousness, ignoring, as it does, 

the text of Article XIII. The first sentence of that Article con-

tained a supremacy clause: “Every State shall abide by the de-

termination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all 

questions which by this confederation are submitted to 

them.”488 Nothing in Article VI of the Constitution says any-

thing materially different.489 The Constitution and all laws 

made in furtherance of the Constitution are supreme over in-

consistent state laws and state constitutions. The provisions of 

the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution on the ques-

                                                                      

  485. Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 484. 

//  //486//. See id.// 

//  //487//. See id.// at 484–87. 

  488. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII. 

//  //489//. See// U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 143

 

tion of supremacy are functionally identical. Moreover, if t

state constitutions of these select states required the use of the 

state amending process to adopt a supremacy clause, then th

requirement was equally applicable to the adoption of the Arti-

cles of Confederation. No state did this, of course, which un-

derscores the absurdity of this argument. 

Although Ackerman and Katyal never mention it, this argu-

ment was made and answered during the ratification debates.

The Republican Federalist argued that the Massachusetts con-

stitution would be effectively amended by the new federal con-

stitution.490 Accordingly, prior to ratification, permission woul

have to be obtained by first following the provisions of t

Massachusetts state constitution.491 This suggestion was neve

given serious consideration in either the Massachusetts legisla-

ture or its ratification convention. 

This theory was also argued by the town of Great Barrington, 

Massachusetts in proposed instructions to their original delegate 

to the state ratification convention, William Whiting.492 He was 

one of the Common Pleas judges from Great Barrington, Massa-

chusetts who was convicted of sedition for his role in Shay’s R

bellion.493 A Federalist writer answered such arguments by poi

ing out that, if true, they would equally demonstrate that 

Articles of Confederation had been illegally adopted: 

[I]f we put the credentials of our rulers in 1781 to the test; if 

we dare to try the extent of their authority by the criterion of 

//first principles//; if in our researches after truth on this point 

we follow //these// whithersoever they will guide us, may it not 

be safely and fairly asserted that the States of South Carolina 

Virginia, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode-Island and New 

Hampshire even from the date of Independence to that of 

the confederation to which we are objecting, never invested 

their respective Legislatures with sufficient powers perma-

nently to form and ratify such a compact.494 

                                                                      

 490. 

//The Republican Federalist III//, MASS.  CENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1787, //reprinted in//

DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 661–65.  

//  //491//. See id.// 

//  //492//. See// Draft Instructions (Nov. 26, 1787), //reprinted in //5 DHRC, //supra //note 4,

959. 

//  //493//. See id.// at 958. 

  494. Letter from John Brown Cutting to William Short London (Jan. 9, 1788)

//reprinted in //14 DHRC, //supra //note 4, at 493–94. 



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144 

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[Vol. 40 

 

As Ackerman and Katyal suggest, we must ask if there is ev-

idence that there was broad agreement as to the validity of the 

argument among Americans at the time. The answer is clearly 

no. The professors cite no contemporary evidence in support of 

their interpretation of the interplay between state constitutions 

and Article VI’s Supremacy Clause. And the supporting evi-

dence this article has discovered and cited above hardly rises to 

the level of general contemporary agreement. 

Moreover, we cannot escape the parallel between the suprema-

cy clause in Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation and the 

one in Article VI of the Constitution. No serious contention was 

ever made that state constitutions had to be revised before either 

of these provisions should be adopted. Ackerman and Katyal’s 

argument in this regard is much like the contention by the plain-

tiffs in //Leser v. Garnett//.495 There, the plaintiffs sought to strike the 

names of women voters from the list of eligible voters on the 

ground that the 19th Amendment was improperly adopted.496 

One of their arguments was that the state legislatures were with-

out power to approve a constitutional amendment allowing 

women to vote if the state constitution prohibited such voting.497 

The plaintiffs contended that legislators who voted for the 19th 

Amendment in states where suffrage was limited to males “ig-

nored their official oaths [and] violated the express provisions” of 

their state constitutions.498 The Court quickly and unanimously 

rejected this contention.499 State constitutions do not have to be 

first amended to allow the legislature to vote to ratify amend-

ments that impliedly contravene provisions thereof. 

//4.  The Professors’ Real Agenda //

The reason that Ackerman and Katyal advance their theory 

that the Constitution was adopted by a revolutionary and ille-

gal process is revealed in their article’s final section. They con-

tend that such revolutionary actions—changes in the governing 

structure without adherence to the proper processes—are ap-

propriate whenever the need is sufficiently great to justify ille-

                                                                      

  495. 258 U.S. 130 (1922). 

//  //496//. Id.// at 135. 

  497. Brief for Petitioner at 100, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (No. 553). 

//  //498//. Id.// at 110. 

//  //499//. See Leser//, 258 U.S. at 137. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 145 

 

gal means.500 They contend that the constitutional revolutions 

of Reconstruction and those of the era of judicial activism are 

just as valid as the Constitution itself: 

In justifying their end run around state-centered ratifica-

tion rules, nineteenth-century Republicans and twentieth-

century Democrats not only resembled eighteenth-century 

Federalists in asserting more nationalistic conceptions of 

We the People than their opponents. They also sought to 

give new meaning to the idea of popular sovereignty by 

making it far more inclusionary than anything contemplat-

ed by the eighteenth century.501 

  They contend that there has been a tacit approval of all of 

these revolutionary changes by the votes of the people in sub-

sequent national elections.502 However, this attempt at equiva-

lency fails on at least two levels. First, the Constitution was ap-

proved by ratification conventions directly elected by the 

people.503 These elections provide the moral justification for the 

claim that the Constitution was adopted by the consent of the 

governed. Moreover, no state was bound by the new Constitu-

tion until the people of that state actually consented. The actual 

consent of the governed was obtained. 

The judicial revolution praised by Ackerman and Katyal has no 

such parallel reflecting the consent of the governed. In fact, just 

the opposite is true. The direct votes of the people are often over-

turned by judicial rulings as was the case in //Lucas v. Forty-Fourth //

//General Assembly of Colorado//.504 Judges cannot consent for the peo-

ple. Subsequent elections for Congress or the White House and 

the passage of time do not constitute the consent of the governed 

for judicial revisionist rulings. Thomas Paine, who understood a 

few things about revolutions and moral consent said: 

All power exercised over a nation must have some begin-

ning. It must either be delegated or assumed. There are no 

other sources. All delegated power is trust, and all assumed 

                                                                      

//  //500//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 568–73. 

//  //501//. Id.// at 570–71. 

//  //502//. See id. //at 571–72. 

//  //503//. See// Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 340, 340. 

  504. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 

144 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

As Ackerman and Katyal suggest, we must ask if there is ev-

idence that there was broad agreement as to the validity of the 

argument among Americans at the time. The answer is clearly 

no. The professors cite no contemporary evidence in support of 

their interpretation of the interplay between state constitutions 

and Article VI’s Supremacy Clause. And the supporting evi-

dence this article has discovered and cited above hardly rises to 

the level of general contemporary agreement. 

Moreover, we cannot escape the parallel between the suprema-

cy clause in Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation and the 

one in Article VI of the Constitution. No serious contention was 

ever made that state constitutions had to be revised before either 

of these provisions should be adopted. Ackerman and Katyal’s 

argument in this regard is much like the contention by the plain-

tiffs in //Leser v. Garnett//.495 There, the plaintiffs sought to strike the 

names of women voters from the list of eligible voters on the 

ground that the 19th Amendment was improperly adopted.496 

One of their arguments was that the state legislatures were with-

out power to approve a constitutional amendment allowing 

women to vote if the state constitution prohibited such voting.497 

The plaintiffs contended that legislators who voted for the 19th 

Amendment in states where suffrage was limited to males “ig-

nored their official oaths [and] violated the express provisions” of 

their state constitutions.498 The Court quickly and unanimously 

rejected this contention.499 State constitutions do not have to be 

first amended to allow the legislature to vote to ratify amend-

ments that impliedly contravene provisions thereof. 

//4.  The Professors’ Real Agenda //

The reason that Ackerman and Katyal advance their theory 

that the Constitution was adopted by a revolutionary and ille-

gal process is revealed in their article’s final section. They con-

tend that such revolutionary actions—changes in the governing 

structure without adherence to the proper processes—are ap-

propriate whenever the need is sufficiently great to justify ille-

                                                                      

  495. 258 U.S. 130 (1922). 

//  //496//. Id.// at 135. 

  497. Brief for Petitioner at 100, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (No. 553). 

//  //498//. Id.// at 110. 

//  //499//. See Leser//, 258 U.S. at 137. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 145

 

gal means.500 They contend that the constitutional revolution

of Reconstruction and those of the era of judicial activism are 

just as valid as the Constitution itself: 

In justifying their end run around state-centered ratifica-

tion rules, nineteenth-century Republicans and twentieth-

century Democrats not only resembled eighteenth-century 

Federalists in asserting more nationalistic conceptions of 

We the People than their opponents. They also sought to 

give new meaning to the idea of popular sovereignty by 

making it far more inclusionary than anything contemplat-

ed by the eighteenth century.501 

  They contend that there has been a tacit approval of all of 

these revolutionary changes by the votes of the people in sub-

sequent national elections.502 However, this attempt at equiva

lency fails on at least two levels. First, the Constitution was ap-

proved by ratification conventions directly elected by the 

people.503 These elections provide the moral justification for the

claim that the Constitution was adopted by the consent of t

governed. Moreover, no state was bound by the new Consti

tion until the people of that state actually consented. The actu

consent of the governed was obtained. 

The judicial revolution praised by Ackerman and Katyal has no 

such parallel reflecting the consent of the governed. In fact, j

the opposite is true. The direct votes of the people are often ov

turned by judicial rulings as was the case in //Lucas v. Forty-Fou//

//General Assembly of Colorado//.504 Judges cannot consent for the peo-

ple. Subsequent elections for Congress or the White House a

the passage of time do not constitute the consent of the govern

for judicial revisionist rulings. Thomas Paine, who understood

few things about revolutions and moral consent said: 

All power exercised over a nation must have some begin-

ning. It must either be delegated or assumed. There are no 

other sources. All delegated power is trust, and all assumed 

                                                                      

//  //500//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 568–73. 

//  //501//. Id.// at 570–71. 

//  //502//. See id. //at 571–72. 

//  //503//. See// Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4

at 340, 340. 

  504. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto149.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**149**

144 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

As Ackerman and Katyal suggest, we must ask if there is ev-

idence that there was broad agreement as to the validity of the 

argument among Americans at the time. The answer is clearly 

no. The professors cite no contemporary evidence in support of 

their interpretation of the interplay between state constitutions 

and Article VI’s Supremacy Clause. And the supporting evi-

dence this article has discovered and cited above hardly rises to 

the level of general contemporary agreement. 

Moreover, we cannot escape the parallel between the suprema-

cy clause in Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation and the 

one in Article VI of the Constitution. No serious contention was 

ever made that state constitutions had to be revised before either 

of these provisions should be adopted. Ackerman and Katyal’s 

argument in this regard is much like the contention by the plain-

tiffs in //Leser v. Garnett//.495 There, the plaintiffs sought to strike the 

names of women voters from the list of eligible voters on the 

ground that the 19th Amendment was improperly adopted.496 

One of their arguments was that the state legislatures were with-

out power to approve a constitutional amendment allowing 

women to vote if the state constitution prohibited such voting.497 

The plaintiffs contended that legislators who voted for the 19th 

Amendment in states where suffrage was limited to males “ig-

nored their official oaths [and] violated the express provisions” of 

their state constitutions.498 The Court quickly and unanimously 

rejected this contention.499 State constitutions do not have to be 

first amended to allow the legislature to vote to ratify amend-

ments that impliedly contravene provisions thereof. 

//4.  The Professors’ Real Agenda //

The reason that Ackerman and Katyal advance their theory 

that the Constitution was adopted by a revolutionary and ille-

gal process is revealed in their article’s final section. They con-

tend that such revolutionary actions—changes in the governing 

structure without adherence to the proper processes—are ap-

propriate whenever the need is sufficiently great to justify ille-

                                                                      

  495. 258 U.S. 130 (1922). 

//  //496//. Id.// at 135. 

  497. Brief for Petitioner at 100, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (No. 553). 

//  //498//. Id.// at 110. 

//  //499//. See Leser//, 258 U.S. at 137. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 145 

 

gal means.500 They contend that the constitutional revolutions 

of Reconstruction and those of the era of judicial activism are 

just as valid as the Constitution itself: 

In justifying their end run around state-centered ratifica-

tion rules, nineteenth-century Republicans and twentieth-

century Democrats not only resembled eighteenth-century 

Federalists in asserting more nationalistic conceptions of 

We the People than their opponents. They also sought to 

give new meaning to the idea of popular sovereignty by 

making it far more inclusionary than anything contemplat-

ed by the eighteenth century.501 

  They contend that there has been a tacit approval of all of 

these revolutionary changes by the votes of the people in sub-

sequent national elections.502 However, this attempt at equiva-

lency fails on at least two levels. First, the Constitution was ap-

proved by ratification conventions directly elected by the 

people.503 These elections provide the moral justification for the 

claim that the Constitution was adopted by the consent of the 

governed. Moreover, no state was bound by the new Constitu-

tion until the people of that state actually consented. The actual 

consent of the governed was obtained. 

The judicial revolution praised by Ackerman and Katyal has no 

such parallel reflecting the consent of the governed. In fact, just 

the opposite is true. The direct votes of the people are often over-

turned by judicial rulings as was the case in //Lucas v. Forty-Fourth //

//General Assembly of Colorado//.504 Judges cannot consent for the peo-

ple. Subsequent elections for Congress or the White House and 

the passage of time do not constitute the consent of the governed 

for judicial revisionist rulings. Thomas Paine, who understood a 

few things about revolutions and moral consent said: 

All power exercised over a nation must have some begin-

ning. It must either be delegated or assumed. There are no 

other sources. All delegated power is trust, and all assumed 

                                                                      

//  //500//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 568–73. 

//  //501//. Id.// at 570–71. 

//  //502//. See id. //at 571–72. 

//  //503//. See// Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4, 

at 340, 340. 

  504. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 

144 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

As Ackerman and Katyal suggest, we must ask if there is ev-

idence that there was broad agreement as to the validity of the 

argument among Americans at the time. The answer is clearly 

no. The professors cite no contemporary evidence in support of 

their interpretation of the interplay between state constitutions 

and Article VI’s Supremacy Clause. And the supporting evi-

dence this article has discovered and cited above hardly rises to 

the level of general contemporary agreement. 

Moreover, we cannot escape the parallel between the suprema-

cy clause in Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation and the 

one in Article VI of the Constitution. No serious contention was 

ever made that state constitutions had to be revised before either 

of these provisions should be adopted. Ackerman and Katyal’s 

argument in this regard is much like the contention by the plain-

tiffs in //Leser v. Garnett//.495 There, the plaintiffs sought to strike the 

names of women voters from the list of eligible voters on the 

ground that the 19th Amendment was improperly adopted.496 

One of their arguments was that the state legislatures were with-

out power to approve a constitutional amendment allowing 

women to vote if the state constitution prohibited such voting.497 

The plaintiffs contended that legislators who voted for the 19th 

Amendment in states where suffrage was limited to males “ig-

nored their official oaths [and] violated the express provisions” of 

their state constitutions.498 The Court quickly and unanimously 

rejected this contention.499 State constitutions do not have to be 

first amended to allow the legislature to vote to ratify amend-

ments that impliedly contravene provisions thereof. 

//4.  The Professors’ Real Agenda //

The reason that Ackerman and Katyal advance their theory 

that the Constitution was adopted by a revolutionary and ille-

gal process is revealed in their article’s final section. They con-

tend that such revolutionary actions—changes in the governing 

structure without adherence to the proper processes—are ap-

propriate whenever the need is sufficiently great to justify ille-

                                                                      

  495. 258 U.S. 130 (1922). 

//  //496//. Id.// at 135. 

  497. Brief for Petitioner at 100, Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (No. 553). 

//  //498//. Id.// at 110. 

//  //499//. See Leser//, 258 U.S. at 137. 

No. 1] 

//Defying Conventional Wisdom// 145

 

gal means.500 They contend that the constitutional revolution

of Reconstruction and those of the era of judicial activism are 

just as valid as the Constitution itself: 

In justifying their end run around state-centered ratifica-

tion rules, nineteenth-century Republicans and twentieth-

century Democrats not only resembled eighteenth-century 

Federalists in asserting more nationalistic conceptions of 

We the People than their opponents. They also sought to 

give new meaning to the idea of popular sovereignty by 

making it far more inclusionary than anything contemplat-

ed by the eighteenth century.501 

  They contend that there has been a tacit approval of all of 

these revolutionary changes by the votes of the people in sub-

sequent national elections.502 However, this attempt at equiva

lency fails on at least two levels. First, the Constitution was ap-

proved by ratification conventions directly elected by the 

people.503 These elections provide the moral justification for the

claim that the Constitution was adopted by the consent of t

governed. Moreover, no state was bound by the new Consti

tion until the people of that state actually consented. The actu

consent of the governed was obtained. 

The judicial revolution praised by Ackerman and Katyal has no 

such parallel reflecting the consent of the governed. In fact, j

the opposite is true. The direct votes of the people are often ov

turned by judicial rulings as was the case in //Lucas v. Forty-Fou//

//General Assembly of Colorado//.504 Judges cannot consent for the peo-

ple. Subsequent elections for Congress or the White House a

the passage of time do not constitute the consent of the govern

for judicial revisionist rulings. Thomas Paine, who understood

few things about revolutions and moral consent said: 

All power exercised over a nation must have some begin-

ning. It must either be delegated or assumed. There are no 

other sources. All delegated power is trust, and all assumed 

                                                                      

//  //500//. See //Ackerman & Katyal, //supra //note 14, at 568–73. 

//  //501//. Id.// at 570–71. 

//  //502//. See id. //at 571–72. 

//  //503//. See// Journals of Congress (Sept. 28, 1787), //reprinted// //in //1 DHRC, //supra// note 4

at 340, 340. 

  504. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto150.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**150**

146 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

power is usurpation. Time does not alter the nature and 

quality of either.505 

The parallel fails. First, the Constitution was lawfully adopt-

ed. Second, the Constitution was approved by the direct vote of 

the people before anyone was obligated by it. Nothing in this 

history provides a parallel to establish an aura of legal or moral 

legitimacy for judges who wish to exercise the self-created pre-

rogative to regularly rewrite the Constitution starting the first 

Monday of every October. 

IV.  CONCLUSION 

When we raise our hands to swear allegiance to the Constitu-

tion and promise to defend it against all enemies foreign or 

domestic, we can do so with a clean conscience. The Constitu-

tional Convention was called by the states. The delegates 

obeyed the instructions from their respective legislatures as to 

the scope of their authority. The new method for ratification 

was a separate act of the Constitutional Convention that was 

approved by a unanimous Congress and all thirteen legisla-

tures. The consent of the governed was obtained by having 

special elections for delegates to every state ratifying conven-

tion. No state was bound to obey the Constitution until its peo-

ple gave their consent. Moral legitimacy and legal propriety 

were in competition at times. But in the end, the Framers found 

a way to satisfy both interests. 

The Constitution of the United States was validly and legally 

adopted. 

                                                                      

  505. THOMAS  PAINE,  THE  RIGHTS OF MAN,  //reprinted in// 2 THE  WRITINGS OF 

THOMAS PAINE, at 265, 428 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 1894). 

//In mid-April, on Good Friday, the George Soros funded left-wing policy group Common Cause declared war on COS, announcing \\
the formation of the largest radical left alliance in US history.//

//Almost every radical, liberal, progressive, Marxist group in America signed onto a coalition to oppose the use of\\
Article V and the Convention of States movement as provided in our Constitution. In doing so, they accomplished something \\
that even Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders couldn’t: **they unified the radical left with one voice.**//

Access to Independence, Inc.\\
(Madison, WI)\\
ACE-AFSCME Local 2250\\
ACLU of Colorado\\
African American Health Alliance\\
African American Ministers In \\
Action\\
AFSCME 2960\\
AFSCME 4041\\
AFSCME Council 3\\
AFSCME Council 32\\
AFSCME Council 67\\
AFSCME Iowa Council 61\\
AFSCME Retirees\\
AFSCME Retirees Chapter 32\\
AFSCME Retirees Chapter 97\\
Alaska AFL-CIO\\
Alliance for Justice\\
America Votes Colorado

**American Federation of Labor \\
and Congress of Industrial \\
Organizations (AFL–CIO)\\
American Federation of State, \\
County and Municipal Employees\\
**American-Arab Anti-Discrimination \\
Committee\\
Americans for Democratic Action \\
(ADA)\\
Asian and Pacific Islander American \\
Vote\\
Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc.\\
Bend the Arc Jewish Action\\
Benedictine Sisters of Baltimore\\
Better Idaho\\
Bhutanese Community Association \\
of Pittsburgh\\
**Brennan Center for Justice\\
**California Common Cause

Campaign Legal Center\\
**Center for American Progress\\
**Center for Community Change\\
Center for Law and Social Policy \\
(CLASP)\\
**Center for Media and Democracy\\
**Center for Medicare Advocacy\\
Center for Popular Democracy\\
**Center on Budget and Policy \\
Priorities\\
**Children’s Defense Fund\\
Citizen Action of Wisconsin\\
**Citizens for Responsibility and \\
Ethics in Washington (CREW)\\
**City of Chino Housing Division\\
Clean Elections Texas\\
Cleveland Nonviolence Network\\
CNY Fair Housing, Inc\\
Coalition on Human Needs

Colorado AFL-CIO\\
Colorado Common Cause\\
Colorado Ethics Watch\\
Colorado Fiscal Institute\\
Colorado Sierra Club\\
Colorado WINS\\
**Common Cause\\
**Common Cause Connecticut\\
Common Cause Delaware\\
Common Cause Florida\\
Common Cause Georgia\\
Common Cause Hawaii\\
Common Cause Illinois\\
Common Cause Indiana\\
Common Cause Kentucky\\
Common Cause Maryland\\
Common Cause Michigan\\
Common Cause Minnesota\\
Common Cause Nebraska

**What you see below is taken directly from the press release**

**Issued on Good Friday, April 14, 2017, by Common Cause:**

“The undersigned organizations strongly urge state legislatures to oppose efforts to pass a resolution to call for a \\
constitutional convention. We also strongly urge state legislatures to rescind any application for an Article V constitutional \\
convention in order to protect all Americans’ constitutional rights and privileges from being put at \\
risk and up for grabs.” ~ Common Cause

//HILLARY CLINTON//

//PLANNED PARENTHOOD//

//GEORGE SOROS//



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto151.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**151**

146 

//Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy// 

[Vol. 40 

 

power is usurpation. Time does not alter the nature and 

quality of either.505 

The parallel fails. First, the Constitution was lawfully adopt-

ed. Second, the Constitution was approved by the direct vote of 

the people before anyone was obligated by it. Nothing in this 

history provides a parallel to establish an aura of legal or moral 

legitimacy for judges who wish to exercise the self-created pre-

rogative to regularly rewrite the Constitution starting the first 

Monday of every October. 

IV.  CONCLUSION 

When we raise our hands to swear allegiance to the Constitu-

tion and promise to defend it against all enemies foreign or 

domestic, we can do so with a clean conscience. The Constitu-

tional Convention was called by the states. The delegates 

obeyed the instructions from their respective legislatures as to 

the scope of their authority. The new method for ratification 

was a separate act of the Constitutional Convention that was 

approved by a unanimous Congress and all thirteen legisla-

tures. The consent of the governed was obtained by having 

special elections for delegates to every state ratifying conven-

tion. No state was bound to obey the Constitution until its peo-

ple gave their consent. Moral legitimacy and legal propriety 

were in competition at times. But in the end, the Framers found 

a way to satisfy both interests. 

The Constitution of the United States was validly and legally 

adopted. 

                                                                      

  505. THOMAS  PAINE,  THE  RIGHTS OF MAN,  //reprinted in// 2 THE  WRITINGS OF 

THOMAS PAINE, at 265, 428 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 1894). 

//In mid-April, on Good Friday, the George Soros funded left-wing policy group Common Cause declared war on COS, announcing \\
the formation of the largest radical left alliance in US history.//

//Almost every radical, liberal, progressive, Marxist group in America signed onto a coalition to oppose the use of\\
Article V and the Convention of States movement as provided in our Constitution. In doing so, they accomplished something \\
that even Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders couldn’t: **they unified the radical left with one voice.**//

Access to Independence, Inc.\\
(Madison, WI)\\
ACE-AFSCME Local 2250\\
ACLU of Colorado\\
African American Health Alliance\\
African American Ministers In \\
Action\\
AFSCME 2960\\
AFSCME 4041\\
AFSCME Council 3\\
AFSCME Council 32\\
AFSCME Council 67\\
AFSCME Iowa Council 61\\
AFSCME Retirees\\
AFSCME Retirees Chapter 32\\
AFSCME Retirees Chapter 97\\
Alaska AFL-CIO\\
Alliance for Justice\\
America Votes Colorado

**American Federation of Labor \\
and Congress of Industrial \\
Organizations (AFL–CIO)\\
American Federation of State, \\
County and Municipal Employees\\
**American-Arab Anti-Discrimination \\
Committee\\
Americans for Democratic Action \\
(ADA)\\
Asian and Pacific Islander American \\
Vote\\
Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc.\\
Bend the Arc Jewish Action\\
Benedictine Sisters of Baltimore\\
Better Idaho\\
Bhutanese Community Association \\
of Pittsburgh\\
**Brennan Center for Justice\\
**California Common Cause

Campaign Legal Center\\
**Center for American Progress\\
**Center for Community Change\\
Center for Law and Social Policy \\
(CLASP)\\
**Center for Media and Democracy\\
**Center for Medicare Advocacy\\
Center for Popular Democracy\\
**Center on Budget and Policy \\
Priorities\\
**Children’s Defense Fund\\
Citizen Action of Wisconsin\\
**Citizens for Responsibility and \\
Ethics in Washington (CREW)\\
**City of Chino Housing Division\\
Clean Elections Texas\\
Cleveland Nonviolence Network\\
CNY Fair Housing, Inc\\
Coalition on Human Needs

Colorado AFL-CIO\\
Colorado Common Cause\\
Colorado Ethics Watch\\
Colorado Fiscal Institute\\
Colorado Sierra Club\\
Colorado WINS\\
**Common Cause\\
**Common Cause Connecticut\\
Common Cause Delaware\\
Common Cause Florida\\
Common Cause Georgia\\
Common Cause Hawaii\\
Common Cause Illinois\\
Common Cause Indiana\\
Common Cause Kentucky\\
Common Cause Maryland\\
Common Cause Michigan\\
Common Cause Minnesota\\
Common Cause Nebraska

**What you see below is taken directly from the press release**

**Issued on Good Friday, April 14, 2017, by Common Cause:**

“The undersigned organizations strongly urge state legislatures to oppose efforts to pass a resolution to call for a \\
constitutional convention. We also strongly urge state legislatures to rescind any application for an Article V constitutional \\
convention in order to protect all Americans’ constitutional rights and privileges from being put at \\
risk and up for grabs.” ~ Common Cause

//HILLARY CLINTON//

//PLANNED PARENTHOOD//

//GEORGE SOROS//



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto152.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**152**

Common Cause New Mexico\\
Common Cause New York\\
Common Cause North Carolina\\
Common Cause Ohio\\
Common Cause Oregon \\
Disability Rights Oregon\\
Common Cause Pennsylvania\\
Common Cause Rhode Island\\
Common Cause Texas\\
Common Cause Wisconsin\\
**Communications \\
Workers of America (CWA)\\
**Community Advocates \\
Public Policy Institute\\
Community at Holy Family Manor \\
(Pittsburgh, PA)\\
Congregation of the Humility of \\
Mary\\
Connecticut Fair Housing Center, \\
Inc. \\
Conscious Talk Radio\\
Courage Campaign\\
Culinary Union\\
CWA Local 1081\\
**Daily Kos\\
Democracy 21\\
**Disability Rights Maine\\
Disability Rights Maryland\\
Disability Rights North Carolina\\
Disabled in Action of \\
Greater Syracuse Inc.\\
Dominicans of Sinsinawa - \\
Leadership Council\\
Downstreet Housing & Community \\
Development\\
Dream Defenders\\
Earthjustice\\
Eclectablog\\
Economic Policy Institute\\
**EMILY’s List\\
**End Domestic Abuse Wisconsin\\
Equality Ohio\\
Every Voice\\
Fair Elections Legal Network\\
Fair Housing Advocates of Northern \\
California\\
Fair Housing Center of Central \\
Indiana\\
Fair Housing Center of Northern \\
Alabama\\
Fair Housing Center of West \\
Michigan\\
Faith in Florida\\
Faith in Public Life

Family Values at Work\\
Florida Consumer Action Network\\
Food Research & Action Center \\
(FRAC)\\
Franciscan Action Network\\
Fuse Washington\\
Grandparents United for Madison \\
Public Schools\\
Greater New Orleans Fair Housing \\
Action Center\\
**Greenpeace USA\\
**Harlingen Community Development \\
Corporation\\
Holy Family Home and Shelter, Inc\\
Idaho AFL-CIO\\
Independence First\\
Independent Living Resources \\
(Durham, NC)\\
International Association of Fire \\
Fighters\\
Iowa AFL-CIO\\
Jobs With Justice\\
Just Harvest (Pittsburgh, PA)\\
Kansas AFL-CIO\\
Kentucky AFL-CIO\\
League of Women Voters of \\
Colorado\\
League of Women Voters of \\
Minnesota\\
League of Women Voters of New \\
Mexico\\
**League of Women Voters of the \\
United States\\
**League of Women Voters of \\
Wisconsin\\
Long Island Housing Services, Inc.\\
Madison-area Urban Ministry\\
Main Street Alliance\\
Maine AFL-CIO\\
Maryland Center on Economic \\
Policy\\
Massachusetts AFL-CIO\\
Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair \\
Housing Council\\
**Mi Familia Vota\\
**Midstate Independent Living \\
Consultants\\
Minnesota AFL-CIO\\
Minnesota Citizens for Clean \\
Elections\\
Mississippi AFL-CIO\\
Monarch Housing Associates\\
Montana AFL-CIO\\
**NAACP**

Nashville CARES\\
National Asian Pacific American \\
Families Against Substance Abuse\\
**National Association of Social \\
Workers\\
**National Association of Social \\
Workers, Wisconsin Chapter\\
National Council of Asian Pacific \\
Americans (NCAPA)\\
National Council of Jewish Women\\
National Council of La Raza Action \\
Fund\\
National Disability Institute\\
National Disability Rights Network\\
National Education Association \\
(NEA)\\
National Employment Law Project \\
(NELP)\\
National Fair Housing Alliance\\
National Korean American Service \\
& Education Consortium\\
National Partnership for Women & \\
Families\\
National WIC Association\\
National Women’s Law Center\\
Nebraskans for Civic Reform\\
New Era Colorado\\
New Hampshire AFL-CIO\\
New Jersey Association of \\
Mental Health and Addiction\\
New Mexico Hospital Workers Union \\
(1199NM)\\
North Dakota AFL-CIO\\
Oak Park River Forest Food Pantry\\
Ohio Voice\\
Oklahoma AFL-CIO\\
OMNI Center for Peace, Justice & \\
Ecology\\
One Wisconsin Now\\
Options for Independent Living Inc. \\
(Green Bay, WI)\\
P.S., A Partnership\\
People Demanding Action\\
People For the American Way\\
**Planned Parenthood of Southern \\
New England\\
**Progress Colorado\\
Progress Florida\\
Progress Michigan\\
Progress Now\\
Progress Ohio\\
Project IRENE\\
Public Justice Center\\
Schenectady Inner City Ministry

School Sisters of Saint Francis \\
(Milwaukee)\\
SEIU Colorado\\
**Service Employees International \\
Union (SEIU)\\
**Sierra Club\\
Sisters of Charity of Nazareth \\
Congregational Leadership\\
Social Security Works\\
Solidarity Committee of the Capital \\
District\\
South Carolina AFL-CIO\\
South Dakota AFL-CIO\\
Southwest Fair Housing Council\\
State Innovation Exchange\\
Survival Coalition of Disability \\
Organization of Wisconsin\\
Tabitha’s Way\\
The Arc of the United States\\
The Arc Wisconsin\\
The Forum for Youth Investment\\
The Public Interest\\
The Voting Rights Institute\\
The Wisconsin Democracy \\
Campaign\\
The Xaverian Brothers\\
Toledo Area Jobs with Justice\\
Toledo Fair Housing Center\\
UNITE HERE\\
**United Food and Commercial \\
Workers (UFCW)\\
**Virginia AFL-CIO\\
Virginia Civic Engagement Table\\
Vision for Children at Risk\\
Voice for Adoption\\
Vote Vets Action Fund\\
Washington AFL-CIO\\
Washington Community Action \\
Network\\
West Virginia Citizen Action Group\\
Wisconsin AFL-CIO\\
Wisconsin Aging Advocacy Network\\
Wisconsin Coalition of Independent \\
Living Centers, Wisconsin \\
Community Action Program \\
Association (WISCAP)\\
Wisconsin Council on Children and \\
Families\\
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign\\
Wisconsin Faith Voices for Justice\\
Wisconsin Voices\\
Women’s Voices Women Vote Action \\
Fund Working America\\
Wyoming AFL-CIO

The  Article V mechanism  is  safe,  and  it  is  the  only  

constitutionally  eff ective  means  available  to  do  what  

is  so  essential  for our nation.

The Constitution’s Framers foresaw a day when the federal 

government would exceed and abuse its enumerated 

powers, thus placing our liberty at risk. George Mason was 

instrumental in fashioning a mechanism by which “we the 

people” could defend our freedom—the ultimate check on 

federal power contained in Article V of the Constitution.

Article V provides the states with the opportunity to 

propose constitutional amendments through a process 

controlled by the states from beginning to end on all 

substantive matters.

A convention to propose amendments is convened when 

34 state legislatures pass resolutions (applications) on an 

agreed topic or set of topics. The Convention is limited to 

considering amendments on these specifi ed topics.

While some have expressed fears that an Article V 

convention might be misused or improperly controlled by 

Congress, it is our considered judgment that the checks 

Signed,

//The//

** JEFFERSON**

**STATEMENT**

//*Original signers of the Jeff erson Statement//

//Randy E. Barnett*//

//Charles J. Cooper*//

//John C. Eastman*//

//Michael P. Farris*//

//Robert P. George*//

//C. Boyden Gray*//

//Mark Levin*//

//Nelson Lund//

//Andrew McCarthy*//

//Mark Meckler*//

//Mat Staver//

//**When the nation’s fi nest legal minds gathered at the Jeff erson Hotel in Washington, D.C., they set out to \\
consider arguments for and against the use of Article V to restrain federal power. But like the Founding \\
Fathers in 1787, they soon realized that they agreed unanimously that the Article V option is safe, eff ective, \\
and necessary.**//

//**These experts, who subsequently signed the Jeff erson Statement reproduced below, rejected the argument \\
that an Article V convention is likely to be misused or improperly controlled by Congress. They shared the \\
conviction that Article V provides the only constitutionally eff ective means to restore our federal system, \\
and they formed the core of our Legal Board of Reference, whose names you can fi nd on the opposite side \\
of this document.**//

**MARK LEVIN**

**MARK MECKLER**

**MICHAEL FARRIS**

and balances in the Constitution are more than sufficient 

to ensure the integrity of the process.

The Article V mechanism is safe, and it is the only 

constitutionally eff ective means available to do what is so 

essential for our nation—restoring robust federalism with 

genuine checks on the power of the federal government.

We share the Founders’ conviction that proper decision-

making structures are essential to preserve liberty. We 

believe that the problems facing our nation require several 

structural limitations on the exercise of federal power. While 

fi scal restraints are essential, we believe the most eff ective 

course is to pursue reasonable limitations, fully in line with 

the vision of our Founders, on the federal government.

Accordingly, I endorse the Convention of States Project, 

which calls for an Article V convention for “the sole purpose 

of proposing amendments that impose fi scal restraints on 

the federal government, limit the power and jurisdiction of 

the federal government, and limit the terms of offi  ce for its 

offi  cials and for members of Congress.” I hereby agree to 

serve on the Legal Board of Reference for the Convention 

of States Project.



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto153.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**153**

Common Cause New Mexico\\
Common Cause New York\\
Common Cause North Carolina\\
Common Cause Ohio\\
Common Cause Oregon \\
Disability Rights Oregon\\
Common Cause Pennsylvania\\
Common Cause Rhode Island\\
Common Cause Texas\\
Common Cause Wisconsin\\
**Communications \\
Workers of America (CWA)\\
**Community Advocates \\
Public Policy Institute\\
Community at Holy Family Manor \\
(Pittsburgh, PA)\\
Congregation of the Humility of \\
Mary\\
Connecticut Fair Housing Center, \\
Inc. \\
Conscious Talk Radio\\
Courage Campaign\\
Culinary Union\\
CWA Local 1081\\
**Daily Kos\\
Democracy 21\\
**Disability Rights Maine\\
Disability Rights Maryland\\
Disability Rights North Carolina\\
Disabled in Action of \\
Greater Syracuse Inc.\\
Dominicans of Sinsinawa - \\
Leadership Council\\
Downstreet Housing & Community \\
Development\\
Dream Defenders\\
Earthjustice\\
Eclectablog\\
Economic Policy Institute\\
**EMILY’s List\\
**End Domestic Abuse Wisconsin\\
Equality Ohio\\
Every Voice\\
Fair Elections Legal Network\\
Fair Housing Advocates of Northern \\
California\\
Fair Housing Center of Central \\
Indiana\\
Fair Housing Center of Northern \\
Alabama\\
Fair Housing Center of West \\
Michigan\\
Faith in Florida\\
Faith in Public Life

Family Values at Work\\
Florida Consumer Action Network\\
Food Research & Action Center \\
(FRAC)\\
Franciscan Action Network\\
Fuse Washington\\
Grandparents United for Madison \\
Public Schools\\
Greater New Orleans Fair Housing \\
Action Center\\
**Greenpeace USA\\
**Harlingen Community Development \\
Corporation\\
Holy Family Home and Shelter, Inc\\
Idaho AFL-CIO\\
Independence First\\
Independent Living Resources \\
(Durham, NC)\\
International Association of Fire \\
Fighters\\
Iowa AFL-CIO\\
Jobs With Justice\\
Just Harvest (Pittsburgh, PA)\\
Kansas AFL-CIO\\
Kentucky AFL-CIO\\
League of Women Voters of \\
Colorado\\
League of Women Voters of \\
Minnesota\\
League of Women Voters of New \\
Mexico\\
**League of Women Voters of the \\
United States\\
**League of Women Voters of \\
Wisconsin\\
Long Island Housing Services, Inc.\\
Madison-area Urban Ministry\\
Main Street Alliance\\
Maine AFL-CIO\\
Maryland Center on Economic \\
Policy\\
Massachusetts AFL-CIO\\
Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair \\
Housing Council\\
**Mi Familia Vota\\
**Midstate Independent Living \\
Consultants\\
Minnesota AFL-CIO\\
Minnesota Citizens for Clean \\
Elections\\
Mississippi AFL-CIO\\
Monarch Housing Associates\\
Montana AFL-CIO\\
**NAACP**

Nashville CARES\\
National Asian Pacific American \\
Families Against Substance Abuse\\
**National Association of Social \\
Workers\\
**National Association of Social \\
Workers, Wisconsin Chapter\\
National Council of Asian Pacific \\
Americans (NCAPA)\\
National Council of Jewish Women\\
National Council of La Raza Action \\
Fund\\
National Disability Institute\\
National Disability Rights Network\\
National Education Association \\
(NEA)\\
National Employment Law Project \\
(NELP)\\
National Fair Housing Alliance\\
National Korean American Service \\
& Education Consortium\\
National Partnership for Women & \\
Families\\
National WIC Association\\
National Women’s Law Center\\
Nebraskans for Civic Reform\\
New Era Colorado\\
New Hampshire AFL-CIO\\
New Jersey Association of \\
Mental Health and Addiction\\
New Mexico Hospital Workers Union \\
(1199NM)\\
North Dakota AFL-CIO\\
Oak Park River Forest Food Pantry\\
Ohio Voice\\
Oklahoma AFL-CIO\\
OMNI Center for Peace, Justice & \\
Ecology\\
One Wisconsin Now\\
Options for Independent Living Inc. \\
(Green Bay, WI)\\
P.S., A Partnership\\
People Demanding Action\\
People For the American Way\\
**Planned Parenthood of Southern \\
New England\\
**Progress Colorado\\
Progress Florida\\
Progress Michigan\\
Progress Now\\
Progress Ohio\\
Project IRENE\\
Public Justice Center\\
Schenectady Inner City Ministry

School Sisters of Saint Francis \\
(Milwaukee)\\
SEIU Colorado\\
**Service Employees International \\
Union (SEIU)\\
**Sierra Club\\
Sisters of Charity of Nazareth \\
Congregational Leadership\\
Social Security Works\\
Solidarity Committee of the Capital \\
District\\
South Carolina AFL-CIO\\
South Dakota AFL-CIO\\
Southwest Fair Housing Council\\
State Innovation Exchange\\
Survival Coalition of Disability \\
Organization of Wisconsin\\
Tabitha’s Way\\
The Arc of the United States\\
The Arc Wisconsin\\
The Forum for Youth Investment\\
The Public Interest\\
The Voting Rights Institute\\
The Wisconsin Democracy \\
Campaign\\
The Xaverian Brothers\\
Toledo Area Jobs with Justice\\
Toledo Fair Housing Center\\
UNITE HERE\\
**United Food and Commercial \\
Workers (UFCW)\\
**Virginia AFL-CIO\\
Virginia Civic Engagement Table\\
Vision for Children at Risk\\
Voice for Adoption\\
Vote Vets Action Fund\\
Washington AFL-CIO\\
Washington Community Action \\
Network\\
West Virginia Citizen Action Group\\
Wisconsin AFL-CIO\\
Wisconsin Aging Advocacy Network\\
Wisconsin Coalition of Independent \\
Living Centers, Wisconsin \\
Community Action Program \\
Association (WISCAP)\\
Wisconsin Council on Children and \\
Families\\
Wisconsin Democracy Campaign\\
Wisconsin Faith Voices for Justice\\
Wisconsin Voices\\
Women’s Voices Women Vote Action \\
Fund Working America\\
Wyoming AFL-CIO

The  Article V mechanism  is  safe,  and  it  is  the  only  

constitutionally  eff ective  means  available  to  do  what  

is  so  essential  for our nation.

The Constitution’s Framers foresaw a day when the federal 

government would exceed and abuse its enumerated 

powers, thus placing our liberty at risk. George Mason was 

instrumental in fashioning a mechanism by which “we the 

people” could defend our freedom—the ultimate check on 

federal power contained in Article V of the Constitution.

Article V provides the states with the opportunity to 

propose constitutional amendments through a process 

controlled by the states from beginning to end on all 

substantive matters.

A convention to propose amendments is convened when 

34 state legislatures pass resolutions (applications) on an 

agreed topic or set of topics. The Convention is limited to 

considering amendments on these specifi ed topics.

While some have expressed fears that an Article V 

convention might be misused or improperly controlled by 

Congress, it is our considered judgment that the checks 

Signed,

//The//

** JEFFERSON**

**STATEMENT**

//*Original signers of the Jeff erson Statement//

//Randy E. Barnett*//

//Charles J. Cooper*//

//John C. Eastman*//

//Michael P. Farris*//

//Robert P. George*//

//C. Boyden Gray*//

//Mark Levin*//

//Nelson Lund//

//Andrew McCarthy*//

//Mark Meckler*//

//Mat Staver//

//**When the nation’s fi nest legal minds gathered at the Jeff erson Hotel in Washington, D.C., they set out to \\
consider arguments for and against the use of Article V to restrain federal power. But like the Founding \\
Fathers in 1787, they soon realized that they agreed unanimously that the Article V option is safe, eff ective, \\
and necessary.**//

//**These experts, who subsequently signed the Jeff erson Statement reproduced below, rejected the argument \\
that an Article V convention is likely to be misused or improperly controlled by Congress. They shared the \\
conviction that Article V provides the only constitutionally eff ective means to restore our federal system, \\
and they formed the core of our Legal Board of Reference, whose names you can fi nd on the opposite side \\
of this document.**//

**MARK LEVIN**

**MARK MECKLER**

**MICHAEL FARRIS**

and balances in the Constitution are more than sufficient 

to ensure the integrity of the process.

The Article V mechanism is safe, and it is the only 

constitutionally eff ective means available to do what is so 

essential for our nation—restoring robust federalism with 

genuine checks on the power of the federal government.

We share the Founders’ conviction that proper decision-

making structures are essential to preserve liberty. We 

believe that the problems facing our nation require several 

structural limitations on the exercise of federal power. While 

fi scal restraints are essential, we believe the most eff ective 

course is to pursue reasonable limitations, fully in line with 

the vision of our Founders, on the federal government.

Accordingly, I endorse the Convention of States Project, 

which calls for an Article V convention for “the sole purpose 

of proposing amendments that impose fi scal restraints on 

the federal government, limit the power and jurisdiction of 

the federal government, and limit the terms of offi  ce for its 

offi  cials and for members of Congress.” I hereby agree to 

serve on the Legal Board of Reference for the Convention 

of States Project.



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto154.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**154**

//Randy E. Barnett//

 is a 

graduate of Harvard Law 

School and a professor at 

the Georgetown University 

Law Center. He represented 

the National Federation of Independent 

Business in its constitutional challenge to the 

Aff ordable Care Act.

//Charles J. Cooper//

 is a 

founding member and 

chairman of Cooper & Kirk, 

PLLC. A member of the 

Reagan Administration, 

Mr. Cooper has argued before the Supreme 

Court, and he spent much of his career 

defending constitutional rights as a top lawyer 

for the National Rifl e Association.

//John C. Eastman//

 is the 

Founding Director of the 

Center for Constitutional 

Jurisprudence, a public 

interest law firm affiliated 

with the Claremont Institute. Prior to joining 

the Fowler School of Law faculty, he served 

as a law clerk with Justice Clarence Thomas at 

the Supreme Court of the United States and 

served in the Reagan administration.

//Michael P. Farris//

 is the co-

founder of the Convention 

of States Project, the 

Chancellor of Patrick Henry 

College, and Chairman of 

the Home School Legal Defense Association. 

During his career as a constitutional appellate 

litigator, he has served as lead counsel in 

the United States Supreme Court, eight 

federal circuit courts, and the appellate 

courts of thirteen states. Mr. Farris is widely 

respected for his leadership in the defense of 

homeschooling, religious freedom, and the 

preservation of American sovereignty.

//Robert P. George//

  is one 

of the nation’s leading 

conservative legal scholars 

and is the founding director 

of the James Madison Program in American 

Ideals and Institutions. He is chairman of the 

United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and has served 

as a presidential appointee to the United 

States Commission on Civil Rights.

//C. Boyden Gray//

 is the 

founding partner of Boyden 

Gray & Associates, in 

Washington, D.C. Prior 

to founding his law firm, 

Ambassador Gray served as Legal Counsel 

to Vice President Bush (1981–1989), as 

White House Counsel in the administration 

of President George H.W. Bush (1989–1993), 

and as counsel to the Presidential Task Force 

on Regulatory Relief during the Reagan 

Administration.

//Mark Levin//

 is one of 

America’s preeminent 

constitutional lawyers and 

the author of several New 

York Times bestselling books 

including //Men in Black// (2007), //Liberty and //

//Tyranny// (2010), //Ameritopia// (2012) and //The //

//Liberty Amendments// (2013). Mr. Levin has 

served as a top advisor to several members 

of President Ronald Reagan’s Cabinet—

including as Chief of Staff  to the Attorney 

General of the United States, Edwin Meese.

//Nelson Lund//

 is University 

Professor at George Mason 

University School of Law. 

After clerking for Justice 

Sandra Day O’Connor, 

he served in the White House as Associate 

Counsel to President George H.W. Bush.

//Andrew McCarthy//

 is a 

bestselling author, a Senior 

Fellow at National Review 

Institute, and a contributing 

editor at //National Review//. 

Mr. McCarthy is a former Chief Assistant 

U.S. Attorney in New York.

info@conventionofstates.com

//M a r k   M e c k l e r//

  i s  

President of Convention 

of States Foundation, the 

parent organization of 

the Convention of States 

Project. Mr. Meckler is one of the nation’s 

most eff ective grassroots activists. After he 

co-founded and served as the National 

Coordinator of the Tea Party Patriots, he 

founded Citizens for Self-Governance in 2012 

to bring the concept of “self governance” 

back to American government.

//Mat Staver,//

 B.A. M.A., J.D., 

B.C.S.

, serves as Senior Pastor, 

Founder and Chairman of 

Liberty Counsel; Chairman 

of Liberty Counsel Action, 

Faith and Liberty, National Pro-life Center, 

Freedom Federation, Salt & Light Council, 

and National House of Hope; Founder and 

Chairman of Liberty Relief International; Vice 

President and Chief Counsel of the National 

Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference 

(which includes over 42,000 Evangelical 

Hispanic churches); Trustee, Timothy Plan, a 

family of mutual funds traded in New York 

and Tel Aviv; and former dean of Liberty 

University School of Law. Mat has the highest 

AV rating for attorneys and is board certifi ed 

in Appellate Practice by the Florida Bar. He 

has argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. 

He has published many scholarly and popular 

articles, brochures, numerous booklets and 

books, including //Why Israel Matters//, //Covenant// 

//Journal//, and //Eternal Vigilance//. He has produced 

the  “Why Israel Matters” original TV, as well 

as produces and hosts Faith & Freedom, an 

11-minute daily radio program, Freedom’s 

Call, a 60-second daily radio program, and 

Freedom Alive, a 30-minute weekly TV 

program. He is married to Anita, who is 

president of Liberty Counsel. Mat and Anita 

have one daughter, three grandchildren, and 

two great grandchildren.

**“The  Article  V  mechanism  is  safe,  and  it  is  the  only  constitutionally  effective  **

**means  available  to  do  what  is  so  essential  for our nation.”**

//Support the only solution that is as big as the problem.//

**Sign the petition at ConventionofStates.com.\\
**www.conventionofstates.com



{{:cb_mirror_public:media:files_4014_pdfto155.png?nolink&918x1188 |background image}}
**155**

//Randy E. Barnett//

 is a 

graduate of Harvard Law 

School and a professor at 

the Georgetown University 

Law Center. He represented 

the National Federation of Independent 

Business in its constitutional challenge to the 

Aff ordable Care Act.

//Charles J. Cooper//

 is a 

founding member and 

chairman of Cooper & Kirk, 

PLLC. A member of the 

Reagan Administration, 

Mr. Cooper has argued before the Supreme 

Court, and he spent much of his career 

defending constitutional rights as a top lawyer 

for the National Rifl e Association.

//John C. Eastman//

 is the 

Founding Director of the 

Center for Constitutional 

Jurisprudence, a public 

interest law firm affiliated 

with the Claremont Institute. Prior to joining 

the Fowler School of Law faculty, he served 

as a law clerk with Justice Clarence Thomas at 

the Supreme Court of the United States and 

served in the Reagan administration.

//Michael P. Farris//

 is the co-

founder of the Convention 

of States Project, the 

Chancellor of Patrick Henry 

College, and Chairman of 

the Home School Legal Defense Association. 

During his career as a constitutional appellate 

litigator, he has served as lead counsel in 

the United States Supreme Court, eight 

federal circuit courts, and the appellate 

courts of thirteen states. Mr. Farris is widely 

respected for his leadership in the defense of 

homeschooling, religious freedom, and the 

preservation of American sovereignty.

//Robert P. George//

  is one 

of the nation’s leading 

conservative legal scholars 

and is the founding director 

of the James Madison Program in American 

Ideals and Institutions. He is chairman of the 

United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and has served 

as a presidential appointee to the United 

States Commission on Civil Rights.

//C. Boyden Gray//

 is the 

founding partner of Boyden 

Gray & Associates, in 

Washington, D.C. Prior 

to founding his law firm, 

Ambassador Gray served as Legal Counsel 

to Vice President Bush (1981–1989), as 

White House Counsel in the administration 

of President George H.W. Bush (1989–1993), 

and as counsel to the Presidential Task Force 

on Regulatory Relief during the Reagan 

Administration.

//Mark Levin//

 is one of 

America’s preeminent 

constitutional lawyers and 

the author of several New 

York Times bestselling books 

including //Men in Black// (2007), //Liberty and //

//Tyranny// (2010), //Ameritopia// (2012) and //The //

//Liberty Amendments// (2013). Mr. Levin has 

served as a top advisor to several members 

of President Ronald Reagan’s Cabinet—

including as Chief of Staff  to the Attorney 

General of the United States, Edwin Meese.

//Nelson Lund//

 is University 

Professor at George Mason 

University School of Law. 

After clerking for Justice 

Sandra Day O’Connor, 

he served in the White House as Associate 

Counsel to President George H.W. Bush.

//Andrew McCarthy//

 is a 

bestselling author, a Senior 

Fellow at National Review 

Institute, and a contributing 

editor at //National Review//. 

Mr. McCarthy is a former Chief Assistant 

U.S. Attorney in New York.

info@conventionofstates.com

//M a r k   M e c k l e r//

  i s  

President of Convention 

of States Foundation, the 

parent organization of 

the Convention of States 

Project. Mr. Meckler is one of the nation’s 

most eff ective grassroots activists. After he 

co-founded and served as the National 

Coordinator of the Tea Party Patriots, he 

founded Citizens for Self-Governance in 2012 

to bring the concept of “self governance” 

back to American government.

//Mat Staver,//

 B.A. M.A., J.D., 

B.C.S.

, serves as Senior Pastor, 

Founder and Chairman of 

Liberty Counsel; Chairman 

of Liberty Counsel Action, 

Faith and Liberty, National Pro-life Center, 

Freedom Federation, Salt & Light Council, 

and National House of Hope; Founder and 

Chairman of Liberty Relief International; Vice 

President and Chief Counsel of the National 

Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference 

(which includes over 42,000 Evangelical 

Hispanic churches); Trustee, Timothy Plan, a 

family of mutual funds traded in New York 

and Tel Aviv; and former dean of Liberty 

University School of Law. Mat has the highest 

AV rating for attorneys and is board certifi ed 

in Appellate Practice by the Florida Bar. He 

has argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. 

He has published many scholarly and popular 

articles, brochures, numerous booklets and 

books, including //Why Israel Matters//, //Covenant// 

//Journal//, and //Eternal Vigilance//. He has produced 

the  “Why Israel Matters” original TV, as well 

as produces and hosts Faith & Freedom, an 

11-minute daily radio program, Freedom’s 

Call, a 60-second daily radio program, and 

Freedom Alive, a 30-minute weekly TV 

program. He is married to Anita, who is 

president of Liberty Counsel. Mat and Anita 

have one daughter, three grandchildren, and 

two great grandchildren.

**“The  Article  V  mechanism  is  safe,  and  it  is  the  only  constitutionally  effective  **

**means  available  to  do  what  is  so  essential  for our nation.”**

//Support the only solution that is as big as the problem.//

**Sign the petition at ConventionofStates.com.\\
**www.conventionofstates.com

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